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ABSTRACT 
Vertical restraints are arrangements concluded between undertakings operating at different 
levels of the manufacturing or distribution chain which restrict the conditions under which 
goods are purchased or sold. This work examines the antitrust treatment of these restraints in 
Europe and the United States of America. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Vertical restraints are arrangements between undertakings operating at different le\'e!s of 
the manufacturing or distribution chain which restrict the conditions under which goods are 
purchased or sold. At first glance one might suspect these restraints are worthy of little 
note. After all, they lack the headline grabbing potential of mergers or acquisitions. 
Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. The antitrust treatment of vertical 
restraints has been the subject of much debate which has occasionally assumed the character 
of religious zealotry. 
Vertical restraints have both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects on competition. 
Their use can solve problems of inefficiency. Supplier and dealer free riding problems, 
which result in sub-optimal investment, can be overcome through the imposition of 
exclusive dealing or purchasing obligations, fixing resale prices (RPM) and territorial 
allocation. Certification problems can be overcome by restricting the sale of products to 
selected outlets or to exclusive dealers with a reputation for selling high quality products. 
Territorial allocation can also be used to attract new dealers and encourage investment 
especially if the supplier wishes to penetrate new markets. Hold up problems can be 
overcome by allowing the investor, whether supplier or dealer, to appropriate the benefit of 
its investment. Finally, although by no means exhaustively, vertical restraints may be 
utilised to create brand image through the creation of uniformity and quality standards by 
thl' lise or selected or franchised outlets. 
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Conversely, these types of restraints may also have a variety of anticompetitive effects. 
RPM and territorial allocation may eliminate or reduce intrabrand competition, facilitate 
horizontal collusion between dealer or supplier and indirectly effect interbrand competition. 
Exclusive dealing or purchasing and tying arrangements may precipitate market foreclosure 
because suppliers are prevented from selling to buyers contractually bound to one supplier. 
In store competition is also prevented as the outlet is obliged to sell a single brand. In fact, 
tying may also result in buyers paying more for the tied product. 
In the US most vertical restraints are now examined under a rule of reason analysis 
underpinned by a market power filter. In historical terms, however, they were treated less 
leniently. Many of these restraints were considered to be illegal per se. This treatment was 
predicated upon property law and the so-called ancient rule on alienation. Once a 
manufacturer sells its product, it no longer has any right to control subsequent dispositions. 
The American judiciary found refuge in this traditional legal concept rather than the foreign 
concept of economic analysis. Over time, however, the position changed. Debate over the 
legislative intent of the antitrust laws was resolved, for the time being, in favour of 
economic efficiency. This resulted in the acceptance of economic analysis by the judiciary 
and the proposition that provided interbrand competition exists, restrictions on intrabrand 
competition should be tolerated. 
In the EU one of goals of competition, arguably the primary goal, is that of market 
unification. In historical context market unification has been seen as vital to infer alia 
European stability, wealth maximisation and efficiency. Central to this process is thc 
integrative thrust of cross-border trade. From the outset. therefore. vcrtical restraints ha\'c 
.., 
-' 
been treated with circumspection. After all, it is pointless preventing Member States from 
imposing market partitioning measures only to pennit private undertakings to perpetuate 
national boundaries through their vertically imposed agreements. 
Admittedly, the objective of market unification often peacefully coexists with that of 
efficiency. Often, however, they collide. It is the resolution of this collision which gives 
EU law its distinctive character. Because competition policy in the EU perfornls this 
unique function greater importance is attached to intrabrand competition. The latter is seen 
as a vehicle for promoting market integration. Indeed, provided the EU embraces market 
unification as a goal, whether it be a primary goal or otherwise, the distinctiveness of its law 
in this area will continue to exist. 
In the US parallel federal and state antitrust legislation exists. However, the Shennan Act 
1890, Clayton Act 1914 and the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 are the main federal 
statutes prohibiting anticompetitive behavior including restraints of trade, monopolising, 
attempts to monopolise and unfair competition. In the EU Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82 (ex 
86) of the Treaty of Rome 1957 are concerned with restrictions of competition and abuse of 
dominance respectively. The European Commission, unlike the federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies, is empowered, by virtue of the bifurcation in Article 81 (ex 85), to 
grant exelnption from the provision of Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) under Article 81(3) (ex 
85(3)). 
In the US federal antitrust matters are enforced either privately or publicly. \Vith regard to 
private enforcement, legal proceedings may be brought by one or more plaintiffs, State 
attorneys acting parens patriae on behalf of injured claimants or through class actions. 
Suits may be pursued on a contingency fee basis and injunctive relief and treble damages 
are available. Public enforcement falls to either the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Agreement between the two agencies clearly divides 
their respective antitrust responsibilities. The DOJ is empowered to bring both criminal and 
civil proceedings and a variety of remedies are available. In the case of the FTC injunctive 
relief, cease and desist orders and consent decrees are available. Appeals can be made to 
higher Courts on points of law. 
The decentralised, complaints based system of the US contrasts with the centralised, 
notification based system in Europe. At the heart of this system lies the European 
Commission. Complaints can be made directly to the Commission or to the national Courts 
of the various Member States. Although the present system is currently in the process of 
reform undertakings must either draft their vertical agreements to conform with the 
provision of block exemptions or notify them in the hope of gaining negative clearance or 
exemption. Appeals can be made to the Court of First Instance which has jurisdiction in 
matters of competition. A further appeal can be made to the Court of Justice on points of 
law. In the case of the Court of Justice the national Courts of Members States can also refer 
questions by way of the preliminary reference procedure. Interestingly, unlike the US, 
dissenting judgments are not pennitted in the EU. In many respects it is the dissenting 
judgments of the US judiciary which contribute to the lively American debate. 
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The discussion is organised as follows. Chapter 2 considers the ideology of vertical 
restraints and the way in which policy aims or goals have impacted upon the development 
of the law in both the US and Europe. Chapter 3 examines the treatment of R P ~ l l in the US 
and EU. Chapter 4 deals with territorial allocation on both sides of the Atlantic. Chapters 5 
and 6 describes the approach adopted to exclusive dealing or purchasing and tying 
respectively. Chapter 7 considers, briefly, the reforms currently being undertaken in the 
EU. 
In 1999 the ratification process of the Treaty of Amsterdam (To A) was finally concluded. 
While the ToA introduced a range of substantive changes it also renumbered all of the 
Articles of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the European Community (EC) 
Treaty. The practice adopted here, is to refer to both numbers and to indicate in parentheses 
the old Treaty numbers. 
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THE IDEOLOGY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years antitrust scholars have debated the proper function and purpose of 
antitrust and this debate has focused primarily, although not exclusively, on the 
treatment of vertical restraints. The latter seem to arouse more passion than any other 
area of antitrust. In the US a number of competing schools exist, each promoting their 
own particular solutions to antitrust dilemmas and each contributing to the ideological 
debate. The Critical Legal Studies approach, which is Socialist in orientation, 
contends that those in power exploit the law to maintain their own power base at the 
expense of the weak. According to this view Congressional intent indicates that 
antitrust was designed to prevent such exploitation.) The Industrial Policy advocates 
take the view that American social, political and economic institutions have outgrown 
antitrust. Business and Government should align more closely and through industrial 
planning set about making the economy more competitive. More recently, public 
choice theorists suggest that antitrust is not concerned with advancing public interest. 
Politicians enact laws to benefit powerful interest groups and policy results from 
political bargains between the two groupings.2 Two main competing schools, 
however, have significantly impacted upon the development of US antitrust. While 
I Sn' R. M. Unger, "The Critical Lcgal Studies Movement", (1983) 96 lIalT L Rev 5h \. For a bricl 
description of the cyclical nature of LIS antitrust theories see T. Frazer, "Competition Pol icy A !ter 1992 
The Next SlL'p", (1990) 5 ~ ~ MLR (l(lt>. 617. 
2 \\'.11. P'I,L',C. "Microsoft and The Public Choice Critique Of Antitrust", (1999) 44 Anfltrw{ B 5. 
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inter-school differences exist in certain areas, there is in each of the main schools a 
broad range of consensus. Between the two approaches there are broad differences 
which reflect differences in social and political philosophy. 3 
The "traditionalist" approach adopts a liberal philosophical stance.4 Adherents to this 
view believe that antitrust is multidimensional embracing concerns relating to access, 
process and pluralism. For the traditionalist, vertical restraints are not always 
procompetitive and may be imposed for strategic anticompetitive purposes. By failing 
to recognise, for example, that consumers are not one homogeneous grouping the 
imposition of such restraints may benefit marginal consumers to the detriment of 
inframarginal consumers. The latter may be required to pay for services they do not 
require. 5 Accordingly, the standard of per se illegality should be applied to these 
restraints or at least they should be presumed illegal. These standards promote 
uniformity, predictability and efficiency. 6 
In the late 1970s a view of antitrust (at one time considered highly idiosyncratic) 
entered mainstream academic thought and legal jurisprudence. The Chicago School 
purported to offer a unified and cohesive approach to antitrust based upon a 
conservative or libertarian philosophy. For Chicagoans the sole purpose or function of 
antitrust is the protection of efficiency and consumer welfare. The gradual rise and 
dominance of the concept of efficiency in the US can be attributed to a number of 
3 E.M. Fox, "Consumers Beware Chicago", (1986) 44 Mich LR 1714. 
~ ~ This approach is referred to under many names reflecting its rather scattered, Ji\erse and eclectic 
nature. Its nomenclature includes realist, populist and Jeffersonian. See E.\1 Fox, "The i\lodernization 
Of Antitrust: A Ncw Equilibrium", (1981) 66 Corn L Rev 1140,1143, 
5 W.S, Comanor, "Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, And The Nc" :\ntitrllst Policy", 
( Il)X5) 98 liar\' I. R('\' 983, l ) l ) ~ ~
t, J.l' Ponsoldt, "The \'nrichment Of Sellers As Justification For Vertical Restraints: \ Rc"pol1se \ 0 
Chicagn's S"itlian Modest Proposals", (1987) 62 srul. Rcv 1161, 1170-71. 
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factors including the high inflation rates in the 1970s, low productivity and dramatic 
increases in the market shares of German and Japanese products. 
Antitrust should not be diluted with concerns for equity, fairness or any other matters 
of a distributive nature. Underpinning this notion is the conservative philosophy that 
markets work best if left alone; strategic business behaviour is rare and market entry 
relatively easy; market power is difficult to obtain and any business behaviour which 
survives over a period of time must be presumed efficient as the market punishes 
inefficiency. Antitrust should be non-interventionist, minimalist and proscribe only 
that activity which results in inefficiency or output restriction. According to this 
approach, vertical agreements are procompetitive and welfare enhancing and should 
be legal per se. While this minimum prescription has attracted many critics it has been 
highly influential in the development of US antitrust policy.7 
In Europe competition policy has never been seen solely in terms of economIc 
efficiency. 8 It retains a multifunctional character.9 Not only is it concerned with 
safeguarding the economic efficiency of the system but it also embraces wider 
concerns. It is linked to the concepts of democracy, pluralism and the need to diffuse 
economic power which may threaten the political and economic freedoms of market 
participants. 10 These concerns have surfaced, for example, in the need to protect small 
and medium sized undertakings (SMEs). Above all, competition policy has been used 
in conjunction with a raft of measures to achieve market unification. I I This policy 
7 Criticism has focused upon the narrow brand of economics employed by Chicagoans and the models 
underlying assumption of rationality and use of rigid deductive logic. 
s O.G. Goyder, EC Competition LUll' (3 rd edn, Oxford, 1998) Ch. 3. 
l) EC Commission, Fifteenth Report on Competition Policr 1985 (Brussels, 1986) p, II. 
10 OJ. Gerber, "Constitutionalizing The Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law And The 
'New' I,'urope", (1994) -/} ,'/mcrtCOIl Journal o/Comparati\'c Lau' 2), pp 35-38, 
II C.D, Fhlermann, "The Contribution Of EC Competition Policy To The S i n ~ ! l e e r-..Llrket" , ( 1 9 9 ~ ) ) 24 
( ',\fL Rel' ~ ~ 57. 
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objective has had important ramifications not only for substantive focus but also for 
institutional framework and competencies. 12 In terms of substantive focus, however, 
greater attention has been directed to vertical arrangements. Traditionally. these 
restraints have been seen as posing the greatest risk to market unification. As a result 
they have been treated more strictly in Europe than in domestic legal systems. This 
substantive focus has resulted in a barrage of criticisms. 13 It is no surprise, therefore, 
that the Commission published its 1997 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints relating to 
substantive and systemic change. 
This Chapter examines the ideological approaches underlying the treatment of vertical 
restraints in the US and EU and how their respective approaches have affected the 
development of the law. 
II. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS IN THE US 
A. The Chicago School 
1. Certain Fundamental Tenets 
The writings of Bork, Posner and Easterbrook are widely identified and associated 
with the Chicago School. Their scholarship and jurisprudence provide cogent 
examples of Chicago School thinking. The Chicago School operates in the '"classical 
12 OJ. Gerber, "The Transformation Of European Community Competition Law", (1994) 35 Han' Inll 
U97. 
D Sec infer alia II.H.P. Luggard, "Vertical Restraints Under EC Competition Law: A Horizontal 
A p p r o a c h ' ~ " , , (1996) 17 ECLR 166; B.E. Hawk, "System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC 
Competition Law", (1995) 32 C\ fL Re\' 973; C. Bright. "Deregulation of EC Competition Polley: 
Rethinkin!.!. Article 8S( I )", in B.E. Hawk (ed.), .,1111111£11 f'roceedin?,s oj Ihe Fordham Cnrpo",JIC Lau' 
Inslil1lle (1994): Anlitrustln..t Glohal Ecollomy (1995), 
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economic tradition running from Smith to Marshall".14 Its policy prescription is one 
of non-interventionism and minimalism. Its design is to get government off the back 
of business enterprise. IS For Chicagoans, competition must be understood in terms of 
consumer welfare or economic efficiency. 16 The goal of antitrust is, therefore, wealth 
maximisation by means of economic efficiency. Distributive concerns such as equity 
and fairness should not form part of antitrust analysis. As Bork suggests antitrust has 
a built-in preference for material prosperity, but it has nothing to say about the way 
prosperity is distributed. I7 For Chicagoans there is no support for the assertion that 
antitrust embodies broad social, political or ethical objectives. Indeed, Bork asserts 
that Congress passed the antitrust laws to serve the sole goal of allocative efficiency. 
Other proponents, notably Posner and Easterbrook, suggest that whether congressional 
intent was focused on the sole goal of allocative efficiency, antitrust laws should be 
interpreted in that manner in any event. 
From this standpoint, antitrust laws are primarily concerned with the efficient 
workings of the market. That which is inefficient is presumed to be anticompetitive 
and should be proscribed by the law. To include other non-economic goals would 
render antitrust untenable, resulting in wealth destruction through the inhibition of 
efficiency, increased accumulation of governmental powers to cater for the need for 
increased governmental incursions into the private business sector and, ultimately. the 
replacement of the free market with that of regulated markets. 18 The consideration of 
non-economic concerns would ultimately protect the inefficient from the rigours of 
competition. 
14 R.A. Posner, "The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis", (1979) 127 U Penn LR 925, 932. 
I' F i\ 1. Fox and R. Pitofsky, "The Antitrust Alternati\'e", (1987) 6: NYUL Rev 931. 
1<> R .11. Bork, Tht'..t IItitrust !"/r(h!OX (Reprint. New York, 1(93) p.-l2 7. 
17 Ibid 90. 
IK R.II. Bork, note 16 < l b l l \ l ~ , , 423 
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For adherents to the Chicago School, allocative and productive efficiency determines 
the level of society's wealth. Allocative efficiency refers to the placement of 
resources into the economy and productive efficiency relates to the effective use of 
those resources by individual undertakings. The task of antitrust is to improve 
allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency. Economic analysis is 
the means by which this task is achieved. 
One of the fundamental tenets of the Chicago School is that of price theory. At its 
most basic, business if acting rationally, does not act in a random manner. Business 
activity is directed towards profit maximisation and the most efficient business is the 
one that has experienced the most success in the market. Chicagoans, however, 
recognise that profits may be made by means other than efficiencies. Profit may be 
made by taking advantage of tax loopholes or by means of output restriction in an 
attempt to gain monopoly profits. 19 The task of antitrust, therefore, is to identify and 
prohibit those forms of business activity whose net effect is output restricting. That 
activity which is neutral should be left untouched. There are no grey areas. If 
business activity is not neutral in its effects, it can only be either efficient or 
inefficient. As Bork writes, if a practice does not raise "... a question of output 
restriction (inefficiency) ... we must assume that its purpose and therefore its effect are 
either the creation of efficiency or some neutral goal. In that case the practice should 
be held lawful".2o To attempt to regulate, by means of antitrust law, that which is 
either efficient or neutral is to suppress the freedom or autonomy of the producer to 
19 R.II. Borh., note 16 above, I ~ ~ ~
20 Ibid. 
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serve the consumer in ways that the consumer desires. The producer or manufacturer, 
in serving its own interests, serve the interest of the consumer. 21 
Chicago's distinctive approach is also reflected in its treatment of strategic behaviour. 
For Chicagoans, strategic behaviour is much like the unicorn or dragon, much talked 
about but never seen. Barriers to market entry or investment rarely exist. 22 In fact, 
market entrants will generally flow to those areas where the greatest profits can be 
made. Generally, those barriers which do exist are usually created by governmental 
interference usually in the form of patent rights or business regulation. To redress this 
problem, government should generally refrain from market intervention. Chicagoans 
generally view predatory practices as counter-productive. In fact, a business acting in 
such a manner is acting inefficiently. The predator ultimately becomes the prey in that 
it " ... loses money during the period of predation and if he tries to recoup it later by 
raising his price, new entrants will be attracted, the price will be bid down to the 
competitive level, and the attempt at recoupment will fail".23 A more rational and 
efficient form of activity would be to buyout the competitor rather than engage in a 
price war that results inevitably in financial loss. The fact that an independent 
competitor is lost to the market is not necessarily, for Chicagoans, a cause for concern. 
No longer do they concur with the view that higher market concentration can be 
equated with lessened competition. As Easterbrook suggests, this thesis posits" ... that 
you could test whether competition was feasible from the structure of the market, if 
the top four firms had fifty per cent or so of the sales we should abandon hope of 
competition ... unless the government should be able to break up the largest firms and 
21 F.H. Easterbrook, "Vertical Arrangements And The Rule of Reason", (1984) 531ntitrust LJ 135. 
1-47. 
22 See, for example, II. Demsetz, "Barriers to Entry", (1982) 72 .Im Ec Re\' 47; J.S r--.1cGee, 'Pred,\t(lf\ 
Price Cutting The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case", (1958) I .IL Ec 13 7. 
21 R.t-\. Posner, note 14 abo\l'. 927. 
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restore workable competition,,?4 For Chicagoans, a result of decades of grubbing 
about in data has disproved the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. Such an 
atomistic concept of competition is simply a longing for a world in which artisans 
made leather artefacts in tiny shops. Market concentration is only problematic if it 
results in monopoly or gives rise to market cartelisation. 
Chicago's distinctive approach is also manifest in its analysis of cartels, 
monopolisation and mergers. Chicagoans assert, in accordance with traditional 
classical economics, that Cartels are susceptible to both internal and external pressure. 
In effect, they carry their own seeds of destruction. Such fragility usually means that 
in the long-term consumer welfare will not be harmed. However, cartel activity which 
reduces output and inflates prices is inefficient and should be condemned by antitrust. 
This net, however, should not be cast too wide, in fear of catching those cartels which 
accomplish efficiency goals because their function is not to restrict output or raise 
pnces. 
With regard to monopolisation, Chicagoans adhere to the policy that all business 
organisations ought to be free to compete. This is so, even if the outcome of this 
competition results in the destruction of independent business organisations. The 
process IS one of competitive struggle reflected in the desire to be the best and 
ultimately the victor. Antitrust should only be concerned when monopolist act 
inefficiently by encouraging output restriction and price raising. Such acts are of no 
benefit to consun1er-welfare. 
!l 1".11. Easterbrook, "Workable Antitrust Pulicy", (1986) S-l Mich L R('\' 1696,1698. 
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With regard to mergers, Chicagoans assert that there is no reason to argue that ..... 
internal expansion is more competitive or more desirable than expansion by merger. 
The firm, in its own interest will make the best choice for consumers".25 Antitrust 
law, therefore, should intervene only were the merger creates a market share that 
raises the likelihood of a significant restriction of output. Indeed Chicagoans assert 
that competitors will only challenge those mergers which are procompetitive. efficient 
and, therefore, legal. Mergers which fail to satisfy these criteria are rarely challenged. 
As a result of self-interest the competitor remains silent. If the merger results in an 
increase in the price of certain products the competitor is likely to benefit from the 
price rise and increase its own profitability. 
In a nutshell, Chicagoans assert, that the object of antitrust is to protect consumer 
welfare by protecting efficiency. A law designed to protect non-economic goals is 
inefficient. Antitrust is not concerned with protecting equity or fairness. It is not 
concerned with the protection of the small business organisation. To attempt to do so 
breeds inefficiency by subsidy. This directly effects consumer welfare and amounts to 
a "tax" on progressive, efficient and effective business. Competitiveness is effectively 
undermined. In the words of Judge Posner, the" ... welfare of a particular competitor 
who may be hurt as the result of some trade practice is not the concern of federal 
. I " 26 antItrust aws . 
-', R.II. Rork. note 16 ;lbu\L', 207-20S . 
.'fJ Roland ,\Iac/lillerr ('0 \' Dress"r Industries. 7-l9 F.2d 3S0, 39-l (7 th Cil". 19S..t). 
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2. Restricted Dealing Is A Way to Compete27 
Per Se Legality 
So far, consideration has been given only to some of the more fundamental concepts 
of Chicago. An awareness of these concepts assists in the understanding of 
Chicagoans approach to vertical restraints. For the most part, adherents to Chicago, 
consider vertical restraints to be very rarely anticompetitive. They are simply a means 
to compete. Whilst Chicagoans recognise that the vertical elimination of rivalry has 
proved troublesome for the Courts, such competitive elimination is merely a means of 
creating efficiency in distribution and the orderly marketing of products. The major 
protagonists, Bork, Posner and Easterbrook argue that every vertical restraint imposed 
by a producer or manufacturer should be completely lawful. Posner stipulates that 
" economIC theory... teaches that a manufacturer will 
(unilaterally) restrict distribution only in order to be more 
competitive. It gains nothing by reducing competition In the 
distribution of its product though it may gain from redirecting that 
competition from price to service".28 
~ 7 7 F.H. I-:askrbrook. "Vertical Arrangements And The Rule Of Reason", (1 9S4) )) Alllifr/l.ll LI 135, 
140. .. ~ s s R.:\ Posner, "The Ne:\t Step In The Antitrust Treatment or Restricted Distribution f\'r ,\t' legality, 
(1981) ·18 U ('111 l. Rt'\' 6, ~ ) )
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Moreover, 
"Given the absence of either theoretical or empirical grounds for 
condemning purely vertical restrictions as anticompetitive, to 
declare vertical restrictions in distribution legal per se would serve 
both to lighten the burden of the courts and to lift a cloud of 
debilitating doubt from practices that are usually 
procompetitive".29 
For Posner, per se legality, should include both price and non-price vertical restraints. 
In his view, resale price maintenance should still be the subject of evolving antitrust 
standards which may warrant declaring such a practice legal per se. 30 He suggests, 
therefore, that the implementation of that rarely used antitrust technique - per se 
legality - would both simplify the law and make it economically more rational. 
Easterbrook adopts similar reasoning. He states quite categorically that no 
" ... practice a manufacturer uses to distribute its products should be 
the subject of serious antitrust attention. It should make no 
difference whether the manufacturer prescribes territories, 
customers, quality standards, or prices for its dealers. 
~ \ ) ) Ibid. 
10 Ibid 24. 
It should make no difference whether the manufacturer 'ties' 
products together in a bundle, employs full-line forcing or 
exclusivity clauses .... It should make no difference whether the 
restrictions are set by contract or by manufacturers' ownership of 
the retail outlets, the most 'extreme' form of control. They are all 
the same".31 
17 
Restricted dealing should be welcomed as being of benefit to consumers. It should not 
be considered in the same light, for example, as the antitrust treatment of cartels. They 
have nothing in common. Restricted dealing is not a form of market displacement. It 
is, in reality, the market at work. Retailers, for example, agree to conduct their 
business in a manner specified by the manufacturer just as an employee does within an 
integrated firm. Easterbrook, echoes Posner's sentiments, in that he too suggests that 
as both price and non-price vertical restraints have similar economic impacts, they 
should be treated symmetrically. 
For Bork, the argument that there is no more reason to permit the producer to eliminate 
dealer rivalry than there is to permit retailers to eliminate such rivalry by agreement 
among themselves is wrong. He contends that when a producer or manufacturer, 
" ... wishes to impose resale price maintenance or vertical division 
of reseller markets, or any other restraints upon the rivalry of 
resellers, his moti ve cannot be the restriction of output and, 
11 F. H. F ~ l s t e r b r o o k , , note 27 abO\l'. I ~ S . .
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therefore, can only be the creation of distributive efficiency. That 
motive should be respected by the law".32 
By way of example Bork makes reference to the case of US v Addyston Pipe and 
Steel. 33 Here vertical elimination of rivalry was made by a railroad company when it 
engaged another company to provide sleeping car facilities for the railroad. In order to 
secure the necessary capital investment and the provision of services, the railroad 
company agreed to exclude any other company from providing the same facilities on 
the same line. In Bork's view, a comparative judgment was made as to the cost of the 
railroad company providing this service and that of the sleeping car company. The 
decision to use the latter indicates that it was the most cost-effective way of providing 
this service. This decision ultimately provided a net benefit to consumers. 
In attempting to create distributive efficiency a producer attempts to retain control over 
its costs. The cost of distribution to a producer is a price which is equal to the 
difference between wholesale price and retail price. The producers desire is to keep 
this cost as low as possible consistent with effective and efficient distribution. If 
achieved, the retail price is not overly inflated. In this sense, Chicagoans argue, that 
producer's and consumer's interests are one and the same. The producer wants to sell 
as much product as possible. This is achieved by keeping retailers margins low, which 
is ultimately in the consumers interest. Their interests are inextricably linked, and as 
price and non-price vertical restraints are beneficial to consumer welfare they should 
be completely lawful. 
n R.II. Hllrk, note 16 abovc, 289. 
n 8) Fcd. 271 (61h Cir. 189S). 
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Possible Criticisms 
Vertical restraints, therefore, are simply a means of restricting intrabrand competition 
and stimulating interbrand competition and provided the latter remains healthy such 
restraints are procompetitive. Critics of this view, however, argue that restricted 
dealing may simply be used as a guise to mask producer or dealer cartels. 34 This may 
occur, for example, when dealers agree amongst themselves to fix prices. Worried 
about the possibility that dealers may cheat on their agreement the dealers collectively 
impose pressure upon the producer to impose, for example, resale price maintenance. 
If the producer agrees and imposes such a restraint it can be effectively used to police 
the dealer cartel. Any dealer reducing its prices becomes immediately transparent. 
Alternatively, producers may agree to curtail their distributors business activities to 
confined areas. What, ostensibly, seems to be restricted vertical dealing, is in effect, a 
guise to mask a horizontal market division agreement among producers. 
Chicagoan's, however, view these possibilities as remote. They respond by making a 
number of observations. With regard to dealer cartels, Chicagoans, acknowledge the 
possibility of their existence.35 They are, however, rare in number and very fragile in 
nature. Moreover, why should producers collude with dealers? Where such pressure is 
being exerted, they can and often do, complain to the enforcement agencies. 
Furthermore, these arrangements are not "purely" vertical. They contain an horizontal 
element. This criticism should not be allowed to detract from the per se legality 
argument. Easterbrook also suggests that the industry must be one in which the dealer 
1.\ Such possibilities have emerged in US case law. In Eibergcr \' ,)'ony Cor!) of America 6n F. 2d 1068, 
the District Court found a price fixing conspiracy among Sony's dealers. 
;, Sce, for cxample, Eastern StalL'S Re/ui/ Lllmner Dealers '.·/SSOC/UtlO!1 \' US 234 U.S 600 (191 ~ ) : : l ',\ \' 
(il'lIl'ru!,Hotor.\· Corporation, 384 U.S 127 (1966). 
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can fonn a carte1.36 In his view, retail markets are notoriously difficult to cartelise. 
They have free entry and retailing is about as close to an atomistic market as you can 
get. Posner suggests, as entry is generally cheap and rapid the maintenance of dealer 
cartel price structures would prove extremely difficult.37 Other factors, Chicagoans 
assert, make the likelihood of dealer cartels only remote possibilities. They are, they 
argue, easily detected. Enforcement authorities need only direct their investigations to 
those markets where vertical distribution is frequently used. Such concentrated efforts 
make detection easier. Additionally, because of the large numbers and disparate 
interests involved, such cartels are difficult to administer. There may, for example, be 
a need for open meetings which may require high visibility advertisements. Thus, 
evidence of the cartels existence may be readily found. Such considerations have led 
Easterbrook to conclude, quite emphatically, that the " ... conditions for restricted 
dealing to be a useful part of a dealers' cartel just do not exist very often".38 
The objection to the per se legality of vertical restraints on the basis that they create or 
facilitate producer or manufacturer cartels, in the view of Chicagoans, is insubstantial 
and ill-founded. Indeed, Chicagoans assert that if dealer cartels are relatively rare, 
manufacturers' cartels are rarer still. For the latter to exist all manufacturers of a 
specific product type must agree to use the same vertical restraint. As Easterbrook 
suggests, it will not do to get " ... just one manufacturer of toothpaste to adopt restricted 
dealing. All or almost all must do so. If there are holdouts, non-co-operating dealers 
can sell the holdouts product for less. That would destroy the cartel".39 It has also 
been suggested that manufacturing cartels may use RPM as a means of enforcing and 
,(, F .ll. Easterbrook, note 27 above, 14 I . 
;7 R.A. Posner, note 28 above 24. 
;x F.II. Easterbrook, note 27 above, l·n. 
,<) Ibid 142-14-' 
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policing cartel arrangements. There are, however, difficulties with this particular 
view.4o Firstly, retailers may still sell products at the maintained price and receive 
secret rebates from the producer. Secondly, the producer may, alternatively. sell to 
distributors at discounted prices and insist that the retailers sell at the maintained price. 
The discount is retained by the retailer as reimbursement for promoting that particular 
product at the expense of other cartel members. As a means of policing cartels RPM is 
not particularly effective. As Bork writes " ... (t)he signs of cheating will not be 
lowered retail prices, which are easy to detect, but heightened retail sale efforts, which 
is far more difficult to prove and trace".41 Moreover, the use of an industry wide 
pattern of RPM may simply attract the enforcement agencies making cartel 
arrangements easily detectable. Chicagoans are dismissive of the criticism that purely 
vertical restraints may be used as a guise to mask either producer or dealer cartels. 
For Chicagoans the imposition of vertical restraints is designed to promote efficiencies 
in distribution. Restricted dealing not only promotes the interests of producers but also 
the interests and welfare of consumers. They are so rarely anticompetitive that 
automatic condemnation would pick up far too many procompetitive restraints to be 
worthwhile. A vertical restraint, however, which contains horizontal elements is not a 
pure vertical restriction. These restraints should be dealt with under the conventional 
rules applicable to horizontal conspiracies. 
~ o o R.Il. Bork, note 16 above, 293-294 
~ I I Ibid 294. 
The Free Rider Concept 
A number of pro competitive justifications are offered in support of vertical restriction. 
Most are offshoots of the free rider concept developed by Telser. Building on earlier 
d· 42 T I stu Ies e ser attempted to explain why producers might wish to engage in "fair 
t d " I' . 43 ra e or resa e pnce maIntenance . A producer stands to sell more products if there is 
price competition amongst its dealers. Where it sets a floor to its resale prices, it seems 
to be embracing a policy that runs counter to its own interests. Telser's contribution 
was to describe the rationale behind such motivation. 
Telser recognised that the need for RPM arose only where there is separate ownership 
of the firms of production and distribution. He also acknowledged that it was 
commonly believed that the chief explanation for RPM was that retailers imposed 
upward vertical pressure on the producer to impose such arrangements. For Telser, this 
argument fell apart when producers themselves imposed resale prices. 
Telser proffered two explanations. Firstly, he suggested RPM could be used as a 
means of policing manufacturers' cartels. Secondly, his primary explanation focused 
on the distributors role of service provision. Telser contended that RPM altered inter-
store price differentials. By providing the same profit margin to all its dealers, 
manufacturers hoped to induce retailers to single out its product for special pre-sale 
treatment. Competition is no longer based on price but on service. These special 
services include, for example, pre-sale product demonstrations and promotional 
~ 2 2 See, for example, \\'.S. Bowman, "Prercquisites and Effects of Resale Price ~ L l i l l t c n a n c c " , , ( l l ) ) ~ ) ) 22 
U Chi L Rc\' R25; B.S. Yamc:, "The ( ) r i ~ l I 1 s s ()f Resale Price Maintenance: ,\ Study of Three Branches 
. '11' d" (19'::;1)1'... c'l'::;/,) of Rctal ra c. . - lL D( • - -- . 
.\1 L.S. Tclsl'l. "\\'il\ Should t'vlanufacturers \\ant Fair Trade'?". (1960) :; .IL Ec 86. 
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advertising. Increased service provision, however, results in higher product pricing. 
The provision of these services, therefore, is only beneficial to the producer proyided it 
increases sales so as to outweigh the detrimental effects of the increased charges. 44 
Telser also maintained that as these services were "special", some retailers would have 
good reason not to provide the service but sell the product at discounted prices. An 
unstable position emerges, 
"Sales are diverted from the retailers who do provide the special 
services at the higher prices to retailers who do not provide the 
special services and offer to sell the product at the lower price. The 
mechanism is simple. A customer, because of the special services 
provided by one retailer, is persuaded to buy the product. But he 
purchases the product from another paying the latter a lower price. 
In this way the retailers who do not provide the special service get a 
free ride at the expense of those who have convinced consumers to 
buy the product". 45 
If the manufacturer is correct in its assumption that these services are required at the 
point of sale to increase the sales of its product (the product, for example, may be new 
on the market or involves new technology which needs to be explained) the producer 
must prevent the diversion of sales from service providers to non-service providers 
who enjoy a "free-ride" on the back of the former. This is accomplished, Telser 
asserts, by establishing a minimum retail price that guarantees a minimum gross mark 
4-1 Ibid 89-91. 
45 Ibid 91. 
up and forces retailers to compete by providing services with the product and not by 
price reductions.46 
Telser also recognised that certain services could not be subject to free rides:n He also 
acknowledged that if these services were sold directly to the consumer, the problem of 
free riding would be overcome. This would also be the case if the producer simply 
refused to sell to the non-service provider. However, Telser dismissed these solutions 
because, in his view, each so-called solution had its own inherent problems. Selling 
the service directly to the consumer presented problems in relation to devising an 
appropriate system of charging. It may be difficult to develop a scale of charging in 
relation to the varying level of special services required by each consumer. Refusing to 
sell to non-service providers, in Telser's view, would only solve the problem of free 
riding if the problem of transhipment could be solved. That is bootleg sales from 
service providers to non-service providers. While acknowledging the possibility of 
other solutions, Telser argued, that the best solution to free riding was the imposition of 
vertical restraints in the form of RPM. For Chicagoans, however, this theory was 
applied equally to non-price vertical restraints. 
46 Ibid 92. 
47 A conSlImer could not purchase a product frolll one distributor and expect it to be d e l i v e r ~ d d or 
I ('paired b:- another 
B. The Traditionalists - Poets Practising Poetry48 
1. Certain Fundamental Tenets 
"One of the fiercest and most persistent debates in American jurisprudence concerns 
the proper goals and objectives of antitrust policy".49 To a large extent this debate has 
focused on the legality of vertical restraints. To fully appreciate the implications of the 
debate, however, it is necessary to understand some of the more fundamental concepts 
of Chicago's opponents. Unlike adherents to the Chicago School, the traditionalists 
regard antitrust as embracing broader non-economic political and social policy 
considerations. For the traditionalist, Bork' s interpretation and assessment of the 
legislative history of antitrust at best strained credulity.5o Antitrust was not designed 
solely to protect or maximise consumer welfare. It was designed to protect a bundle of 
values. Indeed, Posner's and Easterbrook's assertions that antitrust should in any 
event, irrespective of its legislative history, be utilised solely to protect consumer 
welfare is disingenuous as it simply fails to give effect to the policies mandated by 
Congress.5 I Congress, according to the traditionalist, in formulating antitrust law 
adopted a multi-valued or multi-goal approach. Those who suggest otherwise are 
simply" ... in the same boat as the rest of us - practising 'poetry",.52 It is not surprising 
that these ideological tensions have fuelled the constant battle over the goals of 
antitrust. To a great extent the vagaries and inconsistencies in US antitrust enforcement 
is merely a reflection or manifestation of this conflict. 
48 Bork, rather disparagingly referred to those who believed that antitrust embraced non-economic goals 
as "Poets". 
-II) T. Frazer, Monopul\', Competition and the Law (2nd edn, London, 1992) p.1 
50 H. Hovenkamp, "Antitrust Policy After Chicago", (1985) 84 Afich L Rev ~ ~ 13,217. 
"I J.1. Flvlln and J.F. Ponsoldt, "Legal Reasoning And The Jurisprudence Of \ ertical Restraints: fhe 
L i m i t a t i ~ n s s Of Neo-classical Economic Analysis In The Resolution Of Antitruo..,t Disputes", (198'") 62 
N}UL Re\' 1125, 1137. 
52 Ibid, I 140. 
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The belief that Congress adopted this multi-valued or multi-goal approach to antitrust 
is reflected in various academic writings. Hovenkamp, for example, quite categorically 
states that the 
" legislative histories of the vanous antitrust laws fail to exhibit 
anything resembling a dominant concern for economic efficiency".53 
Indeed, he expressly criticises the neo-classical efficiency model for failing to take 
account of preferences which consumers do not express in monetary terms. For 
Hovenkamp people do value 
" ... such things as the diffusion of privately held economic or political 
power or the preservation of small business opportunity". 54 
These concerns are prominent in the legislative history of antitrust and reflect the 
American people's concern with the large amounts of political and economic power 
wielded by large corporations. They merely reflect the people's desire to preserve 
process, pluralism and diversity which is reflected in the continued existence of small 
business. 
While traditionalists may disagree over the importance or significance to be attached to 
certain goals, they all warn that allocative efficiency should not eclipse other non-
5.1 II. 11()\L'llkamp, note 50 above, 249. 
q Ibid 2·l2. 
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economI'c goals.55 p't f: k C I h hi' lOS Y aruges, lor examp e, t at t e egislative history of the 
Sherman Act has produced vague and inconsistent strands of legislati\'e intent. 
Subsequent antitrust statutes should, in his view, be interpreted to incorporate political 
values.56 The latter embraces a number of concerns. Firstly, industrial concentration is 
inherently undesirable for political as well as economic reasons. In Pitofsky' s \'iew. 
Congress exhibited clear concern that an economic order dominated by a few industrial 
giants could overthrow democratic institutions during times of domestic unrest. 
Secondly, antitrust is concerned with the enhancement of individual liberty. 
Individuals should have freedom of action and this implies freedom to compete. The 
competitive process should not be fraught with barriers to market access. Finally, 
Pitofsky contends that there is a need to follow a "correct" antitrust strategy in order to 
ensure that governmental interference in the competitive process is balanced and non-
. . 57 InvaSIve. 
Schwartz has also documented Congressional concern for creating an atomistic 
competitive process and an antitrust policy that embraces the concept of justice. For 
Schwartz, the interests of justice, should prevent the ready acceptance of the dogma of 
economics. 58 Possible economic gains should not be the exclusive or decisive criteria 
in resolving antitrust disputes. Traditionalists, he suggests, should not yield freely, to 
the dogma that antitrust protects competition and not competitors. In fact, he finds clear 
evidence of Congressional intent to create procedural protection for distributors.
59 
He 
55 See, inter alia, E.M. Fox, "The Modernization Of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium", (1981), 66 Corn L 
Rev 1140; K.G. Elzinga, "The Goals Of Antitrust: Other Than Competition And Efficiency: W h ~ t t E I ~ ~ ~
Counts?", (1976-77) 125 U Pcnn LR 1191; H.M. Blake and W.K. Jones, "In Defense Of Antitrust. 
(1965) 65 Co/ L Rev 377. 
'ill R. Pitofsky, "The Political Content Of Antitrust", (1979) 127 U Penn LR 1051. 
qlbid 1052-1060. , ~ ~ L.B. Schwartz, "'Justice' And Other Non-Iconomic Goals Of Antitrust". (1979) 127 U PCIIII LR 
1076. 
<;t) Ibid. 
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also provides a substantial list of Federal Statutes concerned with the welfare of small 
business. The goal of justice, therefore, is inherent in antitrust and this requires 
protection for the small and large business alike. 
Fox also rejects the notion that antitrust should be confined solely to economIC 
objectives. To confine antitrust in this way is a direct contradiction of the history and 
language of its statutes as well as its developed case law. She, therefore, rejects the 
notion that non-economic objectives impair efficiency and that they cannot be 
rationally incorporated into clear antitrust principles.6o 
Antitrust should reflect its concerns with power dispersion, competitive opportunity 
and consumer satisfaction. In fact, a most succinct enumeration of antitrust goals is 
provided by Fox. She states 
"Antitrust should serve consumers' interests and ... other, established, 
non-conflicting objectives. There are four major historical goals of 
antitrust, and all should be continued to be respected. These are: (1) 
dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity to compete 
on the merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of the 
. . k" 61 competItIOn process as a mar et governor. 
For the traditionalist then, antitrust is rooted in a preference for pluralism, access to 
markets, freedom of trade and freedom of choice. It is these goals which have 
(,0 L f\ 1 Fox, note 55 abt)\L', \\·10. 
<d Ibid I t 82. 
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important consequences for the manner In which traditionalists believe vertical 
restraints should be treated. 
The traditionalists also attack the assumptions underlying the rational actor model of 
Chicago. Business behaviour, is not always rational or as outcome orientated as 
Chicagoans assert. In direct contrast, traditionalists proffer the theory of "satisficing ". 
A business organisation acts through its personnel. These individuals have their own 
idiosyncrasies, motives and attitudes. Often a persons motives may conflict with 
business goals. Managers, for example, may arrive at certain decisions to secure 
personal power, protect an existing power base or even secure short term profits at the 
expense of long term gains. Management may even "satisfice" when it sets long term 
goals or short term objectives. The theory posits that managers will set goals or 
objectives at such levels that are readily obtainable. To set goals too highly may result 
in failing to achieve them. The interests of the owners of capital (shareholders) and the 
managers of capital may not, therefore, be mutually consistent. This, may mean that 
managers are induced to enter into business behaviour that is contrary to consumer 
interests. Obviously, this theory contrast with the economic model of Chicago which is 
based on rationality and profit maximisation. For the traditionalist, Chicago's model is 
too static and based on deductive logic. These deductions are based on the models 
unproven assumptions and are then applied to business reality. For traditionalists, this 
deductive logic fails to square with reality. In fact, the model amounts to 
" ... an analytical meat cleaver which ignores noneconomic assumptions 
and fails to draw noneconomic inferences. The result: a form of 
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'tunnel vision' intolerant of any questioning of its assumptions or 
tampering with its predictions through the observation offacts".62 
Adherents to the traditional view argue that a more creative and inductive analysis 
based on a multi-valued antitrust policy should be used. In terms of vertical restraints, 
for example, Chicago's model simply measures the effects of certain practices on price 
or output and ignores the fact that the market may be affected by external events. The 
application of such a static model often causes the Courts to ignore the obvious. Thus, 
Chicagoans argue, that the imposition of vertical restraints are designed to obtain 
efficiency. What other explanation is feasible? This is substantiated when, for 
example, a manufacturer of television sets imposes location or territorial restraints and 
its market share and output increases from 2 to 5 percent. For Chicagoans, this is 
strong evidence to conclude that the imposition of the restraint is procompetitive. 
Traditionalist, by contrast, look to other possibilities. They are not fettered to the neo-
classical economic model. An increase in market share may have come about for a 
number of reasons, the manufacturer may simply produce a superior television set or 
its cost management may be more efficient. Alternatively, the producer may be 
benefiting from lower costs of production as a result, for example, of having the 
television sets manufactured abroad. Antitrust laws, for the traditionalist, are both 
dynamic and process orientated. They deal, or should deal, with business reality. 
It is apparent, that the two major competing schools of antitrust continue to have broad 
policy differences. These differences are also reflected in their differing approaches to 
market concentration, barriers to entry, strategic behaviour and their respective 
(,2 J.J. FIYI1I1, "Thl' 'Is' .lIld 'Ought' Of Vt'rtical Restraint-; Aftt'r \fOl1sallfO Co \' S p n ~ l ' - R i l C ! ! Sen'ICC! 
COI"/).", (Il)S6) 71 Corn L RCI' 1(9), 1130. 
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treatment of cartels, mergers and attempts to monopolise. With regard to market 
concentration they continue to disagree over the significance of concentration and the 
wisdom of deconcentration. Chicagoans reject economic theory which posits high 
market concentration yield less competition. For them, excessive profitability in 
concentrated markets cannot persist without attracting new entrants which will 
ultimately precipitate a reduction in prices to new competitive levels. The arrival of 
new entrants, ultimately deconcentrates the market. By contrast, the traditionalists 
reject these contentions. Undertakings, in concentrated markets, avoid price 
competition by employing "conscious parallelism". This results in abnormal profits 
being earned. Moreover, abnormal profits are indicative of barriers to entry which help 
sustain profitability and prevent the responsiveness of market incumbents to consumer 
needs. These traditionalist concerns were particularly reflected in the antitrust era of 
the Warren Court. Influenced by Harvard economists, it essentially took a 
prointerventionist stance.63 It was concerned with deconcentrating oligopolistic 
markets and with protecting small firms from larger rivals on the basis that a large 
number of small firms would give rise to lower prices than a relatively small number of 
larger firms. In short, a different economic model was used which reflected the major 
concerns of the traditionalist. 
The traditionalist also reject the Chicagoan notion of barriers to entry. For Chicagoans, 
barriers to entry are costs which must be borne by a firm seeking market entry but 
which are not borne by firms incumbent in the industry. 64 According to Chicagoans, 
for example, capital outlay cannot amount to a barrier to entry. All market participants 
must incur this. Traditionalists reject this notion. Any fact or condition that makes 
6, Sec, rllr example. J.S, Bain, "Economies of Scale, Concentration, And The Condition or Entry In 
I\\l'nty Manufacturing Industries", (19)4) 44 Am Ec Re\' IS, 
c>.t I\, I)l'lllcstz, "B'IlTiers To Entry", (1982) 72 Am Ec Rn' 47. 4X 
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efficient entry less likely or more difficult is relevant. Any consideration that allows 
existing market incumbents to raise prices above costs without attracting entry is of 
importance. Strategic business behaviour is a reality which may prevent the flow of 
investment. Hence, the cost of advertising or the cost of capital borrowing may 
amount to barriers to entry. In fact, for the traditionalist, the cost of market exit may 
also amount to a barrier to entry. On entering a market, a business organisation will 
generally consider the cost of exit. Thus, for example, a proportion of capital outlay on 
certain fixed assets may be recoverable on exit. Certain capital expenditure, however, 
will not be recoverable as it is a sunk cost. If sunk costs are anticipated to be 
prohibitively high, this may amount to a barrier to entry. 
The stark differences in approach between the two major competing schools of 
antitrust, is also reflected in their divergent approach to strategic behaviour. Unlike 
Chicagoans, traditionalists take the view that strategic business behaviour does occur. 65 
For adherents to Chicago, strategic behaviour is irrational because it is not always 
profit maximising. Traditionalists, however, assert that strategic behaviour can take 
two main forms. It can relate to pricing or raising a competitors costs. With regard to 
pricing, traditionalists acknowledge that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between 
a low pricing strategy and predatory pricing. However, predatory pricing does occur 
and it is designed to chill competition, deter expansion by existing market incumbents, 
deter market entry or precipitate market exit. Traditionalists also assert that competitors 
try not to provoke dominant firms with a reputation for predatory behaviour. Indeed, 
potential entrants may be reluctant to enter a market which contains a well-known 
predator. In the short term, consumers may benefit from such beha\·iour. In the long 
h' 0.1-:. W i l l i ~ l l l 1 s o n , , "Predatory Pricing A Strategic And Welfare :\nalysis", (1977) 87 raIL' LI 284 . 
.292-295 
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term, however, healthy competition is reduced and consumers lose as a result of the 
inevitable price rises. 
Strategic behaviour may also involve the manipulation of rivals' costs. Normally this 
behaviour is directed by a dominant undertaking or group of undertakings against 
smaller businesses. The object is to impose higher costs upon the smaller businesses, 
even though the strategising firm may also have to bear these higher costs initially The 
effects of this type of business behaviour may be two-fold. Firstly, it may act as a 
barrier to entry. Secondly, the imposition of higher costs on smaller business, reduces 
profitability (as the costs need to be absorbed) and ultimately may result in competitors 
leaving the market. As Hovenkamp suggests as " ... a strategy of raising rivals' costs 
can be both profitable and less risky than predation and it can occur in a wider variety 
of markets". 66 It is more profitable in that profits flow in immediately and less risky in 
that the market looks quite normal. Thus, for example, a dominant company may 
contractually tie distributors to itself in order that its product reaches the market 
effectively and efficiently. This forecloses the use of these distributors, presumably 
chosen on the basis of their efficient methods of working, to other smaller companies. 
The latter may have to use less efficient distributors thereby imposing additional costs 
which reduces profitability. Ultimately, such a subtle strategy may assist in the smaller 
producers leaving the market. 
Having considered some of the major differences in approach to antitrust by the main 
schools, it is not surprising therefore that their approach to monopolisation, mergers 
and cartels differ fundamentally. For the traditionalist, Congress feared a monarchy of 
hh H. Ilovenkall1p, note 50 above, 275. See also in this context T.G. Krattenll1aker and SC ,Salop, 
"Anticoll1pctitivL' Exclusion: Raising, Rivals' Costs to Achie\c PowL'r Over Price", (198(1) 96 }ule LI 
209. 
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business. Hence the development of the law against monopolisation. While the law 
may respect monopoly achieved by superior products and by a company' s ability to 
respond to consumer's demand, it nevertheless realises that monopoly is rarely thus 
achieved. For the traditionalist, therefore, the law against monopolisation was 
designed to protect the competitive process. In so doing it protects smaller business 
from strategic behaviour and ultimately the consumer. With regard to mergers, the 
traditionalist argues, that the law was designed to prevent undue economic 
concentration in the hands of the few. Thus, in highly concentrated markets the law 
will condemn mergers which increases concentration by reducing the number of 
competitors. Unlike Chicagoans, the traditionalist do not view cartels as being of a 
fragile nature. Cartels can and do survive both internal and external pressure. Their 
survival results, ultimately, in harm to the competitive process. As such antitrust law 
should roundly condemn them. Their ability to restrict output and increase price is 
obviously to the detriment of society and the welfare of consumers. 
2. Vertical Restraints - The Traditionalist Viewpoint 
Chicagoan's emphasise the politically conservative or libertarian message of business 
autonomy. The traditionalist, in contrast, emphasise the liberal message of preservation 
of the competitive process. Not surprisingly, therefore, vertical restraints are 
frequently viewed as anticompetitive because by their very nature they interfere with 
this process. The imposition of such restraints can be used, for example, to prevent 
price competition. By preventing distributors from making independent pricing 
decisions, such restraints prevent competition on the merits and the maintenance of a 
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robust competitive process. Dealers should remam free to engage in discount 
distribution and the competitive process should remain open, free and atomistic.67 
Traditionalist attack the veracity of the neo-classical models assumptions relating to 
vertical restraints. For them, recalcitrant reality simply does not accord with the 
dictates of their model. To attempt to explain such restraints on the sole basis of 
efficiency and rationality amounts to an attempt to jam the square peg of business 
reality into the round hole of their model. F or the traditionalist, the concepts of 
rationality and efficiency are " ... not empirically or politically verified and (are) 
asserted without reference to other disciplines that have studied human behaviour,'.68 
Vertical restraints are not necessarily imposed, therefore, on the basis of rationality or 
efficiency. Restraints may be imposed for strategic anticompetitive purposes. They 
may be used, for example, to raise barriers to entry in the face of new competition. For 
the traditionalist, therefore, the neo-classical model is simply used to protect the 
contract rights of the proponent of the restraint without regard for the rights of others. 
In fact, wealth is simply transferred from consumers, to the party imposing the 
restraint. In this respect, traditionalist argue, that the very essence of Chicago's model 
is at odds with Congressional intent in its passage of antitrust law. Antitrust law is 
designed to prevent such wealth transference.69 
67 See, for example, R. Pitofsky, "In Defence Of Discounters: The No-Frills Case For :\ Per Se Rule 
;\!..!,ainst Vertical Price Fixing". (1983) 71 Cco U 1487. .' . . 6 8 ~ J . J . . Flynn and J.r. Ponsoldt. " L e g a ~ ~ R e a s o n i ~ g g And The J u r i ~ p r u d e . n c e e ?f Vertl.cal R e ~ t r a l l 1 h h I h ~ ~
Limitations Of Neo-c1assical I'conomlc AnalYSIS In the Resolution of Antltru'>t Disputes. (1987) 6_ 
i\TUL Rc\' 1125, I U2. 
69 Sl'l' in this context, R.lI. I ande. "Wealth Transfers :\s The Original And Primary Concem 01 
A n ~ i t r l l s t : : Thl' Eflicll'llcy InterprcLltion Challenged". ( 1 9 X ~ ) ) 3·.) Has(lIlgs LJ 65 
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Free Riding - A Critique 
Not only do traditionalists attack the underlying veracity of Chicago's model. they also 
assert that Chicagoans overstate the importance of the free-rider concept. In the view 
of traditionalists its empirical significance is modest. 70 WS Comanor. for example, 
identifies those areas in which consumers and producers interests conflict and asserts 
that the imposition of vertical restraints may actually harm the interests of consumers. 
As a consequence, therefore, vertical restraints should be subject to close antitrust 
scrutiny.71 Comanor suggests that the conventional theory of free riding fails to 
recognise the differences between consumers regarding their preferences for dealer 
provided services. Where consumer differences exist producers and consumer interest 
may not coincide. Comanor makes a distinction between "marginal" and 
"inframarginal" consumers. Marginal consumers are those who mayor may not buy a 
product depending on its price. Thus, improvements in product quality which inflate 
product price may result in a refusal by marginal consumers to purchase the product. 
If, however, in the view of marginal consumers an increase in service or quality makes 
the product more appealing, the product will still be bought irrespective of any price 
increase. In contrast "inframarginal" consumers are relatively insensitive to product 
price fluctuations. If an increase in price is needed to fund increases in service or 
product quality they will not necessarily buy any less of the product. These consumers 
purchase according to tradition. Not surprisingly, therefore, marginal consumers 
determine whether product improvement or services increase sales and as a 
consequence manufacturer's profitability.72 If marginal consumers value the increased 
70 F 1\1. Scherer and D. Ross. Industrial ;\!urkd Structure and Economic Perjol'l11clllCl' (3"1 eJn. Boston. 
1(90) p.593. . .. 
71 \\'.S, Comanor, "Verticli Price Fixing. Vertical 1\1arket Restrictions :\nJ The New r\ntltrust Polley. 
(1985) 98 lIan' L Rc\' l)S3, 
72 Ibid 991. 
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services which a producer attempts to achieve by imposing vertical restraints, they wi II 
continue to buy the product and increase the manufacturer's profits. Consumer 
welfare, however, depends on how a vertical restraint effects the interests of all 
consumers and not simply marginal consumers. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that 
welfare losses to inframarginal consumers may exceed the welfare gains to marginal 
consumers. As Comanor and Kirkwood write , 
" ... (w)hen this possibility is recognised, the link between the interests 
of producers and consumers - presumed by (Chicagoans) to hold in a 
purely vertical context is effectively broken".73 
The mere fact, therefore, that producers impose such restraints does not necessarily 
imply that they serve all consumers interests. This, of course, contrast quite pointedly 
with the assertions of Chicago that the interests of the manufacturer and the consumer 
are the same. Comanor also asserts that a large number of inframarginal consumers 
(because they are traditional purchasers of the product) are "knowledgeable" 
consumers. Thus, where marginal consumers want pre-sale services and producers 
accordingly impose vertical restraints to achieve this, inframarginal consumers with 
product knowledge, are purchasing services that the majority of consumers do not 
want. 74 Such services are being oversupplied in relation to consumer needs and social 
welfare is not enhanced. The only possible winners are new consumers who have been 
attracted to the market as a result of the increased marketing. 
7) \V.S. COll1anor and J .B. Kirkwood, "Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust Policy", (1985) 3 
COl1tempormy Policy Issues 9, 13. ..' 
71 For critical CUl11l11ents on Comano!'s approach, see L.J. White, "Resale Price \lallltcnance And I he 
Problem ()f f\ larg,inal And [nframarginal COnSllIl1LT"", (1985) 3 COf/temporell)' Politico//ssuL'S 17, 18-
[9. 
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Comanor's searching criticisms of the free-rider concept are also echoed by others. 
Pitofsky caustically attacks the concept and states quite vehemently 
" ... it should be made exactly clear who these 'free riders' are. They are 
the discounters of modem American marketing: low overheads, high 
volume sellers who aggressively compete as to price. Until the recent 
ideology about free riders became fashionable they were regarded as 
the very heart of a free market competitive system".75 
Moreover, Pitofsky asserts, that the ability of discounters to supply low priced products 
results not from a failure to provide desired services, but from an ability to provide 
services more efficiently. Why then, Pitofsky asks, should producers imposing such 
restraints be allowed to put the "no frills discounters" out of business? Producers 
should not be allowed to decide the mix of product and service. They should be left to 
the competitive process itself. Indeed, Pitofsky asserts, that there are always less 
restrictive alternatives to the imposition of vertical restraints. Where producers want, 
for example, additional services to be provided by their distributors they can always 
contract separately for their provision. This, Pitofsky argues, is both feasible and cost 
effective. 
Further criticism is also directed at the concept of free riding. Scherer finds it " ... a 
little hard to swallow".76 In his view economists have come to realise that the theory of 
free riding can only carry limited weight. In a large number of cases the concept just 
does not fit the real world. On goods that are frequently purchased or where producers 
75 R. Pitafsky, note h7 above, 149.' 
7(, F.M. Scherer, "The 1'L'ullomics of Vertical Restraints", (1983) 51ft/lilrusl U 687,694. 
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have strong brand image, free riding is less likely. Advertising pulls the item through 
the stores rather than the service provision of the distributors. Free riding is, perhaps. 
more likely on technically complex items. Scherer, however, is unsure as to the extent 
of the problem in this area. Indeed, he places emphasis on the consumer's need for 
post purchase service. That is, if the product is purchased from high price, high service 
stores the consumer is more likely to obtain quick, reliable post purchase service if the 
item proves faulty later on. He states, 
"I suspect that a lot of consumers think this way: that, rather than 
getting the pre-sale service and then going off to a discount house, they 
will buy from the higher-price house and be sure they are going to get 
decent service. So, even here, it is not clear that the free rider problem 
is all that important". 77 
While Scherer expresses the view that vertical restraints may, in certain circumstances, 
be procompetitive, he also expresses certain reservations. Firstly, vertical restraints 
may reduce efficiency the more competitors service provision simply cancels each 
other out. The provision of services, therefore, may not add to overall demand. 
Distributors simply resort to cannibalising each others sales. The more this occurs the 
less efficient the restraint becomes. Secondly, in highly concentrated markets 
producers are more likely to pursue a high price - high margin strategy. Ultimately, 
this restricts consumer choice in that product range is reduced. The restraint, therefore. 
is not efficiency enhancing. Finally, such restraints may reduce efficiency in that the 
more high prices attract new market entrants, without causing a commensurate increase 
77 Ibid 70':; 
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In market volume, existing business will be "squeezed" In terms of their output, 
causing them to lose scale economies. 78 
The Traditionalist Viewpoint and Its Implications For Policy 
F or the most part, traditionalists assert, vertical restraints should be treated more 
harshly than Chicagoan analysis suggests. Policy makers should be cautious about 
relaxing per se standards of illegality. In certain circumstances, however. limited 
change may be possible. Traditionalists recognise that these restraints can either 
enhance or diminish consumer welfare. However, in the interests of judicial economy, 
it would be inappropriate to apply a rule of reason analysis on a case by case basis. 
Even though this may occasionally give rise to improper results, general policy 
standards should be set and applied to vertical restraints. 79 Comanor, therefore, makes 
a distinction between established and non-established products. Established products 
are those products with which large numbers of consumers place little emphasis upon 
obtaining product information. In these circumstances stringent antitrust standards 
should be applied to vertical price and non-price restraints alike.80 There should either 
be a "direct" per se prohibition or some modified form of rule of reason analysis 
applied. In the latter case, for example, the defendant would be required to show that 
the restraint actually benefited consumers. In short, a shift in the burden of proof. In 
the case of non-established products or products of new market entrants, exceptions to 
the pcr se rule deserves serious consideration. These restraints are less likely to reduce 
consUIl1er welfare because product novelty creates demand for information. In such 
circUIl1stances vertical restraints should be permissible or treated leniently in a tnod(jied 
7S Ibid 704. 
79 \V.S. COlllanor. note 71 above. 100 I. 
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rule of reason analysis. The new entrant exception or "safe harbourf finds favour with 
many.8l With regard specifically to RPM, Sharpe argues that most instances of RPM is 
inspired by upward vertical dealer pressure exerted on producers. 82 He maintains that 
most RPM has adverse economic consequences. As such it should remain unlawful 
per se. However, he argues in favour of a new entrant exception for a limited period of 
time for new manufacturers. He states that the " ... new entrant, through the use of 
RPM, may gain access to dealer outlets during the early life cycle of a new product 
wi thout impairing retail competition". 83 
Flynn and Ponsoldt assert that these restraints limit the freedom of distributors and the 
public to choose from whom they may wish to buy or sel1.84 By definition, then, such 
restraints limit commercial rivalry which is fundamental to the competitive process. 
There should, in their view be a rebuttable presumption that these restraints violate the 
antitrust laws. Such an approach, they suggest, provides the flexibility for a reasonable 
evaluation of fact and policy.85 
In short " ... per se rules are (to be) treated as evidentiary presumptions of illegality, 
with rebuttability depending on the degree to which private agreements displace the 
competitive process".86 In the case of vertical price fixing a relatively conclusive 
presumption of illegality is justified. Such restraints interfere with the ability of 
retailers to compete on the merits and ultimately result in higher prices. In the words 
of Flynn and Ponsoldt, such restraints enable " ... the proponent of the restraint to 
81 See, for example, T.R. Overstreet and A.A. Fisher, "Resale Price Maintenance And Distributional 
Efficiency: Some Lessons From the Past", (1985) 3 COl1temporal}, Politica/lsslles ~ 3 . . . . 
X2 B.S. Sharp, "Comments on Marvel: How Fair Is Fair Trade?", (1985) 3 Contemporary Political 
Isslies 37, 38. 
Xl Ibid ~ ~ . .
K4 J.J. 1:lynn and IF. Ponsoldt, note 68 abovl'. 11,,\7. 
s ~ ~ Ibid 1 148. 
K(. Ibid. 
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suppress distributor competition on pnce, denying the right of the independent 
distributors to succeed or fail on the competitive merits".87 In effect, a denial of those 
rights which antitrust laws were designed to protect. Similar considerations are also to 
be applied in regard to maximum price fixing and vertically induced refusals to 
supply.88 The type and amount of evidence which will rebut the presumptions of 
illegality is a matter, ultimately, to be determined by the Courts. With regard to non-
price verticals a similar presumption of illegality should be applied. However, in 
certain circumstances, vertical customer, location or territorial restraints may produce 
public benefits or be of such significance to a seller and its products that the 
presumption should yield.89 Thus, customer location or territorial restraints may be 
justified in limited circumstances to protect the public in the distribution of dangerous 
products or when there is a need for new entrants into a concentrated market or if they 
are used as a means to ensure the provision of necessary repair or warranty services. 
Finally, in those circumstances where no presumption of illegality exists a rule of 
reason analysis may be applied by the Court. 
III. VERTCIAL RESTRAINTS IN THE EU 
A. The Goals Of Competition Policy 
In Europe competition policy has never been seen In terms of narrow economIC 
principles serving only the goal of efficiency. From the outset the primary objective 
87 Ibid. 
8S J..I. Flynn. note 62 abovL'. I 1.+.+ 
IN Ibid 114) 
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has been that of market unification.9o The 1956 Spaak Report, one of the preparatory 
works upon which the EEC Treaty was based insisted that European unification \\·ould 
raise living standards, promote stability, expansion and assist in the development of 
relations between Member States. Market unification, therefore, served political and 
economic ends. Politically, further European conflagration became difficult as 
Member States markets became increasingly intertwined. Economically, an integrated 
market encouraged inter alia rapid industrial regeneration and retooling, enabling 
Europe to compete on the global market and regain its independence from the financial 
purse strings of the US. Indeed, European business could benefit from economies of 
scale and scope. Central to this process has been the rules on competition. Designed 
to supplement the four freedoms91 Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82 (ex 86) were included in 
the Treaty to prevent private undertaking, either through collusion or abuse of market 
power, from reconstructing barriers to interstate trade. Thus frustrating the market 
integrative imperative. 
While the pnmary function of policy has been that of market unification other 
traditional competition issues have not been ignored. Competition policy has been 
seen, therefore, as a means of satisfying individual and collective needs. When 
operating satisfactorily, competition performs three functions " ... a resource allocation 
function, by encouraging better use of available factors of production, so that firms' 
technical efficiency is increased and consumers' wants better s a t i s f i e d ~ ~ an incentive 
function, by stimulating firms to better their performance relative to their c o m p e t i t o r s ~ ~
90 See inter alia, D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (3 rd edn., Oxford, 1(98) eh. ~ ; ; CD. Ehlermann, 
"The Contribution Of IT Compctition Policy To The Single Market", ( 1 9 9 ~ ) ) ~ 9 9 C.\fL RI.;\' ~ 5 7 ; ; B. Van 
der Esch, "FIT Competition Rules: Basic Principles And Policy Aims", (1980) 7 L1EI75; D. W l ' n \ I I ~ , ,
tilL' ('ommunilr 01 Furope: .. / History 01 European Integration Since 19./5 (2'".1 edn .. London. 1(9)) 
eh.l. 
'II Fret? 1\ lu\cmcnt or Goods. Scrvices. \\orkcrs and ('apital. 
and an innovative function, by encouragIng the introduction of new products in 
markets and the development of new production processes and distribution 
techniques".92 
In addition to these concerns, competition policy in Europe has also been intimately 
linked to the concepts of democracy and pluralism. In particular, the diffusion of 
economic power which can threaten individual political freedom and the economic 
freedom of market participants.93 The need to maintain a competitive and atomistic 
market structure has surfaced in the authorities concern to preserve equity and fairness 
in the market place. The Commission has been concerned, therefore, to ensure 
Member States do not favour their own economic operators through inter alia the 
dissemination of State Aids. Nor, indeed, should Member States favour State run 
undertakings to the detriment of private undertakings. A traditional concern of the 
Commission has been its willingness to protect small and medium sized undertakings 
(SMEs). While these undertakings perform a valuable function in the economies of all 
Member States (providing a valuable source of employment) this is particularly the 
case in the so-called "Southern States" (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) where outlet 
density and family owned business is high!94 
In sum, competition policy in Europe has a multidimensional character. Although 
market unification has occupied a central role other traditional concerns have also been 
influential. Often these concerns are inextricably linked to the goal of integration. 
92 Fe Commission, Fourtecnth Rel)()rt Oil Competition Policy: 198-1 (Brussels, 1985) p.ll. .. 
'>1 DJ. Gerber, "Constituionali/ing rile Economy: Gemlan Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law And I he 
'New' Europe", (199--t) -I2lmcrlcol1.1ollmal (1/ ('umparalin' LaH' 25.36-37. _ 
q ~ ~ Fl' Commission, (1r('(,11 Papt'" (}II ,'ertie," Restrt1inls III EC COm{Jt'litioll Policy CO\1 (96) 721 tlllal. 
pp. 7-8. 
45 
Where, however, they clash the goal of market unification has invariably taken 
precedence giving European competition policy its distinctive character. 
B. Market Integration, Institutional Structures, Competences And 
Substantive Focus 
The goal of market unification influenced the development of institutional structures, 
power distribution and substantive focus. In the early stages of the Common Market, 
Member States interpreted the rules on competition.95 Not surprisingly, fears of 
inconsistency and lack of uniformity of interpretation soon arose. These new rules 
were, after all, " ... novel and almost revolutionary requiring changes to ingrained habits 
and patterns of economic conduct".96 Market unification, therefore, necessitated the 
centralisation of power in the hands of a single institution. In 1962 the Council placed 
the Commission at the heart of this process by enacting Regulation 17.97 In so doing, 
Member States were obliged to occupy a position on the periphery.98 While Member 
States are able to apply Article 81(1) and (2) (ex 85(1) and (2)) and Article 82 (ex 86) 
this is only the case provided the Commission has not commenced its own 
investigations (Article 9(3) Regulation 17). In this regard the Commission has been 
furnished with wide ranging powers including the right to request information from 
undertakings (Article 11), the right to conduct on-site investigations (Article 14) and 
the right to obtain assistance from Member States in conducting investigations (Article 
13). Regulation 17 also identifies the circumstances giving rise to the opening of 
95 G.W. Kelleher, "The Common Market Antitrust Laws: The First Ten Years", (1967) 12 Alllitrllst B 
1:2 19. 
96 I. Forrester and C. Norall, "The Laicization Of Community Law, Self-Help And The Rule Of Reason 
lIow Competition Is And Could be Applied", (1984) 21 CML Rev I I, l.3. 
97 OJ 19():2 204. 
98 A. Derin!.!L'r, "The Distribution Of Powers In The Enforcement ()f The Rules Of Competition Under 
The Rome Treaty", (19(13) I C\I/ Rc\' 30. 
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investigations. Once instituted the Commission may conclude matters formally by way 
of comfort letter. Formal decisions are generally not the most efficient way to deal 
with a large number of individual cases.99 Regulation 17, also enhanced and expanded 
the Commission's role by virtue of Articles 9(1) and 4(2). The former provides that 
only the Commission can issue exemptions under Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)). The latter 
introduced the notification procedure and exemption became contingent upon 
application to the Commission. 
The process of centralisation resulted in the Commission being inundated with 
notifications, most of which related to vertical restrictions. This left the Commission 
unbalanced and overburdened. 100 To alleviate this mass problem, Regulation 19/65 
was enacted by the Council which empowered the Commission to declare by way of 
Regulation that Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)) did not apply to certain bilateral agreements 
exhibiting specific characteristics. In effect, the Commission was granted the power to 
legislate through the issuance of block exemptions. In the area of distribution, 
Commission Regulation 67/67, dealing with exclusive distributorships and purchasing 
obligations, was enacted. In the 1980s this was replaced by Commission Regulations 
1983/83 (exclusive distribution) and 1984/83 (exclusive purchasing). Commission 
Regulation 4087/88 of November 1988 was enacted in relation to franchising. The 
effect of these Regulations was to provide business with an approved arena in which 
they could pursue their day to day commercial activities without the fear of infringing 
the competition rules. It is the combination of these functions which has led to 
99 On average the Commission makes 20 decisions per> ear and receives ~ 5 0 0 n o t i f i c a t i o n s ~ ~ See EC 
Commission's, Grecli Paper Oil Vertical Reslrail1ls In EC Comjll'filioll Policy, CO\ 1 (96) tlllal 721, 
p.5cl. d 
100 D.(; Goyder, EC C(!lIlf','llIiulI LaU' Or edn., Oxford, 1998) p.579. 
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complaints that the Commission acts in an investigative, legislative and adjudicatiYe 
fashion. 101 
The European Court of Justice also adopted a central role in the competition system. 
Indeed, the relationship which developed between the Court of Justice and the 
Commission, particularly during the embryonic stages of development, was crucial to 
market unification. Both institutions shared a common vision and goal. During the so-
called days of Eurosclerosis, when the momentum of integration seemed to reach a 
halt, the Court of Justice provided intellectual leadership and the main integrative 
thrust. Unfettered by precedent the Court of Justice adopted an integrative driven 
teleological methodology. Problem resolution was based upon the perceived spirit of 
the Treaty and where market unification required a specific outcome this was generally 
forthcoming. 102 The Court of Justice illuminated the path upon which the Commission 
was to travel and refused to handicap it by interpreting its jurisdiction and powers on a 
technical or narrow basis.103 In the 1973 case of Continental Can,104 for example, the 
Court looking though its teleological lens upheld the Commission's view that Article 
82 (ex 86) applied to mergers. Where undertakings strengthen their existing dominant 
position through mergers, so that the degree of market control acquired substantially 
obstructs competition, this strengthening amounts to an abuse within the context of 
Article 82 (ex 86).105 
101 W. Sauter, Competition Law And Industrial Polier In The EU (Oxford, 1997) p. I ~ ( ) ) "' 
102 H. Rasmussen, "Between Self Restraint And Activism: A Judicial Policy For The European Court . 
(1988) I J EL Re\' ~ x x _ 
Ill, See D.G.Gt)\dcr, note 100 abo\ e, )80. 
Ill.j Case () '1'2 E ~ " · ( l f ) t t 'mhallage and Cont Il1entlll ClIll \. Commission [ 1973 1 ECR :2 15. [ 1973 1 C \ 1 L R 199. 
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It is important to stress, however, that the relationship between the Court of Justice and 
the Commission has been dynamic, evolutionary and subject to change. In particular. 
the judicial activism of the Court of Justice in pursuit of market integration has 
changed as the Court has been obliged to work within the confines of judicial 
precedent, rather than laying down general policy statements or principles for 
guidance. Institutional changes has also been brought about by the creation of the 
Court of First Instance with overall jurisdiction for competition matters. 106 The judicial 
landscape has changed as the role of the Court of Justice is limited to hearing appeals 
from the Court of First Instance on points of law and to answering questions put to it 
by the Courts of Member States. 
In terms of substantive focus the Court of Justice and the Commission concentrated 
their attentions on private vertical arrangements. The latter were perceived as 
presenting the greatest risk to market integration. Arrangements between manufacturer 
and supplier, particularly if exclusivity was involved, could give rise to market 
1· . 107 compartmenta lsatlon. Relationships of an horizontal nature, at least initially, 
attracted less attention because they were perceived to be less related to market 
unification. 108 In any event the Commission wanted to ensure that European business 
could grow to compete with its American counterparts. Often co-operation between 
SMEs was necessary to ensure their survival in the increasingly global market. The 
fear of interfering with national champions and the possible political repercussions was 
10(, In this context see B. Vesterdorf, "The Court Of First Instance Of The European Comlllunities A,fter 
Two Full Years In Operation", (1992) 29 C.\IL Ret, 897; H.G. Schermers, "The European Court Of First 
Instance", (1988) 25 ('!Iff. ReT 541. 
107 .l.M. nlis, "The Legality or E\c\uSI\l' Distributorships Under Common ~ l a r k e t t :\ntltru-.;l Laws", 
( l l ) ( ) · ~ ) ) 9'/lIlilrllsll? 775. 
10K SCL' D.G. GO\der, notl' 100 abo\ l'. 578. 
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reflected in the lack of application of Article 82 (ex 86). Indeed, it was not until the 
end of the 1960s that authorities got to grips with horizontal arrangements. 109 
The Court's approach to vertical arrangements is graphically illustrated in the case of 
C t G d' 110 H· .. ons en- run zg. ere, In examInIng the exclusive distribution arrangements of a 
German manufacturer on the French market, the Court concluded that Article 81 (ex 
85) applied not only to horizontal arrangements but also to arrangements of a vertical 
nature. The latter could simply restore national divisions in trade between Member 
States. Importance was attached to intrabrand competition because of its market 
integrative effect. The fact that restraints on intrabrand competition might stimulate 
interbrand competition was no reason to permit such restraints to escape the clutch of 
Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)). The Court emphasised that these arrangements may threaten 
market integration rather than competition per se. 
Subsequent case law reveals the extent to which vertical restraints, which either 
directly or indirectly fragment the market, are condemned. Case law relating to direct 
bans on exports is voluminous as both the Commission and the Courts have treated 
such restraints with short shrift. III Perhaps one of the most succinct statements which 
the Court of Justice has provided in this area is in the case of Miller International 
Schallplatten GmbH v Commission. I 12 This case involved the inclusion of an export 
ban (clause 5) in an exclusive dealing arrangement between Miller and its exclusive 
distributor for Alsace Lorraine, Sopholest of Strasburg. The Commission concluded 
109 See, for example, Case 48/691CI \' Commission (Dyestuffs) [1972] ECR 619, [1972] C1\1LR 557. 
110 Cases 56, 58i()4 ('ons/en and Gnmdig \' Commission [1966] ECR 299, [1966] C1\ 1LR -l18. 
III See (in/er alia) Comm. Dec. 78N)6 Arthur Bell and Sons Ltd OJ 1978 L23SI15, [ll)78] 3 C\1LR 
)98 Comm. Dec. 91153] rill(} Europe BI' \' Toshiha Europa OJ 1991 L287/39, [199215 C1\1LR 180; 
l " ' a s ~ ' ' T-.rt/9.2 Dunlop S/(/::clIgL'l" Int('/"llu/wna/ Ltd \' ('ommission [1 994 1 EeR 11-441; Case T-77/92 
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that this provision fell foul of Article 81 (ex 85) and the Court of Justice, in rejecting 
Miller's appeal, stated" ... by its very nature, a clause prohibiting exports constitutes a 
restriction on competition, whether it is adopted at the instigation of the supplier or of 
the consumer since the agreed purpose of the contracting parties is the endeavour to 
isolate a part of the market".I13 This is the case, of course, unless the vertical 
agreement affects competition and trade between Member States only to an 
insignificant extent. In which case, as in Volk v Vervaecke,114 absolute territorial 
protection will be held to be outside the parameters of Article 81 (ex 85). 
More recently, the case of Bayer-Adalal l15 shows the extent to which the Commission 
is prepared to stretch the outer boundaries of Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)). Bayer AG, a 
German undertaking based in Leverkusen, manufactures under the Adalat trade name a 
range of medicinal products including a calcium antagonist used in the treatment of 
cardiovascular diseases. In most Member States the price of pharmaceuticals is set 
directly or indirectly by national authorities. Differences in the methods of price 
calculation 116, ease of transportation and product demand gave rise to strong 
commercial incentives to engage in parallel trade. The Commission found that 
measures taken by Bayer France and Bayer Spain, in an attempt to thwart parallel 
imports particularly into the UK, amounted to an export ban. An agreement was found 
to exist between Bayer's French and Spanish subsidiaries and their respective 
wholesalers. The latter, in the view of the Commission, reduced the amounts ordered 
from their suppliers in an attempt to align themselves with amounts considered by 
Bayer to accord with the requirements of their domestic markets. This reflected the 
11.1 Ibid 148. 
I I ~ ~ Clise 5 ()l) [1969] FCR .?l)), [19()l)] Ct\ILR 273. 
115 Com 111 . [kl' 9()/·l78 OJ Il)l)(J L.?O III . 
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wholesaler's acquIescence In the export ban and furnished the bilateral action 
necessary to implicate Article 81 (ex 85). However, all the evidence supplied to the 
Commission indicated that the wholesalers used various methods to obtain supplies for 
export through co-ordinated action and refusals to inform Bayer's subsidiaries of 
product destination. Nevertheless, a fine of 3 million ECU was imposed and Bayer 
was required to inform its subsidiaries that exports were permitted. 
In March 1996 Bayer appealed to the Court of First Instance arguing, in the main, that 
it did not engage in any bilateral action. At the same time, pending outcome of the 
case on the merits, it successfully applied for interim relief. 117 Interestingly, the Court 
felt predisposed to say that Bayer's arguments on the merits were not manifestly 
devoid of all foundations. 118 In Bayer's view it was merely exercising its unilateral 
right to refuse to supply certain wholesalers. If it was unable to pursue this strategy its 
UK based subsidiary would lose turnover of DM 100 million resulting in job losses. 
Export bans are the most obvious form of market compartmentalisation. Other 
disincentives, however, can have similar effects. Refusal to honour guarantees on 
products imported into a Member State by parallel means can render an agreement 
incompatible with Article 81 (ex 85). This may amount to " ... a substantial barrier to 
the normal development of trade within the Community". I 19 The Commission applied 
these principles in the Zanussi case. 120 Here an Italian manufacturer of domestic 
electrical appliances required work to be undertaken only by its importing subsidiary. 
Additionally, any product alterations (for compliance with national electrical safety 
117 Case T--41/96R [1996] ECR \\-381, [19961:) Cf\lLR -417. 
11M Ibid 400. 
11') I''l-:C Commission, Scv('nlh Rcport Oil Compclitiol1 foli(v. I cr7 (Brll,>sels, 1978) pp. 24-25. 
120 Comm. Dec. 78/922 OJ 1978 L322/26, [1979] I C ~ I L R R 81. 
standards) had to be made with the consent of the subsidiary. Purchasers from parallel 
importers were placed at a disadvantage as they could not benefit from the guarantee. 
The Commission refused negative clearance until Zanussi revised the terms of its 
guarantee. However, in 1984 in the case of Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Commission 121 the 
Court of Justice held that it was perfectly legitimate for Hasselblad (GB) Ltd, the sole 
distributor for Victor Hasselblad's photographic equipment in the UK, to combat 
parallel imports by offering a better and wider range of after sale services to its own 
customers. This included offering a 24-hour repair service and an extra 12 months 
guarantee provided this did not deprive customers of parallel importers the service to 
which they were entitled. In 1985 in the case of ETA Fabriques d 'Ebauches \' DK 
Investment SA 122 the Court of Justice confirmed the efficacy of this approach. 
Charging higher pnces on products intended for export (dual pncmg or pnce 
discrimination) has been condemned by Court and Commission alike. 123 This practice 
arose in the case of Distillers v Commission. 124 As a result of price controls in the UK 
and discriminating tax legislation in other Member States the price of Distillers' 
products were significantly lower in the UK than in other Member States. In order to 
combat parallel trading, Distillers offered price discounts to its British customers on all 
products sold within the UK. However, customers intending to export these products 
were required to pay the gross price which was higher than the prices paid hy 
Distiller's sole distributors in other Member States. In Distiller's view this enabled its 
distributors to compete in terms of price with parallel importers whilst allowing them 
to 111eet the heavy costs of sale promotion. The Commission concluded that this system 
121 Casc S() S2 [19S..f I FeR SS:" [198..f] 1 Cf\lLR 559. 
1 2 ~ ~ C ~ I S C C .'IIS) [19S)]ICR 3Q,3, [lllS()j2 CMLR h7..f 
121 Scc, for c : \ ~ \ I 1 1 p l c , , l '0111111. Dec 70',,2 I\oduk OJ 19-;'(\ I 147,24, lll)-'O] 3 C\ 1LR D 19; Clll11ll\ I kc. 
7J. .103 Pillsburg ( 'urI/in,\? FIII( I/l,· OJ 1l)T2 12 nn 5, [1973) Cf\ 1 LR D2 
I ' ~ ~ Casc,O'7S [19801 FCR 222l),lll}SO]3 C\lLR 121 
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simply resulted in the isolation of the UK market. In the view of the Commission, 
Distillers could promote its product in other Member States using other means, rather 
than creating impediments to parallel trading. It could, for example, allow for the costs 
of promotion by its distributors in the prices charged to them. The matter was appealed 
to the Court of Justice and the latter held that the arrangement was ineligible for 
exemption as it had not been properly notified. 
Other provisions have also been condemned when used as instruments of market 
compartmentalisation. These include inter alia the exchange of price lists and market 
information, an obligation placed upon dealers to maintain a register of purchasers 
names, addresses and product serial numbers when used to trace the source of parallel 
imports, the provision of finance to enable dealers to buy back cheaper priced products 
imported by parallel means 125 and the withdrawal of bonuses due to be paid because of 
f · I 126 out 0 terrItory sa es. 
C. Critical Observations 
The Commission's current approach to vertical restraints has attracted vociferous 
criticism. Essentially the criticism may be distilled into two broad categories - those 
relating to substantive focus and those relating to system administration. A frequent 
criticism of the Commission's substantive approach to Article 81 (1) (ex 8S( 1)) has 
been the importance it has attached to mechanistic or formalistic interpretation. In 
particular restrictions on conduct as opposed to effects on competition have been 
sufficient to implicate Article 81 (l) (ex 8S( 1 )). As a result, the Commission has failed 
125 Case 86/82 Hasse/Mad \. Commission [I 9S4] ECR 883, [19841 I Cr-..1LR 559. 
126 Comlll. Dec. ( ) ~ 1 2 6 1 1 Nc'\I'ifI!DlIlI/Op S/a::L'I1RCr If/f OJ 1992 L I] L ]2. 
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to engage in any meaningful economic analysis within its context preferring instead to 
conduct this under Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)).127 In this regard, Hawk is critical of the 
Commission's approach to exclusive distributorships, exclusive purchasing and 
selective distribution. 128 In 1995 the CBI 129 and UNICE130 urged the Commission to 
adopt a more nuanced approach based on economic analysis. In the view of the CBI 
vertical arrangements, absent export prohibition and price restrictions, should not fall 
within Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) provided the supplier does not have market power. The 
First European Competition Forum held in 1995 added its voice to the growing 
criticism. 131 Overall, it concluded that the Commission's current substantive approach 
imposed unrealistic burdens upon European Industry and had detrimental effects on 
economic progress as well as the reputation of the institutions of the Community. 
A number of criticisms are also levelled at the Commission's current administrative 
approach. The notification process, it is alleged, is time consuming, inefficient, costly 
and results in legal uncertainty. Companies internal resources are tied up in 
preparation for notification which adds to transaction costs particularly as expensive 
legal advice is usually required. In fact, if compliance costs are too high business 
behaviour may become distorted as it seeks to pursue alternative commercial strategies. 
A lack of human resources means that there is an inevitable delay in processing 
notifications. Undoubtedly, files are shelved receIVIng little or no attention. 
C'Olnpanies lnay continue to operate agreements, therefore, without certainty as to the 
outcome of their notifications. While this may not unduly perturb some undertakings, 
127 S.E. Hawk, "System Failure: Vertical Restraints And EC Competition Law", (1995) 32 CAlL RC1' 
973. 
128 Ibid 975. 
129 CSI, Loosening The Strait-Jackt!l: CBI Proposals For Rcform Of The SCOjil' And .Idministration of 
.·ll"li('le 85 (1995). 
1.10 UN ICE, ,\lodernising £[1 Compelition Polhy (1995). 
131 I.. Lalldati, "The First European Competition Forum: Vertical Restraints", (1995) 5 Compctition 
PO/itT ,fo.,'eH'slettcr 7. 
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others may find this oppressive, particularly, if large capital investment is involved. 
Those agreements which are processed face a number of possible outcomes which, 
according to Bright, depends more upon the personal views of the case officer than a 
consistent application of the rules. 132 This results in legal uncertainty as parties to 
agreements are afforded an opportunity to renege from agreements or renegotiate their 
terms. Ultimately, the reputation of the Community's institutions are tarnished. After 
all, a system which makes so much dependent upon the issuance of exemptions which 
it is unable to deliver is open to criticism. 133 It is argued, therefore, that the current 
system should be "scrapped" as it exhibits no redeeming virtues. 
In the interest of balance it should be noted that the Commission has utilised a number 
of measures to alleviate some of its administrative problems. The block exemptions 
have enabled business to cast their agreements in accordance with a pre-approved 
lTIould, increasing legal certainty and reducing the need for notification. Admittedly, 
undertakings unwilling or unable to mould their agreements still risk delays in 
obtaining approval. Opposition procedures have been introduced to improve 
efficiency. 134 The use of block exemptions, however, is not without criticism. The 
most frequently heard criticisms are that the block exemptions lack flexibility, have a 
straightjacket effect and are over-regulatory. Adjusting commercial arrangements to fit 
pre-approved moulds may undermine incentives to reach agreements or result in the 
alteration of original bargaining positions. Interpreting these Regulations is time 
consuming, costly and results in formalism taking precedence over economic analysis. 
1.12 C. Bright, "Deregulation Of EC Competition Policy: Rethinking Article 85(1)" in B.E. Hawk (ed.) 
,'/l1l1l1al Proc(,cdings q/ The Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1994: ..Inlitrust In ,-1 Glohal Economy 
( 1995), . 
1,,1 I. Forrester and C. Norall, "The Laicization Of Community Law: Self-llelp And The Rule 01 
Reason: Ho\\' Competition L1\\' Is And Could be Applied", (198'+) 21 CML Re\' II, 16, 
1.14 See Regulation 4087,'88, Article 6( I), 
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Time is spent on textual exegesis rather than determining the market impact of the 
arrangement. Other streamlining measures have been introduced including inter alia 
altering Form AlB to elicit greater information from the parties and an increased 
willingness, on the part of the Commission, to settle matters and to accept undertakings 
from the parties involved. 135 
D. Possible Solutions 
Commentators proffer a number of other possible reforms designed to assist the 
Commission in matching resources to priorities. They include (i) the introduction of a 
rule of reason analysis (ii) decentralisation and (iii) greater selectivity over the choice 
of cases assumed by the Commission. 136 For some the only possible solution to the 
problems created by the Commission's over expansive approach, is a reduction in the 
scope of its approach to Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) through a US style rule of reason. 137 
In support of this view they point to the case law of the Court of Justice in the STM 
Case 138, Maize Seeds l39 , Pronuptia l40 and Delimitis. 141 Korah argues that in Europe 
" ... there is no agreement as to what objectives should be pursued by competition 
policy".142 Market unification has simply been elevated, in her view, into a " ... goal in 
itself, more important than efficiency". 143 Perceived "ex ante" (before the agreement is 
135 See PelikanlKyocera (1996) 3 ECLR R57 and Digital's Press Release IP/97/868 of October 10 1997. 
The difficulties with these practices is that they receive little or no publicity other than a brief press 
release which is often inadequate to serve as a precedent. 
IJ(, See D.G. Goyder, note 100 above, 593. 
m See, inter alia, V.Korah, "EEC Competition Policy - Legal Form Or Economic Efficiency", (1986) 
eLP 85; c. W.F. Baden Fuller, "Economic Issues Relating To Property Rights In Trademarks: Export 
Bans, Differential Pricing, Restrictions On Resale and Repackaging", (1981) 6 EL Rev 162: J.S. Chard, 
"The Economics Of Exclusive Distributorship Arrangements With Special Reference To EEC 
Competition Policy, (1980) Alllilrust B 405. 
118 Case 56/65 Societe Technique Miniere \' Maschinenban VIm [1966] ECR 235, [1966] I CMLR 357. 
139 Case 258178 /\'lIl1gl'sscr \' Commission [1982] ECR 2015, [1983] I CMLR 278. 
140 Case 161/84 Prol1uptia \' Schillgalis [1986] ECR 353, [1986] I CMLR 414. 
141 Case C-234/89 Delimitis \' Hennillger Brau [1991] ECR 1-935, [1992] 5 CMLR 210. 
I · I ~ ~ V.Korah, note 137 above, 85. 
II, Ibid 91. 
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concluded by the parties) vertical agreements may be seen to be procompetitiYe 
including arrangements involving absolute territorial protection. 144 Excessive concern 
with passive and parallel trading is, therefore, misplaced. Firstly, transport costs, a 
lack of after sale service, concerns over legal redress in the event of faulty goods and 
regulatory constraints mean that parallel imports cannot be a consistent source of 
supply. Secondly, information technology is bringing about structural change In 
methods of distribution. Product distribution based on "Just in Time" (JIT) principles 
and Quick Response logistics (QR) is bringing about fully integrated supply chains 
based on mutual dependence and co-operation. What is of fundamental importance, 
therefore, is interbrand competition between fully integrated competing structures. Not 
unsurprisingly the Commission is constantly urged to dispense with its parallel 
importer rationale in favour of the free rider rationale. 145 A US style rule of reason 
approach in which economic analysis is given primacy would enable the Commission 
to do this. 
In contrast others contended that such an approach should be resisted. 146 Those 
advocating such change fail to give due consideration to the significance of market 
integration. As Whish and Sufrin assert 
'\ e )ven if this is not a goal approved by all observers, to call for the 
application of the competition rules in a way which ignores it is 
l.t.t Ibid 94. 
1.t5 L. Gyselen, "Vertical Restraints In The Distributive Process: Strength And Weakness Of the Free 
Rider Rationale Under EEC Competition Law", (1984) 21 CML Rev 647. 
146 See, inter alia, H. Schroter, "Vertical Restriction Under Article 85 EC: Towards A Moderate Reform 
Of Current Competition Policy. Antitrust Analysis Under Article 85(1) and (3)", in B.E. Hawk (ed.), 
.. /nn1lal Proceedings ql the Fordham Corporate Law Institllte (1987) Antitrust III :i Global Economy 
(\988); J.F. Vcrstrynge. "Current A n t i t r ~ s t t Policy Issues In the EEC: Some RenectIOns .On the Second 
Generation Of Competition Policy", 111 B.E. Hawk (cd.), Annual ProcL'edll1gs OJ the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (1 ()S.J) Antitrust and Trade Policies In International Trade (\985). 
fundamentally to misconstrue the context in which (European) law is 
applied". 147 
58 
In any event, as a result of bifurcation of Article 81 (ex 85) there already exists in 
Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) an explicit provision to exempt agreements. There is no such 
provision in US antitrust law which has to deal with the matter implicitly by virtue of a 
rule of reason analysis. To incorporate an implicit process, some assert, would destroy 
the equilibrium between Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) and Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) rendering 
the latter provision meaningless. While opponents of the rule of reason accept that the 
Courts have adopted a nuanced approach, they reject the suggestion that they have 
adopted a rule of reason analysis. The Community Courts have simply been 
developing their own jurisprudence on a case by case basis. 148 This has not involved 
an attempt to determine whether a restraint is pro competitive by weighing restrictions 
on intrabrand competition as against a strengthening of interbrand competition. This 
type of analysis is more appropriate " ... in a large, integrated and highly competitive 
market like that of the United States" .149 Indeed, even within the US there are those 
which reject the minimalist approach advocated by Chicago. 
As the Courts of Member States and competition authorities have increased their 
experience and expertise in matters of competition there have been increased calls for 
decentralisation. ISO Indeed, private antitrust action before national Courts, as in the 
US, is seen as a way of assisting the Commission in the reduction of its \vorkload. 
147 R. Whish and B. Sufrin, "Article 85 And The Rule Of Reason", (1987) 7 }EL I, 37. 
14K R. Whish and B. Surfin, Competition Law (3 rd edn, London, 1993) p. 209. 
149 EEC Commission, Thirtecnth Report 011 Competition Po/icy: /983 (Brussels, 1984) p. 35. 
1'i0 C.O. Ehlermann, "Implementation Of EC Competition Law By National Antitrust Authorities", 
(1996) 17 ECLR 88; AJ. Riley, ·.'More Radicalism, ~ I e a s e : _ _ The Notice On C o o p e r a t ~ ? n n B e ~ w e e n n
National Courts And The CommiSSIOn In ApplYlllg Articles 8) and 86 of the EEC Treaty , (199.,), 14 
FCLR 91; J. Shaw, "[)cccntralisatinn And Law Enforcement In EC Competition Law", (1995) 15 Legal 
Studies 128. 
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However, the process of decentralisation has been slow. The public route of complaint 
to the Commission has its attractions in that it IS less financially onerous, the 
Commission has wide investigatory powers and formal remedies are applicable 
throughout the Community. However, in 1992 the Court of First Instance in Automec 
li s1 affirmed the right of the Commission to reject complaints on the basis of lack of 
Community interest provided adequate legal remedy is available before national 
Courts. In 1993 the Commission's Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts 
provided guidelines for national courts in applying Community Competition Law. 152 
In its Notice the Commission acknowledged that its lack of resources required it to 
prioritise cases according to Community interest. Low priority cases should be dealt 
with by national Courts which, unlike it, could award damages and costs to injured 
parties. In 1997 the Commission also published its Notice on Cooperation between 
National Competition Authorities emphasising the role to be played by the latter in 
monitoring and enforcing the law. IS3 Finally, whilst decentralisation reduces workload 
and dilutes power concentrations it also reduces the ability of the Commission to 
pursue its own ends and increases the risk of inconsistencies. IS4 
More radically, some suggest, the time has now come for the Commission to be more 
selective in the issues it deals with. In particular, with the Single Market virtually in 
place, focus should be redirected away from vertical restraints, for so long intimately 
connected with market unification. After all, where a market is integrated the goal of 
integration loses its force. It is ilnportant to emphasis. however. that the Commission 
151 Case T-24/90 Automec ,'Commission [1992] ECR II - 2223. [1992] 5 CMLR 431. 
152 OJ 1993 C39/o6, [1993] 5 CMLR 95. 
15.1 OJ 1997 C3 U/J. [1997] ,) CMLR 884. _ 
151 OJ. Gerber, "The Transformation Of luropean Community Competition Law?", (1994) 3) Han' IntI 
LJ 97, 14 \. 
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has also addressed other anti competitive issues including horizontal agreements, 155 
Governmental interference with competition l56 and merger controls. 157 In 1997, 
however the Commission published its Green Paper on Vertical Restraints \\'hich set 
out the Commissions proposals for refocusing its approach in this area. Included in its 
proposals was the introduction of a market power filter based on market share. 
Interestingly, a rule of reason option was not included, nor any proposals for the refoml 
of the Commission's sole right to grant exemptions under Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)). 
These matters will be considered in the Chapter 7. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From the 1970s the sole function or purpose of US antitrust has been the promotion of 
efficiency and the maximisation of wealth. Concerns relating to the distribution of that 
wealth or the accomplishment of other non-economic goals are considered the proper 
subjects of other laws. Admittedly, this has not always been the case and the current 
approach is often criticised for its neglect of goals which some consider should inform 
the antitrust debate. This focus on efficiency has had ramifications for the 
development of US law relating to vertical restrictions. In a fully integrated market 
interbrand competition is seen as central to wealth maximisation. Restrictions on 
intrabrand competition, to the extent they overcome problems of free riding, stimulate 
1'i5 S.B. Hornsby, "Competition Policy In The 80's: More Policy Less Competition", (1987) 12 EL Rev 
79. 
1'i11 See in this context, CD. Ehlermann, 'The Contribution Of EC Competition Policy To The Single 
Market", (1992) 29 CML Rev 257, 2 7 ~ - 2 7 7 . . With regard to the effects of State owned undertakings on 
the competitive process and the activation of Article 86 (ex 90) see, Case C - ~ ~ 1i83 I t a ~ l ' ' \' Commission 
[1985] ECR 873, [1985] 2 CMLR 368; Case C - ~ 1 1 9 0 0 Hofner-Elser \' Macrotron [1991] ECR 1979, 
[1993] ~ ~ CMLR 306; Case C-20:2'88 France \' Commission (Terminal Directives) [1991] ECR 1-1223: 
CasL' C-3:20/91 Palll Corbeau [1993] ECR 2533. [1995] ~ ~ CMLR 621. 
157 The principal \\'L'akness in the Court's judgment in Contincntal Can was that it did not e m p o w . e ~ ~ the 
Commission to prohibit concentrations giving risc to the creation of nc\\ dominant POSItions. 
R l ' ~ l I l a t i o n n ~ 0 6 ~ ~ 89 (OJ 1989 L3 l H/1) which came into force in September 1990, gave the Commission 
s u ~ h h pO\\'L'\'s. Sl'L' M. Siragusa and R. Subiotto, "The EEC Merger Control Regulations: The 
('ulllmission's Ivolving CasL' Law", (1991) 28 C.\IL Re\' 877. 
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interbrand competition. In applying a rule of reason analysis the US authorities are 
more tolerant of these restrictions. 
In Europe, however, competition policy has always had wide policy objectiyes. From 
the outset, there has always been the task of balancing contradictory objectives. Not 
only has European Competition Policy been concerned with efficiency it had also 
embraced equity and fairness in the market place. Above all, market unification has 
been central to policy. Unlike domestic legal systems, therefore, importance has been 
attached to intrabrand competition because of its market integrative effect. Parallel 
trading and passive selling is encouraged. Substantive focus has centred on agreements 
or restraints designed to fragment the market. More recently, as the Single Market 
reaches completion, questions about the proper function and purpose of competition 
policy have been asked. In particular whether a more economic based approach to 
vertical restraint should be adopted. Economic analysis should be welcomed. 
However, this does not mean that concerns associated with market integration will not 
arise in the future. The " ... du jure integration of the Community's market does not 
automatically create de facto integration". 158 In short, incentives will continue to exist 
to encourage undertakings to Increase profitability through market 
compartlnentalisation. Finally, the expected expansion of the EU eastwards may also 
reinvigorate the integrative imperative. 
I'iS See D.l Gerber, note 154 above, 145. 
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RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Occasionally, issues of modest importance in themselves became symbolic of a broader 
difference of view between contending schools or ideologies".1 Over the years resale 
price maintenance (RPM), which is really only of modest legal significance, has proved to 
be contentious and controversial in that it encapsulates the very essence of competing 
ideological views of antitrust. RPM arises when manufacturer and dealer agree to set a 
floor on resale prices in order to prevent price-cutting. In contrast, vertical maximum 
price fixing sets a ceiling on resale prices to prevent dealer price-gorging. While a degree 
of consensus exists amongst economists over the impact of maximum price fixing there is 
little agreement over the issue of minimum price fixing. For some RPM is essentially 
procompetitive and should be legal per se. The advocates of this approach stress that 
RPM can only be anticompetitive if it encourages horizontal collusion. This, however. 
rarely occurs and can be attacked as a separate violation of the antitrust laws. RPM is 
designed to create efficiency and not to limit output. As Bork writes "(w)hen a 
manufacturer wishes to impose resale price maintenance ... (its) motive cannot be the 
restriction of output and therefore can only be the creation of distributive efficiency".2 In 
contrast, others suggest that any restrictions placed on the freedom of independent outlets 
I R. Pitofsky, "'n Defense of Discounters: ThL' No-Frills Case for .. \ fa ,1.,,'(' Rule Against Vertical PriLl' 
I-'i\ing", (1983) 71 (l('o L./1-tX7. 
~ ~ R II. Bork, The Alltitrust farm/or (Rl'prlnt, Ncw York, 19(3) p.289 
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to determine their own pricing policy strikes at the very heart of the competitive process. 
In particular, it strikes a blow at those outlets whose marketing strategies embrace the 
concept of high turnover, low price and low service provision. Ultimately, according to 
this view, RPM arrests the development of product distribution. 
A number of pro competitive justifications have been advanced for the imposition of 
RPM. It is argued, firstly, that RPM guarantees profit margins and insulates the dealer 
from competitive activity designed to erode margins between wholesale and retail prices. 
Historically, traditional outlets (chemists, grocers) faced this erosion as a result of the 
arrival of pre-packaged branded products and large chain stores capable of selling 
products at a discount as a result of bulk purchasing.3 Secondly, RPM facilitates market 
entry. The lure of generous profit margins attracts outlets, which might not otherwise be 
available, to market the products of new or prospective suppliers. Thirdly, this type of 
restraint can be used to divert competition from price to service provision. In so doing it 
overcomes the problem of sub-optimal dealer investment by preventing intrabrand free 
riding. Consumers benefit because they receive a mix of price competition and service 
provision.4 Fourthly, the imposition of resale prices prevents large retail outlets from 
driving locally owned outlets out of business because of their inability to compete on 
price. Local communities are not deprived therefore, of cultural diversity and competition 
at the retail level. Finally, prestigious and reputable outlets perform the role of product 
certification.5 By stocking a particular brand the outlet certifies that it is a product of 
repute and quality. RPM prevents outlets from selling products as loss leaders in order to 
; B.S Varney "The Ori!!.ins of Resale Price Maintenance: A Study Of Three Branches of ReLlii Trade", 
- ' ~ ~
( 1 9 5 . ~ ) ) ( ) ~ ~ Ec J 522. 
·1 L.S Tcsler, "Wh\" Should f\ LlIlufacturers Want Fair Trade?"', (1960) 3 .JL Ec 86 
~ ~ H.P Man'cl & S. f \ l c C l 1 r e r t ~ . . "Resale Price f\laintenance and Quality CertIfication", (19S-t) 15 Rand.J 
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increase store traffic. This might damage the reputation of the product and limit its access 
to other stores, as high service providers will be reluctant to stock a product being sold 
elsewhere at discounted prices. 
In contrast others point to the possible anticompetitive effects of RPM. Firstly, if such a 
practice becomes widespread, discount stores may be unable to obtain well known, high 
quality branded products. This may form an obstacle to the internal growth and spread of 
such outlets depriving consumers of new and innovative alternatives in product 
distribution.6 Secondly, it seems the restriction on intrabrand price competition results in 
the general elevation of prices to the final consumer. Thirdly, the general applicability, 
significance and frequency of the free rider rationale is questioned. As consumers 
generally pay for post sale services the concept of free riding relates primarily to pre-sale 
services. The need for RPM to induce this type of service provision is questionable. 
Producers can charge for their services, on a refundable fee basis, depending on whether 
the product is purchased or not. Alternatively, manufacturers can pay the dealer to 
provide the requisite services. Indeed, informative advertising can also reduce the need 
for pre-sale services. RPM may simply result in knowledgeable consumers paying for a 
service they do not require. The restraint, therefore, advances sectional interests to the 
detriment of the totality of consumer welfare.7 Fourthly, RPM acts as a disincentive to 
innovate and create efficiencies in product distribution. It, therefore, protects the 
inefficient from their inefficiencies. Finally, it may be used as an instrument to police 
dealer and manufacturers' cartels.8 
6 R.L. Steiner, "'The Nature of Vertical Restraints", (1985) .30 Antitrust B I-U. 
,. k d "R I P' 11.'1' t c 111d Arlll'trlist I ) q l l ' t ' ~ , , , , , (198.") '\ 7 \V.S. Cornanor & lB. I(lr'\\OO, esae rice Iv:lInenan e , ' '" . 
('ontemporarl' Polin' Issues 9. 
K S.l. Ornstein, "Resak Price ~ ~ Llintenance and Cartels", (198.") 30 Intilrust B -.to I. 
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In spite of the on-going economic debate the US treats horizontal and vertical minimum 
price fixing as per se violations of the Sherman Act. Recently, the Supreme Court 
changed its stance over maximum price fixing concluding that these arrangements should 
be analysised under the rule of reason. In the EU the imposition of resale prices falls foul 
of Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1» EC and is invariably ineligible for exemption. The following 
sections the way in which the law in the US and EU has developed. 
II. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RPM IN THE US 
A. Minimum Resale Price Maintenance 
RPM in both historical and legal terms is of relatively recent origin. Its common law 
background, while rather mixed and unsettled, seems to indicate that such price restraints 
were initially protected by the law.9 However, early American case law under the 
Sherman Act 1890 reversed the position. In 1908, for example, the case of Bobbs-Merill 
Co v lsidor Strauss & Nathan Strauss 10 came before the Supreme Court. The appellants 
brought an action against the respondents trading as RH Macy & Co to restrain the sale of 
a copyrighted novel entitled "The Castaway" from being sold at retail at less than one 
dollar for each copy. Printed below the usual copyright was a notice inserted by the 
appellants to the effect that no dealer was licensed to sell the book below the maintained 
price. Any such sale would be treated as an infringement of copyright. The respondents, 
however. sold the books for 89 cents per copy. It was held by the Court that the copyright 
l) See, for example, Fml'!c \' Park 131 U,S. 88 (1889), .fohn D Park & .\'u//\ Co \'\tlf/o!la/ jl'ho/esa/l' 
D r u ~ ~ i s / s s . . ·Iss 'n 17:" N. Y. I, 67 N .E. 136 (1903); Flliman \' Carrington ( 1901) 2 eh. Div. 27::-' For a bfld 
r e \ i ~ ' ~ ' ' of till' Common La\\' background to RPM see J.c. Peppin, "Price 1 1 \ 1 1 l g . \ : : I ~ e l l 1 e n t ' - , , t Inoer the 
Sherman :\l1ti- I"rust Law", (1940) ]8 Cui L Re\' 297. 
10 210 lJS")39 (I 90S). 
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statute secured to the copyright holder the right to sell the books. This privilege, hov;e\.er. 
was exercised and extinguished by the holder upon sale. The Court also emphasised that 
it was not the purpose of the law to grant the further right to qualify the title future 
purchasers may acquire by means of such printed notices affixed to books. This would 
simply secure privileges not intended to be included in the copyright statute. 
In 1913 the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia presented a question to the 
Supreme Court relating to the right of a patentee to limit by notice the price at which a 
patented article may be resold. In the case of Bauer & Cie and the Bauer Chemical Co v 
James 0 'DonneU 11 Bauer & Cie, a Berlin company, owned a patent relating to a product 
known as "Sanatogen". The German company traded in the United States under the nanle 
Bauer Chemical Company. This New York based company sold the product to both trade 
and public bearing a notice to the effect that it should not be sold at a price below one 
dollar. Any sale in violation of this notice was to be treated as a patent infringement, 
rendering such persons liable to injunction and damages. James O'Donnell, the owner of 
a drug store, purchased the product from the New York based company. To increase 
profitability he sold the product below the stipulated price. In consequence the appellants 
severed business relations. However, he still managed to obtain the same product from 
jobbers in the District of Columbia and continued to embrace his price cutting marketing 
strategy. The question before the Supreme Court, in essence, was whether 0' Donnell's 
business activities constituted a patent infringement. The Court answered the question in 
the negati ve stating 
II 22911.S. I ( 1 9 1 ~ ) . .
" ... it was the intention of Congress to secure an exclusive right to sell. 
and there is no grant of a privilege to keep up prices and prevent 
competition by notices restricting the price at which the article may be 
resold". 12 
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While these cases indicate the general attitude of the Supreme Court to such restraints. 
they were nevertheless primarily concerned with the construction of particular statutes. 
The first case, however, specifically concerned with RPM to reach the Supreme Court 
was that of Dr Miles Medical Co v John D Park & Sons CO.13 Here Dr Miles Medical 
Corporation, based in Indiana, was engaged in the manufacture and sale of proprietary 
medicines prepared by means of a secret formula and identified by distinctive packaging, 
labels and trademarks. Its business practice was to distribute its products through 
wholesalers or jobbers and retail druggists. As a result, however, of cut rate price 
competition from Department stores, the corporation felt its business sales and reputation 
had suffered. To protect its sales and goodwill the corporation developed a method of 
controlling the sales and marketing of its remedies. It required its 400 wholesale dealers 
and 25,000 retail dealers to enter into purported contracts of agency. Thus distributors, if 
selling to another party for the purpose of resale, were obliged to sell only to approved 
dealers. Furthermore, sales could only be made at prices dictated by the manufacturer. 
John D Park & Son, however, refused to enter into any such arrangement. In consequence 
they could not become an approved dealer. In spite of this. they still managed to procure 
the said proprietary medicine and sell it below the maintained price. 
121bidat 17. 
D 220 LJ S 373 (1911) 
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The complainants alleged that John D Park & Son had maliciously interfered with its 
contractual relationships with third parties. It had done so by procuring medicines for sale 
at cut prices and by inducing those who had become approved dealers to \'iolate their 
contractual restrictions. 
The US Supreme Court, however, affirmed the decision of the US Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which dismissed the complainant's action. It did so for a number of reasons. 
First, the Supreme Court stated that the contracts described as agency were, in effect, 
contracts of sale disguised in the mask of agency. In the words of Mr Justice Hughes 
" ... the advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the 
dealers. The enlarged profits which would result from adherence to 
the established rates would go to them, and not to the complainant. ... 
If there be an advantage to the manufacturer in the maintenance of 
fixed retail prices, the question remains whether it is one which he is 
entitled to secure by agreement restricting the freedom of trade on the 
part of dealers who own what they sell. As to this the complainant 
can fare no better with its plan of identical contracts than could the 
dealers themselves if they formed a combination and endeavoured to 
establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by 
. h h h ,,14 agreement WIt eac ot er . 
In short. the imposition of RPM by producers, simply prevents intrabrand prIce 
competition in much the same way as an illegal horizontal comhination of distrihutors. 
11 Ibid at ·H)7. 
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As horizontal price fixing is illegal per se, it follows that vertical price fixing should also 
be unlawful. The Court also seems to have based its judgment on the tenets of property 
law. It observed that simply because a producer decides to manufacture and sell a 
particular product, that in itself, does not confer upon that producer the right to impose 
every sort of restriction. Quoting from the case of Park v Hartman l5 the Court stated 
" ... a general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid. The right 
of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general 
property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been 
generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best 
subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand 
to hand. General restraints in the alienation of articles, things, chattels 
except when a very special kind of property is involved ... have been 
generally held void".16 
Once a producer has sold its product at prices which are satisfactory to itself the consumer 
is then entitled to whatever advantage may be gained from subsequent competition. The 
importance of property law, in relation to vertical restraints, was also emphasised in the 
1967 Supreme Court case of US v Arnold, Schwinn & CO. 17 Admittedly, this case was 
concerned with non-price vertical restraints. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court was at 
pains to emphasise that when a " ... manufacturer parts with dominion over (its) product or 
transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over its destiny or the 
15 I ~ ~ L.R.A. (N.S.) 14(), 153 Fed. 2·l 
16 220 U.S. at 440. 
17 3XX US 365 (1967). 
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condition of its resale". 18 To be otherwise would amount to a violation of the ancient rule 
against restraints on alienation. 
It becomes apparent, then, that the Supreme Court in rendering RPM illegal per se was 
not concerned with the arguments of an economic nature relating to these intrabrand 
restraints. Indeed, inspite of repeated attacks on the principles enunciated in Dr Miles it 
still represents the current state of law in the US. Any attempt to impose minimum RPM 
by a manufacturer on its distributors amounts to a violation of the Sherman Act. In spite 
of this, however, large-scale business used various strategies in an attempt to circumvent 
these principles. As a result, various exceptions soon emerged. In 1919 the Supreme 
Court decision of US v Colgate & Co 19 created confusion and doubt as to the continuing 
vitality of Dr Miles. On the facts, the Colgate Corporation was engaged in the 
manufacture of soap and toiletry articles. As a result of certain business behaviour it was 
indicted for alleged Sherman Act violations. It was alleged that a vertical combination 
existed between Colgate and its wholesale and retail distributors. The object of the 
combination was simply to ensure the distributors compliance to the resale prices fixed by 
Colgate. However, the indictment was " ... couched in rather vague and general 
I " 20 anguage . Technically, it failed to allege that any agreement which existed was 
unlawful. The Supreme Court stated that it 
" ... must conclude that ... the indictment does not charge Colgate & Co 
with selling its products to dealers under agreements which obligated 
,. 1 I 
the latter not to resell except at prices fixed by the company .-
18 Ibid at 379. 
19 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
!() Ibid at 302 
~ I I Ibid at 307. 
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In the absence of such agreements, a producer is entitled to stipulate resale prices and to 
refuse to deal with any distributor which refuses to adhere to those prices. Such unilateral 
action cannot fall foul of S 1 Sherman Act which requires some form of concerted action. 
In the words of Mr Justice McReynolds 
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the 
act does not restrict the long-recognized right of trader or 
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to 
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he 
will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the 
circumstances under which he will refuse to deal".22 
In 1926 the concept of agency was also successfully utilised as a means of circumventing 
the per se illegality of RPM. The case of US v General Electric23 has a rather long 
history. In brief, prior litigation had taken place between the US Government and General 
Electric and 32 other corporations. This litigation was terminated when a consent decree 
was entered into; the defendants agreeing to refrain from fixing resale prices. As a result, 
General Electric developed new methods of distribution for which it sought the approval 
of the Attorney General. He, however, refused to comment upon the legality of the new 
methods of distribution. In spite of this, General Electric implemented its new system. Its 
plan was to distribute its electric lamps, which were produced under patent, by dividing its 
trade into three classes. The first method of distribution involved General Electric's own 
sales representatives selling directly to its own customers. The second method of 
'! Ibid. 
2J 272 U.S. 47() ( 1 l ) ~ 6 ) . .
distribution involved the use of so called "B" agents to sell to its large customers. Finally. 
"A" agents were also used to sell directly to customers. 
The contract between General Electric and its agents provided inter alia that title to the 
property was to remain with General Electric until the product was sold to the customer: 
"risk" was to remain with the principal - General Electric; the agent was to be reimbursed 
by means of commission; sale proceeds were to be accounted for to the principal 
irrespective of receipt of the same by the agent. Agents were also obliged to sell at 
minimum prices set by the principal. The government argued that this system of 
distribution was simply a guise to enable the Electric Company to fix the resale prices of 
lamps in the hands of purchasers. The so- called agents were, in fact, independent 
wholesale and retail merchants. In contrast, General Electric, contended that its 
distributors were bona fide agents and that it had the legal right to market its lamps 
through such agent and at prices prescribed by it. The Supreme Court recognised that the 
plan was doubtless intended to prevent sales by middlemen to consumers at competing 
prices. 24 However, distinguishing Dr Miles, the Supreme Court found that the contracts 
between General Electric and its distributors were, in fact, contracts of Agency. As a 
result, therefore, property in the goods remained with the principal. Any sale, therefore, 
by the agent could not amount to a resale. In the words of Chief lustice Taft, the ..... 
owner of an article ... is not violating the common law or the Anti-Trust Law by seeking 
to dispose of his articles directly to the consumer and fixing the price by which his agents 
transfer the title from hin1 directly to such consumers".25 Obviously. then, selling by 
~ I I Ibid at 479. 
1) Ibid at ·l88. 
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means of agency or consignment enabled the producer to retain control of the product and 
dictate resale price. 
These major decisions by the Supreme Court appeared to provide a means to enable 
business to circumvent the principles of Dr Miles. At State level, lobbying campaigns 
conducted by retailers and manufacturers under the banner of the "Fair Trade Movement" 
exerted pressure on State legislatures to pass laws which enabled producers to practice 
RPM. This eventually came about in California in 1931 with the enactment of the 
California Fair Trade Act. However, this particular Act was severely limited in that 
producers could only enforce RPM against those distributors with whom there was a 
contextual nexus. As a result the Act was subsequently amended to overcome this 
particular problem by the inclusion of a "non-signer" clause. That is, once a producer 
established contractually agreed resale prices with a distributor, it became illegal for other 
distributors (even if not contractually bound to the producer) to undercut the contractually 
agreed resale price. Legislation of this nature proliferated. Yet, State law by its very 
definition, is not applicable to interstate commerce. In 1937, therefore, Congress passed 
the Miller-Tydings Act. RPM agreements on trade marked products, therefore, were 
exempted from violations of the Federal Antitrust laws provided the agreement was 
lawful under State "fair trading" laws and the product was in free and open competition 
with other products of the same class. It was also assumed that the Miler-Tydings Act 
also bound "non signers" in a similar fashion to certain States fair trade laws. However. 
in the 1951 case of Schwegmann Bros v Calvert Distillers Corp26 six members of t h ~ ~
Suprenle Court refused to read a "non-signers" clause into the Act. In the \ ' i ~ \ \ ' ' or the 
Court, such clauses were unconstitutional and, in any event. the l\ lilkr- T y d i n g ~ ~ -\ct 
21, ,41 U.S. -,X4 (195 I). 
applied specifically to contracts or agreements only. In 1952, however, Congress 
responded by passing the McGuire Act which specifically over-ruled the Schwegmann 
decision and allowed producers to bind non-signers. In 1964 in the case of Hudson 
Distributors Inc v Upjohn C027 the Supreme Court confirmed that the purpose of the 
McGuire Act was to ensure that the State fair trade laws including the non-signers 
provision with regard to interstate transactions, did not constitute a violation of the 
Sherman Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
The Colgate doctrine, the concept of agency as stated in the General Electric case and the 
State's fair trade laws are indicative of the fluctuating nature of RPM. In some measure 
they circumvented the principles of per se illegality enunciated in Dr Miles. The reach of 
these exceptions, however, were restricted by the Supreme Court in a number of 
decisions. 
The unilateral right of a producer to refuse to deal with those distributors which failed to 
adhere to stated resale prices was, as a result of a number of Supreme Court decisions, 
narrowly confined. In 1920 in US v Schrader's Son Inc28 a producer of components was 
indicted for entering into price fixing agreements with retailers, jobbers and other 
manufacturers. The District Court, believing that the principles enunciated in Dr Miles 
and Colgate were merely a distinction without a difference, applied the principles of 
The Colgate to the facts of the case and dismissed the action against the defendant. 
Supren1e Court reversed this decision stating 
~ 7 7 377 US. 386 (1964). 
~ s s ~ ) ~ ~ US. 85 (1 9 '::>0). 
"The Court below misapprehended the meanmg and effect of the 
opinion and judgment in (Colgate). We had no intention to overrule 
or modify the doctrine in Dr Miles ... where the effort was to destroy 
the dealers' independent discretion through restrictive agreements".29 
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The Court acknowledged that a producer will not violate antitrust laws if it merely" ... 
indicates his wishes concerning prices and declines further dealings with all who fail to 
observe them".30 However, this is not the case when a producer enters into agreement 
which may be either express or implied from a course of dealings or other circumstances. 
As a result of Schrader the Court could readily imply the existence of an agreement. In 
terms of its commercial use, therefore, the Colgate doctrine was rather limited. The fatal 
agreement may be readily inferred simply if the producer discusses his price structure 
with the distributor or if the latter gives its unsolicited assurance to abide by the producers 
prices. The fact that an agreement may be readily implied was confirmed in 1921, in the 
case of Frey & Son Inc v Cudahy Packing CO. 31 Here the plaintiff instituted a treble 
damage action alleging that the defendant and its jobbers conspired to maintain resale 
prices in violation of the antitrust laws. The District Court held for the plainti tT. The 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision concluding that there was no formal 
written or oral agreement for the maintenance of prices. 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals and referred to the S'chrader 
decision stating that 
29 Ibid at 99. 
lOll' i )I( . 
11 ~ . " ( ) ) U.S. 208 (1921). 
"The latter (case) distinctly stated that the essential agreement, 
combination, or conspiracy might be implied from a course of dealing 
or other circumstance. Having regard to the course of dealing and all 
the pertinent facts disclosed by the present record, we think whether 
there existed lawful combination or agreement between the 
manufacturer and jobbers was a question for the jury to decide, and 
that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred when it held otherwise. ,,32 
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The gradual narrowing of the Colgate decision was also assisted by the decision in the 
Federal Trade Commission v Beech-Nut Packing Co. 33 Here Beech-Nut refused to sell its 
products to any of its distributors if it failed to observe its stipulated prices. Indeed, it 
refused to sell to wholesalers who sold to retailers who refused to observe or adhere to its 
price structures. To ensure compliance to its price structure Beech-Nut adopted various 
strategies. It used special agents adept in the use of coercive methods, product code 
numbers and a system of reporting to detect those in breach of its stated policy. Once 
detected a defaulting distributor would be excluded from the distribution network and 
only reinstated if assurances were given to the effect that it would adhere to the declared 
pricing policy. Beech-Nut alleged that its activities were perfectly legitimate under the 
Colgate doctrine. The Supreme Court, however, held otherwise. The Beech-Nut system 
of distribution went " ... far beyond the simple refusal to sell goods to person who will not 
sell at stated prices which in the Colgate case was held to be within the legal rights of the 
producer".34 Moreover, the fact that express contracts did not exist between the producer 
and its distributors was irrelevant in this case. The methods by which Beech-Nut secured 
12 Ibid at 110. 
1.1 257 U.S. 441 ( 1 9 ~ 2 ) . .
,-I Ibid at 454. 
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adherence to its resale prices sufficiently suppressed freedom of competition among its 
distributors. These methods were quite as effective as agreements express or implied. By 
adopting such methods, Beech-Nut was enabled " ... to prevent competition in all their 
subsequent dispositions by preventing all who (did) not sell at resale prices fixed by it 
from obtaining its goods".35 
Accordingly, not only can agreements express or implied fall foul of antitrust laws, but 
also the methods by which a producer secures adherence to its resale prices (beyond a 
mere refusal to sell to a distributor who fails to adhere to its stated resale policy) may also 
constitute an antitrust infringement. 36 This point was forcefully stated by Justice Brennan 
in US v Parke, Davis & C037 
"When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere 
announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he 
employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices ... he 
has put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act". 38 
Any affirmative action, therefore, designed to secure a distributors adherence to stated 
resale prices effectively means that the product " ... comes packaged in a competition free 
wrapping - a valuable feature in itself - by virtue of concerted action induced by the 
f: " 39 manu acturer . 
15 Ibid at 455. 
'(' Sec also, in this respect, L S \' Bausch (\': Lomb Optical Co 321 U.S. 707 ( 1944) . 
. 17)«2 U.S. 29 (1960). 
,S Ibid at 44 . 
. 19 Ibid at -17. 
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Having confined the scope of a producer's unilateral right to refuse to deal with 
distributors, the Supreme Court also attempted to confine the scope of agency or 
consignment. Congressional investigations were conducted into marketing methods 
utilised in various industries.4o Certain industries, in particular the petroleum industry. 
used agency or consignment as a means to maintain prices. This had the effect. with 
regard to the petroleum industry, that service station operators effectively lost their 
independent business status. Their selling prices, for example, and therefore their gross 
margin of profits were within the control and determination of the major oil companies. 
The latter justified their particular methods of distribution by advancing those arguments 
traditionally proffered for RPM. That is, such arrangements are designed to protect 
dealers profit margins to ensure a competitive relationship between dealer's prices and 
those of competitors. However, serious doubts were cast on this particular form of 
commercial arrangement in 1964 by the Supreme Court decision of Simpson v Union Oil 
CO. 41 This was a private, treble damage, antitrust case brought by Richard Simpson. The 
complaint developed as a result of Simpson's consignment agreement under which he 
sold petrol on behalf of Union Oil. The agreement was for a specific period terminable by 
either party. In any event, the said agreement would cease upon termination of the lease 
to the Petrol Station owned by Union Oil and let to Simpson. The renewal of the lease 
was, in effect, dependant upon observance of the conditions contained in the consignment 
agreement. The latter agreement gave Union oil the right to set the price of petrol sold by 
Sinlpson. Moreover, the Oil Company retained ownership of the petrol. Simpson, for his 
part was to insure for property damage incurred as a result of the consigned petrol. He 
was paid by nleans of commission. During a specific period. the Oil Company fixed 
-10 IIR Rep No 1958. 85th Cong 2d Scss: S Rep No 1555. 85th Cong 2d Sess. 
-II '77tJS 1 ~ ( 1 9 6 4 ) . .
resale prices at 29.9 cents per gallon. As a result of competitive pressures Simpson felt 
the need to sell the petrol at 27.9 cents. In consequence, Union Oil refused to renew the 
lease and the consignment agreement was thereby terminated. The Supreme Court 
adopted a different approach to that of the District Court and Court of Appeals. It stated 
that it had made it clear in the previous case law that a producer or supplier may not use 
coercive methods to achieve resale price maintenance. Moreover, it did not matter what 
form of coercive device or method was used. Failing to renew Simpson's lease was 
simply a coercive means of ensuring RPM. The Court stated 
"By reason of the lease and 'consignment' agreement dealers are 
coercively laced into an arrangement under which their supplier is 
able to impose non-competitive prices on thousands of persons whose 
prices might otherwise be competitive. The evil of this resale price 
maintenance program, ... is its inexorable potentiality for and even 
certainty in destroying competition in retail sales of gasoline by these 
nominal 'consignees' who are in reality small struggling competitors 
k..l " 42 see lng retal gas customers . 
While the Court recognised the important function agency or consignment played in trade 
or commerce, it emphasised that no matter how lawful these matter may be in terms of 
private contract law they must give way before federal antitrust laws. As such, agency or 
consignment could not be used as a "cloak" to avoid antitrust. If it were otherwise they 
I .,·n It 
would simply furnish" .. , a wooden formula for administering prices on a \'ast sea e . -
1'lbidat2l, 
.11 Ibid at 22 
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would be possible to achieve by vertical means that which is unlawful per se when 
competitors combine to fix prices. To allow this eventuality would be to make legality for 
antitrust purposes tum on clever draughtsmanship. The Supreme Court refused to let a 
matter so vital to the competitive process rest on such easy manipulation. It stated that the 
case of General Electric with its "special factors" involving the distribution of patented 
products was not apposite to the facts of Union Oil. The Court, therefore, distinguished 
General Electric on the basis that its rationale rested on patent law. 
Attempts to circumvent the per se illegality of RPM have been confined by the Court to 
very narrow margins. Even the fair trade laws were effectively repealed when Congress 
passed the Consumer Goods Pricing Act 1975. This effectively restored per se illegality 
to those products which had previously been fair traded. In fact, the Supreme Court in 
one of the most fundamental American cases in the area of non-price vertical restraints, 
Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc,44 emphasised that vertical price restraints were 
still to be treated as illegal per se. The Court stated that the per se " ... illegality of price 
restrictions (had) been established firmly for many years (because it) involves 
significantly different questions of analysis" .45 In spite of this, those with differing 
ideological perspectives over the nature of RPM, continue to do battle over its illegality. 
For some, it represents the last fortress of traditional antitrust analysis. Periodic attempts 
are, therefore, made to challenge its current status. Indeed, in the case of Monsanto Co \' 
Spray-Rite Service Corp46 the Department of Justice, by way of amicus brief. requested 
the Supren1e Court to reconsider the per se illegality of RPM. The Court, however, 
categorically refused to consider the request. Indeed, the request actually precipitated 
44 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ U.S .. ,6 (1977). 
I' Ibid at 51 Il 18. 
II, 465 U.S 752 (1984). 
81 
much Congressional anger. Congress stated that it had demonstrated its intent, with 
regard to RPM, by abolishing the fair trade laws by enacting the Consumer Goods Pricing 
Act 1975. It therefore took steps to prevent the Department of Justice from using its 
appropriation funds to achieve this end. 
B. Maximum Resale Price Maintenance 
The imposition of maximum resale pnces was condemned as per se violative of the 
Sherman Act in the 1968 case of Albrecht v Herald Co. 47 The case involved a treble 
damage action by a newspaper distributor or carrier against the publisher of the Globe 
Democrat, a morning newspaper. Each newspaper contained a retail price, printed on it. 
Albrecht, adhered initially to the publishers pricing policy. Eventually. however, the 
carrier charged more than the maximum advertised price. The Supreme Court, in holding 
the setting of maximum resale prices to be per se unlawful stated 
" ... by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the 
forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude upon the 
ability of (distributors) to compete and survive in (the) market".48 
Furthermore, 
"Maximum pnces may be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish 
services essential to the value which goods have for the consumer or 
~ 7 1 9 0 0 u.s. 14) ( 1968). 
IS Ibid at 1 )2. 
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to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire and for 
which they are willing to pay.... Moreover if the actual price charged 
under a maximum price scheme is nearly the fixed maximum price ... 
the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an arrangement fixing 
minimum prices".49 
This remained the position, however, until November 1997 when the US Supreme Court 
in the case of State Oil Co v Khan50 reversed the Albrecht decision. Here Barkat Khan 
leased from the State Oil Company a petrol station and retail shop. The agreement 
between the two parties provided that State Oil would supply Khan with petrol for sale at 
a recommended resale price. Built into the recommended price was a profit margin 
available to Khan of 3.25 cents per gallon sold. Two further points should be made. 
Firstly, Khan was permitted under the agreement to sell petrol at any price. However 
should the actual sale price exceed the recommended price Khan was obliged to repay the 
excess to State Oil in the form of rebate. Secondly, Khan was also permitted to sell petrol 
below the recommended price. Should this occur, however, Khan's profit margin of 3.25 
cents per gallon sold was reduced proportionately. In effect, a maximum resale price was 
set. 
As a result of Khan's non-payment of rent the State Oil Company took legal action to 
seek Khan's eviction and to terminate the lease. Khan defended his position hy alleging 
that the mposition of maximum resale prices affected his profitability and was, in any 
event, per se illegal under S.l Sherman Act. The District Court for the Northern District 
1') Ibid ;11 1 ~ 2 - 1 5 ~ . .
"ill " ")") US 3 ( 19(7). 
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of Illinois, however, held in favour of the State Oil Company. In its view the pricing 
provisions in the agreement did not amount to a per se violation of the Sherman Act as 
they did not have the requisite pernicious effect on competition. Khan appealed the 
decision to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals5J which felt compelled to follow the Supreme 
Court's decision in Albrecht and reversed the decision below. The matter then proceeded 
to the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, known for her pro-Chicagoan leanings, 
delivered the unanimous verdict of the Court. 52 She stated that per se illegality is reserved 
for those arrangements or restraints which have predictable, pernicious anticompetitive 
effects. In the unanimous view of the Court the imposition of vertical maximum price 
restraints, while they may cause dealers to change suppliers, did not harm consumers or 
competition to the extent necessary to justify per se illegality. The Supreme Court, 
therefore, reversed the Albrecht decision and held that vertical maximum price fixing 
should now be evaluated under the rule of reason. In this analysis the Court should 
consider such matters as the nature, effect and history of the restraint as well as the type of 
business concerned. 
For some this is a particularly significant antitrust decision. In reality, however, the full 
implications of State Oil are not exactly clear. Three points can be made. Firstly, while 
the Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission and the American Association of 
Manufacturers supported the change, many urged that per se illegality in this area should 
be maintained. 53 In fact, over thirty Federal States and associations of retailers and 
dealers argued that any change in the legal status of maximum price fixing \\"l)uld render 
~ I I 93 F. 3d 13)8, 1996 US App LEXIS ~ ~ 5 0 4 . . ..... .. . 1 \' 
52 Sec, for example, Justice O'Connor's Opinion in the case of .!d!l'rsot/ Parish ffoSplla/, n l \ / ~ / ( { ~ U U - . 
Ihde 466 U.S. :2 (198.Q where she ~ I r g u e d d for the abandonment of the per Sf! treatment of tlt.:-II1S III I,}\ llllf of 
a l ~ ~ <IppruJch based on the rule of reason. ..", . I " ~ J J Sec. for c , \ ~ l I l 1 p l e , , D.F. Broder S: K.J. Perra. "State 011 Co \ Khan, 1998 E( LR ~ ~ .1 9. 
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dealers and retailers subject to the coercive powers of powerful suppliers. Secondly. it 
seems that the laws in relation to horizontal fixing of maximum prices remains 
unchanged. In 1951, for example, in the case of Kiefer-Stewart Co v Seagram & Sons54 
the US Supreme Court held that joint action taken by a group of affiliated distillers to 
ensure that their wholesalers did not exceed a specified price, with regard to the sale of 
alcohol, amounted to an illegal horizontal maximum price fixing conspiracy. The 
Supreme Court confirmed the position more recently in the 1982 case of Arizona \' 
Maricopa County Medical Socss , where horizontal price fixing agreements did not escape 
per se condemnation. Finally, it also seems to be the case that State Oil does not efTect 
the per se illegality of minimum price fixing. In which case, some may assert, State Oil is 
just another exercise in barren formalism. Whether this is the case only time will tell. 
What is, perhaps, more certain is that the scope of per se illegality in US antitrust has 
been contracted even further. Moreover, one can anticipate further efforts to reduce its 
scope in the area of minimum RPM. 
III. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF RPM IN THE EU 
A. Resale Price Maintenance: An Overview 
In the EU the Court and the Commission have examined systems of pri\'ate and public 
RPM. The former can involve individual and collective systems. In the case of 
individual RPM a producer makes agreements with its distributors as to the consumer 
price of a specific product. Collective systems arise when members of an association. for 
I · I . d' t 'b t s These systems arc enforced example. agree to impose resa e pnces on t lelr IS n u or . -
5 - 1 ~ 4 0 0 u.s. 211 (1951). 
~ , , 457 U.S. : n ~ ~ (I (nQ). 
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by the producer itself or collectively by the maintenance machinery set up by the 
association. Public systems arise when a Member State itself imposes resale prices on a 
specific product.56 In one of its earliest pronouncements on the subject the Commission 
stated that resale price maintenance was essentially a matter for Member States national 
competition policy. Provided national systems were confined to " ... compelling retailers 
in a member state to respect certain prices for the resale within that State of products 
supplied by a manufacturer established on that market..." trade between Member States 
would not be affected. 57 The Commission, stressed, however, that this would only be the 
case provided national systems were not used to prevent or stem the flow of parallel 
imports. Consumers and traders should remain free to purchase goods anywhere in the 
Community at the most favourable prices. Shortly after this statement the Commission, in 
a series of cases, expanded upon its position. 
In the 1973 case of Deutsche Philips GmbH58 German law permitted a manufacturer of 
electric razors to impose resale prices on its dealers. The German undertaking, however, 
obliged its dealers to sell its products to consumers in other Member States at the prices 
lawfully fixed in Germany. Furthermore, German retailers were also obliged to charge 
the maintained price when reselling goods manufactured by Deutsche Philips and 
reimported from other Member States. This prevented German retailers from entering 
into price competition with other German retailers in respect of goods reimported into 
Gern1any. The Commission concluded that these arrangements infringed Article 81 (1) 
(ex 85(1)) and were ineligible for exemption. In the view of the Commission, reimport 
56 r:. eral overview of RPM in the ELI see D.G. Gon!er, EC Competition Law (3,,1 edn. O\ford. 1998) OIagen ( '. ~ ~ "'8' lBrR J CI1 1 ~ ~ See also the Opinion of Advocate (rcneral \' erloren Van Themaat In Cases 4'. (u - allc 
''BBB \' Commission! 19X4] ('CR 19, [198)] I C ~ l L R R 27. 
57 FEe <.. 'ol11l11ission, First Repurt on Compelition Po/icT. 1971 (Brussels, 1972) p.6:2. 
58 ('0111111. Ike 731322 JO 1973 L:293 ',H). [1973] C ~ 1 L R R D241 
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price fixing could not be justified by the fact that it protected legally permissible national 
price fixing by preventing the sale of imported goods below stipulated Gem1an prices. 
While this may be advantageous to retailers in that they can still acquire the contract 
goods at favourable prices, thereby increasing their own profit margins, they remained 
unable to pass this advantage on to the consumer in the form of price reductions. This 
amounted to market sharing which was incompatible with the objectives of the Common 
Market and the rules of competition. 
The Commission made similar observations in the 1973 case of Dupont de Nemours 
(Deutschland) GmbH. 59 Here a contractual term in the standard form distribution 
agreement of a manufacturer of photographic and photochemical equipment requiring its 
German dealers to respect prices fixed by that manufacturer as regard reimported goods 
into Germany infringed Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1 )). However, the removal of this and other 
offending provisions enabled the Commission to grant negative clearance to the standard 
form agreements of Du Pont, a German subsidiary of the American Du Pont de Nemours 
group. 
In 1976 in Gerofabriek N0° the Commission examined the notified agreement of a Dutch 
manufacturer of silver-plated and stainless steel cutlery. Gero sold its highly successful 
product range in the Netherlands and Belgium. From 1925 its standard form agreements 
contained strict conditions in relation to a number of matters, in particular. resale prices. 
Dealers agreed not to sell Gero' s products above or below its indicated prices or to offer 
discounts or rebates of any kind. The Commission concluded that these arrangements 
59 COI11I11. Ike 7V196.1() 1973 LI94.27, [1973] C ~ l l ~ R R D226. 
(,0 COI11I11. DeL'. 77,M) OJ IlJ77 L16 X. [1977J 1 CMLR D3:'. 
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violated the prOVISIons of Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) and were ineligible for exemption. 
Imposed resale prices made it impossible for dealers to fix their own prices according to 
their own costs and commercial policy. This reduced the ability of undertakings to pass 
cost savings to the final consumer. Interestingly, the Commission concluded that RPM 
could influence trade between Member Sates by deflecting trade flows away from the 
channels it would naturally have taken if prices were fixed freely. RPM can impact, 
therefore, upon import and export patterns. The number of dealers affected (more than 
2000) and Gero's market share (50 per cent in the Netherlands and 15 per cent in 
Belgium) was sufficiently large for the adverse affect on trade between Member States to 
be appreciable. This contrasts with the more tolerant position previously adopted by the 
Commission. With regard to its Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) analysis, the Commission 
succinctly concluded that the imposed price obligations did not assist product distribution. 
They simply hindered dealers ability to compete. Even if this was not the case, however, 
RPM did not allow consumers a fair share of any hypothetical benefit since reseIIers were 
prevented from passing on any cost benefits. Nor was it clear to the Commission why 
RPM would be indispensable to the attainment of any alleged benefits. 
It is apparent, then, that action will be taken against agreements between supplier and 
dealer containing restrictions on resale prices, even if permissible under the legislation of 
a Member State, provided they affect trade between Member States and satisfy the other 
f A . 1 81 ( 85) 61 In uennessy-Henkelp2 the French undertaking conditions 0 rtiC e ex. 111 
Hennessy & Co, entered into an exclusive distribution arrangement with the German 
1>1 In Case I ~ 3 / 8 3 3 BNIC \' ('lair [1985] ECR 391, [1985] 2 CMLR ·UO the Court held that an agreement 
seHill!!, minimum prices for an interlllcdl;ltL' product \\as capable of affecting in.tra-Communl!: trade. t . ' \ . ~ n n
thOll!!,ll the product \\':-IS sold on the market of a single r-... kmber States. prm Ided It COil"! ltuted the r,l\\ 
mateCn;t! for another product sold elsewhere in the Community. 
( , ~ ~ Comm. Ike. S O ! I ~ 3 3 3 OJ 19S0 L3S3111. [1981J I C\lLR ()()I 
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undertaking Henkell & Co., for the distribution of Cognac in Germany. The agreement. 
concluded for a term of 25 years, was notified to the Commission in April 1971. 
Hennessy agreed not to supply any other customer with cognac, other than those 
stipulated in the agreement. Henkell was permitted to fix its resale prices for the German 
market although Hennessy retained supervisory control over the upper and lower 
parameters of the dealer's pricing structure. Should Henkell, therefore, wish to set its 
prices above cost plus 17 per cent or below cost plus 12 per cent it was necessary to 
obtain Hennessy's consent. Hennessy also guaranteed a profit margin of 25 per cent (later 
reduced to 18 per cent) and that the German market would be protected from parallel 
imports. In return, Henkell was obliged to use its best endeavours to promote the sale of 
cognac in Germany and to represent no other brand of cognac or wine based spirits. 
The Commission concluded that the exclusivity clauses relating to the sale and purchase 
of Hennessy's cognac and the non-compete clause prohibiting Henkell from directly or 
indirectly representing other brands infringed Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)). These restrictions 
were aggravated by the limitations imposed on Henkell' s freedom to set its own prices 
and Hennessy's undertakings to provide a guaranteed profit margin and protection from 
parallel imports. The agreement affected trade between Member States: firstly, Henkell 
became the sole direct importer of Hennessy's cognac into Germany unable to obtain the 
product from other French undertakings and incapable of selling other brands; secondly, it 
restricted parallel importation and finally, Henkell's inability to fix its own prices 
deflected trade flow from the directions it would naturally have taken. As Hennessy \\as 
one of the major three producers of cognac and the Federal Republic of Germany \\'as the 
world's third largest importer, the restriction on competition \Vas appreciable 63 
6.1 Ibid 14-15, 
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The Commission stated that the agreement could not benefit from Regulation 67/67 nor 
individual exemption. The Block Exemption was rendered inapplicable because the 
agreement contained restrictions relating to parallel importation and price competition not 
permissible under the Regulation.64 
With regard to individual exemption the Commission concluded that the requirements of 
Article 81 (3) (ex 85(3)) were simply not satisfied. The Commission stated that in order 
for the benefits of exclusive distribution to accrue, dealers must remain free to set their 
own prices on the basis of the cost of the products and according to prevailing market 
conditions. This was essential if Hennessy's products were to penetrate the market and to 
combat competition from other brands. Indeed, under the present arrangement consumers 
did not stand to benefit because Henkell was not free to pass on any cost savings in the 
form of price reductions. The imposition of RPM was simply not indispensable to the 
attainment of the objectives of the agreement. Hennessy's arguments that RPM was 
necessary to preserve the character of the product by preventing cut price selling and 
protecting brand name and product image were rejected by the Commission. Hennessy's 
arguments were undermined by its own business strategy in that it had not imposed RPM 
on distributors of its other luxury brands.65 
In 1978 the Commission considered the imposition of resale pnces III exclusive 
purchasing agreements in the Spices case.66 Here the three main supermarket chains in 
Belgium (GB-Inno-BM, Delhaize Freres and Sarma Penney Ltd) entered into modified 
exclusive purchasing agreements with Brooke Bond Liebig. The supermarkets agreed to 
I>.J Ibid I) 
6' Ibid 16-17. 
(,I> COIl11l1. Ike 7X'I72 OJ 1978 IS,'20, [1978] ~ ~ CMLR 116. 
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purchase from Brooke Bond all of their requirements for packaged spices intended for 
domestic consumption. They were, however, permitted to sell their own respective 
brands. In return for entering into these agreements, Brooke Bond imposed price 
restraints designed to guarantee each supermarket a minimum gross profit of 35 per cent 
on retail sales. The Commission took the view that these arrangements foreclosed access 
to the Belgian market and infringed Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1». This infraction was made all 
the more significant by the imposition of resale prices which prevented intrabrand price 
competition. These restrictions had an effect on the pattern of trade between Member 
States in that foreign spice producers, already established on the Belgian market, could 
not utilise the three main supermarket chains in order to expand their own network and 
producers seeking to gain market entry were hindered in their attempts. The system of 
price fixing rendered Regulation 1967/67 inapplicable and the agreements ineligible for 
exemption had they been notified. Product distribution was not improved because the 
restraints limited the availability of other brands and prevented price competition within 
the same brand. The Commission, emphasised, once again, that consumers failed to 
benefit because dealers were prevented from passing on, in the form of price reductions, 
any part of the substantial benefits which they received from sales. 
In October 1977 in the Metro r7 case, the Court of Justice considered the compatibility of 
systems of selective distribution with the rules on competition. One of the many issues 
considered was that of price competition. The facts are generally well kno\\"n. Brieny, 
Metro, a German cash and carry outlet, complained to the Commission that it was 
excluded fronl the selective distribution network of SABA. The Commissi,ll1 r ~ q u i r e d d
SABA to amend its standard distrihution agreements. Not satisfied. \ ktm h r o l l ~ h t t the 
(>1 CISl' 2.6/76 Melro l' ('ommissioll 119771 ECR 1875, [ 19781 ~ ~ C\ 1 LR I. 
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matter before the Court of Justice. This provided the Court with the opportunity to 
enunciate its principles governing network admissions. Provided, firstly, that criteria for 
admission was objective and not applied in a discriminating manner and, secondly, 
admitted dealers were free to supply and provide post sale services anywhere in the 
Community, simple systems would not infringe Article 81 (ex 85).68 However, the Court 
stressed that price competition in these systems was not to be regarded as an exclusive or 
principal factor. This was particularly true in the case of "complex" systems, where 
admitted dealers are obliged to undertake further obligations which may require additional 
capital investment from the dealer. At this point, the Court seems to be acknowledging 
that this additional capital investment may not be forthcoming if the investing dealer is 
subject to competition from outlets embracing low service provision and reduced prices -
discounters. The Court emphasised, however, that while price competition could never be 
eliminated it was not the only effective form of competition. The desire of specialist 
dealers 
" ... to maintain a certain price level, which corresponds to the desire to 
preserve, in the interest of consumers, the possibility of the continued 
existence of this channel of distribution in conjunction with new 
lnethods of distribution based on a different type of competition 
policy, forms one of the objectives which may be pursued without 
necessarily falling under the prohibition contained in Article (81 (1 )), 
and, if it does fall thereunder. either wholly or in part. coming within 
the framework of Article (81 (3 ))".69 
Ill! Ibid 1904. 
(,'I Ibid 1905 
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The Court then attached two important provisos to this statement. I t stressed that if 
systems of selective distribution were to proliferate the Commission must ensure that 
their increased numbers do not, firstly, result in structural price rigidity and secondly, the 
elimination of dealers pursuing a marketing strategy based on low service provision and 
low pricing. 
In 1983 the Court of Justice, once again, considered the issue of pricing levels within 
systems of selective distribution. In November 1973 AEG, a German undertaking 
engaged in the production and sale of consumer electronic equipment, notified its 
selective distribution agreements to the Commission. These European Community 
Agreements indicated that network admission was based on objective qualitative criteria. 
In May 1976 the Commission, having required AEG to make certain modifications to its 
agreements, indicated by comfort letter that it had no objections to AEG' s system of 
selective distribution. Over a period of time, however, the Commission received a 
number of complaints from dealers aggrieved by the way AEG was operating its system. 
The Commission initiated proceedings resulting in its Decision of January 1982.70 It 
found that AEG was operating its system in such a manner as to exclude discount stores, 
self service supermarkets and cash and carry outlets from its network, irrespective of 
whether they had suitable business premises or qualified personnel. Furthermore, AEG 
directly and indirectly set resale prices. AEG's Belgian subsidiary (ATBG) set a market 
price with which contracted dealers had to align. In Germany, AEG's sales office 
explained its pricing policy in detail and often required dealers to undertake to abide by 
set prices. In France specific agreements were concluded to ensure dealers complied with 
pricing policy. The Commission found that AEG's system was being operated in such a 
7(l COI11I11. Dec 82("267 "n i- Telcjilllken OJ 1982 L 1 1711:), [ 1 9 8 ~ 1 1 2 eM LR 386. 
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manner as to infringe Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)) and was ineligible for exemption. It issued 
a cease and desist order and imposed a fine of one million ECU. 
AEG, in the case of AEG v Commission,7) appealed to the Court of Justice. In rejecting 
its appeal the Court used the opportunity to clarify its position on maintaining pricing 
levels within these systems. It stated that certain legitimate requirements, such as the 
maintenance of a specialist trade, may justify a reduction of price competition in favour of 
competition relating to factors other than price. However, this limitation, which is 
inherent in such systems, is only compatible with the rules on competition if network 
admission is based on objective qualitative criteria applied in a non-discriminatory 
fashion. If different or stricter admission criteria is used to determine whether 
discounters, for example, should be admitted an infringement of the rules on competition 
will occur. Refusal to admit discounters which satisfy the network admission criteria is 
proof of an unlawful application of the system " ... if their number is sufficient to preclude 
the possibility that they are isolated cases not forming part of systematic conduct".72 With 
regard to price maintenance AEG argued that its conduct was designed to obtain a level of 
pricing which ensured the survival of the high service providing specialist trade. AEG 
argued that systems of selective distribution in so far as they are designed to guarantee to 
approved dealers the enjoyment of a minimum margin cannot be considered to be 
incompatible with Community law.73 The Court observed, however, that a restriction of 
price competition must be regarded 
7\ (';\SL' 107/82 [\983] FeR 3151. [1984] 3 Ci\1LR3:25. 
' ~ ~ Ibid 3195-,196 
'1 Ibid, 196. 
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" ... as being inherent in any selective distribution system in view of 
the fact that prices charged by specialist traders necessarily remain 
within a much narrower span than that which might be envisaged in 
the case of competition between specialist and non-specialist 
traders". 74 
The Court then emphasised that this inherent restriction IS" counterbalanced by 
competition as regards the quality of the services supplied to customers, which would not 
normally be possible in the absence of an appropriate profit margin making it possible to 
support the higher expenses connected with those services. The maintenance of a certain 
level of prices is therefore lawful, but only to the extent to which it is strictly justified by 
the requirements of a system within which competition must continue to perform the 
functions assigned to it by the Treaty.,,75 
The Court r e j e c t e d ~ ~ therefore, AEG's claim that it was necessary to maintain prices at 
such levels in order to guarantee sufficient profit to provide high service levels as a 
condition of network entry. If dealers were not in a position to provide the requisite 
services AEG, in applying its objective qualitative criteria, could have legitimately 
refused to admit them.76 
It will be recalled that in Metro 1 the Court of Justice attached two important provisos or 
conditions to its statement that, in the area of selective distribution, price n1aintenance is 
inherent and may be pursued without necessarily falling foul of Article 81 (ex 85). In 
'I Ibid J 1l)(1-3 197. 
'\ Ibid J 1l)7. 
,(> Ibid. 
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1986 in the Metro 1/7 case, the Court of Justice expanded upon its earlier statements. 78 
The undertaking from Leverkusen challenged the Commission's decision to renew the 
exemption granted to SABA in 1975. Apart from certain procedural changes relating to 
network admission, SABA's system remained relatively unchanged. 
Metro put forward six substantive submissions in support of its application. In its first 
and second submissions, however, Metro contended that SABA's current system resulted 
in structural price rigidity and the elimination of undertakings following a different 
commercial strategy. In its first submission Metro contended that fundamental changes 
had taken place in the market for consumer electronic equipment since 1975. The use of 
selective distribution systems had increased significantly in Germany and throughout the 
Community. In Metro's view the Commission had failed to take this consideration into 
account, in particular, the large number of "simple" systems operating on the market 
which had not been notified. This resulted in structural price rigidity.79 The Commission 
rejected these claims. In its view an increase in the number of "simple" systems was not 
relevant because they were compatible with Article 81 (ex 85). The Court agreed, 
however, with Metro that it was incumbent upon the Commission to determine whether 
the competitive situation on the market had changed to such an extent that the 
preconditions for exemption could no longer be fulfilled. 8o Thus, the combined effects of 
simple and notified systems had to be considered. The Court then stated, in a rather 
confusing manner, that after an exemption had already been granted and an application for 
renewal was being considered, any increase in the number of simple systems need only be 
77 CasL' 7S/S4 Metro \' Commission [1986] FCR 3021, [1987] 1 CMLR 118. 
78 SL'C R.J (JoL'beL "1\ tetro I1's Confirmation Of The Selective Distribution Rules: Is This The End Of The 
RO;ld')", ( 1(87) 24 CAlL Re\' 60S. 
79 CaSL' 7SrS.l, notL' 77 abovL'. 3083-J08-l. 
lW Ibid 30S.j 
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considered " ... in the special situation in which the relevant market was already so rigid 
and structured that the element of competition inherent in 'simple' systems (was) not 
sufficient to maintain workable competition".81 On the facts, Metro had failed to establish 
this. SABA and the Commission provided evidence to indicate that structural price 
rigidity did not exist. The Court rejected, therefore, Metro's submission. 
In its second submission Metro contended that self service wholesalers were unable to 
obtain supplies from leading manufacturers of electronic equipment, ostensibly on the 
ground that they failed to satisfy network admission criteria. They were, therefore, 
eliminated from the competitive process. The Court accepted the Commission's 
arguments. Metro had only been excluded from three simple systems and four systems 
entailing other obligations. It was still possible for Metro and others to obtain supplies 
elsewhere. 82 The Court dismissed Metro's application. 
The Court of Justice, in the case of selective distribution, is prepared to accept that 
maintaining certain pricing levels is inherent in the system. It is equally apparent that the 
Court accepted free rider arguments as justification. However, the free rider 
justifications for the imposition of RPM has its limitations. It pertains, in the main, to 
pre-sale services and applies to a limited number of products. Indeed, manufacturers can 
induce service provision by other means. Dealers can be contractually obliged to provide 
services and reimbursed accordingly. Above all, the use of RPM to induce service 
provision may simply serve the sectional interests of unknowledgeable consumers whilst 
leaving knowledgeable consumers to pay for services they do not require. I f the latter 
RI Ibid ~ O S 5 . .
Xc Ibid 1089. 
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exceed the former numerically, the interests of the majority of consumers are not 
furthered. 
In January 1986 the Court of Justice considered franchise agreements in the case of 
Pronuptia de Paris v Schillgalis. 83 Here Pronuptia, a French franchisor, operated a 
network in Germany for the retail sale of wedding dresses and other related apparel. Its 
German franchisee, Irmgard Schillgalis, failed to make certain royalty payments and 
Pronuptia took legal action to recover the amount due. Schillgalis claimed that the 
franchise agreement was void under Article 81(2) (ex 85(2» and her argument succeeded 
before the Frankfurt Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht). She appealed to the German 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) and it referred certain questions to the Court of 
Justice by way of the preliminary reference procedure. 
With reference to the issue of RPM Advocate General Verloren Van Themaat took a 
rather relaxed view. He noted, firstly, that royalty provisions included in these 
agreements resulted in a strong upward influence on prices. RPM, therefore, should not 
fall within the parameters of Article 81(1) (ex 85(1» unless a party is in a position of 
economic strength on the local market or competitors of the franchisor impose RPM or 
the franchisor is in a position of price leader on the market concerned. 84 
Although the Court's ruling is favourable to franchising generally, it took a more severe 
view of RPM. It stated that clauses which prevented price competition would implicate 
Article 81 (ex 85). The Court, however, emphasised that price recommendation was 
1l1CasL' 161'X-tlI9861ITR-'5J.[1986]I CMLR414. 
K ~ ~ I bid 36l)- 70. 
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permissible provided attempts were not made to directly or indirectly enforce the 
recommendation. This amounted to unilateral action not within the reach of the requisite 
Article.
85 
The Commission has also required the removal of clauses imposing RPM on 
franchisees emphasising that such restraints are unacceptable. 86 
B. Sectoral Resale Price Maintenance 
The Community authorities have also considered whether certain sectors, because of their 
specific nature, necessitate the imposition of RPM. In this context publishing has been 
subjected to scrutiny.87 In 1985 in the case of Binon v Agence Et Messageries de fa 
Presse (AMP)88, Binon, a Belgian seller of books, stationery and office equipment, sought 
to expand its operations by selling newspapers and periodicals. AMP and various other 
publishers refused it admission into its selective distribution network. It, therefore, 
applied to the Belgian Tribunal de Commerce for an order to the effect that AMP acted in 
breach of domestic rules on fair competition and the European rules on competition. The 
Belgian Tribunal referred several questions to the Court of Justice, in particular, whether 
the imposition of fixed prices by AMP was lawful. AMP and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, as intervener, emphasised the importance of a free and autonomous press. In 
this context, they noted that the special characteristics of newspapers and periodicals 
meant that their shelf life was short and they required, therefore, rapid distribution. 
Substantial copies had to be made available to cater for an uncertain demand. Inevitably 
85 Ibid 384. 
86 Comm. Dec. 87117 Pronllptia OJ 1987 L 13/39, [1989] 4 CMLR 355 para 12: Comm. Dec. 87.11 4 h'cs 
Rocher OJ 1987 U\!49, [1988] 4 CMLR 592 para 63; Comm. Dec. 87,407 Computer/und OJ 1987 
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Cl\l LR 581 para 20: Comm. Dec. 89 '94 ( 'har/es Jourdan OJ 1989 L35/3 I, [1989] 4 CI\ 1 LR 591 para 29. 
X7 S B. Ilornsby, "Public and P r i \ ~ l t e e Resale Price Maintenance Systems in the Publishing Sector: The Need 
lor I:qual Treatment In luropean l.aw", ( 1 9 8 ~ ) ) /0 £L Rc\' 381. 
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COpIes remained unsold and had to be returned to the publisher incurring dual 
transportation costs and retailer rebates. Publishers should remain free, they argued, to fix 
prices in order to cater for these special circumstances.89 The Commission accepted most 
of these arguments but refused to accept the necessity for RPM. The Court of Justice 
agreed with this. It stressed, however, that the Commission should take into account these 
special characteristics in deciding whether to grant an exemption under Article 81(3) (ex 
85(3)). The Court observed that RPM may be acceptable in this sector if two conditions 
were satisfied: firstly, the imposition of resale prices was the only way by which 
publishers could bear the cost of taking back unsold copies and secondly, the taking back 
of unsold copies was the only means of ensuring that consumers received a wide range of 
newspapers and periodicals. 90 
The Community authorities have also considered the issue of book publication and RPM. 
In the Dutch Books case91 the Court of Justice examined a transnational agreement 
concluded in 1949 between Dutch and Flemish associations in the publishing sector. The 
agreement introduced a system of collective RPM. Members of each association were 
obliged to fix a price for each format in which each of its titles appeared. Once fixed the 
books could not be sold in the Netherlands or Belgium at a lower price. To enforce the 
agreement a system of collective exclusive dealing was introduced. Only official dealers, 
recognised as such by the respective Associations, could be appointed as distributors. The 
latter could not sell, stock or promote books supplied by non-recognised publishers or 
resellers. Both Associations notified their respective agreements and the Commission 
concluded they were ineligible for exemption. The system prevented intrabrand price 
K') Ibid 20-l5. 
')() Ibid .:'O-l() 
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competition which hindered market integration. Booksellers were unable to increase their 
market shares through the creation of efficiencies or reduction in prices. The lack of price 
competition also diminished the incentive to rationalise or improve the distributive 
process. Furthermore, the system of cross-subsidisation meant that the majority of 
consumers were contributing to the cost of maintaining less popular works aimed at a 
more specialist market. Its abolition would not result in the diversion of sales away from 
traditional outlets to those pursuing cash and carry marketing strategies. The Commission 
also rejected the notion that the system was designed to preserve cultural identity.92 
In February 1982 the two associations appealed to the Court of Justice seeking annulment 
of the Commission's decision. They contended, firstly, that the abolition of RPM would 
result in indirect censorship by reducing the diversity of available books. This 
jeopardised freedom of expression and was contrary to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights. The Court rejected this because the applicants failed to establish any 
link between the decision of the Commission and the Convention.93 Secondly, the Court 
also rejected the argument relating to loss leading. The fact RPM may have incidentally 
prevented unfair competition was not sufficient reason for not applying Article 81 (1) (ex 
85 (1)) to a whole sector.94 Thirdly, the two associations argued that price competition 
was not the essential element in competition in the book trade. Factors such as stock 
diversity, efficiency in processing orders and customer advice and service were of 
importance. The Court rejected this approach. The system set up by the two associations 
simply deprived distributors of their freedom to set prices.95 Fourthly, the applicants' 
contended that their system of price maintenance had no prejudicial e f t ~ c t t on intra-
II' I· i 7 
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Community trade. The region to be taken into account was the Dutch language territory 
common to Belgium and the Netherlands and not the political territories of the two 
Member States. In rejecting this argument the Court stated that the agreement 
indisputably affected trade between two Member States notwithstanding the linguistic 
links between them.96 Finally, the two associations contended that RPM in relation to 
books was permitted either by national legislation or the judicial practice of all Member 
States and the Commission was bound to accept this when formulating policy. The 
Commission rejected this and stated that it intended to ensure that intermediate sellers and 
consumers retained the opportunity to buy at the most favourable prices. Where national 
systems prevented this, it had the right to intervene.97 Advocate General Verloren Van 
Themaat accepted that it was not entirely clear whether purely national systems of RPM 
reinforced compartmentalisation on a national basis. Where, however, these systems 
impeded parallel imports he accepted that the possibility of Community action should not 
be ruled out, even if the maintenance of national systems became difficult or impossible.98 
The Court rejected the arguments of the applicants. However, it passed no judgment on 
national systems of RPM. Adopting a guarded attitude it side-stepped the issue by 
stressing that it was concerned with the compatibility of the associations transnational 
agreements with the rules on competition. In dismissing the appeal it stated that the 
Commission had not exceeded the limits of its discretion in refusing to grant an 
exemption. The Commission had simply rejected arguments in relation to the advantages 
of cross-subsidisation. The Court, however, passed no comment on these alleged 
advantages as they could be ..... conclusively appraised only in terms of the national 
" 99 
arguments. 
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In Leclerc v Au Ble Vert lOO the Court of Justice examined the French system of public 
RPM relating to the sale of books as introduced by the Book Price Act 1981, commonly 
known as the "Loi Lang". The legislation required all publishers to set a resale price for 
books they published or imported. Retailers were obliged to observe these prices 
although they were permitted to grant discounts up to 5 per cent. Greater discounts were 
available to institutional purchasers. The Act applied to all publications including 
domestic publications sold abroad and reimported into France. Centres Leclerc. a 
member of the Edouard Leclerc network, offered books for sale at discounted prices in 
excess of the maximum permissible allowance. Legal action ensued and Leclerc was 
enjoined from selling books at discounts greater than the stipulated limits. It appealed to 
the Cour d' Appel, Poitiers and questions were asked of the Court of Justice by way of 
preliminary reference. 
Disagreement existed as to the appropriate legal rules to be applied. Leclerc contended 
that the Loi Lang did not introduce State price controls. It merely introduced rules 
restricting price competition because publishers and importers were free to set their own 
prices. The rules relating to competition and the free movement of goods (Article 28 [ex 
30) EC) were applicable. 101 The French Government disagreed. The rules on competition 
applied only to private undertakings. The only potentially relevant Treaty provision was 
that of Article 28 (ex 30) EC which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and all 
measures having equivalent effect. l02 In the view of the French Government this 
h d t b . c.. d It made a number of observations. Firstly, each prOVISIon a no een Inlrmge . 
Member State retained the freedom to enact rules governing its own internal trade. It had 
1lI(l Case .2.29/X3 [1985] I·CR I, [198:'].2 Cr-.1LR 286. 
101 Ibid 30. 
l ( l ~ ~ Ibid, I. 
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enacted this legislation to protect books as a cultural media from the adverse effects of 
untrammelled competition in retail prices. The legislation ensured the survival of the 
specialist bookseller, in the face of competition from others pursuing a policy of reduced 
margins and limited title ranges. This ensured the continued availability of poetic, 
scientific and creative works. Secondly, the legislation applied equally to domestic and 
imported books. The fact that the main importer was obliged to set the book prices did 
not amount to a barrier to trade. It was simply performing the same commercial function 
as French publishers. Without this protection retailers, especially in border areas, could 
obtain foreign supplies of books and sell them in France at less than the prevailing price. 
The provision relating to the reimportation of books was necessary to preserve the 
structural integrity of the system. Without it "illusory" intra-Community trade could take 
place designed merely to defeat the Act. 103 Finally, the French Government argued that 
the two provisions at issue could be justified under the mandatory requirements of Cassis 
d D ·, 104 e ljon. 
In the view of the Commission the rules relating to the free movement of goods were 
apposite. It stated that the provisions in the French legislation which set prices for 
imported and reimported books constituted measures equivalent in effect to quantitative 
restrictions on import. They rendered it impossible for importers to charge lower prices 
and hindered them from using price competition as a means of penetrating the French 
market. Article 28 (ex 30) was infringed and justification could not be found under the 
tinite list of Article 34 (ex 36).105 
Il); Ibid ~ c l . .
104 l 'asl: 120,'78 RCH'c-ZCl1fralc \' Bwu/c.\'/J/ullu!}(J/n'rwu/flmg fi'" Bnmllf\H'in [1979J ECR (149, [1979J 3 
Cf\.lLR cl()·l 
I ( I ~ ~ C a s ~ ~ 2 2 9 / ~ n . . note 100 above, 3.'-34. 
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Advocate General Darmon took the view that the French legislation did not constitute a 
barrier to intra-Community trade. Article 28 (ex 30) was not applicable. As far as foreign 
imported books were concerned, he accepted that theoretically the Loi Lang, by debarring 
retailers from granting discounts in excess of 5 per cent, might impact upon trade. This 
risk, in his view, had to be seen in context. Foreign publishers still retained power to 
negotiate prices with the main importer. Advantage could still be taken of favourable 
exchange rates and the lower costs of foreign banks. In fact, trade figures indicated that 
foreign imports had actually increased since the introduction of the 1981 Act. With 
regard, however, to the reimportation of books published in France the Advocate General 
made a distinction between "normal" commercial transactions which should qualify for 
Community protection and "artificial" trade flows designed to evade the requirement of 
French legislation. In his view the French legislation did not prevent French retailers 
from procuring French books more cheaply abroad. In fact, they had every incentive to 
do so. They could increase their own margins and use their increased profits to purchase 
products other than books or second-hand books not covered by the legislation. The 
Advocate General's main concern was that the obligation placed on the main importer 
could place it in a dominant position which if abused could be capable of affecting intra-
C . d 106 ommunlty tra e. 
The Court stated that the Commission had publicly announced its intention to investigate 
national and private RPM but that it had failed to bring its investigations to a conclusion 
01 to adopt a common policy. It stated that no exact precedents existed in the Courf s 
pre\'ious judgments. It concluded, however, that the relevant Treaty provision \\'as that of 
!\rtick 28 (ex 30). It recognised the right of the French Goyernment to enact legislation 
10(, I bid 1 3 - 14, 
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imposing RPM on books published and sold in France. However, the provisions in the 
Act relating to the importation of foreign books and the reimportation of French books fell 
foul of Article 28 (ex 30) EC. With regard to imported books the Court found that by 
transferring the responsibility to fix resale prices to the main importer, operating at a 
different level in comparison with domestic publishers, the French law created separate 
rules for domestic and imported products liable to restrict intra-Community trade. With 
reference to reimported French books the Court concluded that the legislation discouraged 
the marketing of these books because it prevented the importer from passing on any cost 
savings to the final consumer. These indistinctly applicable rules also infringed Article 
28(3). However, this would not be the case if it was established that the books were 
simply exported and reimported in order to defeat the provisions of the national 
legislation. The Court then rejected the French Government's invocation of the 
mandatory requirement of consumer protection as justifications for these provisions. The 
latter could only be justified under Article 34 (ex 36) and as consumer protection is not 
contained thereunder the French Government's justification could not be accepted. t07 
Three brief points should be made with regard to the Leclerc judgment. Firstly, it 
highlights the distinction between the rules on competition and those relating to the free 
movement of goods. Under the former the Court seems to have accepted a wide 
definition as to what constitutes imports to include reimportation. t08 In Leclerc, imports 
were defined to exclude reimportation designed specifically to defeat national legislation 
imposing RPM. Secondly, the Court's analysis seems to have blurred the distinction 
between distinctly and indistinctly applicable rules. It stated that both types of measures 
107 Ibid 32-36. 
lOR See. for L':\ampk. COIl1Ill. DL'( 731322 Dell/sehc Philips GmhH JO 1913 L293/40, 197.:1 C1\1LR [ ) ~ 4 1 . .
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could only be justified under Article 34 (ex 36) EC. Finally, as a result of the Court's 
ruling the French Government amended the 1981 Act. A sixth paragraph was introduced 
which provided that the Act would not apply to books imported from other Member States 
unless they were reimported French books which had not been marketed in another 
Member State. 109 
In 1995 the Court of Justice had the opportunity to examine the Net Book Agreements 
(NBA) of the UK. In 1973, after the UK's accession to the Community, the Publishers 
Association notified its agreements to the Commission. Under the NBA publishers 
remained free to select which of their publications were to be classified as "net books". 
Once classified publishers set a net price and resellers were obliged not to sell the title at 
less than the published net price. These arrangements applied to sales in Ireland and the 
UK and were monitored and enforced by the association. 
It seems the Commission paid little attention to the notification until 1985 when it 
requested further information. In 1986 it initiated proceedings and adopted a final 
decision in 1988. 110 The Commission refused exemption because the system imposed 
collective price fixing. The imposition of RPM was not indispensable to the attainment of 
the associations stated objectives of preventing a decrease in the number of stockholding 
booksellers, a fall in sales, small print runs and rise in the price of books. The 
COlnmission ordered the association to bring the infringement to an end. 
IO'l [n ('ase 355/85 DraincOllrt \' Cogl1ct [1986] ECR 3231, [1987] 2 Ci\lLR 51 - the Leclerc group 
lIllslIccessfully challenged this amendment on the basis of rt:\erse discrimindtion 
II() Cnlllm. 1 ke gl)'4-1 PlIhlishers AssociatioN - ,vcl Book Agrn'n1cl1ts OJ 1989 L ~ ~ 1 1 2 , , [19891 ... CrvlLR 
S25. 
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An appeal was made to the Court of First Instance. III The applicants' argued that the 
Commission was bound by the "principle of sound administration" to have regard to the 
judgments of the Restrictive Practices Court even if it was not bound by its ruling. 112 The 
British Court found, as a matter of fact, that the restrictions in the agreement were 
indispensable to the international and domestic book trade. The applicant argued that it 
had supplied the Commission with evidence to show that this situation had not 
changed. 113 The Court of First Instance rejected this. The national Court gave its ruling 
prior to the admission of the UK into the Community and did not express any view as 
regards the indispensability of the restrictions, within the Common Market. The 
Commission's decision could not be vitiated on the basis of inadequate reasoning. 
Placing reliance on the Dutch Books case the Court of First Instance stated that " ... 
national judicial practices, even on the supposition that they are common to all Member 
States, cannot prevail in the application of the competition rules ... ".114 Indeed, a system 
of RPM could not qualify for exemption simply because it produced beneficial effects 
inside a national market. 
The Publishers Association in the case of Publishers Association v Commission
l15 
appealed to the Court of Justice submitting eight detailed pleas. The Court, however, felt 
able to identify the appellant's third, fourth and sixth pleas as central to its case. In 
essence, the Court of First Instance failed to take into account " ... consequences of the 
existence of a single language area forming a single market for books in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom".116 This prevented the Court below from conducting a sufficiently 
III Case T-66/89 puhlishers ASS(}ClilfiOI1 \. Commission [1992] ECR 11-1995, [1992J 5 C\lLR 120. 
112 Ibid 2024 
III Ibid 2025-2() 
I I ~ ~ Ibid 2026. 
115 ( ' ~ I S l ' ' C-J6()/92P [19951 reR I-n. [1l)95] 5 C ~ l L R R )). 
116 Ibid 67. 
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detailed analysis of the Commission's assessment of indispensability. It simply held that 
because the Publishers Association was established in the UK market it could not rely on 
the advantages brought about by the NBA on the Irish market in order to justify the 
indispensability of the restrictions imposed.11 7 The Court of Justice ruled that the finding 
of the Court of First Instance, in this respect, was vitiated by an error of law. There was 
nothing in the wording or spirit of Article 81(3) (ex 85(3) that required the benefit of an 
agreement to be felt only on the same territory as that in which the parties to the 
agreement were established. This interpretation was incompatible with the fundamental 
objectives of the Treaty and the very concepts of Common Market. The Court of Justice 
stated that the lower Court had also failed to indicate that it had considered whether the 
Association's arguments relating to the Restrictive Practices Court were correct. On there 
simple grounds the Court annulled the judgment of the Court of First Instance. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The imposition of resale prices is condemned on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US its 
condemnation is of long standing. RPM simply restricts a dealer's ability to trade on the 
basis of price and its effects are similar to that of horizontal price fixing. For some this 
condemnation amounted to a great landmark; for other a travesty of justice. Mr Justice 
Holmes in the Dr Miles case l18, adopting a laissez-faire attitude in his dissenting 
judgment, could find no reason for interfering with the contractual freedom of 
manufacturers and dealers to set prices. Others argued for the Legitimacy of RPM on 
different grounds. Mr Justice Brandeis, although not sitting on the Supreme Court at the 
117 Ibid 68. 
Ill! 220 U.s 373 (1911). 
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time of Dr Miles, took the view that RPM enabled small retailers to compete with larger 
multinationals. This, of course, provided the intellectual underpinnings of the Free Trade 
Movement comprised mainly, although not exclusively, of lobbying retailers. The repeal 
of the Fair Trade law, however, amounted to a rejection of the Brandeis view of RPM, In 
any event these laws suffered from two main disadvantages. Firstly, an unwillingness on 
the part of the manufacturer to engage in costly litigation to enforce their resale prices 
particularly against powerful purchasers. Secondly, the system of fair trade lacked 
structural integrity as a result of the refusal of a number of states to enact Fair Trade laws. 
Entrepreneurs used these "hold-out" states (eg Texas, Vermont, Washington DC) as 
business havens to set up mail order houses to allow consumers in Fair Trade States to 
"import" branded products at greatly reduced prices. I 19 The laissez-faire attitude of Mr 
Justice Holmes has proved more enduring and is reflected in the many and repeated 
attacks on the current illegal status of RPM. So far, the Government and the judiciary 
have refused to accept economic justifications for the imposition of RPM. Not so, 
however, with regard to maximum vertical price fixing. The latter may advance consumer 
interest by preventing agreement to keep product prices high and prevent dealer price 
gorgIng. 
RPM in the EU is also condemned. Private systems of RPM, whether individually or 
collectively enforced, fall within the parameters of Article 81 (1 ) (ex 8S( 1)) and ineligible 
for exemption. They make it impossible for dealers to set their own retail prices by 
reference to their costs and commercial strategy. Prohibiting intrabrand price competition 
acts as a disincentive to innovate, rationalise and create efficiencies, Guaranteeing profit 
II" The lena/it\' of this practice \\as confirmed 111 Bissell Carpel SlI'l'erer \' .\tasters ,\!ot! Order Co ( ~ I I
II
' I' I ~ ~ ~ ~ to /' ld 684 ( ~ t h h Cir 1 9 ~ 7 ) ) and Gcneral Electric ('0 \' ,Hasters ,\luil Order ('0 uJ 
us 1111!!, Oil, _'-t ,- t ,-
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margIns may simply make horizontal collusion between manufacturers or distributors 
easier. Consumers also fail to benefit because of the inability of dealers to pass on cost 
savings or increased profitability in the form of price reductions. Justifications for the 
imposition of RPM relating to inter alia the need for cross-subsidisation, brand image 
protection and the preservation of cultural identity have all been rejected. Unlike the US 
the imposition of resale prices may also impact upon market unification by deflecting 
trade flows away from channels it would naturally have taken if prices were fixed freely. 
The imposition of resale prices, therefore, renders the block exemptions in relation to 
exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing and franchising inapplicable. 12o Interestingly, 
Article 4 of Regulation 2790/1999 121 now seems to permit a supplier to impose maximum 
sale prices provided it does not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of 
pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties. Finally, in both the US and the 
EU the recommendation of prices by a manufacturer does not fall foul of the antitrust 
laws. This unilateral action lacks the necessary bilateral quality necessary to implicate the 
laws of both systems. Manufacturers must, however, refrain from imposing indirect 
pressure to enforce their recommendation. 
12ll Sec Recital 8 to Regulations Nos I q 8 3 8 ~ ~ and 1984,'83 and Recital 13 and Article 5(e) of Regulation 
40X71 XX 
1210J 19991336/21. [2000]4 Cr-.1LR 398. 
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TERRITORIAL ALLOCATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturers are generally engaged in profit maximisation. It is in their interests to 
keep the cost of distribution as low as possible. If their dealers charge excessive prices 
consumers may purchase another lower priced comparable product made by another 
manufacturer. The imposition of territorial restrictions, designed to protect dealers 
from intrabrand competition, seems contrary to the interests of manufacturers. 
Territorial allocation, however, serves a number of purposes. The following are 
merely suggestive and not exhaustive. 
Prospective market entrants may use the lure of territorial allocation to attract dealers 
to market its product. If the latter are obliged to invest heavily in terms of time and 
finance, territorial allocation assist dealers to recoup their investment. On the other 
hand, established manufacturers may simply offer such protection as a means of 
attracting the most efficient and effective dealers. Alternatively, a manufacturer may 
feel the need to limit the number of its dealers because it is unable to efficiently supply 
or give appropriate support to a large network. In this regard territorial allocation may 
facilitate product planning, decrease sales costs, reduce credit risks and lead to the 
establishment of an appropriate number of dealers consonant with efficient 
distribution. Indeed, product quality may be preser\'ed because product malfunction is 
morl' readily tracl'able to SllL'cific points of distribution. "inally, i n t e r o r ~ a n i s a t i o n a l l
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problems, particularly those relating to the already familiar problem of intrabrand free 
riding, can be addressed. 
In contrast, limiting intrabrand competition through territorial allocation may have 
detrimental effects. Intrabrand competitive activity provides dealers with the 
necessary stimulus to review the distributive process, innovate to Improve 
performance and introduce new methods of distribution in an attempt to gain a 
competitive edge. Restricting intrabrand competition reduces these incentives. Where 
interbrand competition is weak, intrabrand competition may be the only real source of 
competitive rivalry on the market. Reducing this, may result in price stabilisation 
usually at uniformly high levels. Territorial allocation also makes side by side product 
price comparisons more difficult for consumers, particularly if the allotted territories 
are large. Indeed, consumers purchasing from exclusive distributors, for example, are 
compelled to accept resale prices which inevitably include costs relating to service 
provision, advertising and other marketing activities. Consumers with product 
awareness are paying for services they do not require. Territories, once allocated, tend 
to be viewed by dealers as property rights. When a manufacturer attempts to alter 
allocated areas, perhaps to improve distribution, it may be faced with unresponsive 
dealers. Finally, territorial allocation also gives rise to concerns over supplier and 
dealer cartels. 
In the US territorial allocation was outlawed for many years. The Department of 
Justice (DOl), without ever submitting its views to legal scrutiny, considercd 
territorial allocation to be per s(' violativc of S.l Sherman Act 1890. 1 The DOJ 
I ~ l ' l ' ' Hedrinl.! on Automobile ~ l a r k e t i l 1 g g Legislation before a Subcommittee of till' House COlllmlttee on 
~ ~ ~ . , , l' t th ( ~ ~ lSI l' 09 (It)' , ) Interstate and Foreign ( omllll'ITl'. ,..,·t ong. ,"'l'SS 0 .'.' . 
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reinforced its belief with the threat of criminal prosecutions. In consequence 
numerous US corporations entered consent decrees with the US Government agreeing 
to refrain from the use of territorial allocation. Over t i m e ~ ~ however, US authorities 
have come to accept the use of territorial allocation and the economic justifications 
underpinning its use. Per se illegality has now been supplanted by an approach based 
on the rule of reason. 
Territorial allocation in the EU is viewed with greater suspicion. Unlike the fully 
integrated market of the US, the EU, which currently consists of 15 Member States, is 
striving to achieve unification. In pursuit of this goal EU authorities are hostile to any 
agreements which may undermine the process. Greater importance is attached to 
intrabrand competitive rivalry particularly cross border parallel trade. The latter is 
seen as a vehicle to promote the interpenetration of markets. It is important to stress, 
however, that territorial allocation is permitted within the context of Europe provided 
it is qualified and not absolute. These concerns are reflected in the Commission's 
annual Reports on Competition, the block exemptions and principles governing 
exclusive distribution, franchising and selective distribution as well as the decisions of 
the Commission and Community Courts? 
Part II of the following explores the development of the law of the US and the 
underlying reasons for its change of approach to territorial allocation. Part I I I 
examines the approach adopted to territorial allocation in the EU. 
~ ~ Re"ulatiol1 Il)XJ/83 011 t::\clusi\'e distribution agreements (OJ 1983 L173II); Regulation 19X-l '83 on 
l ' : \ d ~ s i v c c purchasing agreemcnts (OJ 1983 LI73'I); Regulation 4087/88 on franchising , l ~ r t : e m e n t " " (OJ 
19XX L ~ . ' i l ) / 4 6 ) . .
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II. TERRITORIAL ALLOCATION IN THE US 
A. From White Motor To Schwinn 
Whilst vertical restrictions of this nature were by no means a new phenomenon in the 
world of business, it was not until 1963 that the Supreme Court first considered 
limitations of this nature. In the case of White Motor Co v usJ the Supreme Court 
subjected the views of the Department of Justice to legal enquiry. The White Motor 
Company (White) was engaged in the manufacture of trucks, parts and accessories. Its 
products reached the market via a two-tier system of distribution involving both 
wholesalers and retailers. The principal practices charged as section 1 Sherman Act 
violations were White's use of territorial limitation and customer allocation clauses. 
The territorial limitation clauses ensured that distributors could only sell vehicles to 
individuals, firms or corporations having a place of business and/or purchasing 
headquarters within their own allotted territories. The customer clause prevented 
distributors from selling trucks or parts to specified customers including the Federal or 
State Government. White reserved the right to sell directly to these important 
customers. 
Before the District Court, White asserted that these restraints were imposed for 
procompetitive reasons. Essentially, they were implemented to promote and increase 
the sales of White's vehicles in the face of powerful competition. The object of the 
territorial limitation clause, White asserted, was to enable dealers to cultivate their 
own allotted area. In order to do so, they needed protection from other dealers selling 
; :'72 U.S. 25:' (1963). 
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the same product. Such protection ultimately prevented cut throat price competition 
and allowed efforts to be concentrated on taking sales away from competing 
manufacturers. Intrabrand competition was thereby reduced and interbrand 
competition stimulated. With regard to the customer clauses, White asserted, they 
were justifiable for a number of reasons. Until its distributors received sufficient 
technical training, White contended, they were not qualified to cope with the reserved 
accounts. Additionally, White argued that it reserved these accounts to ensure that its 
important customers received the appropriate discounts. Thus preventing them from 
becoming disgruntled or dissatisfied. In any event, White believed that it had 
legitimate reasons to ensure that its distributors did not tarnish its business reputation 
by faulty promotional work or faulty servicing. The District Court, however, accepted 
the Government's contentions. It found that these restrictions resembled two 
traditionally outlawed forms of restraint namely horizontal market division and resale 
price maintenance. Judicial aversion to these types of restraint had been long 
d· 4 stan lng. The territorial and customer allocation clauses should therefore be 
governed by the same absolute test of per se illegality. The District Court entered 
summary judgment in favour of the Government and enjoined White from enforcing 
its territorial and customer clauses. White, refusing to be beaten, appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Mr Justice Douglas and it 
concluded that summary judgment was improperly employed. The Supreme Court, 
however, was not prepared to equate these challenged vertical restraints with 
horizontal agreements to divide and allocate territories and customers. The latter were 
.t See. TimkclI Roller Bearing Co \' U.\';, )-t 1 U.S. 59) (1951); Dr ,\fi/es ,\lcdicul Co \' John D Park (lid 
SOliS, 220 U.S _ ~ 7 3 3 (1911). 
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simply" ... naked restraints of trade with no purpose except (the) stifling of 
competition".5 Nor was the Supreme Court prepared to say whether such restraints 
were to be considered as illegal per se or tested under the rule of reason. The exact 
holding of the Court was that the legality of such restraints could only be determined 
after a proper trial. It adopted an agnostic approach and stated 
"This is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical 
arrangement; and we know too little of the actual impact of both that 
restriction and the one respecting customers to reach a conclusion on 
the bare bones of the documentary evidence before US".6 
As if to reinforce the point, Mr Justice Douglas, stated further 
"We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of 
which these arrangements emerge to be certain. They may be too 
dangerous to sanction or they may be allowable protections against 
aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company 
has for breaking into or staying in business ... and within 'the rule of 
reason'. We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of 
these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have such a 
'pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming virtue' 
(Northern Pac. R v US 356 U.S. 1) and therefore should be classified 
as per se violations of the Sherman Act". 7 
5 372 U.S. at 263. 
6 Ibid at 261. 
7 Ibid at 263. 
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As a result, the summary judgment of the lower Court was reversed and the matter 
remanded to the District Court for trial. 
The diverse ideological perspectives of the Justices with regard to these restraints was 
revealed in the differing approaches enunciated in White's concurring and dissenting 
judgments. Mr Justice Brennan in his separate concurring opinion commented on 
those factors which he considered the District Court should consider on remand. In 
terms of economics, he suggested that vertically imposed territorial restraints may be 
justifiable because they foster interbrand competition by limiting intrabrand 
competition. Furthermore, if a manufacturer is not vertically integrated into 
distribution, these restraints may be necessary to enable it to acquire and retain outlets 
for its products. This is, particularly the case, if the manufacturer is just starting out in 
business or manufacturing a new and risky product. Additionally, this type of 
restraint may, in Mr Justice Brennan's view, be necessary to ensure that the product is 
properly advertised, promoted and serviced. However, economic justification, 
according to Mr Justice Brennan, was not of itself sufficient. He would take the 
analysis a stage further. Enquiry should be made to determine whether the restraint is 
more restrictive than necessary or excessively anticompetitive. As such, the 
operational and practical effects of the restraint must be considered. Specifically one 
must consider the sanctions imposed on distributors who act in breach of their 
agreements. If, for example, a distributor acts in breach of its territorial agreements, is 
its franchise terminated? If so, intrabrand competition across territorial boundaries 
involves serious hazards which might deter competitive activity. If, however, the 
raiding distributor is obliged only to "pass over" any profit to its neighbour, the 
territorial limitation is relatively benign. In addition to considerations of the 
operational and p r ~ l C t i c a l l effects of the restraint the Court should also consider 
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whether less restrictive alternatives are available. 8 This may include inter alia 
assigning areas of primary responsibility or granting exclusive franchises. Having 
considered all these ramifications if the restraint is more likely to promote rather than 
subvert competition it is, in Mr Justice Brennan's view, justifiable. 
With regard to the customer restrictions, Mr Justice Brennan took the view that they 
were inherently more dangerous than vertical territorial restrictions. They were, 
therefore, more difficult to justify. He stated 
"( t )he crucial question for me is whether, in any meaningful sense, the 
distributors could, but for the restrictions compete with the 
manufacturer for the reserved outlets. If they could but are prevented 
from doing so only by the restrictions, then in the absence of some 
justifications ... their invalidity would seem apparent".9 
In Mr Justice Brennan's view this form of restraint seems to suppress all competition 
between manufacturers and distributors for the most prestigious accounts. Moreover, 
they lack" ... any of the countervailing tendencies to foster competition between brands 
which may accompany the territorial limitations".lo Manufacturers may, therefore, use 
such restraints to protect a non-competitive pricing policy. Mr Justice Brennan 
suspected the Government might prevail on this issue unless it could be shown that the 
distributor could not have competed in any event. 
S Ibid at 269-271. 
'I Ibid at 272-27]. 
10 Ibid. 
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The majority's agnostic approach was roundly condemned by the dissenting judgment 
of Chief Justice Warren, Justice Clark and Justice Black. The dissenting judgment was 
delivered by Justice Clark and embraced a different philosophical and ideological 
perspective. In his own words vertically imposed restrictions amounted " ... to one of 
the most brazen violations of the Sherman Act that (he had) experienced in a quarter of 
a century". 11 The dissenters failed to see any material difference between horizontal 
and vertical restrictions which eliminate competition. White seems to place " ... some 
halo around its agreement because they are vertical. But the intended and actual effect 
is the same as if not even more destructive than, a price-fixing agreement or any of its 
per se counterparts". 12 In the view of the dissenters, the use of such restraints may have 
been beneficial for White but if used generally they would have disastrous effects on 
free enterprise and ultimately undermine the effectiveness of the Sherman Act. Indeed, 
White's economic justifications, in the dissenters view, had no bearing on the legal 
issues. The promotion of interbrand competition was no justification for an explicit 
agreement to eliminate intrabrand competition. Any such agreement, no matter how 
beneficial, fell foul of the Sherman Act. On the basis of Dr Miles 13 the dissenters 
argued that White having sold its products at a price satisfactory to itself, could not 
deprive the consumer of any subsequent competition in the traffic of the product. Such 
restraints were illegal per se. 
One of the perplexing contradictions of the White Motor case is the fact that there was a 
substantial body of US lower federal and state court precedents which upheld on a rule 
of reason basis, vertical restraints of this nature. It would seem the District Court in 
II Ibid at 276. 
12 Ihld at 279. 
11 Dr ,\files :\Icdicu/ Co \' John D PorA. (/1/(/ SOliS Co. 220 U S -" 73 ( 191 I). 
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White Motor preferred to accept the Government's contentions as to per se illegality 
and the Supreme Court simply refused to apply the precedents of the lower courts. As 
early as 1903 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Philips v lola Portland Cement 
C0 14 considered a case in which a cement manufacturer sold to Philips (a partner in 
Williams Parr & Co) 50,000 barrels of Portland cement. Philips agreed that the cement 
would not be shipped outside the state of Texas. 15 Under the contract 24,580 barrels of 
cement were accepted and paid for. William Parr & Co, however, refused to accept and 
pay for the remainder. The cement manufacturer sued Philips for breach of contract. 
Philips argued that the contract was illegal under the Sherman Act as it confined the 
geographical area in which the cement could be sold. Judge Sanborn stated that 
provided such arrangements did not restrict competition substantially, it was not the 
purpose of the Sherman Act to "... render illegal the ordinary contracts ... of 
manufacturers, merchants and traders, or the usual devices to which they resort to 
promote the success of their business, to enhance their trade and to make their 
occupation gainful".16 In 1915 in Cole Motor Car Co v Hurst 17 the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that an agreement between Cole Motor's and Hurst, its distributor, 
was a contract of agency and not one of sale. However, it stated generally that 
contracts containing territorial limitations were designed to " ... foster the trade of the ... 
company and enhance its business to make secure its returns. This sort of arrangement 
is not obnoxious to the law".18 In 1917 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tillar v 
Cole Motor Car C0 19 stated that territorial limitations " ... appear to be a reasonable 
14 125 Fed. 593 (81h Cir. 1903). 
15 Ibid at 594. 
16 Ibid at 594-5. 
17 228 Fed. 280 (5 1h Cir. 1915). 
18 Ibid LIt 2 ~ U U - 2 ~ 4 . .
19 2-16 Fed. ~ 3 1 1 (5 1h Cir. 1917). This case arose Ollt of Cole Mofor Co \' Hurst 228 F. 280. Benjamin 
Idlar acted as t',lIarantor for lIurst to the slim of £50,000 and appealed against the District COllrt'S 
decision. 
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prOVISIon, almost essential to efficient marketing of the company's products". 20 In 
1922 in Lorillard Co v Weingarden21 the plaintiff corporation sought to enJoIn 
Weingarden from selling a large quantity of inferior grade "Helmar" cigarettes to 
customers within the US in violation of an agreement between itself and the Volga 
Engineering Trading Company. Weingarden denied purchasing the cigarettes from 
Volga subject to any territorial or customer restrictions. However, the District Court 
was prepared, subject to conditions, to issue an injunction to enforce both restrictions. 
In the following year the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fosbury v California & 
Hawaiin Sugar Refining Co22 stated that it was settled law that a " ... trader or 
manufacturer engaged in private business '" may sell to whom he pleases, may charge 
different prices for the same article to different individuals and make such 
discrimination in his business as he chooses". 23 
The aforementioned cases are merely representative of a large body of US case law 
upholding such restraints. 24 Yet the Supreme Court's preferred route in White Motor 
was one of agnosticism. Within months of the White Motor decision, however, the 
Court of Appeals adopted a less diffident position. The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals proffered a more definitive statement. In Snap-On Tools Corp v FTC2s the 
Court of Appeals considered a tool manufacturer's nation-wide system of distribution. 
In 1950-51 Snap-On, a large manufacturer of mechanics hand tools and related 
equipment used primarily in the automotive and aircraft industries, ceased to use its 
20 Ibid at 832. 
21 ~ 8 8 Fed. 238 (.',th Cir. 1922) . 
.'2 291 Fed. 29 (9 th Cir. 1923). 
~ ~ JIb i d at .16. ", , .., nd. . 
.'·1 Sec also, for example, 80m Hall (orp. \. General .\/o{or S (orp, 124 F. 2d 822,82) (2 Clr. 1942), 
Reliable J'olk.nmgcl/ Sales {\ .\'l'/TIc'e Co \' World Wide ..11110 Corp., 182 F. Supp 412, 425-27 (D.:\ J. 
19(0); £'."; \' NClI'hun' MIg Co., 125 I 2d 453 ( 1 st Cir 1(41). 
25 121 F. 2d 825 (ih Cir. 1963). 
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own representatives to sell its equipment. It initiated a system of distribution through 
independent franchised dealers. These dealers purchased Snap-On' s tools and resold 
the products out of mobile walk in trucks within defined geographical areas. Snap-On 
contended that the imposition of geographical limitations was necessary for various 
reasons. It contended, firstly, that the nature and complexity of the products was such 
that each distributor needed to establish and maintain a continuing relationship with its 
purchasers. Secondly, Snap-On asserted that unless it imposed such territorial 
limitation it could not attract and maintain dealers to service its purchasers to the 
standard and degree expected of them. Territorial restrictions were necessary, 
therefore, to protect its own interests as well as the interests of its dealers and 
customers. 
The Hearing Examiner took the VIew that there was merit In the manufacturer's 
arguments and that the " ... maintenance of exclusive territories (was) indispensable to 
the successful operation of its business".26 If it were forced to abandon such a policy, 
confusion and chaos would ensue. After extensive hearings the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) took a different VIew. It suggested that there was nothing to 
prevent Snap-On from " ... assigning areas of primary responsibility to its dealers and 
insisting that they provide adequate sales coverage and service within these 
territories".27 The FTC seemed to take the position that vertically imposed territorial 
restraints were per se violative of S5 Federal Trade Commission Act 1914, simply 
because of its existence as a term in a contract between manufacturer and independent 
dealer. In any event the FTC ordered Snap-On to remove the restriction on its dealers. 
The nlatter was then appealed to the Se\'enth Circuit Court of Appeals. Here a 
~ ( , , Ibid at ~ U 2 2 . 
.'7 Ibid at S ~ 2 - S _ , 3 3
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contrasting approach was taken. In its VIew certain benefits may accrue to a 
manufacturer imposing such a restraint. In the absence of horizontal dealer collusion 
such a restraint promotes " ... in a broad, meaningful way competition between (Snap-
On) and other manufacturers of similar products and which therefore justify a minimal 
curtailment of intrabrand competition among its dealers".28 As Snap-On was not in a 
monopolistic position in relation to its competitors and as the restraint could not be 
used for abusive purposes, the legality of the restraint was to be determined by a rule of 
reason analysis. Evidently, agnosticism was not the preferred route of the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Shortly after this decision the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at a similar 
conclusion in the 1964 case of Sandura Co v FTC. 29 This case involved a relatively 
small manufacturer of vinyl floor covering. Sandura Co, was competing with and 
rapidly losing ground to the "giants" of the floor covering industry. The Commission 
found that the corporation was involved in unfair methods of competition in violation 
of S5 Federal Trade Commission Act 1914, in that it engaged in price fixing and 
vertically imposed territorial restraints. Sandura immediately appealed the 
Commission's finding with regard to territorial restraints. It asserted that as a result of 
product failure it had experienced operating losses and its system of distribution had 
become demoralised.3o In consequence it faced bankruptcy, suffered bad product 
reputation and even after it had corrected the defects in its products, it could not attract 
dealers to stock it. Faced with these difficulties Sandura resorted to "special 
inducements" to attract distributors. It offered exclusive territories to those distributors 
. ' ~ ~ Ibid at 833. 
29.,391: :2d X47 (6 th Cir. 1964) . 
.10 Ibid at 8) I 
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which would stock and sell the product. This inducement was all the more necessary 
because Sandura, as a result of a lack of money, required its distributors to pay for an 
expensive advertising campaign. 
The FTC acknowledged that the imposition of "closed territories" may have been 
necessary initially to attract distributors. However, since product quality had been 
improved territorial restrictions were no longer necessary. 31 In fact, the Commission 
believed that the high cost of shipping floor covering actually prevented territorial 
invasion and limited intrabrand competition among Sandura' s distributors. The FTC 
held that the territorial limitation was more restrictive than necessary particularly as 
less restrictive alternatives existed. It, therefore, issued a cease and desist order. In 
reviewing this decision the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the notion that 
territorial limitation was illegal per se. These restrictions, in its view, were to be tested 
under a rule of reason analysis. The Court of Appeals recognised that in this instance, 
this was not a case of a powerful manufacturer employing methods to increase its share 
of the market. The imposition of these restraints were in the best interest of the 
consumer and distributor in that it ensured the continued economic health and 
competitive existence of Sandura. Without the restraint distributors would not have 
engaged either to distribute Sandran products or undertake expensive advertising if it 
were " ... possible for one distributor to make the sales and take the profits promoted by 
another's advertising".32 The only conclusion to be drawn was that the elimination of 
these closed territorial arrangements would impair rather than foster competition. 
11 Ibid at 855. 
, ~ ~ Ibid at 850-852. 
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The situation with regard to customer and territorial restraints, to say the least, was 
contradictory and confusing. The Supreme Court refused to make any pronouncement 
as to the method of treatment or legality of such restraints; the Courts of Appeals, at 
least as far as territorial restraints were concerned, advocating a rule of reason analysis 
and the US government pushing for per se illegality. The government's push was 
further evidenced in the 1967 case of US v Sealy Inc. 33 Here the appellee, Sealy Inc, 
had been engaged in the business of licensing bedding manufacturers to make and sell 
these products under the Sealy name and trademarks in mutually exclusive territories. 
The District Court found Sealy's price fixing activities violative of the Sherman Act. 
However, the Court concluded that it was neither Sealy's nor its distributors intention 
to divide the US into territories where competitors could not compete. The District 
Court held that the government had not proved its case. It, therefore appealed directly 
to the Supreme Court. 
Before the Supreme Court both the appellant and appellee focused their arguments 
upon the vertical nature of the arrangement. In contrast, the Supreme Court considered 
whether this particular arrangement was to be " ... treated as the creature of the licensor, 
h 1· ,,34 L k· Sealy, or as the product of a horizontal arrangement among t e lcensees . 00 Ing 
to substance rather than form, the Supreme Court concluded that the day to day running 
of Sealy Inc was conducted by its 30 licensees. Sealy was merely a "front" created and 
used by the licensees to conceal their own horizontally collusive conduct.35 Oddly, the 
Court did not condemn this horizontal agreement as a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act. It coupled the territorial limitation with that of price fixing and condemned them 
n 388 US 350 (1967). 
II Ibid at 352 
.5 Ibid at 353. 
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both as part of an ~ ~ a g g r e g a t i o n n of trade restraints". By concluding that the restraint 
was not purely vertical the Court side-stepped consideration of vertically imposed 
territorial restraints. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting judgment was not nearly as 
evasIve. In his view vertical restraints could have legitimate procompetitive 
justifications. A manufacturer may enhance its position in relation to its competitors by 
the use of these restraints. Territorial restraints should not be automatically unlawful. A 
rule of reason analysis should be applied. 
The issues Sealy neatly side-stepped were met head on in its companion case of US v 
Arnold, Schwinn & CO.36 Arnold, Schwinn & Co, was a family owned business 
engaged in the manufacture and sale of bicycles and accessories. In 1951 it was the 
largest manufacturer of bicycles in the US with a market share of 22.5 per cent. By 
1961 Schwinn's market share had dramatically fallen to 12.8 per cent although its 
profits had risen substantially. Studies of its system of distribution revealed it to be 
haphazard and inefficient. At one point, for example, it used as many as 15,000 retail 
outlets. Some of them proved to be inactive or ineffective in that sales methods and 
service provision failed to comport with Schwinn's policy of manufacturing and selling 
quality products. Expensive promotional and advertising campaigns were being 
unnecessarily wasted. Schwinn looked to revamp its distribution system. A 
franchising policy was adapted designed to assure quality and efficiency in distribution. 
Accordingly, Schwinn franchised about 5500 retailers chosen on the basis of credit risk, 
sales and service abilities. 
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Schwinn adopted three principal marketing techniques. Firstly, it would sell its product 
directly to wholesalers. Secondly, products reached retailers via wholesalers or jobbers 
acting for Schwinn on an agency or consignment basis. Thirdly, Schwinn would 
deliver the product directly to approved retailers, invoice the wholesaler which took the 
order and pay it by way of commission - the so-called "Schwinn Plan". Schwinn's 
twenty-two wholesale distributors were each assigned specific territories and instructed 
to sell only within their own designated area and only to franchised Schwinn accounts. 
Schwinn was both "firm and resolute" in insisting upon observance of these 
restrictions. Failure to observe resulted in termination.37 
The government brought a civil action in the District Court of Illinois alleging per se 
violations of the Sherman Act in relation to price fixing, territorial allocation and 
customer restrictions. In its view the distributors had actually agreed amongst 
themselves to impose these restrictions even though Schwinn had instigated the idea. 
This horizontal collusion was per se unlawful. The District Court refused to condemn 
the customer restrictions or the territorial limitations in the Schwinn plan and those 
sales made on an agency or consignment basis. The government appealed to the 
Supreme Court and abandoned its 20 year long insistence on per se violation in favour 
of analysis under the rule of reason.38 In a twist of delicious irony, Mr Justice Fortas 
writing for a five-member majority opted for a per se approach. He stated quite 
elnphatically that 
"Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a 
manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with 
;: Ibid at 372. 
1S Ibid at 368. 
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whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with 
dominion over it. ... Such restraints are so obviously destructive of 
competition that there mere existence is enough". 39 
Territorial and customer restrictions were branded illegal per se under the Sherman 
Act, if made incidental to an outright sale of the product. This conclusion was 
reached only four years after the cautious agnostic approach advocated by White 
Motor. In their part concurring and part dissenting judgment Justices Stewart and 
Harlan felt that the majority of the Court were unable to give any reason why the 
position adopted by the Supreme Court in White Motor should now be repudiated. Mr 
Justice Stewart stated 
"(s)urely, we have not in this short interim accumulated sufficient new 
experience or insight to justify embracing a rule automatically 
invalidating any vertical restraints in a distribution system based on 
sales to wholesalers and retailers .... Indeed, the Court does not cite or 
discuss any new data that might support such a radical change in the 
I ,,40 aw. 
The majority, however, felt its per se approach to be justified because the facts of the 
present case did not fall within the 
" ... specific illustrations which the Court in White Motor articulated as 
possible factors relevant to a showing that the challenged vertical 
1') Ibid at 379. 
~ ( I I Ibid at .189. 
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restraint IS sheltered by the rule of reason because it is not 
anticompetitive. Schwinn was not a newcomer, seeking to break into 
or stay in the bicycle business. It was not a 'failing company'. On the 
contrary ... it was the leading bicycle producer in the Nation".41 
At this point it should be emphasised, however, that where a manufacturer retained 
title, dominion and risk in the product (a non-sale agency or c ~ s i g n m e n t t basis), the 
Court in Schwinn concluded that the restraint was to be analysed under the more 
flexible rule of reason. Mr Justice Fortas stated 
" ... we are not prepared to introduce the inflexibility which a per se 
rule might bring if it were applied to prohibit all vertical 
restrictions of territory and all franchising, in the sense of 
designating specified distributors and retailers as the chosen 
instrument through which the manufacturer retaining ownership of 
the goods will distribute them to the public. Such a rule might 
severely hamper smaller enterprises resorting to reasonable 
methods of meeting the competition of giants and of 
merchandising through independent dealers, and it might 
accelerate the trend to vertical integration of the distribution 
" 42 process. 
II Ibid at 37'" 
I ~ ~ Ibid at .179--'80. 
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The Supreme Court predicated this new distinction on the ancient rule against 
restraints on alienation.43 That is, post sale restrictions cannot be imposed by a 
manufacturer on its distributors once it has parted with title, dominion and risk over 
the goods. In his dissenting judgment, Mr Justice Stewart referred to this rule as a 
"wooden and irrelevant formula".44 It is also notable that this ancient rule was only 
fleetingly referred to in the White Motor45 decision and only then by Justice Brennan 
to suggest that restraints on alienation did not mean that vertical restrictions should be 
illegal per se in every case.46 In Schwinn, however, Mr Justice Stewart in his 
dissenting judgment roundly condemned the approach adopted by the Supreme Court. 
In his view, such a rule should not be adopted simply on the basis of antiquity. In any 
event, judicial views appropriate to a few centuries ago need not necessarily be 
appropriate to contemporary commercial policies. He stated quite emphatically that 
"Centuries ago, it could perhaps be assumed that a manufacturer had 
no legitimate interest in what happened to his product once he had 
sold them to a middleman and they had started their way down the 
channel of distribution. But this assumption no longer holds true in a 
day of sophisticated marketing policies, mass advertising and 
vertically integrated manufacturer - distributors".47 
The decision in Schwinn represents a particular brand of antitrust. It represents a view 
of antitrust based on traditionalism or populism. According to this view, the interests 
of society are best served when the competitive process is atomistic in nature and not 
·n Ibid at 380. 
-II Ibid at 394. 
45 37211 S 2)3 (1963). 
46 Ibid at 265. 
47 ~ S 8 8 1I S at 3l)2. 
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comprised of a few fully integrated industrial giants. The Schwinn Court was 
concerned with keeping the channels of distribution open. Its object was to enable 
small independent entrepreneurs to make their own competitive decisions free from 
coercion and from the imposition of restraints by powerful manufacturers. According 
to this view antitrust serves social and political functions as well as those of 
economIcs. 
The Schwinn decision was widely castigated by much scholarly and judicial criticism. 
In fact it spawned a veritable industry. Bork, for example, criticised the Court's 
underlying notion of competition. In Schwinn, Bork asserts, competition is defined as 
complete freedom of the outlet. In his view this notion is not keyed to consumer 
welfare; it is more akin to the destruction of contractual relations. In fact, Schwinn's 
distillation of modem antitrust policy into an ancient rule on alienation was not only 
wrong but verged on mere wittiness.48 Martin Louis criticised the Schwinn judgment 
for reneging on the promise to eschew the use of per se rules until all the ramifications 
of these restraints could be investigated and fully understood.49 A recurring criticism 
has been the Supreme Court's erroneous assumption that such an ancient rule on 
alienation ever existed. Indeed, Handler asserts that antitrust law as well as the 
common law analysed the legality of these restraints on a rule of reason basis. To 
simply apply this basis in a non-sale situation is to give " ... priority to form over 
substance at the expense of justice". 50 For Baker, Schwinn was simply an exercise in 
"barren formulism". It had a "strange red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-
IS R.II. Bark, The Antitrust Paradox (Reprint, New York, 1993) pp. 282-285. 
49 1\ 1 B Louis, "Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Syl\'aniu: An Argument For the 
Continuing Use of A Partial Per Se Approach", (1976) 75 ,\fich L Rev 275,276. 
'\ll 1\1 lIandkr, "Twenty-Five Ycars of Antitrust ( T w e n t ~ - F i f t h h Annual Antitrust Review)", (1973) 73 
('ul L R(',· .J 15, ·J'i8-59. 
limp" quality. It was both "artificial and unresponsive to the competitive needs of the 
real world". 51 
In spite of the wide ranging scholastic criticism of Schwinn some lower Federal and 
District Courts took the view that Schwinn had illuminated the way and they were 
bound to follow. 52 Others, however, refused to be bound. Judicial ingenuity was 
focused, therefore, on ways and means to limit or circumvent the logical rigors of 
Schwinn. In 1970 the Third Circuit Court of appeals turned Schwinn on its head in the 
case of Tripoli Co Inc v Wella Corporation. 53 Until the summer of 1967 Tripoli had 
acted as a wholesale distributor for the Well a Corporation. The latter manufactured a 
range of hair care products designed solely for use by the trade. Wella discovered that 
Tripoli sold these "professional use only products" (via its own retail outlets) directly 
to the public. As a result Wella stopped supplying Tripoli and the latter brought an 
antitrust action. 
Before the District Court of Pennsylvania, Tripoli sought an injunction to reqUIre 
Wella to resume its supplies and damages under the Clayton and Robinson-Patman 
Acts. Wella, however, made application for summary judgment asserting that the 
termination of Tripoli was based on its failure to comply with credit terms and its 
violation of resale restrictions imposed on its products. Tripoli countered by alleging 
that under Schwinn such post sale restrictions were per se violative of the Sherman 
Act. The District Court, however, granted summary judgment in favour of Wella. 
~ I I 0.1. Baker, "Vertical Restraints In Times Of Change: From White to Schwinn To Where?", (1975) ·l·l 
..IlItltrUS! LJ 537. 
'i:' Sec, Cor example, Eastex .·/viatiull /IIC \. ,'.'rc'nT & Hutchinson Co., ~ 6 7 7 F. Supp. 868 (FD. Tc\ 197,): 
Cook \' Ralston Purina Co., ]66 F. Supp. 999 (M D. Ga. 197]): Dohhins \' Kmmsaki ,\I%r ('orr. :162 
F. StipP 5-l (D. Orl' 197]). 
5.l -l25 F. 2d 9,2 0"1 Cir. 1970). 
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On Appeal the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated, on the basis of Schwinn. that it 
was unreasonable without more to impose post sale restrictions. However, on the 
facts of this case there was more. Here the restraints were imposed to protect the 
public against harm from products designed for professional use and to protect Wella 
from product liability claims. Restraints imposed for reasons of health and safety 
should, therefore, be tested under a rule of reason analysis. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the decision of the lower Court and found the restraint reasonable. 
Judicial dissatisfaction and antipathy towards Schwinn also surfaced in the 1973 case 
of Williams v Independent News Inc. S4 The facts of this case are rather tortuous. Very 
briefly, Magazine Management published a comic known as "Atlas" and used 
Independent News as its exclusive distributor. The latter used regional wholesalers to 
distribute the comic to retailers. Upon receipt of new issues, the old editions were 
returned by Independent News to Magazine Management. The latter either sold these 
copies abroad or sold them to Israel Waldheim on the understanding that his 
distribution would be confined to a premium basis. That is, they could be used in 
prizebags or as promotional gifts but not for the purpose of retail. In breach of this 
agreement Waldheim sold the comics to Williams who sold to retailers at discounted 
prices. As a result discounted old editions competed with full price current issues. 
Independent News requested that the publisher take action. Eventually it terminated 
Waldheim and Williams supply ceased. Williams brought an action for antitrust 
violations, alleging that as Independent News was without title, dominion and risk of 
loss it was a per se violation under Schwinn for it to control the destiny or impose 
conditions of resale on these old issues. 
'I 48S F 2d 1099 (31<1 Cir. 1973). 
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The District Court disagreed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. It stated that even 
though title, dominion and risk had passed from Independent News, it was still 
permissible for the latter to direct the publisher to ensure that those dealing in old 
editions restrict and confine their distribution channels to a premium basis rather than 
the retail market. 
Further judicial confinement of Schwinn was evidenced in the case of Scooper Dooper 
Inc v Kraftco Corp. 55 Here the Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressly stated that 
where a legitimate business purpose existed (eg the preservation of work standards) 
the imposition of restraints by a manufacturer on its distributors may be lawful. 
Perhaps one of the more spurious reasons for distinguishing Schwinn was provided by 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In 1968 in the case of Janel Sales Corp v 
Lanvin Par/urns Inc56 the Court of Appeals held that a customer limitation clause, was 
not necessarily per se violative of the Sherman Act. The Court stated that the 
Supreme Court premised its finding of per se violation on the fact that Schwinn had 
been "firm and resolute" in enforcing its vertical restraints. This firmness and 
resolution was evidenced by the communicated danger of termination for those failing 
to observe the vertically imposed restrictions. In this particular case the Court of 
Appeals refused to condemn such clauses because of conflicting evidence in relation 
to the willingness of the manufacturer to enforce its restraint. 
~ ~ ~ 494 F 2d 840 Old Cir. 1974). 
~ h h 3l)() F 2d ~ 9 8 8 On.! Cir. 19(8). 
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This rather dubious distinction was also used by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
the 1973 case of Colorado Pump & Supply Co v Febco Inc. 57 Here Febco Inc 
manufactured lawn and turf equipment which Thompson Pipe & Steel and Colorado 
Pump & Supply Co distributed. In January 1967 Febco and Thompson entered into 
an exclusive distribution agreement whereby Thompson agreed to distribute the 
product within a defined geographical area. Having concluded this agreement Febco 
refused to directly supply Colorado Pump. The latter, however, could still receive the 
product from Thompson, albeit at reduced rates of discount. Colorado's profits fell 
and it discontinued selling Febco's products. It then instituted proceedings against 
Febco alleging, on the basis of Schwinn, per se violations of the Sherman Act. The 
District Court held for Febco and Colorado appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. 
Before the Court of Appeals Colorado Pump alleged once again that contractually 
agreed vertical limitation on products, title to which had passed from manufacturer to 
distributor, amounted to per se violation of the Sherman Act. In delivering the 
Court's decision, Judge Breitenstein stated that in Schwinn the Supreme Court 
commented on the need for firmness and resolution in the enforcement of the vertical 
restraint predicated upon the danger of termination. 58 The present case could, 
therefore, be distinguished in that Febco lacked the required firmness and resolution 
to enforce the restraint. Senior personnel from both Febco and Thompson gave oral 
evidence to the effect that Thompson was not prevented from selling Febco's products 
outside its allotted geographical area. The Court of Appeals concluded that these 
contractual provisions \\'l'rc no more than a " ... description of a primary marketing 
"7 472 F. ~ d d 637 (loth Cir 1(13). 
';s Ibid at 639 
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area and as such '" not a per se violation".59 However, Judge Murrah in his part 
dissenting judgment stated emphatically that if the legality of these restraints 
depended on the firmness and resolution of enforcement Schwinn was a shambles.6o 
This sentiment, however, did not prevent the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals from 
relying on the same justification to hold similar restraints lawful. In Good Investment 
Promotions v Corning Glass Works61 Good Investment a trading stamp company. 
unilaterally expanded a promotional programme involving Coming's products into 
non-designated supermarkets. As a result Coming tenninated its contact with Good 
Investment. The latter alleged antitrust violations stating that once Coming had sold 
the products it could not impose conditions restricting subsequent alienation. The 
District Court found per se violations of the antitrust laws and granted summary 
judgment in favour of Good Investments. The Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded this judgement. It stated that the record was devoid of any information 
from which it may be determined that " ... firm and resolute (insistence) upon 
observance of .. , customer limitations was required by Coming, such as was the 
situation in Schwinn".62 
B. Sylvania And Its Aftermath 
It is apparent that Schwinn was the butt of much scholarly and judicial criticism. It is 
not surprising. therefore, that its reign lasted only ten years. Its demise was brought 
about by the 1977 Supreme Court decision of Continental TT' Inc v GTE Sylvania 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid at 6 ~ 2 . .
61 ~ 9 3 3 F. ~ d d 891 (61h Cir. 1 9 7 ~ ) . .
, , ~ ~ Ibid at 9X3 
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Inc. 63 Sylvania, a corporate subsidiary of Telephone Electric, manufactured and sold 
radios and television sets via its Home Entertainment Products Division. During the 
so-called black and white television era, Sylvania together with other manufactuers 
engaged in a relatively unselective method of saturation distribution. It sold its 
product in volume to wholesalers without any constraints upon resale. Using this 
method of distribution Sylvania's market share fell to 1 or 2 per cent. In 1962, 
however, Sylvania in an attempt to phase out the wholesale aspect of its distribution 
process, implemented a programme of franchising dealers selectively by location. 
This, it was believed, would encourage the franchisees to actively promote Sylvania's 
product. To prevent territorial invasion Sylvania concluded oral agreements with its 
franchisees to the effect that its products could only be sold from specifically 
approved locations. Thus, should a franchisee relocate it needed Sylvania's specific 
approval to sell its products from the new location. Strictly speaking this location 
requirement is not the same as a vertically imposed territorial restraint. All 
franchisees were permitted, for example, to sell competing brands and to customers 
irrespective of their location. In terms of effect, however, the location clause had 
similar results. By 1965 Sylvania's market share increased to 5 per cent and it 
emerged as the United States eighth largest manufacturer and seller of colour 
television sets. 
In May 1964 Continental TV Inc, became an authorised Sylvania dealer and was 
granted franchisees for several locations. As a result of its expansionist programme 
Continental soon became one of Sylvania's largest dealers operating from eight 
locations in California. A series of disputes arose after Sylvania authorised the 
(1.1 43 3 U.S. 36 (1977) 
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openIng of a new dealership near one of Continental's most profitable outlets. 
Continental responded by opening a new outlet in Sacremento and sold Sylvania's 
products from its new unauthorised location. Handy Andy was Sylvania's existing 
franchisee in Sacramento and it voiced its dissent. Accordingly, Sylvania terminated 
Continental's dealership. The latter brought suit charging that Sylvania's enforcement 
of the location clause was, on the basis of Schwinn, a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act. 
The issue was tried in the District Court for Northern California before retired 
Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark.64 He rejected Sylvania's contention that 
location and territorial clauses could be distinguished and that their legality should be 
determined by a rule of reason analysis.65 He instructed the jury that should it find an 
agreement between the parties to confine location, such an arrangement is a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act. On this basis the jury found in favour of Continental 
and fixed damages in the sum of 591,505 dollars. The Court automatically tripled 
these damages and awarded costs in the sum of 275,000 dollars. 
Sylvania appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Sitting as a Panel it voted 
by a majority of 2 to 1 to affirm Justice Clark's per se instructions.66 Sylvania 
petitioned for an en bane hearing. The petition was granted and the matter reargued. 
By a majority of 7 to 4, however, the en bane Court reversed and remanded to the 
64 Mr Justice Clark, although on the Court, did not participate in the Schwinn decision. However, he 
formed part of the vociferous dissent in White Motor. He stated in that case that territorial confinement 
amounted to one of the most brazen violations of the Sherman Act. 
('5 Traditionally, the legality of location clauses was determined under the rule of reason analysis See, 
1\lr example, 80ro Hall Corp \' Gcncral Motors Corp., 124 F. 2d 822 (2 '1d Cir. 1942): Salco Corp. \' 
C;clI<'ra/ ,\futors Cure. 517 F. 2d 567 (loth ell' 1975); Kaiser \' General .\fotors Corp., 530 F. 2d 964 
0'" Cir. 1976). 
hI> Judges Kilkenny and Skopil voted to affirm with Judge Ely dissenting. GTE Sdv(JIl/(/ \' Continental 
/I' Inc 1 \)7·t-1 Irade Cas (CCI-I) ():\072. 
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District Court with the instruction that the legality of the location clause was to be 
determined under a rule of reason analysis. It was the view of the Court of Appeals 
that a " ... contrary holding would constitute an unwarranted body blow to legitimate 
business enterprise and would place our free capitalistic system under stifling 
restraints, never contemplated or intended by the Congress".67 
The differing ideological perspectives of US antitrust is evidenced most graphically in 
the manner in which the Court of Appeals arrived at its decision. Judge Ely delivered 
the Court's decision. He rather disingenuously stated that the lower Court's per se 
instruction was erroneous in that it was based on a misinterpretation of Schwinn. This 
misinterpretation conflicted with existing law in relation to exclusive distribution and 
would ultimately "seriously undermine" the purpose of the Sherman Act. 68 
As the Court of Appeals was bound by the Supreme Court's ruling in Schwinn the 
only course of action opened to the majority was to distinguish the location clause 
before it from Schwinn's territorial confinement. In the words of Judge Ely, Sylvania 
" ... imposed neither of the restrictions that Schwinn appropriately condemned".69 For 
the majority the critical and obvious distinction was that " ... Schwinn involved a 
restriction on the locations and types of permissible vendors while Sylvania only 
imposed restrictions on the permissible locations of vendors. 70 A mere statement of 
the obvious. More fundamentally Judge Ely stated that the per se holding of the trial 
judge was irreconcilable with the "veritable avalanche" of precedent holding 
exclusive dealerships lawful. An exclusive distribution agreement is worthless to both 
h7 UtE Srlvania Inc \' Continental TV Inc, 537 F. 2d. 980, 988 (9 1h Cir. 1(76). 
h8 Ibid at' 998. 
(,I) Ibid ;I( 9S() 
70 Ibid at 990. 
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manufacturer and distributor if it does not contain a location clause. Under the 
approach advocated by the District Court 
" a manufacturer legally prevented from imposing or enforcing a 
location restriction could not lawfully prevent its franchisee from 
creating new outlets at any unauthorised location the franchisee might 
choose and distributing the franchiser's merchandise therefrom. In 
other words under the rule of per se illegality, if a dealer is franchised 
anywhere he is franchised everywhere". 71 
Judge Ely then proceeded to turn on its head the traditionalist or populist approach to 
antitrust and use it to his own advantage. He argued that a per se approach to location 
clauses may result in the growth of "giant franchisees" which may ultimately replace 
networks of small, local businesses; smaller manufacturers may suffer as a result of an 
inability to attract and maintain dealers and larger manufacturers may eliminate 
franchising by integrating vertically into distribution. 72 Ultimately free enterprise 
would suffer, monopoly would be promoted and consumers disadvantaged. The 
Court then gave recognition to the fact that there were differences of opinion as to the 
alleged procompetitive benefits of such restraints. Nevertheless, it recognised that 
pro competitive benefits could be derived from location clauses. They could be used 
to prevent free riding73 and to create the orderly marketing of products. Judge Ely 
stated 
, I . 
. Ibid at 998. 
'l Ibid at 999-1000. 
71 Ihid at 1002. 
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" ... the legislative intent underlying the Sherman Act had as its goal 
the promotion of consumer welfare, we decline briefly to condemn a 
business practice as illegal per se because it imposes a partial ... 
limitation on intrabrand competition, when there is a significant 
possibility that its overall effect is to promote competition between 
brands".74 
Evidently, the consumer welfare perspective had impinged on judicial thinking. 
Judge Kilkenny delivered the principal dissent. In a separate opinion, however, Judge 
Browning delivered a remarkably powerful, bold and forthright defence of the 
traditionalist approach to antitrust. He wasted no time and disagreed with the 
majority's contention that the sole goal of the Sherman Act was simply the promotion 
of consumer welfare. For him one of the objectives of the Sherman Act was to protect 
independent business entities. He stated 
"Congressional debates reflect a concern not only with the consumers 
interest in price, quality and quantity of goods and service, but also 
wi th society's interest in the protection of the independent business for 
reason of social and political as well as economic policy".75 
Antitrust policy is to be viewed as an amalgam of sociaL political and economIC 
clements. In support of this contention he quoted widely from academic works and 
'I Ihid at 1003 
7 ~ ~ Ibid at 1019. 
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Supreme Court decisions. 76 His conclusion was that independent traders needed 
protection from the imposition of unnecessary restrictions. Having established an 
academic, legal and historic basis for his suppositions he moved on to consider the 
imposition of vertically imposed restraints. In Judge Browning's view the "naked 
transfer of title" in Schwinn was not a determinant fact. In his view, Schwinn was 
primarily concerned with drawing a line between those restraints imposed by a 
principal upon its agent and those imposed by one independent business entity upon 
another. In distinguishing between these two categories the Court had actually 
"located the boundary for the application of the per se rule in a way that (served) the 
Sherman Act's purpose of preserving the competitive freedom of independent 
businessman".77 In any event, it was not an appropriate judicial function to weigh the 
loss of intrabrand competition against gains in interbrand competition to determine 
whether such restraints violate the Sherman Act. In Judge Browning's view, the 
Courts were ill-equipped to resolve these complex economic issues. To utilise a rule 
of reason analysis in such circumstances simply enabled the Court to ramble freely 
through the wilds of economic theory. A fruitless exercise which simply ended in 
guesswork. Issues of this nature should be determined by Congress as they are 
beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence. Finally, Judge Browning simply 
disluissed as pure speculation the majority's contention that the nation's 
competitiveness would be disastrously effected if location clauses were held to be 
illegal per se. The minority considered Schwinn to be correctly decided and on this 
basis Sylvania's location clause should be held illegal. 
7h Ibid at 1019-1022 . 
. Ihid at 1022. 
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The decision of the Court of Appeals is particularly illustrative of the diversity of 
ideological approach to antitrust. Not surprisingly, Continental TV, took the matter to 
the Supreme Court. Here the Supreme Court, for the first time in antitrust 
jurisprudence, overruled a prior Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court's 
decision which Bork has referred to as " ... one of the best in the modern career of 
. ,,78· bl' antItrust , IS nota e In many respects. 
While Mr Justice White in his concurring judgment agreed with Judge Browning's 
populist interpretation of the Sherman Act, the majority of the Supreme Court failed 
to do so. In the view of the majority "(c)ompetitive economies have social and 
political as well as economic advantages ... but an antitrust policy divorced from 
market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks".79 In this short sentence 
the Supreme Court made an ideological break with the past. American antitrust was 
to be refocused. No longer was its focus to include social and political concerns. 
These benchmarks lacked the necessary objectivity. The policy reformation was to 
focus on economics. Oddly, however, the Supreme Court failed to give any 
explanation as to why it was dispatching the traditionalist or populist approach to 
antitrust. What is more certain, however, is that Chicagoan influence had successfully 
infiltrated the Supreme Court. 
In considering Schwinn Mr Justice Powell simply concluded that it was an abrupt and 
largely unexplained departure from the agnostic approach to vertical restraints 
evidenced in IVhite Motor. Unlike the Court of Appeals the Supreme Court stated that 
it could not find a principled basis for distinguishing Schwinn from the present casco 
7N R.II Bo.-"-. noll' ·lS above, 287. 
N ('ulltillclllal rl-" Ille \' (iTE ,\'l'i\''''I/(/ Ille .t33 U.S -'6,53 (1977) 
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An emphatic rejection of the Court of Appeals approach. The Supreme Court also 
recognised that Schwinn's reliance on an ancient rule of alienation provoked scholarly 
criticism " ... as both a misreading of legal history and a perversion of antitrust 
analysis,,80 as well as judicial ingenuity to limit and confine its extent. It concluded. 
therefore, that Schwinn's distinction between sale and non-sale transactions was not 
sufficient in itself to justify a per se approach. Thus, the question before the Court 
was whether the per se rule should be expanded to include non-sale transaction or 
abandoned for a rule of reason analysis. Justice Powell reviewed the distinction 
between the two approaches. He stated that per se rules are only appropriate in those 
circumstances were the practice or agreement has a pernicious effect on competition 
and lacks any redeeming virtues. While acknowledging that the market impact of 
vertical restrictions was complex, he recognised that they possessed the potential to 
stimulate interbrand competition. Such restraints, therefore, possessed redeeming 
virtues. Firstly, they may be used by manufacturers to attract and maintain 
distributors, especially if dealer investment is required. Secondly, manufacturers may 
impose these restraints to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to 
provide post sale service and repair functions. Here the Court specifically gave 
judicial recognition to the existence of market imperfection and the necessity for such 
restraints to be used to overcome the possibility of free riding. Finally, in addition to 
market efficiency justifications, these restraints may also be necessary for health and 
safety considerations.8l The Supreme Court, therefore, overturned Schwinn and held 
that non-price vertical restraints should be subject to a rule of reason analysis. 
Furthermore, any departure from this standard must be based on economic effect 
rather than formalistic line drawing typified by Schwinn. 
NO It 'd 5' - t 11 at .l-)-t 
!II Ibid at 55. 
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Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sylvania most Courts in the US have upheld 
the legality of territorial allocation under a rule of reason analysis. It should be 
stressed, however, that the Sylvania decision merely provided general direction as to 
the analytical approach to be adopted in the assessment of this type of restraint. 
Lower courts were left to refine its application and provide a detailed operational 
method. In order to prevent lengthy and costly litigation a truncated or "quick look" 
rule of reason, based on a market power filter, has been developed. 
The antitrust plaintiff must show that the party imposing the restraint has market 
power. If this proves to be the case the burden of proof shifts to the Defendant to 
justify its imposition.82 Where the plaintiff fails to show market power the situation is 
rather ambiguous. Some judgments indicate that the rule of reason involves a two 
step analysis. Firstly, a determination of market power and, secondly, an assessment 
of the procompetitive justifications for the implementation of the restraint. 83 Other 
Courts have simply taken the view that a failure to show market power invariably 
means that the defendant can show that the restraint has no anti competitive effect. A 
failure to show market power, therefore, ends the analysis. 84 The use of such a 
threshold necessitates product and geographic market definitions. Most Courts have 
accepted market share as a proxy for market power and have acknowledged that these 
definitional issues are not a precise science. Where the party imposing the restraint 
has a market share of less than 20 per cent the restraint is usually upheld as legal. 85 
82 See Illinois Corporate Travel \' American Airlines, 866 F. 2d 722, 729 (7 th Cir. 1986); Valley Liquors 
Inc \. Reafield Importers Ltd 822 F. 2d 656 (7 th Cir. 1987). 
83 Graphic Prods. Distribs. \' Itek C o ~ { - , , 717 F. 2d 1560 (I Ilh Cir. 1983); Davis-Watkins Co v SCITicc 
Merchandise, 686 F. 2d 1190, 1202 (611 Cir. 1982). 
SI .. tSSUII/ Drug Co \' Miller Brewing Co. 798 F. 2d 3 II. 316 (8 th Cir. 1986); Murrow Furniture Galleries 
\ Tholl/u.\Tillt' Furnit/lre Indus!, 889 F. 2d 5 2 ~ , , 529 ( ~ t h h Cir. 1989); O.S.c. Corp v Apple Computer, 
7()2 F. 2d l · t 6 ~ , , I ~ 6 9 9 (9 th Cir. 1986); Jack Walters & Sons Corp \'\!orton Bldg Inc., 737 F. 2d 698, 702 
(7th Cir. 1 9 X ~ ) . .
K ~ ~ Rl'ko .\fgg, \' Edell ,','e/Ts, X23 I 2d 1215, (8 th Cir. 1987). 
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Market share in excess of 50 per cent leads the Court to question the validity of the 
territorial restraint. 86 
III. TERRITORIAL ALLOCATION IN THE EU 
A. Exclusive Distribution 
Exclusive distribution arises when a manufacturer agrees to provide its dealer with a 
specific contract territory in which to concentrate its sales efforts. In such 
circumstances resellers invariably agree to enter exclusive purchasing obligations. 
Prior to the creation of a block exemption in this area, exclusive distribution 
agreements in Europe were exempted on an individual basis by the European 
Commission following notification. In the latter half of 1965 the Commission 
examined the notified agreements of three undertakings. In Blondel's Agreement87 a 
Dutch manufacturer of cast iron household articles, DRU, appointed Blondel of Paris 
as its exclusive distributor for France. In Edmond Isbeque 88 a German manufacturer 
of agricultural machinery, Hummel appointed Edmond Isbeque as its exclusive 
distributor for Belgium. In Maison JaUatte 89 Hans Voss and Vandeputte acted as 
exclusive distributors for Germany and Belgium of Maison Jallatte, a French producer 
of safety shoes. 
In each of these cases the Commission found that the notified agreements infringed 
Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)). The contractual arrangement, in all three cases, restricted the 
~ h h (;,.aphic Prods Dislrih \' Ilek COIF. 717 F. 2d 1560 (11 th Cir. 1983) 
K7 ('0111111. Dee 6:'")(1() JO 1965 2 1 9 ~ ~ '6:'. [1965] CMLR 180. 
KI! Comlll. Ike 6 : , / ~ 2 6 6 JO 1965 2581/6:\ [196:'] C ~ ~ lLR 242. 
s"(\lI11ll1, Ike 6()15JO 1 9 6 6 ~ 7 ( ) 6 , [ 1 9 6 6 ] C ~ l L R D I . .
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freedom of the parties and the position of third parties was noticeably altered. 
Undertakings established on the respective markets, other than the exclusive 
distributor, could not acquire the contract goods. 
The Commission, however, was prepared to grant exemptions in all three cases. It 
recognised that exclusive distribution could lead to improvements in product 
distribution. Manufacturers no longer needed to maintain a multiplicity of contracts 
with a large number of dealers. Concentrating distribution in the hands of a single 
dealer within a defined contact territory increased market awareness. Levels of 
production could, therefore, be adjusted to meet changing patterns of demand. 
Linguistic, legal and other differences which arise between country of production and 
that of distribution could more readily be overcome. Moreover, these arrangements 
also facilitated information exchange and technical help between the parties. 
Consumers also benefited because foreign products, adapted to meet their needs, were 
more readily available. The Commission also emphasised that exclusive distribution 
could increase product demand and lead to a better spreading of manufacturer's 
overheads. Consumers benefited from this as a result of better product pricing. In all 
three cases, however, the Commission emphasised that the dealer did not acquire 
absolute territorial protection. Parallel imports remained possible. 
In the following year the Court of Justice considered three cases in this area, each of 
which raised interpretative issues relating to Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) and exclusive 
distribution. In lIar" v Council and Commission90 the Italian Government brought an 
action for annulment of Council Regulation 19/65 which empowers the Commission 
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to draft block exemptions. In contended inter alia that Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)) 
applied only to horizontal agreements and Article 82 (ex 86) governed relation of a 
vertical nature. In rejecting these arguments the Court of Justice concluded that the 
Italian Government had made a distinction which the Treaty itself did not make. Both 
horizontal and vertical arrangements were susceptible to Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85( 1)). 
Exclusive Distribution, in particular, could implicate Article 81 (ex 85) because of the 
possibility that it might be used to restore national partitioning in trade between 
Member States. 
In Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Vim GmbI-f1 the Court of Justice 
examined the distribution arrangements between Maschinenbau Ulm (MBU), a 
German manufacturer of heavy plant and machinery, and its distributor, Societe 
Techinque Miniere (STM). The latter agreed to purchase a specific quantity of earth 
moving equipment over a period of two years and to provide post sale repair and 
maintenance services. In return MBU appointed STM as its exclusive distributor for 
France. The agreement did not prevent parallel importation or exportation. STM was 
unable to sell the German equipment on the French market and its bills of exchange, 
payable to MBU, were not honoured. The latter, therefore, took successful action 
before the Tribunal de Commerce for contractual recession and damages. STM 
appealed to the Cour 0' Appel, Paris which referred the matter to the Court of Justice. 
STM argued that exclusive distribution eliminated competition and simply guaranteed 
monopoly profits for dealers within their allotted territories. Furthermore, while these 
arrangements may not expressly restrict parallel imports its prohibition is a 
prerequisite of exclusive dealerships.92 In contrast MBU contended that pro\'ided 
')1 Case 56 ()5 [1l)()6j FeR 235. [1966] 1 Cf\lLR 357. 
')2 Ibid 2 . L ) - 2 ~ ~ ~
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interbrand competition existed exclusive distribution arrangements should not fall 
within the confines of Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)). On the facts, its agreement with STM 
related to a sector where interbrand competition was particularly intense. MBU also 
stressed that its arrangements did not curtail parallel exports or imports. In its view 
exclusive distribution assisted in opening new markets, helped SMEs to gain market 
footholds and enabled dealers to appropriate the benefits of their investments.93 
The Commission adopted the stance that Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)) applied virtually 
automatically to these arrangements with the possibility of exemption under Article 
81 (3 ) (ex 85(3)).94 The freedom of action of the respective parties was restricted and 
provided trade between Member States was affected appreciably Article 81 (1) (ex 
85(1)) applied. On the facts, the Commission felt this determination had to be made 
by the national Court. Advocate General Roemer also accepted that exclusive 
distribution could, in principle, fall within the parameters of Article 81 (1) (ex 85( 1 )).95 
In concluding that exclusive distribution did not by its nature infringe Article 81 (1) 
(ex 85( 1)) the Court of Justice enunciated a "two-step" analysis. Firstly, the object of 
the agreement had to be considered in the economic context in which it is intended to 
operate. Any interference with competition must stem from all or some of the clauses 
of the agreement itself.96 Secondly, if a sufficiently deleterious effect on competition 
is not revealed by this examination, the consequences or effect of the agreement must 
then be considered. In this context special attention should be given to 
91 Ibid ~ ~ ~ I. 
94 Ibid ~ . I O . .
l ) ~ ~ It . l 
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the nature and quantity ... of the products covered by the 
agreement, the position and importance of the grantor and 
concessionaire on the market for the products concerned, the isolated 
nature of the disputed agreement or ... its position in a series of 
arrangements, the severity of the clauses intended to protect the 
exclusive dealerships or alternatively the opportunities allowed for 
other commercial competitors in the same products by way of parallel 
re-exportation and importation".97 
In this case the Court observed that there was an attempt by MBU to penetrate the 
market of another Member State. It doubted whether there was any interference with 
competition if the agreement was "really necessary" to achieve market penetration. 
Shortly after the STM case the Court of Justice in the case of Consten and Grundig v 
Commission98 reviewed the exclusive distribution arrangements of a German 
manufacturer of consumer electronic products. The facts are generally well known. 
In April 1957 Grundig appointed Consten as its sole distributor for France, the Saar 
and Corsica. Consten agreed not to handle competing goods or represent other 
undertakings. It also agreed to invest heavily in post sale services. In return Grundig 
agreed not to supply others in Consten's contract territory. This constituted one 
aspect of a system of territorial protection which also required other dealers to refrain 
from exporting or re-exporting the contract goods into Consten' s contract territory. 
To provide further protection from parallel imports Consten was permitted to register 
'>7 1 bid ."2:' () 
'IX Cases )(l.:'S ()·l [1966] FeR ."2l)l). [1966] C\lLR ellS. 
151 
the "GINT" trademark enabling it to sue for infringement in the event of parallel 
importation. 
In 1960-61 French Quota restrictions on certain products (tape recorders, television 
sets and radios) were lifted. Realising that Grundig's products were considerably 
cheaper in Germany, UNEF of Paris and Leissner of Strasbourg, imported them into 
France. These imports were sold at prices which undercut those of Consten. The 
latter took legal action on the basis of trademark infringement and unfair competition. 
The Cour d' Appel, however, adjourned its proceedings once the Commission 
instigated its own investigations. 
In September 1964 the Commission concluded that the Grundig - Consten agreement 
infringed Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) and was ineligible for exemption.99 The agreement 
infringed Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) because it restricted the freedom of the respective 
parties. The Commission also attached importance to intrabrand competition because 
it provided consumers with real power of choice. Price differentials between official 
and parallel networks were immediately apparent. Parallel imports could be used, 
therefore, as a mechanism to bring about price convergence and market unification. 
In contrast, interbrand price comparisons did not allow the consumer to ascertain 
whether price differentials resulted from differences in production costs, production 
quality or the costs of distribution. The agreement, in effect, hindered or prevented 
market integration. 
l)l) I b i d ~ 0 4 ; ; SL'e also ('0111111. [kL' 64'566 Re The Agreement of GrulIJig "aka/d." GmhH JO 1964 
l ~ ) · l " ( ) · l . . [ 19(dl CMLR 4X9. 
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The Commission also refused exemption under Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)). Firstly, 
whilst the price of Grundig's products in France were falling, consumers still did not 
receive an equitable share in the resulting profits. Secondly, Consten did not need 
absolute territorial protection to exploit the French market. By ensuring that its profit 
margins equated roughly with those in other Member States the incentive to import on 
a parallel basis would diminish. Finally, the granting of absolute territorial protection 
was noxious to the realisation of market unification. 
Consten and Grundig sought annulment of the Commission's Decision before the 
Court of Justice. For the most part the Court upheld the Commission's position. It 
rejected the applicant's contention and that of the Italian Government, intervening on 
their behalf, that Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) applied only to horizontal agreements. Any 
agreement between producer and distributor " ... which might tend to restore the 
national divisions between Member States might be such as to frustrate the most 
fundamental (objects) of the Community".IOO Article 81 (ex 85) applied, therefore, to 
vertical as well as horizontal arrangements. The Court upheld the importance 
attached by the Commission to intrabrand competition. It stated "(a)lthough 
competition between producers is generally more noticeable than that between 
distributors of products of the same make, it does not thereby follow that an 
agreement tending to restrict the latter kind of competition should escape the 
prohibition of Article 81 (1) merely because it might increase the former". 101 
The Court then found the necessary restriction of competition in the agreement 
betwcen Consten and Grundig to use French law to grant absolute krritorial 
Ilill Ihid J--lO. 
Ilil I h i d ~ - - l ~ . .
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protection. No amount of economic data or arguments showing the favourable effects 
of exclusive distribution could lead to a different conclusion. The Court also rejected 
the applicants' submissions under Article 81 (3 ) (ex 85(3)). Arguments that parallel 
imports added to commercial risk by making advance planning difficult did not justify 
special consideration. Risk is inherent in all commercial activity. The Court also 
rejected the submission that damage to Grundig's reputation might occur as a result of 
parallel trading. It was still open to the applicants to publicise the nature of their 
services and the benefits to be derived from using the official network for Grundig' s 
products. In fact, UNEF actually provided a free guarantee and after sale service 
which did nothing to harm Grundig's reputation. 102 
At this point it is interesting to note the submissions of Advocate General Roemer. 
He was critical of the Commission's Decision and argued that it should be annulled 
and the matter referred back for fresh examination. He made reference to the 
American case of White Motor and concluded that American law required a wide 
examination of the economic repercussions of such restraints. It was not possible, in 
his view, to dispense with observing the market in concreto. An examination of this 
kind might lead to the conclusion that exclusive distribution is pro competitive and not 
necessarily within the parameters of Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)).103 
In the STM case the Court of Justice concluded that exclusive distribution need not 
necessarily fall foul of the competition rules. In effect, a balance needed to be struck 
betwccn the legal control of these agreements and product distribution. In Consten 
and Grundig the Court used the notion of absolute territorial to distinguish between 
l ( l ~ ~ Ibid 349. 
10J Ibid 3."8. 
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the legal and illegal. Indeed, a similar approach was adopted in the case of Maize 
Seeds l04 where the Court made a distinction between open and closed licensing 
systems. 
Shortly after these judgments the Court of Justice refined its analysis in the case of 
Volk v Vervaecke. 105 Here a German undertaking, Josef Erd and Co owned by Mr 
Yolk, manufactured washing machines under the trade name Konstant. In September 
1963 it appointed Vervaecke as its exclusive distributor for Belgium and 
Luxembourg. In return for purchasing a specific quantity of machines each month, 
Vervaecke was granted protection from intrabrand competition. In November 1964 
Yolk alleged that its exclusive distributor acted in breach of contract. Yolk 
successfully took legal action before the landgericht. Vervaecke appealed to the 
Oberlandgericht arguing that the disputed provisions were void under Article 81 (ex 
85) because they provided absolute territorial protection. The German Court referred 
the matter to the Court of Justice. 
In submitting its observations the Commission noted that Josef Erd and Co had a 
market share of 0.08 per cent in the Common market and 0.2 per cent in the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Its total share of the Belgian and Luxemborg markets 
amounted to 0.6 per cent. In view of these small market shares the Commission 
concluded that even though absolute territorial protection was conferred upon the 
distributor it did not restrict competition appreciably. 106 
1(11 Case . 2 ~ X I 7 8 8 .\'UfI.I!.C.\Scr \' CommissiON [1982] ECR .2015, [1983] I Cr--.1LR 2'78. 
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The Advocate General adopted similar reasoning. In a very brief judgment the Court 
stressed that agreements which have an insignificant effect on the market, taking into 
account the weak position of the parties, fall outside the parameters of Article 81 (ex 
85). This remained the case even if absolute territorial protection was afforded to the 
dealer. 107 
The Commission reacted quickly to the Court's judgment. In 1970 it introduced its 
Notice relating to Decisions and concerted practices of Minor Importance. 
Agreements between undertakings whose effects on competition and trade between 
Member States is not significant do not fall within Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)).108 
In July 1983, Regulation 1983/83 came into force replacing Regulation 1967/67. This 
Regulation exempts exclusive distribution agreements, exhibiting certain 
characteristics, from the provisions of Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1 )).109 The principles 
enunciated by the Commission and approved by the Court of Justice in Consten and 
Grundig formed the basis of the Regulation. Article 3 (c) and (d) provides that the 
benefits of the block exemption do not apply to agreements which confer absolute 
territorial protection. According to the Recitals to the Regulation competition at the 
level of distribution is ensured only if parallel imports remain possible. I 10 The 
Regulation identifies two situations in which absolute territorial protection is 
conferred. Firstly, where users can only obtain the contract goods from the exclusive 
distributor with no alternative sources of supply outside the contract territory. I II To 
107 Ibid 301-30.2 
lOR This Notice has been revised on a periodic basis. Its most recent revision is to be found at OJ 1997 
C . l T 2 ! ~ . . [\998] 4 Cr-.ll.R 19.2. 
109 Sec Annex I. 
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prevent this the parties must ensure that the contract goods are available from parallel 
importers or can be acquired outside the contract territory.112 The supplier can 
represent an alternative source of supply provided it has not agreed not to supply 
others in the dealer's contract territory. Secondly, territorial protection is absolute if 
either party, jointly or unilaterally, impede parallel importation. 
Relative or qualified territorial protection is conferred upon an exclusive distributor 
provided only those restrictions of competition envisaged in Article 1 and Article 2( 1) 
are imposed upon the supplier. The distributor must remain free to respond to passive 
sales in accordance with Article 2(2)( c). Article 1 of the Regulation enables the 
supplier to supply goods to a distributor within a defined contract territory. According 
to Guideline 27, however, a supplier is not prevented from providing the contract 
goods to other resellers who then resell in the exclusive distributors contract territory. 
This is the case provided the "other resellers" request supply of the contract goods, the 
latter are handed over outside the exclusive dealers territory and the resellers bear the 
cost of transportation into the contract territory. These requirements are designed to 
ensure that the exclusive dealer is subject to competitive intrabrand pressures. Article 
2( 1) of the Regulation also enables the supplier to agree not to supply the contract 
goods to other users in the contract territory. This restriction is optional and, in any 
event cannot be absolute. The supplier must remain free to supply the contract goods 
'd h . fi I . h . I I3 outSI e t e contract territory to Ina users In t e territory. 
An active sales restraint may be imposed on an exclusive distributor (Article 2(2)(c)). 
This may oblige a dealer to refrain from "seeking customers", establishing a branch 
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11'1' i '" '0 \.lUll L' 111l' -' " 
157 
office or maintaining a depot outside its contractual territory in relation to the contract 
goods. However, the distributor must remain free to respond to unsolicited requests 
for sales from other users or intermediaries outside its exclusive territory (passive 
sales).114 
B. Territorial Allocation In Other Systems Of Distribution 
Territorial allocation has so far been considered in the context of exclusive 
distribution. Economic analysis indicates that different types of vertical restraints 
serve the same purpose and may be used as substitutes for each other. Limiting the 
number of dealers in a selective distribution network, for example, has the same effect 
as granting territorial protection. This section focuses primarily on selective 
distribution and franchise agreements. It should be noted, however, in the case of 
exclusive purchasing agreements that any form of territorial allocation will render 
Regulation 1984/83 inapplicable. The exclusive purchaser is free of restrictions, 
therefore, as to the area over which it makes its sales efforts. 
In systems of selective distribution provided network admission is based on objective, 
qualitative criteria applied uniformly and without discrimination, the agreement is not 
regarded as violating Article 81 (1) ex 8S( 1 )). Numerical or quantitative restrictions 
on dealer admission, which in effect controls spatial density and performs the same 
function as territorial allocation, is acceptable only in exceptional cases. 
114 Guideline 28. 
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In 1980 the Court of Justice in the Guerlain, liS Estee Lauder l16 and Lancome l17 cases. 
collectively known as the "perfume cases", examined the selective distribution 
systems of certain perfume manufacturers. In Guerlain and Estee Lauder the French 
Courts were faced with criminal proceedings and claims for damages against 
manufacturers for their refusal to supply certain retail outlets contrary to French law. 
In both cases the manufacturer argued that their respective systems of selective 
distribution, which employed qualitative and quantitative network admission criteria, 
were in conformity with the European rules on competition. Both manufacturers had 
notified their agreements and received comfort letters from the Commission. The 
French Court referred the matter to the Court of Justice. In the Lancome case, 
Lancome of Paris and its Dutch subsidiary took action before the Dutch Courts to 
prohibit the sale of its perfumes at discounted prices by unauthorised stockists. The 
discount stores claimed, however, that the manufacturer's sales arrangements 
infringed the competition rules and the comfort letter received by the plaintiff did not 
preclude this adjudication. This matter was also referred to the Court of Justice. 
The manufacturers' reliance upon the receipt of comfort letters proved fruitless. They 
simply amounted to administrative communications designed to inform the recipient 
that no further action was envisioned. With regard to network admission criteria the 
Court affirmed the principle that quantitative restriction would render such systems 
susceptible to the European rules on competition. In this regard the manufacturers' 
contentions that quantitative limitation was necessary to guarantee the earning power 
of authorised stockists to enable them to absorb the costs of advertising and the 
I I ~ ~ Cases 2 ) ~ 1 7 8 8 1-3179 Procureur (Ie la RI.;puhliqlle v Guy and GlI£:r/ain [1980] ECR 2327, [19S I] 2 
Cr-..1LR 99 
116 Case 37179 A 1I11L' .\ fLirt I ,\./ \' E.\·/(;(' Lallder .\',./ [1980] ECR 2481, [1981] 2 C i\ 1 LR 14:; 
117 (';Ise 9 l ) 79 SA L(/IICOII/l' \' E!os B I' ulld Alher! HCI'Il Supemwr! B I' [1980] ECR 2511, [1981] 2 
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provision of customer services as well as preservation of brand image were rejected. 
Quantitative selection criteria is acceptable only by way of exception and only then, if 
close collaboration between supplier and dealer is necessary because of the nature of 
the product. 118 
In 1992 in the case of Vichy v Commission I 19 the Court of First Instance reviewed the 
selective distribution system of another French perfume manufacturer. In July 1985 
Vichy notified its distribution arrangements relating to the sale of cosmetic products 
through retail pharmacies. This notification lapsed as a result of a decision of the 
French Conseil de la Concurrence which required the manufacturer to modify its 
French system to ensure conformity with the European rules on competition. 120 
In August 1989 Vichy notified its modified French agreements and its unmodified 
European agreements. In January 1991 the Commission concluded that the latter 
violated Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) and was ineligible for exemption. 121 Network 
admission was dependent upon the reseller being a retail chemist. This quantitative 
criteria restricted the number of potential resellers. Firstly, dispensing chemists 
needed to possess a diplomacy in pharmacy. Secondly, in a number of Member States 
the right of establishment was controlled on a quantitative basis by national rules 
linked to a certain number of inhabitants per point of sale and/or to a certain 
geographical distance between the retail outlets. The Commission went further and 
118 See Cases 253178 1-3179, note 115 above, 2387. 
119 Case T-19/91 [1992] ECR 11-415. 
120 The French court arrived at this decision on 9 June 1987 (Decision No 87-015) and was later upheld 
b\' the Paris Cour 0' Appel (28 June 1988) and the Cour de Cassation (25 April 1989). Vichy was 
rl:quired to modify its agreemcnts by (I) removing a clause under which resellers WCT\.' prohibited from 
sl'lling products to other approved resellers and (2) to discontinue the requirement that its distributors 
should ha\e thc status of dispensing chemist. 
121 Comm. [)l'C 91/153 /'icln OJ 1991 L 75 '57. 
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concluded that even if sales through retail chemists could be deemed qualitative, the 
admission criteria was not proportional. It went beyond what was necessary to ensure 
quality control and proper product use. National and Community rules ensured that 
cosmetic products did not pose a risk to consumer's health. 
The Commission simply rejected Vichy's arguments that sales through retail chemists 
contributed to product availability through large stock holdings or rapid 
establishment; assisted in the launch of new and innovative products; provided 
information feedback to manufacturers and provided an educative and advisory 
function to consumers. These alleged benefits could equally be achieved through 
sales outlets, other than pharmacies, by means of contractual obligations. In fact, the 
professional standards and ethics of chemists, in any event, curbed intrabrand 
competition. Finally, the Commission stressed that Vichy was unable to provide any 
justification for its dual system of distribution which resulted In market 
compartmentalisation. 
In March 1991 Vichy appealed to the Court of First Instance seeking annulment of the 
Commission's Decision. In its view its network admission criteria was of a 
qualitative nature and any quantitative ceilings were attributable solely to the national 
provisions of the various Member States. l22 The Commission rejected this view. 
Vichy had deliberately opted for a system designed to limit the number of outlets. A 
producer who " ... decided to distribute (its) products only at airports could not claim 
that (it) had no control over the number of sales outlets on the ground and that it was 
the competent authority that limited the number of airports.,,123 
In C ~ s c c 1'-19/91, note 119 above ... U-l. 
121 Ihid 437. 
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The Court of First Instance agreed with the position of the Commission, provided a 
manufacturer is in some way associated with outlet limitations, it matters not that 
some degree of limitation can be attributed to legislation. Furthermore, the status of 
dispensing chemists was not necessary for the purpose of product distribution. The 
Court held that the Commission was correct to conclude that Vichy's admission 
criteria was quantitative and despite the existence of a clause designed to permit 
cross-supplies, was capable of reducing parallel trade. Because of the dual nature of 
the system an authorised reseller who might wish to acquire the contract goods from a 
reseller other than a dispensing chemist, was confined to imports from France. The 
Court also agreed with the Commission that the professional ethics of chemists 
reduced intrabrand competition and rejected arguments in relation to improved 
product distribution. In dismissing the appeal, the Court stressed that Vichy's own 
actions actually contradicted its own arguments. Vichy actually sold the same 
products, albeit under different brand names, through non-pharmaceutical channels. 124 
More recently the Court of First Instance in the cases of Leclerc v Commission (Yves 
Saint Laurent) 125 and Leclerc v Commission (Givenchy) 126 examined the lawfulness of 
the distribution networks of Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA (YSL) and Parfums 
Givenchy SA (Givenchy). In July 1989 and March 1990 YSL and Givenchy notified 
their respective distribution agreements. The Commission raised several objections to 
both systems. especially in relation to the use of quantitative network admission. 
Oddly. both manufacturers employed remarkably similar admission procedures. In 
124 Ibid 442-45cl 
125 else 1'-19/92 [1996] ITR 11-18:' I. 
12('CaseT-88 l): [1996] ECR 11-1961. 
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France both competitors placed applications for admission to their respective 
networks on regional waiting lists. Admission depended upon the economic potential 
of the region in question, in particular, whether it was capable of sustaining another 
outlet. In other Member States the waiting list procedure was not followed. 
However, in both cases, admission was still subject to considerations of "economic 
opportuneness" . 
Following adverse comments from the Commission YSL and Givenchy amended their 
agreements to dispense with the use of quantitative limitations. In December 1990 
and October 1991, the Commission stated that it intended to adopt a favourable 
position with regard to the modified systems of both undertakings. It invited 
comments from interested third parties. Edouard Leclerc (Galee), a French co-
operative society and frequent litigator in matters of competition, submitted 
observations in January 1991 opposing the Commission's proposed decisions. The 
Commission required further contractual amendments and in December 1991 and 
August 1992 granted exemption to both systems. 127 
The Commission's Decisions set in motion a number of legal actions. Firstly, in 
March and October 1992 Galee applied to the Court of First Instance to have the 
Commission's Decision in Yves Saint Laurent (Case T-19/92) and Givenchy (Case T-
88/92) annulled. Secondly, in October 1992 BVBA Kruidvat, the Belgian subsidiary 
of a Dutch chain of outlets selling health and beauty products, brought a similar action 
to have the Givenchy decision annulled. 
1 ~ 7 7 ('0111111. Ike. l ) ~ ! D D hes Sa/lll Laurent Par/illns OJ 1992 L 12/24: Comm. Dec. 92428 Pmjimls 
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With regard to Galee's action in relation to YSL and Givenchy, the Court of First 
Instance concluded it had locus standi under Article 230 (ex 173). Galee had 
approached both manufacturers to gain network admission and many of its members 
had brought legal action seeking admission. Galee had also participated in the 
administrative procedure by submitting observations. In many respects the situation 
was similar to that in Metro i 28 where the Court of Justice held that an operator which 
submitted observations during the administrative process was directly and 
individually concerned by a Commission Decision which upheld admission criteria 
which it had criticised. 
The Court of First Instance reviewed the arguments of the respective parties. Galee 
contended that the degree of selectivity accepted by the Commission, in both cases, 
excluded some of its hypermarkets a priori from the respective networks. In 
exempting this criteria the Commission offended against the principle that quantitative 
. . . fi' I wful 129 restnctIOns are prima aCle un a . 
Both YSL and Givenchy intervened in the respective actions. They rejected the 
argument that their admission criteria set numerical limits to their systems in order to 
control spatial density. Provided traders satisfied their objective qualitative criteria 
they were admitted. Both manufacturers pointed to the diverse compositions of their 
respective networks. They both agreed with the Commission that consumers attached 
importance to brand names and prestige and without the concept of selective 
distribution the concept of luxury products would disappear. In this respect they 
l ~ S S l 'asl' 26176 Aft'l/"() \' Commlss/(m [1977] ECR 1875, (1978) 2 CMLR I. 
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referred to the market exit of Coty perfumes as a result of an inappropriate match 
between product quality and product distribution. 130 
The Commission also rejected the notion that the approved admission criteria 
excluded any form of modem trading a priori. It was patently objective and 
necessary to preserve product quality and proper product use. The Commission 
stressed that since the 1980s it had continually objected to the use of quantitative 
selection criteria in the perfume industry. 131 Its decisions, therefore, neither fixed the 
number of distributors nor endorsed a system based on numerical restriction. 
Interestingly, while the Commission received support from several organisations 
representing manufacturers and retailers, four French consumer associations did not 
unreservedly support its position. In their view, the Commission's approach could 
lead to the maintenance of excessively high consumer prices. Thus, preventing a 
significant population from gaining access to the products. 132 
The Court of First Instance, in both actions, reviewed the general legal principles 
applicable to selective distribution. With regard to cosmetics it noted that such 
systems were used to protect brand image and exclusivity and to ensure appropriate 
marketing settings. These systems, however, had to be justified in the interests of the 
consumer and must not limit inordinately network admission. 133 
The Court then considered, in both actions, the lawfulness of the selection criteria 
llsed by both manufacturers. It concluded that criteria relating to the professional 
Il(leaSe 1'-Il) 9:2, note 125 abo\'l' , 1891-1892:CaseT-88/92,note 126 above, 2000. 
III CasL' 1'-XXl):2, note 12() ablne, 1996. 
I l ~ ~ C;1SL' T-199:2, nute 125 abl)\e, 1961; Case 1'-88, 92, note 126 above, 2025. 
In Case T-ll) l ) ~ , , note 125 abo\e, 1899-1901; Case T-XX92, note 126 above, 2009-2011. 
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qualification of resellers, outlet location, external outlet appearance, bans on selling 
products which detract from brand image and shop name requirements do not, in 
principle, offend Article 81 (ex 85).134 In both cases, however, a clause which 
required sales of perfume in YSL and Givenchy outlets to constitute 60 and 50 per 
cent respectively of all sales activity infringed Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1 )). Sales turnover 
had no connection with the preservation of luxury image. 135 The Court also stressed 
that Galec had failed to show that it had been excluded a priori from the respective 
networks. Network admission was based on qualitative criteria. However, it 
emphasised that in any application for renewal the Commission must consider 
whether the market had become so rigid and structured as to exclude new forms of 
distribution. 136 The Court, therefore, annulled the Commission's Decisions only to 
the extent that the agreements of the respective parties allowed them to discriminate 
against retailers where sales of perfume represented a minority of its sales activities. 
In all other respects it dismissed Galec action. 
It will be recalled that in October 1992 Krudidvat BV brought annulment proceedings 
with regard to Givenchy's system of selective distribution in the case of Krudidvat v 
('ommission. 137 The Court of First Instance dismissed this action as inadmissible as 
Krudidvat was unable to establish locus standi under Article 230 (ex 173) EC. A 
subsequent appeal to the Court of Justice proved equally unsuccessful. 138 Krudidvat 
had simply failed to avail itself of the invitation extended by the Commission to 
participate in the administrative proceedings. 
LH CaSl' T-19/92.notel:25 above. 1904-1911; Case T-88/92, note 126 abo\e. 2014-2020. 
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It is apparent then that EU authorities have been cautious in approving quantitative 
restrictions. This caution applies not only to selective distribution networks in the 
fi . d t b h . h 139 . . per ume In us ry ut to sue systems In ot er sectors. However, the CommIssIOn 
has stated that in certain circumstances it would grant exception to numerical 
limitations if close co-operation between manufacturer and dealer is needed. In some 
respects the relevant issues are similar to those of exclusive distribution. That is, the 
need to furnish dealers with protection from intrabrand competition to justify their 
investments, to provide them with the necessary incentive to expand sales, or to 
ensure the appropriate number of dealers consonant with efficient and effective 
distribution. In other circumstances, the restriction in the number of dealers may be 
necessary because of the manufacturers inability to supply an expanded network. 
In Omega l40 a Swiss manufacturer of quality watches distributed its products via a 
combination of exclusive and selective distribution. The manufacturer appointed, in 
each Member State, an exclusive dealer responsible for importing, promoting and 
setting up a retail system of selective distribution. Network admission was based on 
qualitative and quantitative criteria. The number of admitted dealers was limited to an 
optimum figure dependant on the size of the local population and its presumed wealth. 
The Commission concluded that Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) was infringed but that the 
arrangement was eligible for exemption. The use of an exclusive distributor allowed 
for intense market exploitation and the choice of selected dealers enabled the 
manufacturer to adapt itself to local preferences. Ultimately consumers benefited 
IW Sec, fnr e\<Ill1ple, Case 2() 7() ,\ferro \' Commission [1977] ECR 1875, [1978] 2 CMLR 1; Case 8() /82 
I/wsdh/w/ \' Commissio/l [1984] fCR 883, [1984] 1 Cf\lLR 559; Case 107/82 AEG Te/ejimkL'1l \' 
( 'om m iss ion [ I 983] I <- 'R -"1 1 5 1, [ 1984] 3 C i\ 1 L R 325. 
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because they obtained a range of watches adapted to local tastes supported by an 
international guarantee. The use of quantitative selection criteria was necessary, 
firstly, because Omega was only "physically capable" of producing a limited number 
of watches. Secondly, demand for the Omega product was also limited. Thirdly, to 
admit all dealers capable of satisfying objective qualitative criteria would have 
resulted in too many dealers seeking a limited number of watches to meet a limited 
demand. Ultimately, dealers interest in promoting the product would diminish. 
Numerical limitation was, therefore, indispensable to the successful marketing of 
Omega's product. In granting exemption the Commission stressed that interbrand 
competition remained strong and that Omega had lifted export restrictions. 141 
In BMW142 a German manufacturer of motor vehicles used quantitative admission 
criteria to exclude dealers from its network system. However, the Commission found 
that the reasons given by BMW in support of its restrictions were justified. Numerical 
limitations were necessary to persuade dealers to make substantial investment in terms 
of finance and staff. Furthermore, the limited number of dealers selected were all 
capable of receiving and storing BMW vehicles in technically perfect conditions. 
Vehicle maintenance and repair work was readily available and to a high standard. 
BMW was also in a position to inform its limited number of dealers of any technical 
problems, knowing that modifications would be rapidly carried out. Quantitative 
limitation also enabled BMW to co-operate with its dealers to improve road safety and 
reducC' environmental pollution. The Commission, howevec was only prepared to 
grant C'xC'mption once BMW had lifted its export restrictions. 
III Ibid IL':; I-()(). 
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Similar justifications for the use of quantitative restrictions were also approved by the 
Commission in the Ivoclar l43 case. Firstly, numerical limitation enabled this dental 
supplier, based in Lichtenstein, to focus its efforts and expensive training programmes 
on a manageable number of distribution outlets. Secondly, concentrating distribution 
in the hands of a limited number of professionally qualified outlets ensured proper 
product use and proper patient care. Finally, numerical limitation provided the 
necessary incentive for dealers to make the substantial financial commitments 
necessary to employ suitably qualified staff, provide intensive product promotion and 
carry a full product range. Once again the Commission emphasised that interbrand 
competition was strong and that intra-network supplies remained possible. 
Franchise distribution was first introduced into the Community in the 1970s. Since 
that time the use of franchise arrangements have proliferated. Franchising involves 
the transference of industrial or intellectual property rights, the use or application of 
uniform commercial methods and the payment of an entrance fee or monthly royalty. 
Franchisors, unlike suppliers in selective distribution networks, do not post selection 
criteria. Contracts are concluded intuito personae - on the basis of the candidates 
personal and professional qualities. In consequence a franchise agreement may not be 
assigned or transferred without the franchisor's consent. 
I t was not until 1986 in the case of Pronuptia v Schillga/is l44 that the Court of lustice 
considered franchising. Here, the German Supreme Court referred certain questions to 
the l 'ourt of lustice in an atten1pt to resolve a dispute between a French franchisor. 
Pronuptia, and its Gl'rman franchisee, Schillgalis, over the latter's non payment of 
II' l'OIllIll. Ike 85/559 OJ 198.:' L369'1, [198814 Cr-.1LR 78\. 
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royalty fees. The German Court asked whether franchise agreements fell within the 
parameters of Article 81 (ex 85) and whether such agreements could benefit from 
Regulation 1967/67 the predecessor of Regulation 1983/83 and 1984/83. 
Pronuptia contended that its franchise arrangements enabled it to present a uniform 
face to the public, even though its network was comprised of independent outlets each 
of which bore their own risks of sale. Franchising, enabled it to create a ""supra 
regional" network without risking its own capital. These arrangements, therefore, did 
not fall within the parameters of Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) unless the contractual 
restrictions went beyond those demanded by the system. Should, however, the Court 
consider Article 81 (ex 85) to be applicable it should benefit from the provisions of 
Regulation 1967/67. 145 In contrast Mrs Schillgalis contended that these arrangements 
involved territorial restrictions and, therefore, fell within the parameters of Article 
81 (1 ) (ex 85( 1 )). Regulation 1967/67 was inapplicable because it was not drafted 
with this type of arrangement in mind. 146 
The French Government adopted the position that franchising may fall foul of the 
competition rules depending on the factual circumstances and that Regulation 1967/67 
did not appear relevant. The Commission stated succinctly that Article 81 (ex 85) was 
not limited to specific agreements. When its conditions are met, Article 81 (1 ) (ex 
85( 1)) applies. Regulation 1967/67 was not applicable because it was not intended to 
exempt restrictions of competition licensing trademarks, trade names or symbols. I.t7 
II' Ibid 380-386. 
II<, Ibid 386. 
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Advocate General Verloren Van Themaat delivered his Opinion in June 1985. In his 
view the question of whether a franchise agreement resulted in a fair division of costs 
and benefits between franchisor and franchisee was irrelevant to the applicability of 
Article 81. In the Advocate General's view, Article 81 should apply only if the 
vertical obligation caused injury to third parties, including competitors, suppliers or 
purchasers. This would seldom be the case where alternative chains of distribution for 
similar products existed. However, he stressed that particular attention should be paid 
to whether market access was foreclosed and whether the arrangement resulted in 
higher retail prices. 148 Finally, Regulation 1967/67 did not, in his view, apply to 
franchise agreements. 
In July 1986 the Court of Justice gave its ruling. It classified franchises into three 
categories: production franchises where the franchisee manufactures and sells the 
contract goods bearing the franchisor's trademarks; service franchises where the 
franchisee offers a service under the franchisor's name or symbol and distribution 
franchises where the franchisor licenses independent dealers, in return for royalty 
payments, to use its name and proven business formula. The Court concluded that the 
arrangement before it was a distribution franchise and limited its judgment 
d· I 149 accor Ing y. 
With regard to the compatibility of these arrangements with Article 81 (I) (ex 85(1» 
the Court held that any assessment could not be made in the abstract. Much depended 
on the clauses in the agreement. Clauses which resulted in market division, either 
hetwcen the franchisor or franchisee or between the franchisees inter se, fell within 
lIN Ibid 36S-371. 
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Article 81 (ex 85).150 The Court concluded that the use of territorial or location 
clauses would render the agreement susceptible to the rules on competition. 
Surprisingly, the Court failed to make any distinction between absolute and qualified 
territorial protection. It did, however, stress that these clauses may be exempted by 
the Commission if deemed necessary to protect the franchisee from intrabrand 
competition to protect its investments or to attract other franchisees. 151 The Court also 
stressed that other clauses may not offend the competition rules. These included, 
firstly, clauses designed to enable the franchisor to communicate its know-how and 
commercial practice without benefiting its competitors. Such clauses included non-
compete obligations and prohibitions on changing outlet location without the 
franchisor's consent. Secondly, clauses designed to enable the franchisor to take 
appropriate measures to preserve its identity and reputation would not offend Article 
81 (ex 85). These included clauses relating to the use of business method and know-
how, specification for business set-up, advertising approval and site location 
clauses. 152 
In Pronuptia v Schillgalis the Commission made it abundantly clear that it lacked 
experience in the area of franchise distribution. Over the course of a two year period 
(December 1986 - December 1988) the Commission received a number of 
notifications with which to rectify this situation. With one exception these 
notifications related to distribution franchises. The ServiceMaster Agreement lS3 
related to the provision of services but this displayed such strong similarities with 
distribution franchises that the Commission felt it could be treated in a similar fashion. 
I ~ o o II .. i '" l'''' ... 8.1 Oil .'0.'-.) 'i. 
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The other notified agreements included Pronuptia 's154 standard form franchise 
contracts relating to the sale of its bridal wear; Yves Rocher 'SIS5 agreements relating to 
the sale of its cosmetic products; the franchise agreements of Computerland Europe 156 
developed for the sale of its computer products and the agreements of Charles 
Jourdan l57 governing the sale of its shoes. In each of these cases the franchisee was 
allotted a defined territorial area or required to operate from an approved site location. 
The Commission concluded, in each of these cases, that Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)) was 
infringed. The use of territorial and site location clauses amounted to market sharing. 
Location clauses prevented franchisees from setting up in other locations including 
the markets of other Member States. In Computerland, for example, the Commission 
noted that expansion into other Member States was a logical and desirable 
development, particularly as Computerland's franchisees were not "one man 
operations" but SMEs employing between 10 and 20 employees and sometimes 
substantially more. The fact that Computerland's franchisees were empowered to 
open "satellite shops" was only a relative freedom since approval had to be acquired 
and this was dependent on the payment of another entrance fee. 158 In all five cases the 
Commission had no difficulty in concluding that trade between Member States would 
be affected appreciably. In ServiceMaster the Commission found this on the basis of 
"sufficient probability" concluding that the franchisor's market share would exceed 5 
per cent in the near future and it was sufficiently probable that its network would 
ft! . C . d 159 a ect 1I1tra- ommumty tra e. 
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The Commission's approach also reflected the approach adopted by the Court of 
Justice, in that certain clauses were not relevant to competition (entrance fee 
payments, monthly royalties, business medium) and others fell outside the parameters 
of Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)). The latter related to the transference of know-how and 
assistance and provisions designed to safeguard the common identity of the network. 
In all of these notifications the Commission concluded that exemption was available. 
Prospective franchisees would be unwilling to undertake the necessary financial 
investment if they were not going to receive a degree of protection from other 
resellers. However, in all of these cases the Commission stressed the importance of 
cross-supplies and the need to preserve franchisee's freedom to respond to unsolicited 
enqUInes. The Commission also noted that franchising improved production and 
distribution through rationalisation, encouragIng market feedback and allowing 
franchisors to meet fluctuations in demand. In all of this consumers benefited from an 
efficient and attentive service provided by independent undertakings. 
The knowledge and experience gained from dealing with these notifications underpin 
the drafting of Regulation 4087/88 (See Annex III). This block exemption, which 
currently governs franchising, permits territorial allocation in limited circumstances. 
Firstly, the franchisor may be obliged to refrain from allowing third parties to exploit 
the franchise in a territory already allocated to its franchisee. Secondly, the franchisor 
may agree not to exploit the franchise within the territory of another franchisee or 
otherwise sell or market the contract goods (Article 2(a)). 
The franchisee. by virtue of Article ~ ( c ) . . may be obliged to exploit the franchise from 
an appro\'cd location and to rcfrain from acti\'ely seeking customers outside its 
cnntract territor\' (,\rtick 2(d)). This activc saks restraint ho\\c\'CI". still permits thc 
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franchisee to respond to passive requests for sale. Importantly, Article 4(a) insists that 
franchisees are entitled to obtain the contract goods from other franchisees. Cross-
supplies must remain possible if the agreement is to be block exempt. Article 4(b) 
prevents guarantees being used as instruments of market compartmentalisation. 
Article 5( c) black lists any clause which prevents the franchisee from supplying end 
users with the contract goods because of their place of residence. Finally, Article 8( c) 
empowers the Commission to withdraw the benefit of the block exemption if either 
party uses differences in product specification to compartmentalise the market. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the fully integrated market of the US an efficiency based, market power approach is 
adopted to territorial allocation. It is now generally accepted that where markets are 
not concentrated and interbrand competition is strong, manufacturers will not insulate 
their dealers from intrabrand competitive pressures simply to enable them to enrich 
themselves. Other justifications must, therefore, exist. In the case of territorial 
allocation it is usually to attract aggressive dealers to engage in product distribution. 
Providing dealers with intrabrand protection encourages optimal dealer investment by 
overcoming free riding problems. 
Unlike the EU the US has no equivalent to the regulatory enactments of the block 
exemption governing territorial allocation. The matter is mainly dealt with by the 
Courts. Since 1977 and the Supreme Court's Sylvania l60 decision a rule of reason 
dpproach has bCl'I1 applied to non-price vertical restraints. Over the years the lIS 
IMI 4-;) U.S. )6 ( Il)7?) 
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judiciary has developed a truncated rule of reason approach based on market power 
filters. Market power is traditionally defined in terms of market share. This structural 
approach, generally precludes the application of S 1 Sherman Act to territorial 
allocation, unless the party imposing the restraint has market power. Whilst there is 
ambiguity over what market share percentage gives rise to market power, shares over 
50 per cent give rise to concerns over the legality of the restraint. Although, it is still 
possible for the supplier to justify its use. 
This approach contrasts significantly with the approach adopted in the EU. The latter 
consists of a collection of States striving to achieve the goal of unification, constantly 
vigilant over private efforts designed to perpetuate market fragmentation. Concerns 
of efficiency, whilst of importance, have not occupied centre stage. In the EU greater 
importance is attached to intrabrand competition. Often distribution arrangements are 
organised along national lines and allocated territories coincide with national markets. 
Cross border parallel trading is viewed, therefore, as a means to achieve market 
unification. The parallel trader, which often free rides on the promotional efforts of 
official distributors within Member States, is seen as saint and not sinner. 
The goal of market integration, therefore, ensures that territorial allocation cannot be 
absolute and must be qualified. These concerns are reflected in the block exemptions 
governing exclusive distribution, franchising and the principles governing selective 
distribution. Moreover. attempts to directly or indirectly fragment the market are 
treated with short shrift. These include, dual pricing schemes 161, the use of 
1(>1 Case ~ O / 7 8 8 Distillers v ('ommissiol1 [1980] ECR 229, [1980] 3 CMLR 121; Comm. Dec. 72/403 
f'illshllrg Corning Ellrope OJ 1972 L272,'35, [1973] CMLR 02; see also V. Korah '''Goodbye' Red 
I ,Ihel: Condemnation of Dual Pricing by Distillers", 1978 -' EL ReI' 62; T. Sharpe, "The Distillers 
Ikl'lslon", (1978) 15 CML ReI' 447; C.W.F Baden Fuller, "Private Variations - The Distillers Case and 
:\rticIe 8) EFe", (1 9 79) ~ 8 8 I( 'I.Q 128. 
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intellectual property rights 162, the limitation of guarantee rights 163, controlling price 
h '· 1M mec anIsms to Impede parallel imports and, of course, export bans. 165 
162 See L.J. DeKeyser, "Territorial Restrictions and Export Prohibitions Under The United States And 
The Common Market Antitrust Laws", (1964-5) 2 CML Rev 271; A. Deringer, "Exclusive Agency 
Agreements With Territorial Protection Under The EEC Antitrust Laws", (1965) 10 Antitrust B 599; 
C.H. Fulda, "The First Antitrust Decisions Of The Commission Of The European Community", (1965) 
65 Col L Rev 625. 
163 EEC Commission, Seventh Report on Competition Policy: 1977 (Brussels, 1978) p 24; Comm. Dec. 
78/922 Zanussi OJ 1978 L322/26, [1979] 1 CMLR 81; Case 31185 ETA Fabriques d'Ebauches v DK 
Investment [1985] ECR 3933, [1986] 2 CMLR 674; Case 86/82 Hasselblad v Commission [1984] ECR 
883, [1984] I CMLR 559; see also F.L. Fine, "EEC Consumer Warranties: A New Antitrust Hurdle 
Facing Exporters", (1989) 10 ECLR 233. 
164 Comm. Dec. 80/1333 Hennessey- Henkel/OJ 1980 L3831l1, [1981] 1 CMLR 601. 
165 See, inter alia, Case 19177 Miller International \' Commission [1978] ECR 131, [1978] 2 CMLR 
334; Case T-77/92 Parker Pen Ltd \' Commission, [1994] ECR 11-549, [1995] 5 CMLR 435: Case T-
41/96R Bayer \' Commission [1996] ECR 11-381, [1996] 5 CMLR 417. 
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EXCLUSIVE DEALING OR PURCHASING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An agreement between supplier and dealer where the latter promises to purchase the 
contract goods exclusively from the supplier and not to deal in competing goods is known 
in the US as an exclusive dealing arrangement and in the EU as an exclusive purchasing 
agreement. These arrangements cover both input and output contracts. The former are 
generally known as industrial supply or requirement contracts where the purchaser 
consumes the contract goods in the production process or the provision of services. The 
latter relate to the acquisition of products for the purpose of resale. These types of 
arrangements are restraints on interbrand competition and are usually employed In 
conjunction with other restraints. In a pure exclusive dealing or purchasing agreement the 
purchaser remains in competition with other parties entering into similar arrangements. 
Protection from intrabrand competition, for example, is only available if the supplier 
imposes restraints specifically designed to provide such protection. 
There are a variety of explanations for the use of these type of arrangements. Perhaps the 
most conventional explanation is that it is a means of stimulating dealers to sell its 
suppliers product \vith n1aximum energy and efficiency. Dissipation of effort or dilution 
nf 1'I1crgy caused by the sale of multiple products is overcome if a dealer's success is 
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inextricably tied to the success of a single product line. l In 1982 Marvel provided an 
efficiency rationale for the use of such arrangements based upon a property right 
explanation.2 While acknowledging that intrabrand restraints had attracted most academic 
attention, Marvel concluded that this interbrand restraint prevented the erosion of 
supplier's property rights with the corresponding diminution in the incentive to invest. By 
preventing interbrand free riding these arrangements encouraged optimal investment and 
the strengthening of dealer networks through the provision of finance, management, 
accounting and technical advice. Exclusive dealing or purchasing has other 
procompetitive benefits. It can be used to protect product innovation and design as well 
as protecting confidential technical information which a supplier has to pass on to its 
dealers.3 It can also be used to ensure product quality is maintained by preventing dealers 
from substituting inferior unbranded products for more expensive branded products. 
Finally, although not exhaustively, these arrangements can encourage long term planning 
with corresponding savings in costs. 
Others suggest, however, that exclusive dealing or purchasing can be used for strategic 
anticompetitive purposes. In particular, this restraint may precipitate market foreclosure. 
The latter may be calculated in a number of ways. A volume weighted calculation 
consists of determining the total volume or value of sales of the particular product on the 
relevant market and expressing the volume or value sold through tied outlets as a 
I F.M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3 rd edn, Boston 1990) 
~ p p ) ( ) ~ - ) 6 5 . . . . . . 
~ ~ I L P. Marvel, "Exclusive Dealing", (1982) 25 JL Ec I; see also S.l. Ornstem, "ixc\uslve Dealing And 
Antitrust", (1989) 34 ..tntitrust B 65; R.M. Steuer, "Exclusive Dealing in Distribution", (1983) 69 Corn L 
Rn 101. 
; In the US, for example, until the judgment in Standard Fashion \' Magrane HOllston Co (258 U.S. 346 
1922) it \\as cOlllmon practice in the dress-pattern design industry (in the dhsence of patent or copynght) to 
lISL' L'Xclusi\L' d L ' J l i n ~ ~ to protect suppliL'r's proprietal\ interests in original dress pattern deSigns. 
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percentage of total sales. A numeric calculation involves expressing the amount of tied 
outlets as a percentage of the total number of outlets on the relevant market. Comanor and 
Frech 
4 
assert that these arrangements may be used to exclude prospective market entrants. 
Incumbent suppliers, by setting entry prices, may deter entry altogether or permit it on 
unfavorable terms. Aghion and Bolton5 and Krattenmaker and Salop6 echo these 
sentiments. More recently, Lin? has examined the possibility that exclusive dealing or 
purchasing can be used to "dampen" interbrand competition generated by rivals usmg 
common outlets to market their respective products. 
In the US the Courts have generally upheld the legality of these arrangements at common 
law. 8 However, exclusive dealing is now governed by three distinct statutory enactments. 
These statutes were enacted to serve different legislative purposes. It is perhaps not 
surprising that this has resulted in inconsistent treatment. These arrangements may be 
interdicted as illegal restraints of trade contrary to the Sherman Act and as unfair methods 
of competition contrary to S.S Federal Trade Commission Act 1914. The major antitrust 
weapon, however, is that of S.3 Clayton Act 1914 which provides that it is unlawful to 
leave or sell commodities on condition, agreement or understanding that the purchaser 
will not deal in the commodities of the suppliers' competitors where the effect of the 
arrangement " ... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly 
in any line of commerce". The US Courts have encountered difficulty in construing this 
~ ~ W.S. Comanor and H.E. Frech, "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?" (1985) 75 Am Ec Rev 
539, )·l5. 
~ ~ P. Aghion and P. Bolton. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry". (1987) 77 ,·lm Ec Rev 388, 
b \' ( ~ ~ ~ K r a t t e n l 1 1 a k e r r and S.c. Salop, "Anticompetiti\'C' Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to :\chin C' Power 
Over Price". (1986) 96 Yale l_f 109. 
7 .I Lin. "The Dampening-of-CompC'tition 11fect of ['\clusi\C' Dealing". (1990-91) 39 J Illd Ec 109. 
II See. for example. Pcn'less Pol/t'm Co \. (711(1l1llcl/ Dry Goods Co., 171 r-.llch. 1)8. -l2 L.R .. -\ (\ S) 84;. 
\3() N \\' 1 1 1 ~ : : Rljn' \' .·lrlH'all PlI/lt.,-\/tI/s, -ll Okla 10.) 1 L.R.:\ (N S ) 33. 136 P ~ I C C 1080. 
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competitive impact clause and case law has lacked consistency and has fluctuated 
considerably over the years. 
In the EU Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82 (ex 86) EC are relevant to exclusive purchasing 
agreements. Regulation 1984/83,9 due to expire shortly, governs these agreements 
provided they exhibit specific characteristics. Market foreclosure is also of real concern 
in that these agreements, if concluded on a national basis, can result in market 
compartmentalisation. Where this is not an issue the Court of Justice, since 1967 has 
taken the view that exclusive purchasing may not necessarily violate the provisions of 
Article 81 (ex 85).10 Part II of this chapter examines the way in which the US authorities 
treat exclusive dealing arrangements and Part III examines the approach adopted in the 
EU. 
II. EXCLUSIVE DEALING IN THE US 
A. In Search Of A Standard: From Market Dominance To Quantitative 
S u bstan tiality 
The first exclusive dealing arrangement to come before the US Supreme Court. after the 
enactment of the Clayton Act, was the 1922 case of Standard Fashion Co \' Magrane -
11 Houston. This case provided the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to direct 
lower Courts in their assessment and treatment of these restraints. Standard Fashion. a 
9()J 1983 LI73/5. _ 
10 Clse 5 (1 () 5 Soc ide Techniqlle !lflll/a, \' ,\laschill('lIho/l L'/III [ 1 966] EC R :2 3 5, [1966 J 1 (' r-, 1 L R 3" 7. 
II 258 U.S . ' ~ 6 6 (1922). 
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New York corporation, was engaged in the marketing and distribution of paper patterns 
for women's and children's clothing. Magrane - Houston ran a retail outlet in Boston. In 
November 1914 both corporations entered into contractual relations. Standard Fashion 
agreed to sell its patterns to Magrane - Houston at discounted prices and to repurchase 
discarded patterns. For its part, Magrane - Houston agreed not to sell or permit to be sold 
on its premises any other makes of patterns. In July 1917, during the currency of the 
agreement, Magrane - Houston discontinued the sale of Standard Fashion's patterns and 
commenced selling the patterns of the McCall Company - a rival competitor. 
In an attempt to restrain Magrane - Houston from continuing to violate the terms of the 
contract, Standard Fashion instituted proceedings in the District Court of Massachusetts. 12 
The matter came before Judge Johnson and Magrane - Houston simply asserted that the 
contract was illegal as it violated the provisions of the Clayton Act. In contrast, Standard 
Fashion asserted that before such a conclusion could be reached a broad enquiry into the 
competitive nature of these arrangements should be conducted. Judge Johnson, 
reluctantly agreed to hear evidence which indicated that competition had actually 
increased since the introduction of the exclusive arrangement; that such agreements were 
customary in the pattern-trade industry and may be of benefit to supplier, dealer and 
customer alike. In fact, suppliers used exclusive dealing, in the absence of patent and 
copyright, to protect their proprietary interests in their original dress designs. While 
Judge Johnson permitted this evidence to be heard, he chose to ignore it. Instead, he 
preferred to focus on the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff had similar exclusive 
dealing arrangen1ents with at least 20,000 out of a possible 52,000 outlets nationwide. In 
I' 2)4 Fed. 493. 
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his view, this was sufficient, in itself, to violate Section 3 and he accordingly dismissed 
the action. 
An appeal was made to the Circuit Court of Appeals 13 and affirming the decision below, it 
also chose to focus on the relative market position of the appellant. It also placed great 
emphasis on the fact that the appellant had similar arrangements with approximately 40 
per cent of all retail outlets. 
Standard Fashion appealed to the Supreme Court. Charles Hughes, appellant's counsel, 
argued that the Court of Appeals should have reached a conclusion on the basis of all the 
evidence before it. It should, he asserted, have considered whether the arrangement 
actually lessened competition. In effect, a Sherman Act rule of reason approach should 
have been adopted. 
As the case involved matters of public policy the Supreme Court invited the US 
Department of Justice to file an amicus brief. 14 The Solicitor - General, James Beck, 
asserted that the sole reason for the use of such arrangements was to enable small 
manufacturers to enter a field already occupied by an entrenched monopolist or powerful 
economic unit. 
Mr Justice Day delivered the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court. He stated that 
the main issue before the Court was the construction of the competitive impact clause of 
Section 3. He concluded that the Sherman Act rule of reason approach was of no 
11 2)l) Fcd. 79"}t (1 st ('ir. 1920). 
11 BlIl'f· for US - as Amicus Curi(/L' 258 U.S at 351. 
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relevance. The Clayton Act " ... sought to reach the agreements embraced within its 
sphere in their incipiency, and in the section under consideration to determine their 
legality by specific tests of its own". 15 
He stated further 
"... Section 3 condemns sales or agreements where the effect of such 
sale or contract of sale Imay' be to substantially lessen competition or 
tend to create monopoly .... But we do not think that the purpose in 
writing the word Imay' was to prohibit the mere possibility of the 
consequences described. It was intended to prevent such agreements 
as would under the circumstances disclosed probably lessen 
competition or create an actual tendency to monopoly.,,16 
Mr Justice Day then added that the fact that Section 3 was " ... not intended to reach every 
remote lessening of competition is shown in the requirement that such lessening must be 
substantial". I? Unfortunately, however, Mr Justice Day did not pause to indicate how to 
distinguish between a remote and substantial lessening of competition. The Supreme 
Court sin1ply accepted the lower Court's judgment that the arrangement did substantially 
lessen competition and tended to create monopoly. Not only did the arrangement 
foreclose 40 per cent of nationwide outlets to Standard Fashion's competitors, but the 
Supreme Court also assumed that in large cities competitors would be denied access to the 
15 b'd ..,-( I I at ,) =' ). 
1<> Ibid at 3,'16-.157, 
17 t' I " -7 111<. at _,=, . 
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most desirable outlets and, in smaller communities, it would exclude them altogether. 
Eventually, it was assumed that this would lead Standard Fashion to obtain most of the 
pattern business. The Supreme Court regarded the relative standing of the supplier in the 
market to be of prime importance. If it occupied a position of market dominance, this was 
sufficient in itself, to support the inference that competition had been or probably would 
be lessened by the restraint. Accordingly, Section 3 had been violated. A demonstration 
of the pro competitive effects of such arrangements embracing a Sherman Act rule of 
reason approach was not of prime importance. On this basis, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision below and held in favour of Magrane - Houston. 
Almost 20 years later the Supreme Court once again embraced the importance of market 
dominance in holding an exclusive dealing arrangement violative of the antitrust laws. 
The 1941 case of Fashion Originators' Guild v FTC l8 involved both horizontal and 
vertical elimination of competition. The Fashion Originators' Guild was formed by a 
combination of textile and women's garment manufacturers. Both types of manufacturer 
claimed that their original textile and dress designs were being copied and sold by 
unscrupulous manufacturers and retailers. The Guild was formed, therefore, to combat 
and destroy all competition from the sale of garments which were copies of Guild-
members original creations. 19 In addition to boycotting those involved in "style piracy", 
exclusive dealing arrangements were utilised to protect the respective manufacturer's 
investments. That is, textile manufacturers sold their products to garment manufacturers 
on condition they would refrain from using textiles copied from Guild members. In turn, 
111312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
I') I' 1 ' '( 1 )Il at .''-t ). 
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garment manufacturers sold only to retailers on condition that the latter would not use or 
deal in copied dress design. 
Upon investigation the Federal Trade Commission concluded these vertical restraints 
were an unfair method of competition and accordingly issued a cease and desist order. 
The Circuit Court of Appeals,20 with certain modifications, affirmed this order. The Guild 
appealed to the Supreme Court. Mr Justice Black delivered the unanimous judgment of 
the Court. He concluded that the Commission was not in error when it refused to hear 
business justification proffered by the Guild for the implementation of the restraint. The 
Guild's assertion that these restraints were necessary and reasonable " ... to protect the 
manufacturer, labourer, retailer and consumer against the ... pirating of original designs,,21 
was held to be irrelevant. In affirming the decisions of the Commission and the Court of 
Appeals, the Supreme Court emphasised the presence and consequence of market 
dominance. It noted, for example, that in 1936 Guild members sold more than 60 per cent 
of all women's garments wholesaling in the US at more than 10.75 dollars and 38 per cent 
of all women's garments wholesaling at 6.75 dollars or more. Accordingly, the Guild's 
" ... potential power, its tendency to monopoly, the coercion it could 
and did practice upon rival methods of competition, all brought it 
within the policy of the prohibition declared (illegal) by the ... Clayton 
'0 I 14 F. 2d 80 (2lld Cir. 19..l0). 
2 I 3 I 2 lJ. S . at ·167. 
~ 2 2 Ibid at ..l()7-..l68 
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The Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that these arrangements violated both the 
Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. It also condemned the horizontal 
combination of Guild Members as being violative of Section 1 and 2 Sherman Act. 
During this period then, it became apparent, that if a business utilised exclusive dealing 
arrangements and also occupied a dominant market position the restraint would be 
considered to be in violation of the antitrust laws. In 1949, however, in the landmark 
decision of Standard Oil of California v US3 the Supreme Court adopted a more stringent 
position. It extended the rule of Standard Fashion to include those business organisations 
which enjoyed a powerful though clearly not a dominant position in their industry. The 
Standard Oil Company owned petroleum producing resources and refining plants in 
California. It was, in fact, the largest seller of gasoline in what was referred to as the 
"Western Area".24 In 1946 its retail gasoline sales amounted to 23 per cent of the total 
taxable gallonage sold in this area. Of this, 6.8 per cent was sold through company owned 
service stations and 6.7 per cent (approximately 58 million dollars worth of annual 
business) was sold through independent service stations bound to Standard Oil by 
exclusive dealing arrangements. These requirement contracts obligated the independents 
to purchase all of their gasoline and other petroleum related products from the company. 25 
Standard Oil first entered into these arrangements in 1934. Until that time, however. 
retail sales by independent outlets were made pursuant to agency agreements. By 1947, 
Standard Oil had concluded exclusive dealing arrangements with 5937 independent 
outlets which a010unted to 16 per cent of the available retail outlets in the Western area. 
2.1 D 7 lJ .S. 29:-; ( 1 l ) ~ 9 ) . .
24 rhis area comprised Arizona, Califomia, Idaho. Nevada. Oregon. Utah and \Vashington. 
25 3:-;7 US. at 2l)). 
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Standard's six leading competitors also employed similar arrangements and by 1 946 these 
competitors absorbed 42.5 per cent of retail sales.26 About 70 other small refiners 
absorbed the remaining trade. 
The Government contended that these exclusive dealing arrangements were violative of 
both the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. On 2 January 1947, therefore, it instituted 
proceedings in the District Court of California for a Declaratory judgment to that effect 
and for an injunction to prevent Standard Oil from enforcing these contractual provisions. 
The District Court upheld the governments position. It held that the Section 3 
requirement would be satisfied if the contract covered " ... a substantial number of outlets 
and a substantial amount of products whether considered comparatively or no1".27 Having 
adopted this standard of proof Judge Yankwhich excluded as immaterial testimony from 
Standard as to the possible business justifications for the implementation of the restraints. 
In fact, the District Court took the view that it was also irrelevant that Standard Oil's 
position in the petroleum market had actually deteriorated since the introduction of 
exclusive dealing. 
Not surprisingly, Standard Oil appealed to the Supreme Court. John Hall, lead counsel 
for the appellants, argued that the District Court had erroneously concluded that a 
violation of the antitrust laws was conclusively established simply on the basis of the 
number of dealers under contract to Standard and on the dollar volume of the products 
handled thereunder. It was asserted that the District Court should have considered other 
competiti \'c factors in reaching its decision. An analytical approach based on the rule of 
~ h h Ibid. 
~ 7 7 l','; \' Stolldard Oi! 78 F. Supp. SiO. 
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reason should have been adopted. 28 Had these additional factors been considered 
, 
Standard argued, they would have indicated that it did not exert a monopoly nor had it 
perpetrated a calculated scheme to restrain or suppress competition. 
Mr Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court. He stated succinctly 
that the main issue before the Court was the construction of the competitive impact clause 
of Section 3 Clayton Act. In particular, 
" whether the requirement of showing that the effect of the 
agreement 'may be to substantially lessen competition' may be met 
simply by proof that a substantial portion of commerce is affected or 
whether it must also be demonstrated that competitive activity has 
diminished or probably will diminish".29 
Mr Justice Frankfurter commenced his analysis by reviewing prior Supreme Court case 
law. He noted that the Supreme Court had passed on the applicability of Section 3 on 
eight prior occasions. He acknowledged, however, that this case law included both tying 
arrangements and exclusive dealing arrangements. On two of these occasions, namely 
FTC v Sinclair/o and Pick Mfg Co v General Motors,31 the Supreme Court considered the 
actual or probable economic consequence of the agreements and in so doing held Section 
3 to be inapplicable and the restraints valid. These decisions, then, lent support to 
Standard's contentions that economic considerations ought to be taken into account in 
28 Sec A.D. Neale and D.G. Cioyder, The Antitrust Laws of the Us.·1, (3rd edn, Cambridge. 1980) p:269. 
~ l ) ) ,.., 7 lJ" t '99 1.1 ., ...... a _ . 
10 261 U.S. ·.l(13 (1923) . 
.11 299 U.S . .1 (Itn()) 
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determining the legality of exclusive dealing arrangements. A third case, FTC v Curtis 
Pub., Co.,32 involved contractual agency and was, therefore, of no precedential value. 
The remaining five cases, however, held Section 3 to be applicable and in each case the 
Court held the restraint between supplier and dealer to be in violation of the Clayton Act. 
With one exception, the Court had done so on the basis that the supplier had occupied a 
dominant position in its industry. 33 Market dominance, in itself, was sufficient to support 
the inference that competition had been or probably would be lessened. However, 
Standard Oil did not occupy a position of market dominance. Mr Justice Frankfurter, 
therefore, concluded that these cases could not be regarded as controlling the disposition 
of the present appeal. 
There was, however, one exception. This was the 1947 case of International Salt v Us. 34 
Very briefly, this case involved a tying contract whereby International Salt leased 
patented salt dispensers on condition that the lessee would only dispense salt purchased 
from International Salt. The Supreme Court condemned the arrangement as violative of 
Section 3 even though International Salt did not occupy a position of market dominance. 
The Court rejected the necessity of considering economic consequences once it had 
established that the volume of business was " ... not insignificant or insubstantial", and that 
the effect of such contracts was to " ... foreclose competitors from a substantial market" .35 
As Standard Oil did not occupy a dominant market position one might have expected that 
this case would be controlling. Mr Justice Frankfurter, however did not treat it so. 
J ~ ~ 260 U.S. 568 (19:23). 
n .\'tilmlard Fashion \' Magrane - HOllston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922); Fashion Origll1ators· GlI/leI \' FTC, 
312 U.S. 457 (1941); United Shoe ,\tach Corp \' US, 258 U.S. -lSI (1922); IBM Corp v US 56,298 U.S 131 
(1()36). 
;.1·\")2 U.S. 392 (19-l7) . 
. \5 Ibid at 396. 
190 
Firstly, International Salt enjoyed the benefits of a patent on the machinery it leased to its 
dealers. Secondly, the Court took the view that important economic differences existed 
between tying agreements and exclusive dealing arrangements. As a result differing 
standards of proof were required to fulfil the conditions of Section 3. In support of this 
contention he said, quite emphatically, that " ... tying agreements serve hardly any purpose 
beyond the suppression of competition".36 In contrast exclusive dealing arrangements. 
" ... may well be of economic advantage to buyers (dealers) as well as 
to sellers (suppliers), and thus indirectly of advantage to the 
consuming public. In the case of the buyer, they may assure supply, 
afford protection against rises in price, enable long term planning on 
the basis of known costs, and obviate the expense and risk of storage 
in the quantity necessary for a commodity having a fluctuating 
demand. From the seller's point of view, (exclusive dealing) may 
make possible the substantial reduction of selling expenses, give 
protection against price fluctuation and - of particular advantage to a 
newcomer to the field to whom it is important to know what capital 
expenditures are justified - offer the possibility of a predictable 
ket" 37 mar . 
In these circumstances, Mr Justice Frankfurter, acknowledged that a rule of reason 
analysis could theoretically be used to determine the economic utility or usefulness of 
exclusive dealing. Factors that would be relevant to such an enquiry would include: 
16 117 US at 305-306. 
17 Ihid. 
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evidence that competition had flourished despite the use of exclusive dealing 
arrangements (under this category much of the evidence tendered by Standard Oil would 
be relevant); whether the contractual arrangement was reasonable in terms of duration; the 
status of the supplier, that is, whether it is a struggling newcomer or an established 
competitor; the degree of market control the supplier possesses - the greater this is, the 
greater the inference that exclusive dealing has been used to attain and maintain the 
suppliers position in the market. 38 
In spite of these admissions, Mr Justice Frankfurter rather surprisingly brushed aside the 
application of this approach to exclusive dealing. He did so on the basis that it would be 
difficult to apply these tests. Firstly, the standard of proof required by such an analytical 
approach was virtually impossible to meet and most ill-suited for ascertainment by courts. 
A broad economic enquiry would be impractical and inconclusive. How could one 
determine, for example, whether Standard Oil had maintained its market position as 
against its competitors as a result of its use of this particular form of vertical restraint? 
Underpinning this particular notion of Mr Justice Frankfurter, one suspects, is the view 
that courts could not be expected to wrestle with complex economic issues or problems. 
Secondly, enquiry into the economic merits of these restraints would amount to a test of 
their reasonableness; a test which had rendered the Sherman Act impotent against certain 
abusive practices and which Congress had decided to remove by the passage of the 
(' layton Act. 
In spite of all the factors which pointed to a rule of reason analysis, the majority of the 
S llprcmc Court held that the District Court was correct to refuse to consider the 
III Ibid at 3 0 ~ ~
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competitive effects of these restraints and the reasons proffered by Standard as 
justification for the implementation of the restraint. The Supreme Court held that the use 
of these contracts created a potential clog on competition. It was the purpose of Section 3 
to remove such obstructions. The Court's crucial holding, therefore, was that Section 3 
was satisfied by proof that competition had been closed in a substantial share of the line of 
commerce affected.39 Eventually, this became known as the test of "quantitative 
substantiality". Rather than deal in refined economic analysis which a rule of reason 
approach might entail, the Supreme Court preferred a straightforward quantitative test 
relating to the amount of business foreclosed. 
Mr Justice Douglas in his separate dissenting judgment opposed the condemnation of 
Standard Oil's exclusive dealing contracts. In his view, the condemnation of these 
restraints would simply lead to the return of agency agreements as a means of product 
distribution or drive Standard Oil and others to integrate forward into distribution. In his 
view, this would have detrimental social repercussions in that entrepreneurs would 
become employees of absentee owners causing local leadership to be diluted. 4o 
Mr Justice Jackson, writing for the minority agreed that Standard's exclusive dealing 
arrangement covered a substantial amount of outlets and a substantial number of products. 
This in his view, did not automatically bring the accused arrangements within the 
prohibition of the statute. He stated 
19 1 bid at -' 14 
Ill ll ' i " ' 1 ~ " 1 9 9., I ( a I _, , ~ ~ --' . 
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"The number of dealers and the volume of sales covered by the 
arrangement ... was sufficient to be substantial. That is to say, this 
agreement operated on enough commerce to violate the Act, provided 
its effects were substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly. But proof of their quantity does not prove that they had 
this forbidden quality; and the assumption that they did, without proof 
seems to be unwarranted".41 
Mr Justice Jackson roundly condemned the Court below for failing to allow the defendant 
to adduce evidence to show that such effects did not flow from the exclusive dealing 
arrangement. In the view of the minority, therefore, the lower Court's decree should be 
vacated with a direction to complete the case after consideration of evidence from both 
sides as to the effects of the restraint. While acknowledging that such an analytical 
approach might prove tedious, Mr Justice Jackson asserted, any other approach would 
amount to a "guess in the dark". In any event, if the Court was obliged to consider such 
issues without evidence being adduced, Mr Justice Jackson viewed these restraints as " ... 
device(s) for waging competition" rather than suppressing it.42 They were simply a 
"necessary means" to maintain the competitive struggle between suppliers. Dealers were 
mere conduits with no real economic independence or freedom and were, quite simply, 
the means by which competition was waged. 
41 1b'd "'")1 I at _' __ 
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The Standard Oil decision, usually referred to as Standard Stations, was the subject of 
much academic comment and the butt of much criticism.43 Its approach was criticised for 
being too mechanical and depriving the consumer of the economic benefits of exclusiye 
dealing. One of the main reasons, arguably the prime reason, for the refusal to consider 
all relevant economic factors in assessing the legality of exclusive dealing was the 
majority's interpretation of the political will of Congress in passing the Clayton Act. The 
majority, in Standard Stations, simply believed that to give effect to such a broad enquiry 
would stulify Congressional intent. In this respect, academics roundly condemned the 
case as being built upon an " ... improper reading of the legislative history of Section 3".44 
The application by the majority of quantitative substantiality was based upon an improper 
and erroneous interpretation of Congressional intent. Unfortunately, it is beyond the 
scope of this work to consider in detail the machinations of Congress in passing the 
Clayton Act. In brief, however, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives 
preferred a bill which contained a flat prohibition against all exclusive dealing. In its 
view, these arrangements were simply an illegal attempt to monopolise, punishable by a 
5000 dollars fine and a sentence of one years imprisonment. The Senate, however, 
adopted a different position. It rejected a blanket prohibition, asserting that exclusive 
dealing could perform valuable economic functions. These arrangements, for example, 
could provide assistance to struggling newcomers trying to enter a market with an 
entrenched encumbent.45 The Senate confined itself, therefore, to declaring illegal "patent 
tie-ins". The bill then proceeded to the Conference Committee which accepted that the 
two Chan1bers had adopted differing approaches to the matter. Not surprisingly a 
~ J J W.B. Lockhart and H.R. Sacks, "The Relevance of Economic Factors in Detennining Whether Exclusive 
Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Acf', (1951-52) 65 HWT L Rev 913; F. Kl')sler and R Il. 
Stern, "Competition, Contract. and Vertical Integration", (1959) 69 rule L.J I. 
i·j M. Ilandler, "Recent Antitrust Developments", (1961) 71 rale LJ 75,84. 
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compromIse was reached. The Conference Committee adopted the House of 
Representatives basic approach and accommodated the Senate by including the 
competitive impact clause. This approach gave rise to vehement protests from the 
supporters of absolute prohibition. In their view, the Act would simply become a milk 
and water provision. 
It is clear from the original opinion of Mr Justice Frankfurter, delivered on 13 June 1949. 
that the majority in Standard Stations erroneously concluded that both Houses favoured 
an outright prohibition on exclusive dealing. In his original opinion he stated " ... it is 
significant that the qualifying language was added only after a flat prohibition of tying 
clauses and requirements contracts had passed both Houses of Congress" (emphasis 
added).46 This view was used by the majority to support the contention that it would be 
unlikely that Congress would set up an express prohibition on exclusive dealing only to 
require a wide ranging rule of reason analysis into its effect. Within 4 months of the case 
being concluded the Court's erroneous statutory interpretation was ordered to be 
corrected. The amended wording now benignly reads "... in this connection it is 
significant that the qualifying language was not added until after the House and Senate 
bills reached Conference".47 
Not surprisingly, this interpretative error precipitated much criticism. Handler suggests, 
for example, that the inclusion of the competitive impact clause " ... was not meant as a 
mere gloss, without significant substantive effect".48 Standard Station's contrary 
1<> Sl'e M. Handler, note -l·t above, 8-l-86. 
1- Sec Standard Oil Cu \' [i.\', 338 LJ S 808 (1949). 
IS Sec M. Handler, note 4·t abtl\ e, 86. 
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intimations were, therefore, incorrect. In his view, Congress intended the Courts, when 
considering the legality of these restraints, to apply a " ... discriminating judgment in 
differentiating between those arrangements which had a reasonable prospect of lessening 
competition to a substantial degree and those which did not".49 Lockhart and Sacks also 
assert that the competitive impact clause must have been designed " ... as the legislative 
history indicates to require consideration of other economic factors in appraising the 
overall effect upon competition". 50 Furthermore, in their view had this history been 
known at the time the initial decision was made, it might well have persuaded one or more 
justices to vote differently and give effect to the evident purpose of the qualifying 
clause. 51 As a result, a whole line of jurisprudential authority may well have developed in 
a significantly different manner. 
The lower Federal and District Courts dutifully applied the Supreme Court test of 
quantitative substantiality. In fact, with one exception, the Courts found a section 3 
infraction in every exclusive dealing case which came before them. 52 In the 1954 case of 
Dictograph Products v FTC53 a manufacturer of hearing aids, Dictograph Products, 
appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals against an Order of the Federal Trade 
Commission requiring it to eliminate from its distribution agreements clauses relating to 
exclusive dealing. Judge Medina, placing emphasis on Standard Stations, noted that the 
manufacturer's arrangement foreclosed its competitors from dealing \\'ith 22 per cent of 
the nations choicest outlets. This fact alone compelled a finding that section 3 had been 
49 Ibid 86-87. 
50 Lockhart and Sacks, note 43 abo\l" 935-936. 
51 Ibid 937. , ~ ~ SL'L' also PCIII1.\I'h'(1nia Wuft'" & Powcr Co. v Consolidated Gas, Dec Light & fout'r Co., 1 8 , ~ ~ F 2d :'52 
(11h elr 19:'0): CS \' Sun Oil Co., 176 F. Slipp. 715 (E D. Pa. \959). 
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infringed. However, he noted that there was an industry wide practice of using exclusive 
dealing which also made market access difficult for newcomers. 
In Anchor Serum v FTC54 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also applied the approach 
of quantitative substantiality. In rejecting Anchor Serum's (a manufacturer of animal 
health products) justifications for the use of such arrangements, Judge Mayor, concluded 
that Anchor's practices involved a substantial volume of business. It would require, 
therefore, a "naIve mind" to conclude that these arrangements could result in anything 
other than an adverse effect upon competition. 
The one case in which an antitrust infraction was not found was that of US v Jf Case 
CO. 55 Here the exclusive dealing arrangements of the Wisconsin based undertaking, 
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of farm machinery, was held to be 
acceptable. Chief Judge Nordbye accepted the argument that it would be contrary to 
"business acumen and prudence" not to permit exclusive dealing in this case. 
Comparatively few dealers could afford the necessary financial investment to run more 
than one line of farm machinery. The Court also accepted evidence which indicated that 
manufacturers were still able to gain market entry and that the Case Corporation was by 
no means the largest manufacturer in the field. 
The Federal Trade COInmission's response to the test of quantitative substantiality was 
initially receptive. By 1953, however, in the case of Maico C0 56 the position changed as 
54 217 F. 2d 867 (ih Cir. 1954). 
~ ~ ~ 101 F. Supp X)(l (D. Minn. 1951). 
'i(, 50 F.T.C. -l85 ( 1953). 
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the Commission concluded that it had the necessary expertise to deal with the complex 
economic issues surrounding exclusive dealing. Interestingly, during the Maico era the 
Commission never actually upheld as legal an exclusive dealing arrangement. By 1960-61 
the Commission formally returned to the fold in the case of Mytinger and Casselberry57. 
B. Qualitative Substantiality And The Concept Of Incipiency 
It is quite ironic, to say the least, that the Commission in 1960-61 announced its return to 
the doctrine of Standard Stations and its abandonment of its 7 year old Maico doctrine on 
the eve of the Supreme Court's decision to abandon its approach to Section 3 Clayton Act 
based on quantitative substantiality. As a result of fierce criticism the Supreme Court's 
doctrinal change was almost inevitable and it occurred in the case of Tampa Electric Co v 
Nashville Coal Co. 58 Here the Tampa Electric Company, a public utility, was engaged in 
the production and sale of electricity serving the City of Tampa and surrounding 
communities. As a public utility it operated under franchise granted by the State of 
Florida. In 1954, it operated two integrated generating plants which were comprised of 
eleven generating units. All of these units used oil in their burners to generate electricity. 
In 1955, in order to meet an increased demand for electricity, the corporation took the 
decision to expand its operations. It decided, therefore, to build the Francis J Gannon 
Station. This new plant would consist of 6 new generating units: the first two constructed 
would use coal rather than oil as a means of generating electricity. 
q 57 F.T.C. 717 (1960). 
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In May 1955 Tampa Electric contracted with the Nashville Coal Company to provide its 
total fuel requirements for a period of 20 years. The new Gannon Station would 
eventually consume 2.25 million tons of coal annually at a cost of 128 million dollars. The 
Nashville Coal Co was one of 700 coal companies operating in the Appalachian region. 
Taking this region as a whole, Tampa Electric's total coal requirements would amount to 
only 1 per cent of all coal marketed there. Within peninsular Florida, however, where 
total coal consumption accounted for less than 6 per cent of all fuel consumed, Tampa 
Electric's coal consumption would account for a high proportion of all coal purchased. 
Deliveries of coal were expected to commence in 1957. In April of that year, however, 
Nashville Coal advised Tampa Electric that their 20 year contract violated the antitrust 
laws. As such, deliveries would not commence. Tampa Electric had to purchase its coal 
requirements from another source at a price substantially higher than the original 
contractually agreed price. It, therefore, commenced proceedings in the District Court of 
Tennessee for a Declaration that the contract was valid and enforceable. In the District 
Court, Judge Miller emphatically stated that the contract was 
" ... exclusionary to such a degree and the volume of commerce (was) 
manifestly so large that there (was) no escape from the conclusion that 
its efects under the circumstances disclosed (was) to 'probably lessen 
I ,,,59 competition or create an actual tendency to monopo y 
s\> 16S F. Stipp ·t56, 4(11 (1960). 
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The contract, therefore, violated Section 3 Clayton Act and was illegal and unenforceable. 
Accordingly, Tampa Electric was entitled to no relief. 
An appeal was made to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Shackelford Miller 
delivered the judgment of the divided Court and rejected Tampa Electric's contentions. 
The majority of the Court held that Tampa Electric had entered into a requirements 
contract (contrary to Tampa's assertions); the line of commerce affected was coal and the 
geographic market was peninsular Florida. Applying the Supreme Court's approach in 
Standard Stations Judge Schackelford Miller concluded that in the" ... present case there 
is no question but that the effect of the contract will be to substantially lessen 
competition".6o The Court of Appeals, therefore, affirmed the decision below. 
Judge Weick, however, was the sole voice of dissent in the Court of Appeals. In his view 
the District Court's judgment should be reversed. He gave three main reasons. Firstly, it 
was in the public interest that such arrangements should not be condemned. Tampa 
Electric was a public utility and its needs were materially different from those of private 
industry. As a public utility it was obliged to provide a continuous supply of electricity to 
the public at prices fixed by the Public Utility Commission of Florida. These rates could 
not be fixed if it was dependent upon fluctuating market prices for boiler fuel. It was not 
in the public interest to " ... require a utility to purchase boiler fuel on short term contracts 
or on the open market so that every time there was a shift in the market price the utility's 
rates to the public would have to be adjusted".61 Secondly, Judge Weick accepted Tampa 
Electric's view that a requirements contract did not exist. In his \'ie\\, Tampa F lectric 
(,() 276 I, 2d 766. 7 7 ~ ~ (61h Cir. 1960). 
Cd Ibid at 776-777. 
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was not prevented from uSIng other suppliers or the products of other suppliers. Its 
contractual arrangements with its input suppliers simply obligated it to purchase its 
requirements from Nashville Coal for the first two coal burning units to be constructed at 
Gannon Station. It was left free, therefore, to convert existing oil burning units to coal 
and purchase its coal requirements from Nashville's competitors and to construct new 
coal burning units and purchase its requirements elsewhere. In fact, under the terms of its 
contractual arrangement, it could if it desired, reduce the quantity of coal purchased from 
Nashville by 15 per cent and purchase this requirement from other local suppliers.62 
Thirdly, even if the contractual arrangement could be construed as a requirements 
contract, Judge Weick's interpretation of the line of commerce meant that no antitrust 
violation had occurred. He stated 
"(i)t is my firm conviction that the line of commerce in which these 
parties were dealing was boiler fuels, not just coal. If the line of 
commerce is boiler fuels generally, then this contract could not come 
within the purview of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, as Tampa was 
certainly free to purchase boiler fuels other than coal from whosoever 
. h " 63 It c ose . 
In Judge Weick's view coal, oiL gas and atomic energy were components of the general 
line of boiler fuels. As the contract related only to coaL Tampa Electric could not 
conceivably establish a monopoly in any line of commerce within the meaning of the 
Clavton Act. 
62 Ibid at 778-779. 
6) I bid ~ I t t 779. 
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Tampa Electric appealed to the Supreme Court. Mr Justice Clark, writing for the seven 
member majority, delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court.64 The majority 
concluded that the contract sued upon did " ... not tend to foreclose a substantial volume of 
.. ,,65 I h .c 
competItIon. t, t erelore, reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the 
District Court for further proceedings. In so doing the Supreme Court enunciated a three-
step analysis for evaluating the legitimacy of exclusive dealing arrangements. This 
tripartite test eventually became known as the test of "qualitative substantiality". 
In construing the competitive impact clause of Section 3, the Supreme Court stated that 
certain considerations must be taken into account. Firstly, the line of commerce involved 
in the exclusive arrangement must be determined. Secondly, the area of effective 
competition in the known line of commerce must be ascertained by careful selection of 
the market area. Any competitive foreclosure must relate to this geographic area. Finally, 
the competition foreclosed by the exclusive dealing arrangement must be found to 
constitute a substantial share of the relevant market. 66 Mr Justice Clark then indicated 
that quantitative substantiality, in terms of either dollar volume or market share foreclosed 
was not to be the controlling doctrine. He stated 
"To determine substantiality ... it is necessary to weigh the probable 
effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, 
taking into account the relative strength of the parties, the 
proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total 
(,.j Mr Justice Black and 1\ lr Justice Douglas dissented. They would have an-Imled the decision of the 
District Court and COllrt of Appt:als. Neither. IwwnCf, submitted l1 written Opinion. 
h', - U L' t 3"' C 
.'()) ,,"), a J_1. 
6(, Ibid at ~ 2 7 - ~ 2 9 , ,
volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable 
immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the 
market might have on effective competition therein. It follows that a 
mere showing that the contract itself involves a substantial number of 
dollars is ordinarily of little consequence". 67 
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This particular approach introduced greater judicial flexibility, in that the Courts were 
required to evaluate the restrictiveness and economic utility of the exclusive dealing 
arrangement. 
Having enunciated these principles the Supreme Court then applied them to the facts of 
the case before it. Firstly, it assumed that the challenged restraint was, in fact, an 
exclusive dealing arrangement within the compass of Section 3. Secondly, the line of 
commerce was bituminous coal. However, the Supreme Court was critical of both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals for failing to give consideration to the 
determination of the relevant market area. The Supreme Court viewed this omission as 
sufficient, in itself, to reverse the decision below. Mr Justice Clark stated " ... the relevant 
market is the prime factor in relation to which the ultimate question, whether the contact 
forecloses competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce involved, must be 
decided".68 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals were satisfied that 
peninsular Florida comprised the relevant geographic market. Within this market area 
only 700 000 tons of coal was consumed in 1959. Oil and natural gas were considered to 
be the primary fuels. In contrast, Tampa Electric contended that the relevant geographic 
67 It ·d '')l) )1 at _'- . 
68 Ibid. 
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market area was the Appalachian coal region which contained 700 coal producers. The 
Supreme Court upheld this contention and noted that in that area in 1954 alone, the region 
produced some 359,289,000 tons of coal of which only 78,716,000 tons were sold to the 
electric utilities.69 Within this particular geographic market area " ... the proportionate 
volume of the total relevant coal product as to which the challenged contract pre-empted 
competition, less than 1 per cent, (was) conservatively speaking quite insubstantial".7o By 
redefining the geographic market the Supreme Court found the exclusive dealing 
arrangement before it to be legal and enforceable. In doing so, Mr Justice Clark, made a 
number of observations. He stated that this was not a case involving plainly restrictive 
tying arrangements like those of International Salt. Secondly, he distinguished Standard 
Fashion in that the Tampa Electric case did not involve a seller with a dominant market 
position. Thirdly Tampa Electric did not involve a large range of outlets with substantial 
sales volume, and an industry wide practice of reliance upon exclusive contracts as in 
Standard Oil. In the view of the Court, exclusive dealing possessed certain economic 
advantages. In the case of the buyer it assured supply and in the case of the supplier it 
reduced selling costs, furnished protection against price fluctuation and offered the 
possibility of predictable markets. 71 Mr Justice Clark then echoed some of the sentiment 
expressed by Judge Weick in the Court of Appeals. He stated that such contracts were 
necessary in the interests of the public. In the case of public utilities they assured a steady 
and ample supply of fuel which protected the consumer against " ... shut downs and 
increasingly unjustified costs".72 
(,!) It"d t"''''"") )1 a .u_ 
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The Tampa Electric decision was not without its critics. Derek Bok argued. for example, 
that its great weakness was " ... its vagueness as a prescription for future cases". 73 The 
criteria enumerated by the Supreme Court as relevant to the determination of the legality 
of these arrangements were just too vague to act as guiding principles. R.H. Bork simply 
asserted that the law in this area had gained " ... more complex inadequacy".74 For the 
most part, however, Tampa Electric was welcomed as creating a sufficiently flexible 
doctrinal base which avoided the uncompromising prohibitions of Standard Stations. For 
some, the Tampa Electric decision meant a return by the Supreme Court to an 
interpretation of Section 3 which was " ... faithful both to its legislative history and to the 
philosophy of antitrust". 75 The lower Courts responded favourably to the decision and 
consistently apply its standards to the construction of Section 3.76 
At this point, it would not be unreasonable to assume that the Supreme Court had finally 
concluded its quest for an appropriate standard to determine the legality of these 
arrangements. The assumption, however, would be inaccurate. In the 1966 case of FTC v 
Brown Shoen the Commission alleged that the exclusive dealing arrangements of the 
Brown Shoe Corporation, one of the worlds largest shoe manufacturers, amounted to an 
unfair method of competition contrary to Section 5 Federal Trade Commission Act 1914. 
The allegation revolved around Brown Shoe's franchise programme. This involved some 
650 independent outlets all of which agreed to handle only shoes manufactured by Brown 
73 D.C. Bok, "The Tampa Electric Case And The Problem Of Exclusive Arrangements Under The C l a ~ ~ ton 
Act", (1961) Supreme COllrl Re\'lew 267,283. 
74 R. H. Bork. The Antitrust Paradox, (Reprint, New York, 1993) p.30\. 
75 See, M. Handler, note 44 above, 81-8:2. 
76 Scc, for example, Barr Lahoratories Inc. \' Abbot Lahoratories, 978 F. 2d 98 (yd Cir. 199:2),: R e l £ J 1 ~ l I l 1 g g
lI"all ,,,','stellls Inc v J!"cstrock /IIC , 79:2 F. 792 F. Supp 1552 (D. Or. 1991): Ado/ph Coors \' FTC, 497 \. 2d 
1178(10 'h Cir. 1974). 
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or other suppliers non-conflicting lines. This amounted to only 1 per cent of the total 
number of available outlets (approximately 70,000 nationwide) purchasing 25 million 
dollars worth of shoes from Brown; which amounted to only 1 per cent of the nations 2.5 
billion dollars worth of annual sales. In return the Brown Shoe Corporation provided these 
outlets with valuable services including the provision of architectural plans, 
merchandising records, the services of a Brown Shoe field representative and the right to 
participate in cheaper group insurance. 78 
The Commission concluded, quite simply, that the franchise programme effectively 
foreclosed Brown's competitors from selling to a substantial number of retail shoe 
dealers. 79 This amounted, therefore, to an unfair method of competition contrary to 
Section 5. Accordingly a cease and desist order was issued. 
Brown Shoe then appealed to the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals. This Court concluded 
that the Commission lacked the authority to declare the franchise programme unfair. In 
its view the Federal Trade Commission Act 1914 was not intended to prohibit or limit , 
such activities. The matter then proceeded to the Supreme Court. It took a different view. 
It concluded that the Commission had the authority to declare these methods of 
distribution unfair and contrary to Section 5. Mr Justice Black stated that the 
" ... broad powers of the Commission is particularly well established 
with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of 
7X Ib'd '\ . .',1 I at . ' ( ) ~ , ,
N Ibid. 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not 
actually violate these laws".8o 
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The Supreme Court then unanimously concluded that Brown Shoe's program conflicted 
with the basic policy of the antitrust laws. That is, with the freedom of purchasers 
(dealers) to buy in an open market.8) Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected Brown's 
contention that an economic investigation must be conducted to determine the competitive 
effect of the restraint. Mr Justice Black stated 
"We reject the argument that proof of this Section 3 element must be 
made ... the Commission has power under Section 5 to arrest trade 
restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an 
outright violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act or other provision of 
the antitrust laws".82 
On this "incipency" basis, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's decision. It 
represented a particular philosophical brand of antitrust, the roots of which were firmly 
planted in the traditionalist school. It was primarily concerned with keeping the channels 
of distribution open and not with distributive efficiency. The Court was prepared, 
therefore, to condemn any contractual restriction which prevented a dealer from 
purchasing freely in the open market. The fact that a substantial number of retail dealers 
were foreclosed to other competitors was sufficient to condemn the arrangement. This 
80 IbOd .., ') I I at .'_ 0 
81 Ibid 
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approach went further than Standard Stations In that the market share percentage of 
dealers foreclosed was irrelevant. 
This particular decision provoked much criticism. It seemed to allow the Clayton Act 
standard based on Tampa Electric to be totally interdicted. It moved to a form of 
absolutism in which restraints of trade, however reasonable, could be condemned. 
Historically, this position had been abandoned as early as 1 711 in the English case of 
Mitchell v Reynolds. 83 In this respect, Milton Handler asked rather caustically ..... (i)s it 
consonant with our democratic tradition to permit an administrative agency to refashion 
statutory standards of legality with no limit other than the vague concept of incipiency?"x.t 
However, he reserved his more critical comments for the underlying policy considerations 
of Brown Shoe. In his view, they were neither sound, viable nor wise. The freedom 
which "... should be protected is the freedom to contract, not the freedom to buy in a 
market untrammeled by any restriction, however reasonable".85 Much of the vehement 
criticism directed at Brown Shoe proved only to be academic. In terms of precedential 
value, it was applied in only three subsequent cases.86 The Supreme Court decision of 
Tampa Electric has proved more enduring and influential. 
It becomes abundantly apparent that the US Courts and the Commission's approach to 
exclusive dealing has vacilitated considerably over the years. In this respect exclusive 
dealing has certainly been an antitrust violation in search of a standard, The 
83:24 E Rep 347 (K B 1711). . .. 8 ~ ~ [\ 1 Handler, "Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policy Making - Nineteenth Annual ReView . (1966) 7() 
)u/e LJ 9:2. 98. 
85 Ibid lOt. 
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Commission's current approach to these arrangements is in line with the Tampa Electric 
decision. In Beltone Electronic Corp87 for example, the Commission stated that a proper 
analysis of these restraints should 
" ... take into account market definition, the amount of foreclosure in 
the relevant market, the duration of the contracts, the extent to which 
entry is deterred and the reasonable justification, if any, for the 
exclusivity".88 
In holding the restraint legal, the Commission in Beltone recognised that these restraints 
could be used to protect a suppliers capital investment and thereby prevent interbrand free 
riding. 
III. EXCLUSIVE PURCHASING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
A. The Development Of EU Case Law: From Beer To Ice-Cream And Vice Versa 
In 1963 the Court of Justice was gIven an early opportunity to consider exclusive 
purchasing in the case of Brasserie de Haecht SA v Wilkin-Janssens. 89 Brasserie de 
Haecht, a Belgian brewer, entered into a number of contracts with a married couple called 
Wilkin-Janssens, the proprietors of "A la Ferme" cafe in Esneux. The Belgian brewer 
agreed to lend equipn1ent and money to the value of 52,000 francs and, in return, the 
87 Trade Reg, Rep (CCH) 21. 934 F rc (1982) 
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owners of the cafe undertook to obtain their supplies of beer, lemonade and other drinks 
from the brewery. In 1966 the brewery discovered that the exclusive purchasing 
obligation had been broken and sued for recission of the loan contract, return of the goods 
lent and damages in accordance with the contractual penalty clause. 
The Wilkin-Janssens admitted that they obtained supplies in breach of their contractual 
obligations but contended that the arrangement was void under Article 81 (ex 85). To be 
successful the defendant cafe proprietors had to show that their rather modest contracts 
affected trade between Member States. They contended, therefore, that they should not be 
considered in isolation. Consideration had to be given, firstly, to the fact that the brewery 
had concluded similar arrangements with other cafe proprietors and, secondly, that other 
breweries had concluded analogous contracts with other licensees. The Belgian Court of 
Liege referred the matter to the Court of Justice asking whether it was possible to take 
into account the whole of the market in its economic context or whether it was necessary 
to keep to an examination of the effects on the market of the loan agreement in isolation.9o 
Advocate General Roemer stated that it was perfectly feasible for a single long term 
exclusive purchasing arrangement to infringe Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)). A highly technical 
product, for example, may have to be marketed by an undertaking with appropriate 
technical know-how. If only one such undertaking is established in a Member State and it 
is tied to a single producer, foreign manufacturers would be prevented from marketing 
their products in that Member State. The Advocate General, however, felt the contracts in 
question did not fall within this category. In assessing whether they violated Article 81 (1 ) 
'>0 Ibid .lO9. 
211 
(ex 85(1)) he concluded they should not be considered in isolation. Account had to be 
taken of the fact that they formed part of a network of similar agreements. Factors to be 
considered in this analysis included the number of such contracts, their duration, the 
quantities of goods involved, the proportion of goods sold thereunder in comparison with 
the amount sold by free distributors and the possibility of establishing other outlets.91 
The Court of Justice, in a very brief judgment, accepted this analysis. It held that the 
affects of beer supply agreements had to be assessed in the economic and legal context in 
which they occur and where they might combine with others to have a cumulative effect 
on competition. The Court stressed, however, that this factor was not on its own 
determinative. Without enumerating other factors, the Court simply stated that the 
cumulative effect of several agreements was only one factor amongst others to be 
considered in this analysis.92 
The Commission, however, has traditionally applied Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) in a rather 
summary fashion, contrasting with the more nuanced approach of the Court.93 It preferred 
to conduct any economic analysis within the parameters of Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)). This, 
of course, increased the Commission's jurisdictional reach. An example of its approach 
can be seen in the 1977 case of Spices. 94 Here Brook Bond Liebig, a spice producer with 
39 per cent of the Belgian market entered into supply agreements with the three leading 
Belgian supermarket chains. The latter, whose combined sales of spices accounted for 30 
91 Ibid 423-424. 
()2 Ibid .lI4-415. . . 
93 Sec I. Bissocoli. "Exclusive Purchasing Obligations: The Italian Chapter Of The Ice Cream DistnbutlOn 
Sag.I", (1998) 19 FCLR :'20: V. Korah, "Exclusive Purchasing Obligations: Mars v Langnese and 
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per cent of all such sales in Belgium, agreed to purchase and stock only Liebig's spices in 
addition to their own branded products. The Commission found that this arrangement 
infringed Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)) because it restricted the freedom of choice of the 
supermarkets in respect of the purchase and resale of spices. It also restricted competition 
between spice producers because it restricted other producers from distributing their 
products through the bound outlets forcing them to market their products through a larger 
number of smaller outlets.95 The effects of this restriction were made all the more 
significant because Liebig imposed resale prices on its distributors preventing intrabrand 
competition. The Commission concluded that the agreements, had they been notified, 
would not qualify for exemption. They neither improved distribution nor benefitted the 
consumer. 96 
More recently in Delimitis v Henninger Brau AG97 the Court of Justice confirmed and 
expanded upon its judgment in Brasserie de Haecht(l). In this seminal case the Court 
held that exclusive purchasing obligations do not fall within the parameters of Article 
81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) unless they foreclose market access to domestic or foreign competitors. 
The facts of the case are rather straightforward. Delimitis entered into a tie by type beer 
supply agreement with the Henninger Brau brewery in May 1985. The latter agreed to let 
to Delimitis one of its public houses in Frankfurt. Delimitis was contractually obliged to 
furnish a rental deposit as a form of guarantee. He also agreed to purchase a minimum 
quantity of beer from the German brewery, in the knowledge that failure to do so would 
result in the imposition of financial penalties for contractual non-performance. The tie by 
l ) ~ ~ It 'd ).., )1 ~ _ 1 . .
' l 6 I t ' ~ ' t _ , ~ ~)1(1 _'-t __ . 
'17 Case C - 2 3 ~ / 8 9 9 [1991] FCR 1-935, [19921 :" CMLR 210. 
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type beer supply agreement also contained an "access clause" which enabled Delimitis to 
purchase his beer requirements, should he wish to do so, from other breweries established 
in other Member States. 
In December 1986, as a result of ill health, Delimitis terminated the agreement and the 
brewery deducted a sum in excess of DM 6000 from the rental deposit. In its view its 
tenant failed to meet its minimum purchasing requirements. Delimitis regarded the 
deduction as unlawful and alleged that the agreement violated Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)). 
He brought proceedings against the brewery before the Landgericht, Frankfurt am Main 
for recovery of the sum deducted. In February 1988 the German Court dismissed his 
claim. The Landgericht considered that the contract did not affect trade between Member 
States. In its view this would still be the case even if the contract constituted one element 
in a series of beer supply agreements. Delimitis appealed against this judgment to the 
Oberlandergericht. In order to resolve the dispute the Higher Regional Court referred the 
matter, in July 1989, to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the compatibility 
of tie by type beer supply agreements with the Community competition rules. 
The parties to the proceedings, not unsurprisingly, adopted differing positions. Delimitis 
contended that case law indicated that a single beer supply agreement containing 
exclusive purchasing obligations was capable of falling within the provisions of Article 
81 (1) (ex 85(1 )). This was also the case for a contract which constituted one of a bundle 
of similar agreements, the cumulative effect of which may be to affect intra-community 
trade. rhis would be the case if the bundle of contracts covered -l0 to 50 per cent of the 
r ~ l e \ ' a n t t drinks outlets in a Member State or a similar percentage of turnover. Delimitis 
contended, in any event, that 60 pcr cent of outlets were tied in the German market dnd 
214 
this was sufficient to indicate that intra-community trade was significantly affected. 
Should the Court refuse to accept this figure, Delimitis argued that a number of other 
factors had to be taken into account. These included inter alia the number, duration, 
volume of trade covered by the bundle of contracts and the ratio of goods sold under these 
agreements in relation to the quantities sold by free distributors. Delimitis also argued 
that the geographic market should be determined on a regional basis and the product 
market should be limited to the sale of beer in bars.98 
In contrast, the brewery argued that the agreement was not a standard beer supply 
contract. It did not contain an exclusive purchasing obligation, merely a requirement to 
purchase minimum quantities. It was also an "open-contract" permitting publicans to 
freely obtain supplies in other Member States. The brewery argued, therefore, that Article 
81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) was not automatically applicable even though the contract restricted the 
freedom of action of the respective parties. In fact, limiting freedom of action was 
essential to proper contractual performance. With regard to intra-Community trade the 
brewery argued that the agreement could not affect trade between Member States because 
it contained an access clause. There was, therefore, no barrier to economic interpretation. 
Should however the Court consider that trade between Member States was affected, the , , 
brewery contended it could not be affected appreciably. The contract related to a small 
amount of beer and only to suppliers within Germany. Even if the contract formed part of 
a bundle of agreements it would only affect trade in exceptional cases.99 The brewery 
made reference to the factors listed by Advocate General Karl Roemer in his Opinion in 
'IK Ibid 943-<4 
'I') Ibid 945. 
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Brasserie de Haecht (1/00 as pertinent to such an assessment. The brewery stressed. 
however, that the application of these factors was a matter for the national Court although 
the Court of Justice should provide operational guidelines. It then argued that the product 
market included not only the sale of beer in hotels, restaurants and public houses but also 
retail sales of beer. The geographic market was the Federal Republic of Germany. On 
this basis, the brewery concluded that there was no infringement of the competition rules. 
The French Government submitted observations. In its view the national Court, when 
assessing the effect of intra-Community trade, must take into account the existence of 
similar contracts entered into by the brewery with its tenants and analogous contracts 
entered into by other breweries with their respective tenants. The French Government felt 
unable to set, in percentage terms, a figure relating to foreclosed outlets which would 
indicate that competition was restricted. 
The Commission commenced its observations by defining the relevant market. The 
product market was limited to the sale of beer in hotels, restaurants and public houses and 
did not include retail sales. It noted, however, that there was a close interdependence 
because retail sales could be used by a foreign supplier to gain market acceptance for its 
products. The Commission concluded that the relevant geographic market was the 
Federal Republic of Germany. It then observed that the Court's case law indicated that 
network effects were relevant, anlongst other factors, to the current analysis. These other 
factors included consideration of the number of outlets bound by exclusi \'C purchasing 
obligations in comparison with free houses and thc comparative volume of heer sold in 
til'd hOllses. In this conte:\t the Commission emphasised market saturation and access to 
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the retail trade by foreign suppliers. Finally, the Commission stated that a bundle of 
contracts covering 30 per cent of public houses in a Member State was already capable of 
appreciably affecting trade between Member States. 101 
Advocate General Van Gerven delivered his Opinion on 11 October 1990. He agreed 
with the brewery, the French Government and the Commission that the relevant 
geographic market was that of the Federal Republic of Germany, observing that contracts 
of this type were generally entered into by parties established in the same Member State. 
With regard to the product market, he agreed with the position adopted by the 
Commission and Delimitis, confining it to the sale of beer in bars. 102 Concerning the 
effect on trade between Member States, the Advocate General noted that an extensive 
network of similar contracts not only reduced the freedom of the contracting parties but 
also had consequences for market structure, in that they could reduce the number of 
supply and demand possibilities. Ultimately, these contracts could be used to protect 
national markets from imports from other Member States. He concluded that the 
cumulative effect of a bundle of such contracts constituted one factor amongst others 
which may render an agreement, which at first sight appears insignificant, susceptible to 
Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)). He felt unable, however, to set down a percentage figure relating 
to the degree of market foreclosure which would render Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)) 
applicable. He merely concluded that a high proportion of foreclosure (between 40 and 
. I f!': d k . . 103 60 per cent) senous y a lecte mar et competItIveness. 
101 [1991] Fe'R 1-948. 
102 Ibid 9()..t-965. 
1(11 Ibid 967. 
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The Advocate General then commented on those other factors which may be relevant to 
the assessment. They fell into two categories. Firstly, factors relevant to the actual 
agreement itself and secondly, factors relevant to the agreements falling within the 
network. Taking the second category first, the Advocate General attached importance to 
the volume of sales in tied outlets in relation to the overall beer market, the number, 
duration and volume of the tied outlet agreements. 104 In this connection, however, he 
noted that the available facts were " ... too cursory and imprecise".105 He concluded, 
therefore, that excessive importance should not be attached to the cumulative effect of a 
series of agreements. They merely provided an economic background to the individual 
agreement itself. With regard to the first category of factors the Advocate General 
attached importance mainly to the market position of the brewery and volume of sales. 
He noted that Henninger Brau ranked thirteenth out of a possible thousand breweries. 106 
Finally, with regard to the access clause he observed that the Commission adopted a 
restrictive interpretation concluding that trade between Member States was still affected 
notwithstanding the inclusion of the provision. In his view this was a matter for the 
German Court. 
In February 1991 the Court of Justice delivered its judgment. It stressed that Regulation 
1984/83 did not apply to tie by type beer supply agreements. The latter failed to specify 
by b r a ~ d d or denomination the products forming the subject matter of the contract. This 
did not conform with Article 6 of Regulation 1983/84 as the brewer could unilaterally 
extend or vary the exclusive purchasing obligation. 107 The Court then outlined, briefly. 
104 Ibid 968. 
105 Ibid 967. 
10(, Ibid 9()9-970. 
In? Ibid 989-990 
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the advantages of exclusive purchasing arrangements. 108 It stated, however. that where 
these arrangements do not have as their object the restriction of competition it was still 
necessary to consider whether they had that effect. It referred to the judgment in 
Brasserie de Haecht 1 and noted that the cumulative effect of these arrangements had to 
be considered amongst other factors in any assessment. It was necessary, therefore, to 
determine whether the present agreement, in conjunction with other agreements of the 
same type, affected the opportunities of national competitors or those from other Member 
State gaining access to the market for beer consumption or from increasing their market 
share. 109 
The Court then presented its cumulative two-step assessment for the determination of 
these issues. The first step involved the definition of the relevant market. With regard to 
the product market the Court concluded that it should be defined on the basis of the nature 
of the economic activity in question, in this case the sale of beer. From the consumers 
point of view, sales from public houses and restaurants could be distinguished from retail 
sector sales. In the case of the former, product purchase is linked to the provision of 
service which is generally reflected in higher prices. The product market was defined as 
110 . 
on trade sales - the sale of beer in bars and restaurants. The fact that there was a certam 
overlap between the on trade and off trade market (retail sales), in as much as retail sales 
allowed new competitors to gain product acceptance, did not affect the Court's findings. 
The geographic market was then defined as the market for the sale and consumption of 
108 Ibid 9 X ~ ~
lOt} Ibid 984 
110 Ihis definition reflected the position adopted by the Court of Justice in Case '271'(1 {'II/fed Brollds \' 
Commissioll [197X] ECR 207. [1978] 1 CMLR '+:29, para 12. where the product llllirket \\ as defined as 
including ;111 gllods or services perceived b} the consumer (price. purpose, product charactcrI\!lcs) to be 
interchange;!! 1 Ie 
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b · . h G III eer In premises on t e erman market. The Court then moved on to consider the 
cumulative effect of several similar networks in order to determine the degree of market 
foreclosure. It emphasised the need to consider the number of outlets tied to national 
producers in relation to the number of public houses not so tied (numeric f o r e c l o s u r e ) ~ ~
contract duration; the quantities of beer to which these contracts related and the 
proportion between these contracts and the quantities of beer sold by free distributors 
(volume weighted foreclosure). The Court then stressed that this finding was not, in itself. 
sufficient for a finding of market inaccessibility. Other factors had to be considered 
including, firstly, opportunities for market access and secondly, competitive market 
forces. With regard to the former the Court emphasised that consideration needed to be 
given to whether a new brewery could acquire an existing brewery with its network of 
sales outlets or open up its own public houses. This would entail consideration of inter 
alia the law on company acquisitions and the minimum number of outlets necessary to 
create a profitable distribution system. With regard to competitive market forces the 
Court emphasised the need to consider the number and size of producers, the degree of 
market concentration and brand loyalty. Market access is hindered to a greater degree 
. . I b d . 112 where the market IS saturated and customer loyalty to a partlCU ar ran IS strong. 
The Court then turned to the second step in its analytical model. If having considered step 
one there are no indications that market access has been denied to new national or f o r e i ~ n n, 
competitors, the bundle or network of agreements cannot be considered to be in violation 
of Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) EC. If, however, access has been made more difficult it is 
necessary to consider whether the brewer's net\\'ork of agreements had made " ... a 
III Ibid 91'\) 
112 Ibid 986, 
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significant contribution to the sealing-off effect brought about by the totality of '" 
agreements in their economic and legal context". 113 If the contribution is significant the 
requisite Article is infringed. In this assessment the Court listed a number of factors to be 
considered: the market position of the contracting parties (the market share of the brewery 
and its group), the number of outlets tied to the brewery in relation to the total number of 
outlets on the relevant market not so tied and the duration of the agreements. With regard 
to the latter, the Court observed that manifestly excessive contract terms could render the 
contract violative of the competition rules. 
The Delimitis judgment, with its more nuanced economic based approach to exclusive 
purchasing, has been welcomed by many commentators. 114 However, the Court's 
approach is not without criticism. Firstly, the first step in the Delimitis analysis was 
confined to the foreclosure effect produced by domestic manufacturers on the German 
market. Market foreclosure precipitated by ties concluded between foreign beer 
producers and German outlets were excluded from the analysis. The mere fact that the 
geographic market was confined to Germany was no justification for their omission. A tie 
to a foreign brewer could foreclose as much as a tie to a domestic producer. I 15 Secondly, 
if the cumulative network effect indicated that market access was made more difficult, the 
Delimitis second stage analysis required consideration of the contribution made by the 
agreements of the brewery in question to this effect. Only if the contribution is significant 
will the agreement fall within Article 81 (1 ) (ex 8S( 1 ». In this respect the Court simply 
111 Ibid. 
I I ~ ~ See K PI· Lasok, "Assessing The Iconomic Consequences Of Restrictive Agreemenh A Comment On 
The Dclimitis Case", (1991) I ~ ~ ECLR IlJ-l V. Korah, "The Judgment In Ddimitis: A Milestone Towards /\ 
Realistic ,\sseSSll1l'nt Of The Effects Of .\n Agreement - Or r\ Damp Squib?" (I l)l)2) l-l f/PR 167. 
115 S ~ ~ ~ V Korah, note I l-l ab()\e. 1 7 ~ . .
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listed factors to be considered and failed to define exactly what it meant by a "significant" 
contribution to market foreclosure. In many respects, therefore, everything seems 
relevant. Yet, the analysis need not consider all the beer supply agreements concluded by 
the brewery in question. The latter may, for example, conduct its business using two or 
three quite distinct standard form agreements. If the dispute relates to a specific network 
operating, under a specific type of agreement, the brewer's other networks operating 
under quite distinct standard form agreements may be excluded from the analysis. 116 
Thirdly, the Court failed to provide clarification upon the degree of market foreclosure 
needed to implicate Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)). Fourthly, the matters raised by Delimitis are 
undoubtedly complex. Fears arose that national Courts, not versed or experienced in the 
complexities of competition law, may find the resolution of such disputes difficult. 
Perhaps, more fundamentally, the party seeking to establish an infraction of Article 81 ( 1 ) 
(ex 85(1)) bears a heavy burden of proof beyond the financial means of most litigants. To 
avoid intolerably complex litigation Korah has argued that national Courts should develop 
a truncated analysis. That is, Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) should not apply if the contracts are 
of short duration, barriers to market access low, the degree of free trade is capable of 
dealing with the output of a new entrant and the party has a low market share.
117 
Finally, 
at the time of the Court's judgment it was uncertain whether Delimitis would be extended 
to other types of agreements. Indeed, it was uncertain whether the Commission would 
embrace the more nuanced approach of the Court. 
Shortly after the Delimitis judgment the Commission turned its attention to the 
distribution practices of the ice-cream industry, a sector which has attracted the attentions 
11<> SeL' K.P.E. Lasok, note 114 abo\e, 199. 
II' See \' Korah, notL' 11·l above, 174 
of the regulatory authorities in Denmark, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the UK. The 
Commission, however, focused on the German and Irish ice-cream markets. 
By way of background, it should be noted that the US multinational Mars Incorporated 
acquired the US ice-cream company, Dove. Mars developed ice-cream versions of its 
confectionery brands and sought to introduce them into Europe via its wholly-o\vned 
European subsidiaries. The American corporation, however. felt that its attempts to 
penetrate the European market was hindered by the distributive practices of European 
manufacturers, in particular, those of the Unilever group. The wide-spread European 
practice of outlet and freezer exclusivity gave Mars cause for concern. Outlet exclusivity 
occurs when an ice-cream manufacturer requires its purchasers to enter into a supply 
contract whereby the latter agrees not to stock any rival brands at its retail outlet. Freezer 
exclusivity arises when a manufacturer provides the retailer with a freezer, subject to the 
obligation to only stock its products therein. The retailer is not, however, contractually 
prevented from selling other brands. In certain circumstances, freezer exclusivity can 
amount to de facto outlet exclusivity if, for example, the retailer has space constraints and 
cannot install another freezer from which to sell competing brands. 
In September 1991 the American Corporation's subsidiary, Mars GmbH, complained to 
the Commission in relation to the exclusivity agreements concluded by Scholler 
lebensmittel GmbH and langnese-Iglo GmbH. a subsidiary of the Unilever group. Both 
these Gernlan undertakings manufactured and distributed ice-creams, frozen foods and 
pastries for the German market. The standard form supply agreements or hoth 
undertakings wcre similar In many respects. Both suppl icrs required their respect 1 ve 
retailers to purchasc their icC-CrL'<lm products exclusively from themsd\"es. In rL'turn 
II" 
---' 
retailers received, free of charge, a freezer cabinet from which to sell ice-cream products. 
Both German manufacturers believed this distributive method would enable them to 
utilise a large number of sales outlets which would not otherwise be a\'ailable and. 
therefore, to exploit the new marketing opportunities arising in the former German 
Democratic Republic. 
Scholler's standard agreements had been the subject of a comfort letter in 1985 in which 
the Commission stated they were compatible with the rules on competition. In December 
1991, however, the Commission announced that it intended to reconsider the exclusive 
purchasing arrangements of both German undertakings. In Scholler Lebensmittel GmbH 
& Co KG1J8 and Langnese-Iglo GmbHI19 the Commission decided that the outlet 
exclusivity typical of both distribution systems infringed Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) and 
were ineligible for exemption. The Commission defined the relevant market, in each 
case, as that of the self service impulse ice-cream market. The geographic market 
comprised that of the German national market. At this point, the Commission's approach 
departed from that adopted by the Court of Justice in its Delimitis judgment. It developed 
its own three-tier test for the determination of compatibility with Article 81 (1) (ex 
85( 1 )).120 Three questions had to be asked and answered. Firstly, does the exclusive 
purchasing agreement at issue have an appreciable effect on competition or trade between 
Member States? Secondly, if not, do all the agreements of this kind entered into by the 
undertaking concerned have this effect? Finally, if not. do all the agreements which e\ist 
on 
11K ('0111111. Dec. 9.:1,'.tO) OJ 1993 L 18.:111, [1994] .t CMLR ) I. 
III) ('0111111. Ike "n .t06 OJ 199.:1118.:1/19, [1994].t Cf\lLR)\. 
I ~ O O E(' COl11mission, j'm·J1/I'-, .... ;('cond Report on ('umpclillOl1 folic\' 1992 (Brussels, 199.:1) P I 12 
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relevant market have this effect? The Commission stated that if one of these questions 
was answered in the affirmative Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) would apply. 
The Commission turned to the issue of market foreclosure and noted that Scholler sold 
about 10 per cent of the total volume of industrial ice-cream on the relevant market and 
tied to itself, by means of these arrangements 10 per cent of traditional sales and grocery 
outlets. In contrast Langnese sold approximately 15 per cent of impulse ice-cream on the 
relevant market and tied about 15 per cent of outlets. Making reference to its 1986 Notice 
on Agreements of Minor Importance 121 the Commission concluded that contracts of this 
type would have no appreciable effect and would not be caught by Article 81 (1) (ex 
85(1)) if the goods which are the subject of the agreement do not represent more than 5 
per cent of the relevant market or if the aggregate turnover of the participating 
undertakings does not exceed ECU 200 million. In the case of Scholler and Langnese 
numeric and volume weighted foreclosure amounted to 10 per cent and 15 per cent 
respectively and, therefore, exceeded the ceiling defining an agreement of minor 
importance. The second tier, of the three tier, test had been satisfied. The Commission, 
in each case, concluded that these 
facts alone (were) sufficient to establish that the supply 
agreements do appreciably restrict the scope for domestic and foreign 
competitors to establish themselves on the relevant market, or to 
. h . k t h ,,122 mcrease t elr mar e s are . 
I ~ I I OJ 198() C.231/2. This notice has been replaced. See OJ 1997 C372/3 [1998J 4 C:--'lLR 1 9 ~ ~
I ~ ~ ~ COI11I11. Dec. 93 '.W5, note 118 abu\e, para 105: Comm. Dec. 93'406. note 119 above, 104 
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In the Commission's view it was, therefore, unnecessary to examine network effects in 
accordance with the case law of Brasserie de Haecht J and Delimitis. 
The Commission's analysis then turned to considerations of Article 81(3) (ex 85(3) EC. 
It rejected the contentions of both German undertakings that their respective supply 
agreements contributed to improvements in product distribution. While they may produce 
advantages to the respective suppliers they did not produce any appreciable objective 
benefits in favour of the public. They simply strengthened the market position of both 
undertakings which led to a lessening of competition. In fact, consumers failed to derive a 
fair share of the alleged benefits. Consumer choice was diminished in that they could 
only obtain one brand of product from tied outlets. It was not always the case that 
alternative outlets selling other brands existed within the neighbourhood and, even if this 
was the case, consumers found it "irksome" to have to visit a separate outlet to acquire 
another branded product. 123 
The Commission, in both cases, then considered whether effective competition existed on 
the relevant market and this entailed a consideration of barriers to market entry. The 
Commission considered, firstly, the insulating effect of the exclusive supply contracts of 
both German undertakings. It noted that the market comprised two distinct channels, 
namely, distribution through grocery stores and outlets of a more traditional nature such 
as ice-cream kiosks, cakeshops and petrol stations. In both channels Scholler and 
Langnese occupied leading market positions. In the grocery trade they accounted for o\'er 
two-thirds of all sales. This rendered market access for prospecti\'e entrants and market 
1 ~ 1 1 ('0111111. Dec 9 Y ~ 0 5 , , note 118 above, p a r ~ l l 123; Comm. Dec. 93/406 note 119 above. para I ~ ~ I 
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expanSIOn for existing incumbents more difficult. Furthermore, a strong supply side 
concentration meant that incumbents would take action to defend their market positions. 
A similar picture emerged for distribution through traditional outlets. Once again, 
Scholler and Langnese accounted for over two thirds of sale volume. Here, the 
Commission emphasised the extent to which the respective undertakings exclusive supply 
agreements contributed to market foreclosure. While this effect could be mitigated by 
short term agreements the contracts of both parties could not be considered as agreements 
with short durations. Secondly, the Commission noted the absence of independent 
middlemen on the market. Prospective entrants, therefore, had either to collaborate with 
or acquire existing incumbents. Only Scholler and Langnese were available for this 
purpose and their market positions were so strong that it was not possible to compete 
effectively. In fact, collaboration simply perpetuated existing market structures. Thirdly, 
the Commission considered that the technology and know-how needed for the production 
of impulse ice-cream and consumer preferences built up over many years of consumption 
and marketing all contributed to insulating the relevant market. Finally, the Commission 
concluded that freezer exclusivity amounted to a barrier to market entry. By accepting 
freezer cabinets from the respective German undertakings retailers avoided capital 
investment and maintenance costs. Even if prospective entrants were willing to provide a 
similar service, market entry was still dependent on their ability to persuade retailers to 
replace their existing freezer. Retailers would, therefore, have to be convinced to give up 
selling the products of their current supplier who occupied a strong market position. Ihis 
was not likely to happen if the prospective entrant was not well known or offered a partial 
product range. Lastly, the installation of additional freezers may prove problematic 
because of outlet space constraints or the availability of space in an appropriate pl1sitioll 
llsual! \' c lose to till' check Ollt desk. The existence of these barriers to market entry 
prevented any substantial shift in market shares and the duopolistic market structure 
meant that competition between the duopolists was limited. Accordingl y . the 
Commission condemned the outlet exclusivity of both undertakings. 124 
In April 1992 in Scholler Lebensmittel GmbH v Commission 125 and Langnese-lglo \' 
Commission 126 the two German undertakings appealed to the Court of First Instance 
seeking annulment of the Commission's Decisions. They both argued that the 
Commission should have adopted a more expansive market definition to include ice-
cream, in general, and scooping ice-cream, in particular. The Court of First Instance 
agreed but concluded that this failure did not substantially effect its assessment, 111 
particular, as to whether access to the market was closed or considerably hindered. 
The German undertakings also contended that their respective supply contracts did not fall 
within the parameters of Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1 ». The Commission had failed, in their 
view, to conduct a sufficiently far reaching market analysis. It failed to take into account 
the first step in the two stage Delimitis test. Had the Commission embarked upon this 
nuanced approach, it would have concluded that the amount of foreclosure was less than 
30 per cent, a figure which the Commission in its Fifteenth Report on Competition Polic), 
(1985, point 19) had previously considered acceptable. Indeed, the Commission had 
failed to take account of the relatively short duration of these contracts in mitigating 
market foreclosure. The German undertakings also argued that the cumulative etTect of 
these networks were not sufficient. in themselves, to sustain a conclusion of market 
1.'·\ Comm. Dec. 9Y.t05, note 118 (Ibm'l'. 12.t-147; Comm. Dec. 93/.t06. note 119 abO\l'. paras 125-I-lS 
125 Case T-9/93 [1995jl:CR 11-161 I, [ll)95] 5 CMLR 602. 
1.'(, Case T-7/93 [19951 ECR 11-1 ~ 3 3 . . [1995] 5 CMLR 602. 
2:!S 
foreclosure. Other legal and factual circumstances had to be taken into account. 
Consideration of these factors would indicate that the market was not foreclosed. 
Langnese, firstly, pointed to the fact that numerous outlets remained untied and were 
immediately available to other competitors. Secondly, the ice-cream market was 
expanding rapidly as a result of new marketing opportunities emerging in the German 
Democratic Republic. If Mars encountered difficulties in gaining market access this was 
attributable to its inappropriate commercial strategy. It should have set up its own outlets 
rather than confining itself to sales through existing outlets. Finally, with regard to 
technological barriers to market entry the applicants contended that Mars had the requisite 
technology and considerable financial resources to market its products. 127 
The Court of First Instance agreed with the Commission that outlet exclusivity, as 
practised by Scholler and Langnese, fell within Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)). It rejected, 
however, the Commission's analytical approach and substituted the two stage approach of 
Delimitis. With regard to network effects the Court, in both cases, considered numeric and 
volume weighted market foreclosure concluding that the degree of foreclosure exceeded 
30 per cent. It then considered other factors pertinent to the legal and economic appraisal 
of the agreements in question. Agreeing with the Commission, the Court concluded that 
freezer exclusivity and rebates granted to enforce such schemes, the lack of independent 
distribution intermediaries, brand strength and contract duration all constituted barriers to 
market entry. The Court then applied the second stage of the Delimitis test and concluded. 
in view of the respective applicants market shares and strong market positions. that the 
individual networks of Scholler and Langnese "contributed significantly" to market 
1 ~ 7 C a s c T - 9 9 3 . n o t e e 125abo\'c.1637-\()41;Case r-7/93,note 126above.l.'i65-1570 
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foreclosure.
128 
With regard to the applicability of Regulation 1984/83 and the possibility 
of exemption the Court upheld the Commission's decision. The undertakings respecti \ ' ( ~ ~
agreements were subject to "tacit renewal" and could be regarded, therefore. as concluded 
for an indefinite period rendering the block exemption inapplicable. Individual exemption 
was not possible as the two undertakings could not show that their distributive methods 
displayed appreciable objective benefits. 129 The applicants were, however, successful in 
one respect in that the court upheld their contention that the Commission did not have the 
legal basis to withhold the benefit of the block exemption from future supply agreements 
concluded by them. 
In August 1995 Langnese perpetuated the saga by appealing to the Court of Justice in the 
case of Langnese 19lo GmbH v Commission 130 asking it to set aside the lower Court's 
judgment. The Court of Justice gave its ruling in October 1998. Langnese supported its 
appeal of three grounds. Firstly, it maintained that the Commission was bound by its 
assessment made in its comfort letter of September 1986 and addressed to Scholler. To 
depart from it would breach the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. The 
Court of First Instance held that new circumstances had arisen which required a more 
detailed market examination. Mars and Jacob Suchard had entered the market and the 
Commission became aware of additional barriers to market entry. The Court of Justice, 
therefore, rejected this ground of appeal. Secondly, Langnese contested the conclusion 
that its exclusive supply agreements were incompatible with Article 81 (l) (ex 85(1)). It 
contended that it had presented documentary evidence to the Court of First Instance 
1-'xCaseT-9/93,1l0k 125 above, 16cl1-lh-46;CaseT-7/93,note 126 above, 1 5 7 1 - 1 ~ 7 6 . .
129 Case \"-9/93, note 125 above, 1651-1666; Case T-7/93, note 126 above, 1585-1600. 
1.10 Case C -279 'l)5P [1998] 1-:CR 1-5609, [ 1998J 5 C1\ lLR 933. 
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indicating that market foreclosure was less than 30 per cent. Furthermore, the lower 
Court merely accepted the Commission's arguments that freezer exclusivity amounted to 
a barrier to market access without requiring evidence to be adduced in support. In the 
view of the applicant, the facts indicated that market access was not impeded. The Court 
of Justice rejected this ground in its entirety. The appellant simply did not specify the 
errors of law allegedly committed by the lower Court and because matters of evidence 
were for the Court of First Instance to assess. I3I Finally, the Court of Justice rejected the 
applicant's claims that the principles of proportionality and equal treatment were 
infringed. I32 It should also be noted that the Court of Justice rejected the Commission's 
cross-appeal holding that it was not entitled to prohibit the applicant from concluding 
such agreements in the future. 133 
The condemnation of the distribution arrangements in the German ice-cream cases related 
to outlet exclusivity. The Commission considered the issues of freezer exclusivity in the 
134 . h . . Irish market in Van Den Bergh Foods Ltd. Once agam t e two mam protagonIsts were 
the Unilever Group and Mars Incorporated. The legal and factual background to the case, 
is to say the least, rather convoluted. HB Ice Cream Ltd (HB) succeeded Hughes Brothers 
Ltd an Irish diary company formed in 1924. In 1968 it acquired its principal rivaL 
Premier Dairies. Since that date it has become Ireland's principal manufacturer and 
distributor of ice-cream products. In 1974 it was taken over by the Unilever Group and 
reformed, in 1993, as Van den Bergh Foods Ltd as part of Unilever's internal 
reorganisation. Masterfoods Ltd trading as Mars Ireland (Mars) is the wholh'-owneJ 
1:1\ Ibid 5640-5642 
I:l2 Ibid 5642-5(146 
1.1:1 It 'J " .. '" )1 _ l) __ 
I J ~ ~ Comm, Dec 98 5, I OJ 1998 1.246/1, [1998] 5 CMLR 530, 
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subsidiary of Mars Incorporated. Valley Ice Cream (Ireland) Ltd manufactured its own 
ice-cream products and, prior to its liquidation in 1997, acted as principal distributor of 
Mars ice-cream products in Ireland. For many years HB made available to retailers. 
freezer cabinets for the storage and display of its ice-cream products. The cabinets \\'ere 
either loaned to the retailer at no charge or leased for a nominal rent which was rarely 
collected. Cabinet repair and maintenance was performed by HB and the cabinets were 
supplied under a standard form contract which provided that they were to be used 
exclusively for storing HB' s products. When Mars entered the Irish ice-cream market. 
many retailers stored its products in their cabinets in contravention of their agreements 
with HB. 
In March 1990 Mars brought an action in the Irish High Court seeking a Declaration to 
the effect that the exclusivity provisions in HB's cabinet agreements were void under the 
competition rules. HB brought a separate cross-action claiming injunctions to restrain 
Mars from inducing retailers to breach their exclusivity agreements. In April 1990 
interlocutory injunctions were granted in favour of HB pending outcome of the trial. In 
September 1991 Mars, once again, complained to the Commission alleging that it was 
being hindered from gaining market access. In May 1992 in Master/oods v HB Ice Cream 
Ltj 35 the Irish High Court dismissed the action brought by Mars holding that HB' s 
freezer exclusivity agreements did not violate domestic law or the Community rules on 
competition. It also made the interlocutory injunction permanent. The Court did. 
however, recognise that HB occupied a position of market dominance. In July 1992 
Valky Icc Creanl (Ireland) Ltd also complained to the Commission in terms similar to 
115 r 1992] J CMLR ~ n o , ,
that of Mars. In September 1992 Mars appealed to the Irish Supreme Court against the 
judgment of the High Court. The former, seeking a preliminary ruling on certain issues, 
referred the matter to the Court of Justice. 136 
In July 1993 the Commission addressed a Statement of Objections to HB in which it 
provisionally concluded that its system of distribution infringed both Article 81 (ex 85) 
and 82 (ex 86). 
HB vigorously contested this VIew. Following discussions with the Commission, 
however, it agreed to introduce changes to its system. A package of measures were 
introduced designed, in the short term, to increase the number of non-exclusive retailer 
owned cabinets and, in the long term, to make it easier for retail outlets to buy their own 
non-exclusive cabinets as an alternative to the present system. In August 1995 the 
Commission announced its intention to take a favourable view of the new system. 137 
These alterations failed to bring about the structural change which the Commission 
expected to achieve and in January 1997 the Commission initiated proceedings. In March 
1998 it concluded that the use of freezer exclusivity by HB violated Article 81 (ex 85) and 
Article 82 (ex 86). 
Interestingly, the Commission's approach now seems to conform with the Court's ruling 
in Delimitis. 138 It defined the product market as comprising single wrapped items of 
impulse ice-cream as distinct from take home products and the geographic market \\ as 
Db Case ('-3el.l/98, [1999] 4 CMLR 167. 
117 OJ 199)CnI4. 
11K C;\Sl' C - : 2 J . ~ / S 9 9 [1991] ECR 1-93), [1992J 5 Ci\lLR 210. 
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confined to Ireland. 139 T . t t k f'C d h urmng 0 ne wor elects an t e issue of market foreclosure the 
Commission concluded (on the basis of the economic survey conducted by lansdowne on 
its behalf) that numeric foreclosure amounted to 41 per cent. Volume weighted 
foreclosure, however, amounted to 40 per cent. 140 The Commission then examined other 
factors which made market access more difficult. It concluded that disincentives existed 
which made it unlikely that retailers would purchase their own cabinets, use the cabinets 
of prospective entrants or install additional freezers. These included the need to rupture 
relations with HB the capital investment necessary to acquire the necessary equipment. 
shortage of floor space, the lack of independent wholesalers, brand strength and customer 
loyalty. As a result, sales outlets were de facto exclusively tied to HB.141 The 
Commission then concluded that these restrictions made market penetration more difficult 
for foreign suppliers and that HB' s network "contributed significantly" to the foreclosure 
of the relevant market. 142 Exemption under Article 81 (3) (ex 85(3)) was also refused by 
the Commission. HB' s system of distribution reduced the ability of retailers to choose the 
products they wished to sell and created space inefficiencies in those outlets. 143 Freezer 
exclusivity also reduced consumer choice by reducing the availability of different brands 
of ice-cream. Consumers did not share, therefore, in the alleged benefits of HB' s 
distribution system. The imposed restrictions were not indispensable. They simply 
contributed to the perpetuation of structural inertia resulting in a reduction of interbrand 
competition. Accordingly, the Commission condemned the arrangement. 
II') Comm. Dec. 98/53 I OJ 1998 L246/ I, [1998] 5 CMLR 530, paras 130-140. 
'lil lt 'd 1--' 1-( )1 paras y,- .)). 
I ~ I I Ibid P;\I;\S 1."7-1 X6. 
II.' Ibid para 200. 
I ~ . l l It ...... I ..., .l( )Id paras..:...:. -_'-t). 
Two brief points should be made. Firstly, the cocktail of legal actions may han? 
ramifications for subsidiarity. At the time of the Commission's intervention the Irish 
High Court, with concurrent competence in the area of competition law. had already 
adjudged HB' s practice to be in accord with domestic and European law. YeL the 
Commission decided to "second guess" this judgment. As a result, the Commission's 
decision condemns the very practice which the High Court's injunction is designed to 
protect. The Irish Supreme Court, in its preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. has 
been critical of the Commission's approach commenting that co-operation is a double 
edged sword. If Irish retail outlets are confused as to their legal position it is, perhaps, 
unsurpnslng. In fact, scope for further confusion may arise as a result of HB's appeal to 
the Court of First Instance seeking annulment of the Commission's decision.'-l-l Secondly, 
HB's legal representatives have questioned the degree to which European business can 
rely on the Commission as a body with which they can do business. Any deal struck with 
the Commission, in their view, offers limited legal security. They point to the fact that 
HB had agreed with the Commission to kick start a movement to freezer cabinet 
ownership by selling 20 per cent of its freezers. To subsequently deny negative clearance 
or exemption to the revised agreements, therefore, defeated HB's legitimate 
. 145 
expectatIOns. 
In 1999 the Commission revisited the issue of tie by type beer supply agreements as a 
result of notifications received from three leading UK brewers, namely WhitbreaJ pIc, 
Bass pIc and Scottish and Newcastle pIc. The respective notifications related tu the 
provISions, by each brewer, of fully fitted-out on licensed public houses with a tic for 
I I ~ ~ Casl' T-(l) M; (pending). 
I ~ ~ ~ M. R()"l', "Icc Cream: The Saga Continues", (1998) 7 ECLR 479.480. 
beer. The lessees agreed to purchase all their beer requirements from their respecti \ ' t ~ ~
brewers or landlords with the exception of a "guest beer" which they were permitted to 
acquire from any other source. In each case the Commission gave notification of its 
intention to adopt a favourable position with regard to each notification. As a resul t the 
Commission received a number of observations from interested third parties, in particular, 
action groups representing disgruntled tenants wishing to have the leases declared \'oid. 
The Commission resisted this course of action and in February 1999 in Trhitbread plc l46 
and June 1999 in Bass plC147 and Scottish and Newcastle plc l48 it concluded that these 
arrangements infringed Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) but were eligible for exemption 
Significantly, the Commission's approach to these arrangements followed closely the 
Court's approach in Delimitis. It interpreted Regulation 1984/83 strictly concluding that 
tie by type beer supply agreements could not benefit from the block exemption because 
they did not fulfil the requirements of Article 6 of the stipulated Regulation. 
With regard to the applicability of Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)) the Commission, in each case, 
commenced its analysis by defining the product and geographic market. The product 
market, in each case, was that for the distribution of beer in premises for the sale and 
consumption of drinks. The relevant geographic market was confined. in each case. to the 
UK. The Commission, in contrast to its approach in the German ice-cream casLs. 
embraced the two step test of Delimitis. As a first step it considered network effects 
noting that in 1997 volume weighted foreclosure fell between 50 and 58 per cLnt. The 
146 Comm. Dec. 1999/2)0 OJ 1999 L88126. [1999] :' CMLR 118. 
147 Comm. Dec. I 999'-IFl OJ 1999 L1861l, [1999]:' C ~ 1 L R R 782. 
I I ~ ~ Comm. Dec. 1999..t7-1 OJ 1999 L 186/28, [1999] :) C ~ ~ 1LR 83 I. 
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bundle of agreements, therefore, had a considerable effect on the opportunities for gaining 
access to the UK on trade beer market. 149 The Commission then acknowledged that 
cumulative network effects was only one factor, amongst others, which had to be 
appraised. On the basis of paragraph 21 of the Delimitis judgment the Commission. in 
each case, considered opportunities for market access. It noted that most foreign brewers 
gained market access by licensing a major UK brewer to sell its products. This route was 
chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, in view of the UK's licensing laws it was not 
easy to open a substantial number of new pubs. Secondly, as the average price of a UK 
freehold pub was £200,000 a prospective entrant would be obliged to make substantial 
capital investment to either acquire an existing network or establish its own. Thirdly, the 
Commission noted that takeovers by foreign brewers had occurred but in most cases the 
foreign brewer divested itself of its interest. Finally, the lack of independent wholesalers 
made it difficult for foreign brewers to gain market access. The Commission then 
considered, on the basis of paragraph 22 of Delimitis the competitive forces operating on 
the relevant market. It observed that the UK market was going through a supply side 
concentration whilst demand in the on-trade market was declining or at best remaining 
static. The increasing costs of advertising acted as an incentive for foreign brewers to 
gain market access via licensing agreements. Furthermore, the small size of the UK oft-
trade provided only limited opportunities to build brand reputation to gain market access. 
The Commission, having considered all these factors, concluded that the first Delimitis 
. fi d . h 150 test was sahs Ie In eac case. 
I ~ < ) ) ("' D 19()()'i'0 not.' 146 'Ibove para liS' COl11ll1, Dec 1999"473. note 117 abo\l', par,t 1 3 ~ . .
,0111111, ee, '_.' , '- " . 
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It then moved on to consider whether the contribution to market foreclosure made by each 
of the brewer's networks was significant. In each case it found an infraction of Article 
81 (1 ) (ex 85(1 )). With regard to Whitbread the Commission noted that in 1990-1991 it 
owned 6,162 pubs falling to 4,490 pubs in 1996-1997. This amounted to 4 and 3 per cent 
respectively of the total number of on-licensed premises. During the same period its tied 
sales amounted to 7.59 per cent and 6.12 per cent of the UK on-trade market vol ume. I 51 
In the case of Bass the Commission observed that in 1991 it owned 3.8 per cent of pubs 
(5,555) declining to 2.8 per cent (4,182) in 1996-1997. During the same period its tied 
sales amounted to 18 per cent and 13.7 per cent of the on-trade market volume. 152 
Finally, with reference to Scottish & Newcastle numeric foreclosure amounted to 0.57 per 
cent in 1990-1991 and 1.9 per cent in 1997-1998. Volume weight foreclosure during the 
same period amounted to 6.1 per cent and 9.44 per cent respectively. 153 The Commission, 
concluded, therefore, that each brewer's network of agreements contributed significantly 
to market foreclosure. 
It seems the Commission is prepared to adapt its approach to Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) to 
equate with the more nuanced approach of the Court of Justice in Delimitis. However, 
while finding an Article 81 (1) infraction in each case the Commission was prepared to 
grant individual exemption to the agreements of Whitbread, Bass and Scottish & 
Newcastle. In the view of the Commission tie by type agreements generally improved 
distribution by making it easier to establish, modernise, maintain and operate public 
houses. They also facilitated the introduction of brands of beer from foreign or new 
I ~ I I COl11rn. Dec. 1999/230, note 146 above, para 136. 
152 Cornrn. Dec. 1999/473. note 1·41 abovl'. para 153. 
1'1 COlllm. Del' 1 9 9 9 / 4 7 ~ l . . note 148 abovl'. para 123. 
competitors as their tenants consent was not required for the introduction of the 11C'\\ 
product. Thereby, increasing consumer choice. This type of contractual structure. 
therefore, increased opportunities for market entry. While the Commission acknowledged 
that certain disadvantages existed, it accepted the brewers' arguments that lessees 
received countervailing benefits including the provision of rent subsidies, procurement 
services (discounts on glassware, gas supply, rates and insurance), repair services and frC'c 
business planning and development initiative services. 154 
B. Regulation 1984/83 And Market Foreclosure 
Regulation 1984/83 which deals specifically with agreements for the resale of goods (see 
Annex II) attempts to overcome the problem of market foreclosure in three main rcspects. 
Firstly, it limits the scope or range of the dealers purchasing obligation is agreed for more 
than one type of goods where these are neither by their nature nor according to 
commercial usage connected to each other. Under Article 3(c), however, it is permissible 
to sell more than one product together provided they belong to the same range of goods. 
This is the case if they are linked because of technical (eg machine accessories or spare 
parts) or commercial reasons (eg several products must be used for the same purpose) or 
the goods are linked by commercial usage (goods customarily sold together). Secondly, 
the block exemption limits the permissible length or duration of these agreements. ,\rticle 
3(d) provides that the block exemption will not apply if the agreement is concluded for an 
indefinite duration or for a period of more than 5 years. According to Recital 18 this is 
designed to ensure that dealer's commercial freedom is maintained and to el1sure access tn 
1 ~ 4 4 COI11I11. Dec Illl)9 :30, note 146 above, paras 150-177; Cornrn. Dec 199(47), 11llte 117 abovl'. par.I'> 
16.'\-195; COll1m Ikl' I 999/ c174, notL' 14S above. paras 1)7-164 
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the retail level of distribution on the part of other suppliers. Dealers become free after the 
expiry of 5 years to look for more competitive suppliers. Conversely. suppliers become 
free to look for more cost efficient distribution outlets. Exclusive purchasing agreements 
for fixed terms that are automatically renewable unless either party gives notice to 
terminate also fall outside the parameters of the Regulation. Similar provisions also apply 
to beer supply and service station agreements. In both cases the agreement must not 
exceed 10 years. In beer supply agreements this period is reduced to five years if the 
agreement covers both beer and other drinks. In both types of agreement the duration of 
the arrangement may be extended if the supplier owns the premises from which the beer 
or petrol is sold to cover the whole period for which the reseller operates from the 
premises. Finally Article 14(b) provides that the Commission can withdraw the benefits 
of the exemption if the agreement, to a significant extent excludes the supplier's 
competitors from the market or makes access difficult. 
c. Exclusive Purchasing Obligations In Other Systems of Distribution 
In exclusive distribution systems it is not uncommon for a dealer, in return for being 
granted an exclusive territory, to enter into an exclusive purchasing obligation with its 
supplier. In fact, Article 2(2)(b) of Regulation 1983/83 expressly permits the imposition 
of such an obligation. Moreover, the obligation is exempted for the duration of the 
agreement. 
. . . C h" d monstnk'd their hostility tl) In contrast, the CommISSIOn and Commumty ourts a\ t: e . ( . 
. d' 'b' t' h' . >, "Illents \\hich I Ciluin: autlwriscd ohligations in SC\cctI\'C Istn utIOn or ranc 1St: (lgrec '1 
I t d c:\clusivch.' from thc supplier \.11 dealers or franchiscl's to sourcc t le contrac goo s 
franchisor. This hostility is of long-standing. As early as 1974 the Commission. in 
examining the selective distribution networks of Christian Dior and Lancome. insisted on 
the removal of a number of clauses. 155 One such clause prevented authorised dealers from 
purchasing contract goods from any source other than their national distributor. The 
prohibition on cross-supplies could lead to market fragmentation. 156 
In the case of franchise agreements the Court of Justice, in Pronuptia v Schillgalis. 157 that 
franchise networks must not operate to prevent franchises from obtaining intra-network 
supplies. The Commission has subsequently reinforced this position.1 58 Finally. Article 
4(a) of Regulation 4087/88 provides that franchisees cannot be prevented from sourcing 
the contract goods from other franchisees. 
D. Exclusive Purchasing Obligations And Abuse Of Dominance 
It is important to stress that exclusive purchasing can also fall foul of Article 82 (ex 86) 
EC. This occurs where the party imposing the restraint abuses its dominant market 
position.1 59 The abuse can take many forms. The use of fidelity rebates, however. to 
induce de facto exclusivity is of particular importance. In Hoffmann - La Roche & ('0 .i G 
155 EEC Commission, Fourth Report on Competition Policy: 1974 (Brussels, 1975) p.60. ) 
156 Case 26176 Metro Grossmdrkte GmbH v Commission [1977] ECR 1875, [1978] 2 CMLR 1; Case 86 B2 
Hasselblad (GB) Ltd \' Commission, [1984] ECR 883; [1984] 1 CMLR 559. 
157 Case 161/84 [1986] ECR 353, [1986] 1 CMLR 414. ~ ) )
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v Commission 160 the world's largest manufacturer of vitamins was fined hy the 
Commission under Article 82 (ex 86) for excluding its competitors from the market by 
giving fidelity rebates to 22 large buyers. Although Roche, in its appeal was successful in 
having its fine reduced by one-third, the Court upheld the central elements of the 
Commission's decision. The rebate was designed to prevent customers from obtaining 
their supplies from competing producers. It also resulted in dissimilar conditions 
applying to equivalent transactions in that two purchasers paid different prices for the 
same quantity of the same product. In Michelin v Commission 161 the Court upheld the 
Commission's condemnation of Michelin's annual rebates granted to dealers meeting 
sales targets. The discount system was not sufficiently objective or transparent and 
amounted, therefore, to abuse within the context of Article 82 (ex 86). In British Gypsum 
v Commission l62 the Court of Justice dismissed the applicant's appeal holding that it 
abused its position of dominance by paying rebates to all UK dealers who refused to 
handle plasterboard manufactured in Spain, imported in the UK and sold at prices which 
undercut those of British Gypsum. More recently in the Irish Ice-Cream case 163 the 
Commission condemned HB' s practice of supplying and maintaining, free of charge, 
freezer cabinets to retailers as an abuse of its dominant market position. The inducement 
interfered with the retailers freedom to choose suppliers on the basis of the merits of their 
products, harming the interests of HB' s competitors and consumers generally. 
160 C;JSL' 8" 7h [1979] ECR 461, [1979] ) CMLR 21 I. 
I<d CISl' J.?.?/81 [1983] ECR 3461, [1985] I CMLR 2S.? 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
On both sides of the Atlantic it is generally accepted that exclusive dealing or purchasing 
has procompetitive benefits. The Supreme Court and the Court of Justice, in the cases of 
Standard Stations and Delimitis respectively, have enunciated the beneficial implications 
of these restraints. The European Commission has also endorsed these sentiments in the 
Recitals to Regulation 1984/83. 
Antitrust concerns, however, do exist. They relate primarily to market foreclosure. In 
1914 in its Report on the proposed Clayton Act, the House of Representatives expressed 
grave reservations over the possible anticompetitive aspects of these agreements. In its 
view "(w)here the concern making these contracts is all great and powerfuL the exclusive 
(dealing arrangement) becomes one of the greatest agencies and instrumentalities of 
monopoly ever devised by the brain of men. It completely shuts out competititors".I64 
Where the supplier has market power foreclosure becomes a real concern. 
In 1983 the European Commission, in response to a Question from the UK Parliament 
justified the introduction of its new rules on beer supply agreements on the basis they 
would loosen the combined effects of exclusive purchasing within the brewing industries. 
These arrangements had ..... immobolize(d) competitive structures within the national 
markets affected". 165 This resulted in market partitioning and frustrated the imperati\e of 
market uni fication. 
l / l ~ ~ \I R. Report No (d -62 7, 63 C l l n ~ r l ' s s s 2"d Session 12- 13 ( 1914). 
I h ~ ~ Commission AnswCI' to l\lrl. ()lJ No. 17 ()-l 82; OJ [198, J C9, 22. 
In the Tampa Electric case the US Supreme Court, revised its long-standing test of market 
foreclosure and annunciated its tripartite test of qualitative substantiality. This 
necessitated defining, firstly, the line of commerce involved Secondl\' as t·· h 
. _, cer ammg t e 
relevant market and finally, calculating the amount of competition foreclosed by the 
arrangement. To fall foul of S.3 Clayton Act 1914 the degree of foreclosure had to be 
"substantial". To assist in this determination the Supreme Court listed a number of 
factors relevant to the assessment. These included inter alia the strength or position of the 
parties on the market, the volume of commerce involved and the consideration of the 
immediate and future effects of foreclosure. 
In 1991 in Delimitis the Court of Justice developed its bipartite test. In order to determine 
whether domestic or foreign competitors were prevented from gaining market entry the 
relevant market had, firstly, to be foreclosed and secondly the agreements in question had 
to make a "significant" contribution to that foreclosure. In this analysis the ('oUli of 
Justice listed a number of factors pertinent to each limb of the test. With regard to the 
first limb the Court emphasised, the degree of market foreclosure caused by all similar 
agreements, the length or duration of the agreements, the possibility of gaining entry 
through the acquisition of a competitor or establishing new outlets for product 
distribution, the degree of brand loyalty on the existing market, whether non-exclusive 
outlets are available and the structure of the market. With reference to the second limb 
(significant contribution) the Court emphasised the need to calculate the market shan? or 
the brewery in question, the overall contribution to market foreclosure by the agreements 
and contract duration. 
In both jurisdictions market definition is crucial as market foreclosure can be diluted or 
concentrated depending on whether the market is defined widely or narrowly. Both tests. 
however, seem to lack a degree of precision as to what constitutes "substantial" or 
"significant" market foreclosure. Unlike the US market foreclosure is of evident concern 
in the EU because of the possibility of market compartmentalisation. Finally, whilst the 
European Commission initially refused to follow the Delimitis test it has recently 
indicated its willingness to embrace the more nuanced approach of the Court of Justice. 
6 
TYING ARRANGEMENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tying arrangements arise where a supplier agrees to sell a product on condition the 
purchaser buys an additional product or service, or at least agrees not to acquire that 
product or service from any other supplier. Bundling is a related concept and arises 
where a supplier requires a purchaser to take a package of products at a singular price. 
It is particularly prevalent in the manufacture and sale of computers, especially with 
regard to the configuration of computer specifications. Suppliers may wish tl) avail 
themselves of this particular type of arrangement for a number of reasons. Tie-ins 
may be used for quality control purposes. A supplier can reduce the incidence of 
product malfunction, which may detrimentally effect product reputation and goodwilL 
by ensuring consumables manufactured by itself are used in its primary equipment. 
Another conceptually related idea is the notion that tie-ins can be used as a means of 
public health protection. Tying may also be used as a means to discriminate between 
intensive and less intensive product users. This is of particular importance in relation 
to product leasing agreements. The use of the tied consumable, for example, enables 
the supplier to calculate intensity of use through the consumption of the tied product. 
This enables the supplier to cover product depreciation more e f f e c t i n ~ l y y through its 
pricing policy. Manufacturers may also use tying as a means to inncase rrimary 
product sail's through price reductions \\hich arc onset hy profits guaranteed hy the 
contractual obligation to USl' the tied cOllsumahle. Indeed, this may' also result in cOSl 
efficiencies in that suppliers in carrying out routine repair and maintenance work can, 
at the same time, deliver the tied product reducing inter alia transportation costs. 
Finally, tying can be used as a legitimate means to evade governmental price 
regulations. Undertakings bound to observe price in relation to a specific product can 
require the user to purchase another product priced above competitive levels. 
While this list is by no means exhaustive there are, however, contrary arguments 
against the use of these agreements. In particular it is often alleged that tie-ins reduce 
the purchaser's freedom of choice as to where he or she acquires the tied product. 
Furthermore, tying can deny market access to competing suppliers by denying them 
access to outlets. Finally, it is often asserted that tie-ins may be used to lever market 
power from the tying product market to the tied product market thereby enabling the 
supplier to extract monopoly profits from both. 
In the US tying arrangements, which include tie-in leases as well as sales, are 
generally governed by s.3 Clayton Act 1914 or S.I Sherman Act 1890. Where the 
arrangement involves commodities - goods, wares, merchandise, machinery or 
supplies - the antitrust litigant brings his or her action under the provisions of the 
Clayton Act. If commodities are not involved (the tie may relate to the provision of 
services) the antitrust action must be pursued under the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
In 1984 the Supreme Court acknowledged that tying may simply be an attempt to 
~ ~ c o m p e t e e effectively" and that packaged sales may be beneficial to consumers.' \' l't 
tic-ins relnain illegal per xc. It must be stressed, hovvcvcr, that tying arrangements are 
'0 it h ~ i l l ~ g · t 1 / ) ( ' ' ' ' · t . ' ' In 
not treated in the same manner as other agreements cons, erel 0 t: t: < .' 
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the case of RPM, for example, it is sufficient to hold an agreement illegal upon proof 
that the agreement exists. In the case of tying the Courts must, firstly. determine 
whether two products are involved and if so, whether they are actually tied. Oddly. 
the Supreme Court failed to make any judicial pronouncements as to how this analysis 
was to be conducted until 1984. In this vacuum the lower Courts developed their own 
inconsistent tests which were applied in a random fashion. Secondly, tie-ins are illegal 
per se only if the seller is shown to have " ... sufficient economic power with respect to 
the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied 
product".2 These threshold requirements have furnished the judiciary with a greater 
degree of flexibility with regard to the invocation of the per se rules than one might 
have initially anticipated. Indeed, the Supreme Court has manipulated these 
thresholds on several occasions, in order to conform to the prevailing or current notion 
of antitrust. During the Warren Court era, threshold levels were set low in order that 
the standard of per se illegality could be easily satisfied. Provided a de minimis 
amount or a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product 
market was affected the Supreme Court was quite prepared to infer that the seller had 
the requisite economic power in the tying product market to render the arrangements 
illegal per se. 
In 1969, with the appointment of Chief Justice Burger the Warren Court's precedents 
were gradually overhauled. These judgments were deemed to lack o b j c c t i \ ' t ~ ~
benchmarks. 3 A gradual erosion of the scope and applicability of per se rules took 
place. In Fortner It the Supreme Court signalled that it was no 1l1l1gcr prepared to 
rely on i I ~ l e r e n c e e to show that a seller had the requisite economic po\\cr in the m,lrkd 
2 Sor/hem l'tIC/lil Railway ( '0 \' U",'. 356 U,S. 1.6 (1958). 
1. ' '1'/'("'/" ' ...... lIS ... ( '::;'(1977) 
. COII/1I1CI/IO/ TI 111(' \' (, ~ ~ .)\ \ (111/(/, "t.'.' ... ').,.,) . 
4 (Illilcd ,,,"lol,'s "<lccI ('Of'l'oraliol1 \' Forlncr LI/IClpl"/SCS . ..\29 liS 610 ( 1(77) 
for the tying product. If the rules of per se illegality were to be invoked a greater 
evidentiary showing of sufficient economic power had to be made. This, of C()urse, 
involved market analysis. In 1984, in its Jefferson Parish decision, the Supreme l 'ourt 
reinforced this analytical realignment. It linked for the first time sufficient economic 
power to the concept of market power and anticompetitive forcing. The threshold 
levels of per se illegality were heightened. This situation prevailed until 1992 \\'hen 
the Supreme Court in the case of Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services) 
shocked some antitrust observers by holding that market power could be gained 
through market imperfections. In particular, information costs and switching costs. 
For some, the lowering of the threshold levels amounted to a return to a multi-
dimensional antitrust. For others Kodak was to be construed narrowly and confined to 
its own peculiar facts. 
In the EU tying arrangements can fall foul of Article 81 (1) (e) (ex 85 (1) (e)) and 
Article 82 (d) (ex 86 (d)) Ee. Both Articles specifically include as falling within their 
respective parameters the " ... conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to their 
common usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts". \\'hile 
receiving little praise, tying agreements do not appear to be a Commission 
enforcelnent priority. Veltrop suggests that this is " ... perhaps out of recognition that 
'1 . I "t" 6 Where such exclusiyity exists. tying does not necessan y Impose exc USIVI y , . 
however, tying precludes the application of Regulation 1984/83 and. perhaps. 
Regulation 1983/83. Article 3( c) of the former Regulation provides that the hlock 
exemption does not apply if the exclusive purchasing o h l i ~ a t i o n n is agreed for more 
~ ~ 5()·l liS ..J51 ( 1 9 ( ) ~ ) . . . d' I (' ('Pill elitlllll I .1\\" (Il)l).j) ~ ~ I 
,> I () \'l'llrop "I'in o ;ll1d F\.cluSI\l' P u r c h a s t n ~ ~ :\rrangcments l 11 l:r _ . p .. 
( :\'//' /' , . 0).19' S ,', ~ l ' l ' ' 1ll\O n. Waelbroeck, 'The ( ' o l 1 l p a t i b i l i t ~ ~ 01 r y t n ~ ~ :grL'crncllt, \\ Ith \ 111 Ilrll .... t 
. . \l \ - • - . . _'. ~ ~ ~ . . . 19X 7) 7 ) t I J l) Rules: :\ Cnmparatl\ e S l u d ~ ~ ()! :\mcncan And I:uropcan Rules. ( ~ ~ . 
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than one type of good where by their very nature or commercial usage they are not 
connected. In the Commission's view this ensures access for undertakings to the 
different stages of distribution and prevents market foreclosure and market 
compartmentalisation. 
In comparison with the US, case law in the EU with regard to tying is relati\'cly 
sparse. This is particularly true of Article 81 (ex 85). Article 82 (ex 86) is only 
implicated where a party abuses its dominant market position. However. the 
authorities, through the use of narrow product market definitions, have held that 
secondary aftermarkets for specific branded products comprise separate markets for 
the purpose of Article 82 (ex 86) and the imposition of tying arrangements in these 
markets can also amount to an abuse. 7 The contradictory views expressed by the 
Comrnission in PelikaniKyocera8 and Digitaf leaves the issue of whether a 
manufacturer can enjoy dominance in the secondary aftermarkets if it is subject to 
intense competition in the primary markets somewhat unresolved. Finally, the 
authorities have stretched the jurisdictional reach of Article 82 (ex 86) in the case of 
Tetra Pak 1110 by concluding that the imposition of tying arrangements by a dominant 
undertaking acting in a market in which it is not dominant can still amount to an abuse 
contrary to the requisite Article. Parts II and III of this chapter explores the way in 
which the law has developed in the US and EU respectively. 
, .' 869 [1979] ~ ~ {'r--1l R ... .t ~ ~ Case 2 ~ ~ 8 87 I'o/\'tl \ Erik 
7 C a s ~ ~ 2'2178 Hugin \' ( OmnllSS1011 [1979] ECR I, J '- . ),' ' l: ' 1 ' L ' I 1 ~ ~ Ltd [19881 ECR 621 I. [1989] -l CMLR 122; Case 53187 \ {([\,/l'ur & Others \' R t . " ) ( / / l I ( ~ [ [ 1 )88]1( R 
h::' 1 'I, [ 1990] ,l C r--l LR '26:"; Case C -:" -' 92 P Hilt I \' Comnllssion [199-11 FCR h() 7, [ 1l)1l-l] -I C \ 1 L R 61 I 
K I C Commission. 15th Report on COIl1/)t'/lfion PO/In' I C)C).f (1995) r 'f I. 
0) Commission PIL'SS KL'lease IP 'n/868 of October 10. 1997. . ., 
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II. TYING AGREEMENTS AND US ANTITRUST LA \\' 
A. Patent Law And Early Tie-In Case Law 
As early as 1896 in the Button - Fastener case ll the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the tying of unpatented wire staples (the tied product) to a patented device (the 
tying product) designed to attach buttons to high button boots. In the view of the 
Court a tie-in was a legitimate means of exercising a lawfully granted monopoly. It 
neither violated the Sherman Act nor was contrary to public policy. In 1912 the 
Supreme Court also upheld the validity of tying arrangements in the case of Henry v A 
B Dick Co. 12 Here the AB Dick Co sold a stencil duplicating machine to a Miss Skou. 
A metal notice affixed to the machine informed purchasers that it was to be used only 
in conjunction with ink supplied by the AB Dick Co. Sidney Henry, sold a can of ink 
to Miss Skou in full knowledge that it would breach Miss Skou' s licence agreement. 
An action was initiated, therefore, for breach of licence restriction. The majority of 
the Court viewed tie-ins as legitimate. It was better, in their view, to allow a patentee 
to impose conditions determining the subsequent use of its product rather than lose the 
patented product from the market altogether. Mr Justice White, writing for the 
minority, took the view that the Court's ruling simply enabled the patentee to extend 
its patent rights by use of private contract. 
In 1 C) 13 the case of US v Winslow l3 came before the Supreme Court. Here. for the tirst 
time, the Government stressed the possible anticompetitive effects of tic-ins In the 
main it stressed that tic-ins deprived purchasers of their freedom in the tied product 
II IIcu/olI _ "cllinsu/ar Bul/on-Fas/cner Co \' Eureka Speciality Co, 77 F. 228 (6 th elf. 18(6) 
I ~ ~ 2 ~ . l l U. S I (I <) 1 2 ) 
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market and foreclosed the tied product market to other independents. Shortly after the 
enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914 the Supreme Court, once again, considered the 
legality of tie-ins in the case of Motion Picture Patents Co \' L'niversul 
Manufacturing. l4 The case involved the tying of unpatented supplies to patented film 
projection equipment. Here the Supreme Court overruled the decision in the Button 
Fastener case and the AB Dick case and held the tie-in illegal. In short, it held that a 
patentee's legal rights could not be extended by private contract to include unpatented 
supplies. 
In 1918, however, in the case of US v United Shoe Machinery Co of Ne \!' Jers£'yl) the 
Supreme Court curtailed the importance of the decision in the Motion Picture case. It 
held that tie-ins were illegal only in contracts of sale. Where, however, the tying 
arrangement was contained in a lease, neither patent law nor antitrust law \\as 
infringed. In 1922 the Government successfully closed this loophole in the case of 
United Shoe Machinery v US I6 . Mr Justice Day concluded that tying agreements must 
necessarily lessen competition and tend to monopoly. Accordingly, tie-ins were to be 
condemned whether the arrangements was contained in a contract of sale or lease. 
B. From International Salt To Fortner I: (1947-1969) 
While the Supreme Court condemned a tying arrangement In 1936 in the case of 
International Business Machines v US l7 , the first major antitrust tie-in case \\as heard 
111 1947 in International Salt ('0 \' US. IS In 1947 International Salt \\as one of the 
11 :?U U.S. 50:? (1917). 
I ~ ~ :?n 1I, S .1:? ( I 9 I 8). 
II> 2 5 ~ ~ lJ.S 451 (1922). 
l' 298 U. S 1 ~ ~ I (I 93 6) . 
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largest producers of salt for industrial use in the United States. The corporation o\\'ned 
patents on two machines - the "lixator" and "saltomat". The latter injected salt tablets 
into canned products during the canning process and the former dissolved rock salt 
into brine for use in various industrial processes. These machines were leased by the 
corporation on condition that the lessees purchased all of their salt requirements from 
it. The lixator leases contained a provision that enabled lessees to purchase their salt 
requirements from other producers provided their salt was of equal quality and sold at 
lower prices. In contrast, the saltomat leases simply provided that the lessee \vas 
guaranteed to receive International Salt's own lowest price. 
The US Government felt that these tying restrictions violated the provisions of the 
Sherman Act and Clayton Act. It, therefore, initiated an antitrust action in the District 
Court of New York. The Court granted summary judgment in favour of the 
Government and International Salt appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 
International Salt argued against the summary judgment on four grounds. Firstly, it 
asserted that the District Court's judgments was "unauthorised" because it precluded 
trial of alleged issues of fact as to whether the restraint was unreasonable within the 
Sherman Act or substantially lessened competition or tended to create a monopoly 
within the Clayton Act. Secondly, the corporation asserted that the provisions of the 
leases saved them from unreasonableness and the tendency to create monopoly. 
Thirdly, it asserted that the tie-in insured that its lessees used its salt which had a high 
degree of purity (it had an average sodium chloride content of 98.2 percent) t h e r ~ h y y
ensuring that the machines functioned efficiently and correctly. Finally, the a p p ~ l l a n l l
drgued that the tying clauses had not been insisted upon in all its leases, nor had they 
lwen enforced when they were included. 
Despite these contentions, the Supreme Court unanimously found in favour of the US 
Government and upheld the District Court's summary judgment order. .tvlr Justice 
Jackson delivered the Court's decision and his analysis focused almost exclusivelY on 
the tied product market - the market for salt. With regard to the tying product market 
Mr Justice Jackson stated that the appellant's machine patents gave them " ... a right to 
restrain others from making, vending or using the patented machines". 19 However. the 
patents themselves conferred no right to restrain trade in the market for unpatented 
salt. With regard to the tied product market Mr Justice Jackson stated that "(t)he 
volume of business affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant or 
insubstantial and the tendency of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly 
seems obvious".2o In this respect 119,000 tons of salt, worth approximately 500,000 
dollars, was the volume of business affected by the appellants tie-in. Mr Justice 
Jackson also stressed that these arrangements may foreclose competition in the tied 
product market for which patents confer no immunity from antitrust laws. 
In reaching its decision the Supreme Court dealt with each of the appellants' 
arguments. With regard to the first contention that the summary judgment order was 
"unauthorised" the Supreme Court stated "(w)e think the admitted facts left no 
genume Issue. Not only is price fixing unreasonable, per se, ... but also it is 
unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market".21 The 
Supreme Court also rejected International Salt's second contention. In its view, the 
provisions contained within the leases did nothing to " ... avoid the stifling effect of the 
agreement on competition" 22 With regard to International Salt's third argument. the 
Court took the view that it was legitimate for a lessor to impose reasonable restrict jPlls 
1<) Ibid at ,9:'. 
~ o o Ibid ;It 396. 
II Ibid. 
~ ! ! Ibid <It N7. 
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on a lessee if such restrictions were imposed to ensure the proper functioning of the 
'-
machine. However, in the view of the Court, the same result may be achieved by the 
less onerous method of manufacturer's specifications rather than the imposition of 
tying arrangements. As Mr Justice Jackson stated the leased machines are not ..... 
allergic to salt of equal quality produced by other competitors".23 Finally, the Court 
quickly dispatched the appellant's fourth argument. The fact the appellant did not 
insist upon tying arrangements being included in all its leases, or enforced them when 
included, did not, in the view of the Court, justify the general use of such 
.. 24 
restnctIOns. 
It is apparent, then, that the Court's analysis in the International Salt case centred 
mainly on the tied product market. In respect of the tying product market, Mr Justice 
Jackson, made few comments of note. As a result, one can only speculate \\'ith regard 
to the Court's intention in this area. D. F. Turner has suggested a number of possible 
interpretations.25 Firstly, the Supreme Court may have presumed that as a result of its 
patents, International Salt had the requisite economic power in the tying product 
market. Alternatively, economic power may have been presumed to exist on a 
showing that the tying product had some element of distinctiveness or some unique 
aspects which made buyers prefer it over competing products. Finally, the Court may 
have been intimating that economic power in the tying product market was ei ther 
unnecessary or presumed to exist from the existence of the tie-in itself. In any cn:nt. 
this particular aspect of antitrust law lacked coherence and clarity. 
2:\ Ibid . ~ q s s
' ~ I b i d . . . '.. . . [ .. " (19';S) 7 ~ ~ II,/f\' 
>, D.F. Turner. "The ValIdity Of 1 ~ l I 1 g g :\rrallg.clllcllts Linder The :\Illltru,t ,\\\s. . 
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Legal commentators hoped that the Supreme Court \\'ould take:: the:: next available 
opportunity to clarify this rather unsatisfactory position. This occasion presented itself 
in 1953 in the case of Times - Picayune Publishing Co v US. 26 Here the Times _ 
Picayune Publishing Co owned and published two newspapers - a morning daily 
known as the "Times-Picayune" and an evening paper known as the "States". The 
only other significant competitor in the area was the Item Co Ltd which owned and 
published the "Item", In 1950 the Times-Picayune Publishing Co, introduced a "unit 
plan" which applied to its general and classified advertisers, The plan required 
advertisers wishing to acquire space, to purchase combined insertions only. That is, to 
purchase space in both the morning and evening papers jointly. The Government 
considered that these forced combination contracts violated antitrust laws. As the case 
did not involve commodities within the meaning of the Clayton Act, the Government 
was obliged to institute antitrust proceedings in the District Court of Louisiana on the 
basis that the tying arrangements violated section 1 and 2 Sherman Act. 
The District Court determined that the Times-Picayune newspaper was dominant in 
terms of advertising and circulation. Moreover, the adoption of the unit plan caused a 
substantial rise in the amount of advertising in its "sister" newspaper - the States. It 
took the view, therefore, that this plan reduced consumer choice and the competitive 
vigour of the Item. The tying arrangements violated the provisions of the Sherman 
Act. Both the publishing company and the Government appealed directly tt) the 
Supreme Court. The former appealed the merits of the District Court's j u d ~ m e n t t and 
the latter appealed seeking greater protective relief. 
!h -' S.l U.S. )lq ( 1953). 
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Mr Justice Clark delivered the Supreme Court's verdict. He noted that tving 
. '-
arrangements", " fare harshly under the law forbidding restraints of trade'", 27 Thev 
" .. , flout the Sherman Act's policy that competition rules the marts of trade '", 28 Basic 
to that policy is the faith that products must stand the test of competition, Tying 
arrangements, however, may undermine this test. Firstly, they may insulate the tied 
product from competitive stresses by conditioning its sale on the purchasers 
acquisition of the tying product. Secondly, they can effectively foreclose the tied 
product market to other competitors, However, as this case did not involve industrial 
property rights the Supreme Court had to expressly address the issue of economic 
power in the tying product market. In this respect Mr Justice Clark stated: 
"When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the 
'tying' product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' 
product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower 
standards expressed in S3 of the Clayton Act because from either 
factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is inferred. 
And because for even a lawful monopolist it is 'unreasonable per se, 
to foreclose competitors from any substantial market', a tying 
arrangement is banned by S 1 whenever both conditions are met".29 
Unfortunately, Mr Justice Clark never fully explained why the Court made this 
distinction between the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. In any event, as the present 
case was an action under the Sherman Act both conditions, according to r--.tr Justice 
Clark, had to be satisfied if the Times-Picayune tying arrangements were to be held 
.'7 Ibid ,It 606, 
's Ibid at 605, 
!') Ibid at ( ) ( ) ~ - ( J 0 9 , ,
illegal per se. Times-Picayune had to enJoy a monopolistic position In the tying 
product market and the tie-in had to restrain a substantial volume of commerce in the 
tied product market. 
With regard to the tied product market the Supreme Court simply assumed that the 
volume of commerce affected by the arrangement was not insignificant or 
insubstantia1.
3o 
However, with respect to the tying product market Mr Justice Clark 
stated "(u)nlike any other 'tying' cases where patents or copyrights supplied the 
requisite market control, any equivalent market 'dominance' in this case must rests on 
comparative marketing data".31 Economic power over the tying product market could 
not be inferred but could only be determined after analysis of the market had been 
conducted. The Supreme Court, therefore, focused its analysis on the market position 
of the Times-Picayune newspaper. In the view of the majority this newspaper 
operated as a dual trader in separate though interdependent markets. The newspaper 
sold news and advertising to its readers and the readership, in tum. was sold to the 
buyers of advertising. In the Court's view the relevant market was the newspapers 
advertising market. The Times-Picayune share of this market hovered around 40 per 
cent and this figure could not be taken to indicate the existence of market 
dominance. 32 On this basis a finding of per se illegality could not be sustained. As if 
to reinforce this finding the Supreme Court also held that the District Court's h o l d i l 1 ~ ~
that the Times-Picayune and the States were two distinct products was clearly 
erroneous. To advertisers both newspapers were indistinguishable products. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District Court. 
JO Ibid at 610 11.28. 
H Ibid at 61 1-612. 
12 Ibid at 612-613. 
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Justices Black, Burton, Douglas and Minton dissented, In their new the relevant 
market was the morning newspaper market. Here the Times-Pica\une. as the only 
morning newspaper, had a complete monopoly of access to morn· mg newspaper 
readers in the New Orleans area. In the view of the dissenting minority the Times-
Picayune Publishing Co, used this position to " ... restrain ... the competition between 
its evening newspaper, the New Orleans State, and the independent New Orleans Item, 
in the competitive field of newspaper advertising".33 In the view of the minority the 
unit-plan violated the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
The Times-Picayune case did little to clarify the law relating to tying arrangements. If 
anything, it added to the confusion by its insistence that dual standards be applied to 
tie-ins depending on whether the proceedings were commenced under the Clayton Act 
or Sherman Act. With the appointment of Chief Justice Warren the Supreme Court 
addressed this duality of treatment. In 1958 the case of Northern PacUic Railway Co \' 
usJ4 came before the Supreme Court. Once again the case did not i n v o l \ ' l ~ ~
commodities and the action was brought under the Sherman Act. In 186.+ and 1870, 
Congress granted the predecessor of the Northern Pacific Railway Company 
approximately 40 million acres of land in several states in order that a raih\ay line be 
built from Lake Superior to Puget Sound. By 1949, the company had sold 
approximately 37 million acres subject, in certain circumstances, to the reseryation of 
mineral rights. Most of the unsold land was leased. In a large number of sale 
contracts and most of the leasing agreements the Railway insisted upon the inclusion 
of "preferential routing clauses", The disposition of the land was tied to the cundition 
that the vendee or lessee ship oyer the Rai h\a\" s lines all artic ks produced or 
d 'I'h' d't' I "\ 'r \\"IS SUbl' eet to the m ; ' l I 1 u t ~ l l · t u r e d d on the land sold or lease, IS con 1 Ion. 1l)\\L L, c.. , 
" Ibid at (l,"lX 
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proviso that the vendee or lessee was free to ship with competing lines if their rates 
were lower or their service was better. 
The Government considered these "preferential routing clauses" to be in yiolation of 
Section 1 Shennan Act. It sought a Declaration to that effect in the District Court of 
Washington. After a number of pre-trial proceedings the US Government moved for 
summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion and enjoined the Northern 
Pacific Railway Co, from enforcing the existing clauses and from entering into similar 
agreements in the future. The Railway appealed directly to the Supreme Court. 
Before the Supreme Court, Northern Pacific proffered three main arguments. Firstly, 
it contended that the full force of per se illegality as defined in International Salt was 
not applicable. It applied only to patented tying products. Secondly, Northern Pacific 
asserted that International Salt was restricted by the decision in the Times-Picayune 
case. In the latter case, the Supreme Court made "monopoly power" or "dominance" 
over the tying product a necessary precondition to the application of per se illegality. 
Finally, the appellant argued that the preferential routing clauses were subject to so 
many exceptions and administered so leniently that they could not significantly 
restrain competition. 
Once again, the Supreme Court, split with regard to its judgment. Diyiding fiyc to 
three the majority affirmed the District Court's decision. On behalf or the majl)rity f\ 1r 
Justice Black delivered the Court's Opinion He embraced the populist philosophical 
notion that the "Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensi\'c charter or eCOl1ll1111 C 
- i"" I 
'. . , d t' d' (tion as the rule 01 trall' -' n Ilht'rty aimed at preserving tree an un ettee lompe I 
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the VIew of the majority certain agreements because of their pernICIOUS effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue were presumed to be illegal per se. In 
this category, Mr Justice Black included price fixing agreements,36 agreements to 
divide the market,37 group boycotts38 and tying arrangements.39 
Mr Justice Black then addressed each of Northern Pacific's main arguments. The 
majority held, firstly, that the decision in the International Salt case had not confined 
the applicability of per se illegality to those situations in which the tying product was 
patented. The rule of per se illegality applied equally to non-patented cases. -lO The 
Court also dispatched Northern Pacific's third contention. The proviso which enabled 
the vendee or lessee to ship its products on competing lines, in certain circumstances, 
did not affect the legality of the restraint. The preferential routing clauses were still 
" ... binding obligations held over the heads of vendees which (denied the) defendant's 
competitors access to the fenced off markets on the same terms as the defendant".-ll It 
was however Northern Pacific's second assertion that caused the division within the , , 
Court. The Majority of the Court acknowledged that in the Times-Picayune case the 
Supreme Court spoke of monopoly power or dominance in the tying product market as 
a necessary precondition for the applicability of per se illegality. However, in the 
present case, the majority construed the specific strictures of Mr Justice Clark in 
Times-Picayune as nothing more than "general language".42 The Court. therefore. 
"watered down" the monopolistic prerequisite of Times-Picayune. Mr Justice Black 
stated that tying arrangements were illegal per se 
1(, US v ,\'u('om' - VUClIlInl Oil Co., 310 U S 130 (1940). 
17 US \' Add11.;ton Pipe and Sled Co., 85 F ~ 7 1 1 (6 th Cir. 18(8). 
111 .... 'C' '11 I I .' , FTC'" I' II S -l" 7 ( 19-11 ). FashIOn (}ngll1otors 'Ill ( (! :1111('//( (} \' I'. J - ~ . . .
19 InICr/"/liollul S(J!t Co \'i;"S. 3 3 ~ ~ U S 392 (1947). 
~ o o 356 U,S. at l) 
41 Ibid at 12 
-12 11 'd ,,') 1 )( . - . 
" ... whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to 
the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the 
market for the tied product and a not insubstantial amount of 
interstate commerce is affected".43 
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not express with any degree of clarity what 
constituted sufficient economic power. It did, however, make three suggestions. 
Firstly, Northern Pacific possessed sufficient economic power by virtue of its 
extensive land holdings. Secondly, the majority seemed to suggest that the \ ' t ~ r y y
existence of these arrangements was compelling evidence of the defendant's great 
power. Thirdly, the Supreme Court seemed to accept the Government's arguments 
that land, like patented or copyright articles, is inherently unique. If the tying product, 
therefore, possesses this element of uniqueness or distinctiveness, sufficient economic 
power is conferred. In this respect Mr Justice Black observed that the land sold or 
leased was strategically located within economic distance of transportation facilities. 
Common sense, indicated that this particular land was often prized by those who 
purchased or leased it and was frequently essential to their business activity.44 
As a result of these findings, the Supreme Court concluded that the essential 
prerequisites of per se illegality were conclusively established in the Court below. 
Summary judgment was, therefore, affirmed. A dissenting minority, howcyer, 
rejected this approach. In their view the Times-Picayune decision required proo/ uf 
power over the tying product market.45 A proper market analysis, in their vic\\. 
" Ibid at 7. 
II Ibid at 7-'8.. 
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should have been conducted in order to determine whether in ~ a c t t "T rth p. t-
, Ii ,.,0 em aCI IC 
had the requisite economic power. Reliance on common sense amounted simply to a 
" ... poor substitute for the proof to which the Government should have been put".46 In 
the view of the minority the summary judgment order should be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the District Court for trial. 
The next development in the attenuation of economic power over the tying product 
market came in 1962 in the case of US v Loew's Incorporated. 47 Here six film 
distributors sold their pre 1948 copyright films to various television networks. The 
distributors conditioned the sale of their feature films upon the acceptance of a 
package of block-bookings. To obtain "Gone with the Wind", for example, television 
networks were obliged to purchase "Getting Gertie's Garter". The Government took 
the view that this form of film distribution violated Section 1 Sherman Act. An 
antitrust action was, therefore, initiated in the Southern District Court of New York. 
After lengthy consideration the District Court concluded that these arrangements 
violated the stipulated provisions. 
Five of the film distributors appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The primary 
issue in the consolidated appeals was whether the Government had established 
sufficient economic power in the sense contemplated by the Northern PacUic Court 
for non-patented products. In this respect, Mr Justice Goldberg noted that "(m)arket 
dominance - some power to control price and to exclude competition - (\\'as) h: no 
means the only test of whether the seller has the requisite economic powcr",-l8 This 
was merely only nne species. Such power may also he inferred from the produd' s 
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desirability or from its unique attributes. Furth . h 
ermore, III t ose cases where industrial 
property rights are concerned the requisite economic power is presumed to exist. 
Thus, where the tying product is patented or copyrighted it should ..... seldom be 
necessary to embark upon a full factual inquiry into the scope of the relcyant market 
for the tying product".49 The Supreme Court, therefore, upheld the District Court's 
judgment. 
The next major tie-in case to come before the Warren Courts was the 1969 Supreme 
Court case of Fortner Enterprises Inc v US Steel Corp. 50 The facts of this particular 
case are, to say the least, rather convoluted. Fortner Enterprises was involved in the 
acquisition and development of land. In order to purchase land in Louisville Kentucky 
it entered into a loan agreement with US Steel Homes Credit Corporation to the value 
of 2 million dollars. Unusually, this loan agreement provided 100 per cent financing 
for the acquisition and development of the land. However, the loan (the tying product) 
was conditioned upon Fortner Enterprises agreeing to purchase and construct on each 
plot of land purchased with the loan proceeds, prefabricated housing (the tied product) 
manufactured by the credit corporations parent company - US Steel Corporation. 
Having acquired the land, Fortner Enterprises soon began to complain about the 
quality of the housing components it was receiving from the US Steel Corporation. 
Windows leaked, closet doors did not fit and exterior building panels did not align 
correctly. The complaints, it seems, were not unjustified. In order, therefore, to 
extricate itself from its agreement, Fortner Enterprises made a proposal to pay ofr the 
loan, provided it was allowed to complete the development usint! COIlventional 
housing. US Steel llomes Credit Corporation refused the offer. :\t this point. OIle 
~ 9 9 Ibid at ·15 nA. 
~ o o 39 IUS 495 ( 1l)(19). 
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might reasonably conclude that this was a typical commercial dispute which might 
have been resolved on the basis of contractual warranties or other consumer law 
concepts. However, Fortner Enterprises' lawyers had other ideas. They instituted an 
antitrust action alleging that the contractual arrangement between Fortner and US 
Steel, amounted to an illegal tie-in contrary to Section 1 and Section 2 Sherman Act. 
After certain pre-trial proceedings the District Court of Kentucky entered summary 
judgment in favour of US Steel. It held, quite simply, that Fortner Enterprises had 
failed to establish the prerequisites of per se illegality. It arrived at this conclusion for 
two main reasons. Firstly, the District Court interpreted the standard of sufficient 
economic power over the tying product market as requiring a monopolistic position or 
one of dominance. 51 Secondly, it held that the amount of interstate commerce affected 
by the tie-in was insubstantial. Only a small proportion of land in the Louisvilk area 
was foreclosed to other developers. 52 
The matter then proceeded to the Court of Appeals which rather surprisingly affirmed 
the District Court's summary judgment order without passing opinion. The matter 
then proceeded to the Supreme Court. On hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court. 
once again, split over the issue of tying arrangements. Mr Justice Black delivered the 
Opinion of a five-man majority. In his view the case involved a tying arrangement of 
the traditional kind. However, he concluded that the Court below misunderstood t h ~ ~
two controlling standards. With regard to the first controlling standard or threshold, 
the Supreme Court took the view that its .. ", tie-in cases han? made unmistakcnly 
, d b fticicnt 'n;n thouph t h ~ ~c kar that the cconol11ic power over the tymg pro uct can e su L t-
I I ' ts )nh with r ~ s r c c t tpo\\cr f ~ l l l s s far short of dominance and c\'cn thoug 1 t H ~ ~ pO\\'LT C" IS ( -
'I I bid at · ~ l ) 7 7 -4l)8, 
<,] Ibid at ..tl)9 
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to some buyers in the market".53 Furthermore, in the view of the majority. prior case 
law rejected the requirement of explicit proof of requisite economic po\\·er. Its 
existence may simply be inferred, for example, from the "... tying products 
desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes".54 Thus pro\ided a 
seller has" ... some power over some of the buyers in the market" this is sufficient to 
invalidate the tie-in. 55 
Having dealt with this particular controlling standard or threshold leveL Mr Justice 
Black then applied this analysis to the facts of the case. He concluded that US Steel 
Homes Credit Corporation may have had sufficient economic power in the market for 
credit for two main reasons. Firstly, the majority acknowledged that US Steel's 
competitors sold their prefabricated houses at prices of 400 dollars less than US 
Steel's comparable models. The fact that Fortner Enterprises readily accepted the 
price differential, in itself, might indicate that the credit corporation had the requisite 
economic power in the market for credit. Secondly, US Steel Homes Credit 
Corporation actually provided Fortner Enterprises with 100 per cent financing. 
Evidence was given that credit financing of this nature was highly unusual and was not 
available elsewhere in the Louisville area. The Court concluded, therefore, that the 
respondent could exercise market power over borrowers in the credit market. In this 
respect, however, Mr Justice Black stated: 
51 Ibid <It 502 
'-Ill'd ·0' 11 .\ t) _, 
~ ~ ~ I hid 
"We do not mean to accept (the) petitioner's apparent argument that 
market power can be inferred simply because of the kind of financing 
terms offered by a lending company are 'unique and unusual'. \Ve do 
mean, however, that uniquely and unusually advantageous terms can 
reflect a creditors unique economic advantage over its competitors".56 
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The Supreme Court also rejected the District Court's holding with regard to the second 
controlling standard or threshold level. That is, it rejected the lower Court's finding 
that the amount of interstate commerce affected by the tie-in was insubstantial. In the 
Supreme Court's view " ... the controlling consideration is simply whether a total 
amount of business substantial enough in terms of dollar volume so as not to be 
merely de minimis is foreclosed to competitors by the tie".57 As to this foreclosure 
requirement the total volume of the respondents annual sales under tying arrangements 
should be taken into account. While the respondents annual sales to Fortner 
Enterprises amounted to only 190,000 (a dollar volume which the majority did not 
consider to be "paltry" or "insubstantial") its total annual sales foreclosed by tying 
arrangements amounted to 4 million dollars in 1 9 6 0 ~ ~ 2.8 million dollars in 1961 and 
2.3 million dollars in 1962. Accordingly, the majority took the view that the District 
Court's judgment should be reversed with directions that the matter proceed to trial. 
There can be no doubt that Mr Justice Black's judgment reflected aspects of populist 
concern. In his view, competition should remain atomistic in terms of structure. II is 
primary concern, therefore, was that US Steel and its subsidiaries with "\'ast sums ot 
money in its treasury" might fence out local competitors from the market f\.1r credit. 
Ilowever, the two sets of dissenting minority judgments, adopted a Ji ( f c r i n ~ ~
'I> Ibid at )0) 
,7 lbid at 501, 
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philosophical stance. Justices White and Harlan made up the first pairing and Justice 
F ortas and Stewart the second. 
Mr Justice White delivered the judgment on behalf of the first pairing. In his view. 
tying arrangements were not entirely unmitigated evils. In certain circumstances they 
could be imposed for legitimate pro competitive reasons of efficiency. Thev should 
. . 
not, therefore, be readily condemned. Moreover, they should only be condemned if 
independent proof of market power in the tying product market exists. Applying this 
particular philosophical notion to the facts, Mr Justice White made a number of 
observations. Firstly, he expressed concerns that the use of credit financina may not b • 
actually involve a tie of two distinct products. Secondly, he rejected the notion that 
simply because buyers accept tie-ins this indicates that a seller has the requisite power 
in the tying product market. Sellers may offer tie-ins for reasons of promotion or 
efficiency. Thirdly, Mr Justice White argued that in the absence of independent proof 
of market power the majority's conclusions were erroneous. In his view, if other 
sources of credit financing were available to Fortner Enterprises, there was nothing 
inherently unique about US Steers money except its low cost. But low cost financing 
neither proves nor disproves the existence of market power. If anything. in Mr Justice 
White's view, the absence of power is a more reasonable inference. Sellers with 
market power are more likely to raise prices than lower them. S8 If, on the other hand. 
other sources of credit were not available the fact that US Steel provided the financing 
actually stimulated competition. It was simply prepared to accept risks which others 
found unacceptable and engaged. therefore, in -' ... hard and risky competition \\"hich it 
is the policy of the Sherman Act to encourage 
~ M M It . i .:; I .:; )I( at - -' 
~ ' ) ) - 17 Ibid at) . 
" 59 
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With regard to the second dissenting minority Mr Justice Fortas delivt:rcd the 
judgment. This pairing agreed substantially with the rationale of Mr Justice \\rhite. 
However, in their view, credit financing amounted simply to the sale of a sinole 
t:-
product with the incidental provision of financing. 60 The main transaction (the sale of 
houses) was perfectly lawful and the ancillary transaction (the provision of credit) 
should not render it violative of the antitrust laws. In fact, to condemn these 
arrangements under the tying rubric was in the view of this pairing ..... to use the 
antitrust laws themselves as an instrument in restraint of competition,'.61 
C. Tie-In Case Law Under The Burger Courts 
In 1957 Ward S Bowman in his article "Tying arrangements And The Leverage 
Problem" challenged the traditional approach to tie-ins. 62 In his vicw there was a need 
for a revaluation of the law. Bowman argued that sellers could not impose tie-ins 
unless they offered a compensating advantage to purchasers63 or they had monopoly 
power (which he defined as the ability to control supply) in the market for the tying 
product.64 In the absence of these two prerequisites a seller attempting to impose a tie-
in would simply be displaced in the market. Bowman quickly dismissed the 
possibility that sellers would offer a compensating advantage. In his view such a tie-in 
would serve no useful purpose. For Bowman, therefore, the main area of difficulty 
was that of monopoly power over the tying product market. He argued that this form 
of power had to be legitimate. If it were not it would be attacked, presumably. as an 
antitrust violation.65 On the assumption that the monopoly power \\ClS legitimate. thl' 
60 [bid at 522. 
hl[l'd --,-
')1 at )_) 
62 ([957) 67 rale LI [9. 
h. Ibid 20, 
hi [bid 1 9 - ' - : ~ ( ) , ,
h5 [I, 'd " 01 .'_, 
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seller could utilise it either to maximise its profits or create a new or second monopoly 
in the market for the tied product. Bowman concluded, therefore, that any re\'enue 
maximising tie-in was legitimate and should be perfectly legal. Thus tie-ins could 
legitimately be used to evade price regulations,66 ensure quality of inputs thereby 
preserving goodwill,67 act as "metering" devices68 or assist in the creation of 
economics of joint production or sale.69 According to Bowman. then, tie-ins should 
only be condemned where monopolistic leverage occurs. That is, where the tie-in is 
used to create a second or new monopoly in the tied product market. 70 An indication 
that this has occurred is a reduction in the total sales volume by all sellers in the tied 
product market. Bowman concluded, therefore, that tie-ins were generally 
procompetitive and should be condemned in limited circumstances only. 
Bowman's article which departed from conventional wisdom, provoked debate over 
the appropriate treatment of tying arrangements. F or other Chicagoans Bowman's 
theory, whilst a welcomed advance in terms of analysis, did not go far enough. 
Posner, for example, argued that tie-ins could not be used to lever power from one 
market to another. 71 In Bork's view the transfer of power theory was simply 
fallacious. 72 In their view all tie-ins were procompetitive and should be presumed 
legal. In direct contrast to this approach others adopted a differing philosophical 
stance. Slawson, for example, adopts the position that all tie-ins (whether created hy 
66 War time whisky producers, for example, tied the sale of price controlled whisky to non-priced 
controlled rum and wine in an attempt to maximise revenue 
67 Ibid 27 . I' . f tt. ·.)f the tVIll" 
(>8 Tie-ins C,\I1 be used as a means or charging, buyers accord\l1g, III t le llltenslty 0 ltlr 1 I ~ l : : l -:-
product 
(,l) It . ~ ~ ') l) 11CI _ 
7(l Ibid 20. .." f '1 . LR "06 :'OX-:' I:' 
71 R.A 1\ )SIlL'[', ''!-:XClllSIOIl,ll\ PrilCI Ices And 1 he .-\ntltrllst La" ~ ~ . ( 1 9 7 ~ ) ) ~ ~ I l (1/t . , 
' ~ R . I I I Bnrk. 711c.·lllwrllsIParac/ox(Reprint. '\;e\\ York, 199))Ch.ll) 
~ i ' O O
compulsion or inducement) lessen competition. 73 In fact, in his \'iew. tie-ins created 
by inducement are equally as pernicious as those created by compulsion. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the views promulgated by Chicagoans that tic-ins 
were essentially pro competitive gained the ascendancy. Under the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission ceased 
prosecuting tie-ins. Any litigation in this area was pursued by the private antitrust 
litigant. In fact, by 1985, the Justice Departments Guidelines for Vertical Restraints 
declared that tie-ins were "often procompetitive" and generally did ..... not have a 
significant anticompetitive potential".74 A period of "anti-antitrust" or roll-back had 
been entered. To an extent the changes in economic analysis and political climate was 
reflected in the judicial approach to tie-ins. It should be emphasised that after the 
appointment of Chief Justice Burger in 1969 the Supreme Court did not fully embrace 
Chicago. In spite of repeated attacks, the Supreme Court albeit by a single vote, 
retained the per se illegality of tying arrangements. However, an analytical shift 
occurred which had the effect of reducing the scope and applicability of the per se 
rules. The Supreme Court altered the threshold levels which brought the rules of per 
se illegality into play. This alteration prompted Slawson to assert 
" although tie-ins are still illegal in theory, they are legal in 
practice, because the obstacles the Court has erected in the way of 
proving illegality are practically insurmountable". 75 
. . . . .' I M I P \er' rhe lise l)! 1\ in\! \ r r a n g ~ J l \ ~ l 1 h h7J \\ D. Slawson, "I'::-:c\udmg l lllllpetition \\ It 101lt onopo ~ ~ 0\ . . ~ ~
To I \plult r'darket Failurl''', (1991) 36 .llltitrust B 457. ,,-
, ~ ~ . J l I s t i c ~ ~ D l ' P ; ' r t 1 l 1 ~ l l t t ('lIidclines for \'crtical Restraint'. 5 I (Janlllln ~ ' . . 19S") 
7S "l'l' \\' I) Slawson, llote 73 a h o \ ' ~ . . 457. 
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During this period the Supreme Court addressed the threshold l e n ~ l s s of per se 
illegality in two major cases - US Steel Corporatz'on v FOl-tnel- E nterprise5, Inc 
(Fortner II) 76 and jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde. 77 
In the 1969 Fortner I case the Supreme Court held that Fortner Enterprises was 
entitled to an opportunity to show that US Steel had the requisite economic power in 
the tying product market. At trial the District Court simply directed that a verdict be 
entered in favour of Fortner Enterprises on the issue of liability and submitted only the 
issue of damages to the jury. In 1971 the finding was appealed to the Court of 
Appeals which reversed the District Court's directed verdict and remanded the matter 
for a new trial on liability.78 At the new trial, the District Court heard additional 
evidence and held that US Steel had the requisite economic power to render the tic -in 
illegal per se. In 1975, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. 79 In 
1977, US Steel appealed this decision and the matter came before the Supreme Court 
as US Steel Corporation v Fortner Enterprises80 usually referred to as Fortner 11. 
The relatively brief judgment of the Supreme Court in Fortner fJ was delivered by ~ ~ lr 
Justice Stevens. Under the Burger regime, Mr Justice Stevens made it abundantly 
clear that the Supreme Court was no longer prepared to permit a cursory analysis of 
what constituted sufficient economic power. The Court was no longer predisposed to 
rely on inference as a means of establishing per se illegality. Under the ne\\ rq;ime a 
greater evidentiary showing of requisite economic power in the market for the tying 
product had to he made. In this respect, he echoed the dissenting sentiments of \ 1 r 
7 6 . l ~ 9 9 US 610(1977) 
'7 -466 U.S. 2 {\98-4). 
'K . t ; ; ~ ~ F. 2d 109) (6 th ell 1971). 
7'1 ):' \. 2d \)(1\ «l th Cir. 1(7)). 
80 .l2 t) lJ. S (J \ 0 ( 1 (77) 
Justice White in Fortner I and stated quite simply that" t·f th .od I 
° o. e e\ 1 ence mere v 
shows that credit terms are unique because the seller is willing to accept a lesser profit 
- or to incur greater risks - than its competitors, that kind of uniqueness will not give 
rise to economic power in the credit market.,,81 Yet in the view of the Supreme Court. 
this was all that the record indicated. As a result Fortner Enterprises had not satisfied 
the appropriate burden of proof and could not prevail in the litigation. Chief Justice 
Burger gave a one paragraph concurring judgment simply to emphasise that the 
present agreement involved a "peculiar arrangement" and that the antitrust laws cast 
" ... no doubt on the legality of credit financing by manufacturers or distributors. 82 
The Supreme Court reinforced the Fortner II decision in the 1984 case of Jefferson 
Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde. 83 In 1971 shortly before the East Jefferson 
Hospital opened, it entered into an "Anaesthesiology Agreement" with a professional 
medical corporation known as Roux and Associates. This agreement provided that 
only anaesthesiologists designated by Roux could provide anesthesological services to 
the hospital. It was believed that this "closed group policy" was in the best interests of 
quality patient care. The hospital, for its part, agreed to supply and maintain the 
department as well as providing nursing personnel. In July 1977 Dr Edwin Hyde, a 
certified anaesthesiologist, applied for admission to the medical staff of the hospital 
The Credentials Committee and the Medical Executive Board, on the basis of its 
commitment to the closed group policy, denied the application. As a result, Dr Hyde 
instituted an antitrust action in the Louisiana District Court alleging that the 
anaesthesiology agreement violated Section I Sherman Act. 
XI Ibid at ( ) ~ ~ 1-(122. 
82 Ibid at «?) 
83 466 U.S. 2 (19S·I) 
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Judge Mitchell in the Louisiana District Court held against Hyde. He did so primarily 
on the basis that East Jefferson Hospital lacked market power in the releyant 
geographic market. The Court defined this market as including the entire New 
Orleans Metropolitan area. Within this area there was at least 20 other hospitals and 
about 70 per cent of patients attended hospitals other than East Jefferson Hospital. The 
District Court concluded that the impact on commerce was minimal. The Court also 
seemed to intimate that the principles of per se illegality might not apply to a case 
involving the medical profession. 84 
Not surprisingly Hyde appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 85 It concluded 
that the agreement was a tying arrangement by which users of the hospital operating 
rooms (the tying product) were required to purchase the anaesthesia service (the tied 
product) chosen by the hospital. It reversed the District Court rejecting as "clearly 
erroneous"the lower Courts finding that the agreement could be justified by quality 
considerations and its intimations that the principles of per se illegality did not apply 
to the medical profession. The Court of Appeals redefined the relevant geographic 
market narrowly to include only the East Bank of Jefferson Parish. Within this area it 
found that the hospital had the requisite economic power to render the tie-in illegal per 
se. The Court of Appeals found the existence of market power by relying on a theor) 
of market imperfection. These imperfections enabled the hospital to charge non-
competitive prices. This was the case for two main reasons. Firstly, insurers payment 
of health care bills reduced patients incentives to compare costs which reduced pricl' 
competition. Secondly, a lack of adequate information rendered patients unahle to 
compare the quality of services provided by competing hospitals. 
" flrdL' \' Jeffersoll Parish I/ospilal Disl \ ()], 513 I' Supp 532, )·W-'i·U (1981) 
x' bX6 F. ~ d ~ 8 6 6 (5 1h Cir. Il)S2). 
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Jefferson Parish appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the decision of the 
Court of Appeals. In doing so, Mr Justice Stevens addressed two major concerns. 
Firstly, the problem of determining whether an arrangement involves two distinct 
products for the purpose of tie-in law. 86 Secondly, the issue of market po\\'er. \\'ith 
regard to the first concern, Mr Justice Stevens stated that whether one or two products 
are involved'" ... turns not on the functional relation between them, but rather on the 
character of the demand for the two items".87 That is, whether there exists a separate 
market for each of the products. With regard to the issue of market power the majority 
of the Court embraced a particular philosophical approach. Anticipating arguments 
that were to be presented by the concurring minority Mr Justice Stevens stated that: 
"It was far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to 
question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an 
unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are 
bl " 88 unreasona e per se . 
This particular rule had been repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme Court. However. 
the Court now believed that there was" ... nothing inherently anticompetitive about 
packaged sales".89 They could be of benefit to both purchaser and seller alike. In the 
case of the latter, the decision to enter into a tying arrangement may simply be an 
. .. I enl by Ihe Supreme Court. 86 Prior to 1984 the lower Courts. in the absence of any JudiCia pronouncem ~ ~ ',' ... 
. " 'I' h f, d on whether t le Items" Ul 
used t\\O main tests: the 'fullctlOn of the aggregation test \\ lIC o c ~ s e e h' 1 'II 1'1 [ 1 J"I"rmine 
h d h "d I tv test \\ IC 1 ,} emp II l '" '" normall, or should reasonably be sold toget er a. n t e ua I., I' l' I' ("h·f... 'n DdH:,ht 
• , C h ' . d cts See (Illter a 13) ,)/ega \ /( ~ ~ . . whether separate markets eXisted lor t e respectl\e pro u . ~ ~ . . If' ,,(' )'8 F 
' , / / C' ,/' 'g'lll flee (III( (Jill! (I. ' /nc., --l--l8 1 ~ d · 1 3 3 (91h Cir, 197') and WaS/llngfoll (HIS .Ig If () \ II /I ( , 
,\1 ~ 4 8 8 (4 1h Cir 1(71), 
87 --l66 U.S ,It 19, 
" Ibid at 9 
R'l 'i ') " Ib[l al _. , 
attempt to compete more effectively and efficiently.9o As a result. the majority took 
the view that tie-ins should be illegal per se only if the seller uses 
" its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the 
purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or 
might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terrns".91 
The per se condemnation of tying arrangements was linked to the concept of market 
power and anticompetitive forcing. In so doing, the Supreme Court heightened the 
threshold requirements of per se illegality. In effect, contracting the scope and 
applicability of the rules. 
Having made these judicial pronouncements Mr Justice Stevens then applied them to 
the facts of the case. Firstly, he concluded that the arrangements involved the tie of 
two distinct products. Secondly, he acknowledged that the Court of Appeals had 
found the existence of sufficient economic power on the basis of market imperfections. 
However, in the view of the majority, whilst factors relevant to this theory may 
generate market power in some "abstract sense", they did " ... not generate the kind of 
market power that justifies condemnation oftying".92 In the majority's view, a lack of 
price or quality competition did not generate the anticompetitive forcing which the 
Supreme Court now viewed as necessary for per se condemnation. Accordingly. the 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
'>0 l 'd \ \)1 at \ ' 
'11 Ib' I \, Il at _, 
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Ms Justice O'Connor delivered the concurrz·ng opInIon b h If f 
on e a 0 l'.1r Justices 
Powell and Rhenquist. In their view 
" ... tying may make the provision of packages of goods and services 
more efficient. A tie-in should be condemned only when its 
anticompetitive impact outweighs its contribution to efficiency".93 
The concurring minority, influenced greatly by pro-Chicagoan theories, advocated the 
abandonment of the per se treatment of tie-ins in favour of an approach based on the 
rule of reason. Ms Justice O'Connor stated that "(t)he 'per se' doctrine in tying cases 
always required an elaborate inquiry into the economic benefits of the tying 
arrangement. As a result tying doctrine incurs the costs of a rule of reason approach 
without achieving its benefits".94 In other words, the per se doctrine calls for " ... 
extensive and time-consuming economic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, 
but then may be interpreted to prohibit arrangements that economic analysis would 
show to be beneficial".95 In the view of the concurring minority the per se label 
generated more confusion than coherent law. To rectify this situation Ms Justice 
O'Connor proposed a tie-in test that required the plaintiff to satisfy three threshold 
requirements, in addition to showing that the restraint was unreasonable under the 
application of the rule of reason. Firstly, the seller must be shown to have power in 
the tying product market. Secondly, there must be a "substantial threaC that the tying 
seller will acquire market power in the tied product market. Finally. there must be a 
coherent basis for treating the tying and tied products as distinct.96 If theSl' threshold 
requirements are met, the tie-in must then he considered under a rule or I"l'aSOIl 
9J Ibid at 42 
9 ~ ~ Ibid ;It'4 
' ) ~ ~ Ibid. 
% Ibid at 37 ·10. 
,--
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analysis. Applying this particular approach to the facts of the case, \ Is Justice 
O'Connor assumed that East Jefferson Hospital had market power and that a 
substantial threat existed that it would acquire market power in the tied product 
market. However, in the view of Ms Justice O'Connor, there was no sound economic 
reason for treating surgery and anaesthesia as separate services.97 There was no 
distinct products for the purpose of antitrust tie-in law. Mr Justices Brennan and 
Marshall concurred but delivered a one paragraph opinion to state that modification of 
the per se rules should be left to Congress. 
D. The Eastman Kodak Decision And The Rise Of Market Imperfection 
In the early 1990s, with the election of the Clinton administration, the political climate 
in the United States changed. Anne Bingamen was appointed Assistant Attorney 
General for Antitrust and with her appointment the 1985 US Department of Justice 
Vertical Restraint Guidelines were repealed. In her confirmation testimony she 
pledged to enforce the antitrust laws to accord with the wishes of Congress and in 
accordance with the facts of each case and not just according to economic constructs 
or models.98 At that time, it was said '''Facts are back' ... and never mind the niceties 
of Chicago's ... economic theorising". At roughly the same time the Supreme Court 
heard the case of Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services,99 a case which 
raised a veritable host of antitrust questions. 
97 Ibid at cD. [ .. ' I) t' , 
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Eastman Kodak manufactured and sold complex business machines including high 
volume photocopiers and micrographic equipment. Replacement parts for this 
equipment was manufactured either by Kodak itself or according to Kodak's 
specifications by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). These parts \\"('re 
compatible with Kodak's equipment only. In the early 1980s independent service 
organisations (ISOs) began to repair and service Kodak's equipment using parts 
purchased from OEMs, but also using parts acquired from Kodak itself, parts brokers 
and existing customers. The ISOs provided a service that was substantially lower in 
terms of price and, in the opinion of many customers, of superior quality. By the mid-
1980s the ISOs had made substantial inroads into Kodak's share of the service market. 
In 1985 and 1986, therefore, Kodak implemented policy changes in relation to the 
provision of parts. It decided that it would only sell replacement parts to those 
customers who either repaired and serviced their own machines or who used Kodak' s 
servicing facilities. The IS0s were effectively excluded from receiving new parts. 
Kodak buttressed its policy changes by ensuring that its original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) did not supply parts to anyone else other than Kodak itself. It 
also took steps to ensure that parts brokers and equipment owners refused to sell parts 
to IS0s. These policy changes were designed to make it difficult or impossible for the 
[SOs to service Kodak's equipment. In this respect Kodak was successful. The IS0s 
were either forced out of business or lost substantial revenues. Customers were forced 
to turn to Kodak for servicing even though they felt the ISO's provided a superior 
quality service. 
In 1987, as a result of Eastman Kodak's actions, eighteen IS0s instituted antitrust 
proceedings in the District Court of California. I hey alleged that Kodak had 
llnla\\fullv til'd the sale of s c n i c ~ ~ (the tied product) to the sale of parts \the t y i n ~ ~
product) in contravention of Section 1 Sherman Act and had monopolised or attempted 
to monopolise the sale of service for Kodaks' machines in \'iolation of S t· , ec IOn _. 
Kodak immediately filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court, after 
limited discovery and without a hearing, held that the ISOs had not provided evidence 
of the existence of a tying arrangement between Kodak's equipment and service or 
parts and that Kodak had merely exercised a unilateral right to refuse to sell its parts to 
the ISOs. Accordingly neither provision of the Sherman Act was violated and Judge 
Schwarzer granted Kodak's motion. 
The ISOs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 100 Sitting as a panel the 
appellate Court found that the issue was whether a tying arrangement existed between 
the sale of Kodak's parts and service. In the Court's view that was a disputed issue of 
fact. With regard to the issue of market power the ISOs conceded that Kodak lacked 
market power in the interband market. 101 It was accepted that the equipment market 
was highly competitive. Kodak relied on neo-classical economic theory, therefore, to 
assert that it could not have market power in the aftermarkets for its own parts. As the 
interband market for their equipment was vigorous this meant that it could not have 
market power in the derivative aftermarkets. A divided Court of Appeals agreed that 
this might be the case but it refused to uphold the District Court's summary judgment 
on a mere "theoretical basis". In this respect Judge Wallace dissented. In his view 
" ... power in the primary interbrand market is a prerequisite to power in the derivative 
market for replacement parts".102 In any event, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the ISOs had presented evidence of actual market imperjecfions which enabled a 
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that" ... competition in the (equipments) market 
lOll 903 F. 2d 612 (9 th Cir. 1980). 
101 Ibid at () 16 113 
I O ~ ~ II . I ( ..,., )Il at L). 
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does not, in reality, curb Kodak's power in the parts market". 103 Market imperfections 
could prevent Kodak's neo-classical price theory, about how consumers might act. 
from mirroring the reality of the situation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, remanded 
the matter for trial. 
Kodak appealed to the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted. The Court's 
judgment was delivered by Mr Justice Blackmum. He stated that two main issues 
existed. Firstly whether a tying arrangement actually existed. Secondl\', whether 
Kodak had the requisite economic power in the tying product market. Mr Justice 
Blackmum, quickly and succinctly, stated that Kodak's argument that parts and 
service could not be regarded as separate products was incorrect as a factual matter 
and not borne out by the evidence of the record. 104 In the view of the majority a tie-in 
actually existed. 
The Court then focused on the issue of market power. In this respect the ISOs argued 
that Kodak had the requisite power for a number of reasons. Firstly, certain parts were 
available exclusively through Kodak. Secondly, Kodak exercised control over the 
availability of parts which it did not manufacture. Thirdly, by controlling the 
availability of parts Kodak excluded service competition, increased service prices and 
forced consumers to accept higher priced, lower quality servicing. On this basis the 
Supren1e Court asserted "(u)nder our prior precedents, this evidence would be 
. k " 105 
sufficient to entitle respondents to a trial on their claim of mar et power . 
10J Ibid at 617. 
1(l·1 504 lJ S at ·163. 
105 Ibid at 46) 
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The Court then placed on Kodak the burden of showing that despite e\'idence of 
increased prices and excluded competition, an inference of market power was 
unreasonable. Kodak responded by arguing that the primary equipment market was 
highly competitive and within the interbrand market it did not possess market power. 
It was, therefore, not in a position to raise prices in relation to parts and sen'ice abo\'e 
a competitive level. To raise prices in the secondary or derivative aftermarkets would 
result in lower sales of primary equipment in the interbrand market with a 
corresponding diminution in profits. In short, a competitive interbrand market 
disciplines the aftermarkets. Kodak argued, therefore, that the Supreme Court should 
adopt a substantive legal rule that 'equipment competition precludes any finding of 
monopoly power in derivative aftermarkets".lo6 On this basis there could be no 
genuine issue as to any material fact on the market power issue. 107 Thus, the Supreme 
Court should approve its application for summary judgment. 
Kodak based its arguments on the two-twin pillars of neo-classical economIC 
enlightenment - the decisions in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co \' Zenith R{/dio 
('orp I08 and Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc. 109 These cases reflect the 
Supreme Court's willingness to embrace some of the theoretical propositions of the 
Chicago School in developing antitrust doctrine. In the Matsushita case a number uf 
American manufacturers of electronic products alleged that 21 Japanese competitors 
had engaged in predatory pricing in order to undercut their American counterparts and 
expand their share of the American market. After years of discovery the Japanese 
corporations moved for summary judgment. They asserted that the :\merican 
. . 'r'} S e Court aprced In its corporatIons argUI11ents made no economIC sense. 1e uprem :-. 
lOll Ibid at . ~ 6 6 . .
107 Ibid 
108 -t 7 '\ LJ. S 5 7...t ( 1 (86). 
109 -t n LJ S .16 ( I (77). 
~ 8 2 2
view there was no rational motive to conspire Such a 20 year I . Id 
. ong conspIracy wou 
have required the Japanese corporations to sustain losses cor d d . h 
11 eca es WIt no 
foreseeable profits. A more plausible explanation was that they were' I. j slmp y engagel 
in hard competition. 
Kodak also repeatedly relied on the Sylvania case in support of its contentions that 
interbrand competition in the equipments market would prevent the exploitation of the 
service and parts market. In Sylvania the Supreme Court stated" ... when interbrand 
competition exists, ... it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand 
market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the 
same product". I 10 It should be emphasised, then, that Kodak's response to the ISOs 
arguments was based on purely theoretical economic arguments the roots of which 
were firmly planted in Chicago. 
On behalf of the majority Mr Justice Blackmum proceeded to unravel the assumptions 
underpinning Kodak's proposed rule. He stated that Kodak's theory was based on an 
assumption about the cross-elasticity of demand in the interbrand equipment market 
and aftermarkets. If Kodak raised its parts or service prices above competitive levels, 
consumers would purchase similar products from other manufacturers. In Kodak's 
view this was a matter of basic economic reality which should be accepted as a matter 
of law. In the view of the Court, however, Kodak's claim while "intuitively 
appealing" was based on a "false dichotomy" that only two prices could be charged - a 
competitive price or a ruinous one. In the Court's view a further altematin.' existed. 
A middle or optimum price could be charged which generated increased revenues 
from higher priced parts or services which would compensate for lower rc\,enUL" 
110 Ibid at 52 1119. 
283 
generated by lost equipment sales. I II The Court concluded, therefore, that there was 
no immutable physical law or economic reality which held that" co t't' . I 
. . . mpe I IOn m t le 
equipment market cannot coexist with market power in aftermarkets··. 112 The 
Supreme Court simply rejected Kodak's arguments. It did so because a fact based 
analysis proved inconsistent with Kodak's reliance on a purely theoretical Chicagoan 
economic construct. 
In this respect the Court made four main observations. Firstly, it observed that the 
corollary of Kodak's theory was that lower service prices should increase primary 
equipment sales. If this was the case, why then did Kodak attempt to eliminate the 
lower priced servicing of the ISOs? In fact, the ISOs presented evidence to sho\\' that 
the price of Kodak's servicing had actually increased without any concomitant 
decrease in the sales of primary equipment. 113 Secondly, with regard to Kodak' s 
reliance on Matsushita, the Court stated that the Court in that case did not hold that if 
the "moving party (Kodak) enunciates any economic theory supporting its beha\'iour. 
regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the actual market, it is entitled to summary 
judgment". I 14 The Court interpreted Matsushita as demanding only that the ISOs 
inferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury". Thirdly, the Court rejected 
Kodak's reliance on the Sylvania decision as being inapposite. In the view of the 
majority the tying arrangement at issue in Kodak was a horizontal restraint on 
. .. 115 
interbrand competition and not a vertical restraint on mtrabrand competItIOn. 
Fourthly, and most importantly, the Supreme Court held that the ISOs offered a 
"forceful reason" why Kodak's theory may not prove persuasIve. Kodak may h a \ L ~ ~ the 
111504 U.S. at 47 \. 
II! Ibid, 
ILl Ibid at 472 
I I ~ ~ Ibid at 4M; 
I I ~ ~ Ibid at 471 nlS 
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requisite market power on the basis of market imperfections, in particular, information 
costs and switching costs. With regard to information costs, for service prices to affect 
demand for primary equipment, consumers must engage in accurate life cycle 
.. 116 Th d· pncing. ey must etermine the total cost of the equipment, service and parts in 
comparison with other equipment. This involves a sophisticated analysis which is 
both difficult and costly. Moreover, the information to conduct this analysis may not 
be available or may be customer specific. Uunsophisticated consumers may fail to 
engage in the process and may, therefore, be charged inflated service prices. In fact 
the Supreme Court accepted evidence that this was the case with regard to certain 
Governmental agencies. Alternatively, Kodak may simply price discriminate between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, charging the former less or allowing 
them to take their business elsewhere. The second argument which the ISOs presented 
related to switching costS." 7 If the cost of switching from Kodak's product to that of 
another competitor is high, consumers are "locked in". They will tolerate some level 
f . .. b .c h . b d 118 o service-pnce Increase elore c anglng ran s. If switching costs are high 
relative to service prices, a seller can profitably maintain supracompetitive prices in 
the aftermarkets just as if it were a monopolist. On this basis, the majority of the 
Court did not feel that it was sensible to adopt Kodak's assumption that interbrand 
competition would prevent exploitation in the derivative aftermarkets. 
Mr Justice Scalia delivered the dissent on behalf of himself and Justices O'Connor and 
Thomas. For the dissenting minority the crux of the matter was whether a 
manufacturer's conceded lack of power in the interbrand market for its equipment was 
consistent with its possession of market power in the secondary aftermarkets for that 
11<> Ibid at .In. 
117 Ibid at 478. 
IIX Ibid 
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eqUIpment. In their VIew the Court had supplied an erroneous answer. The 
minority asserted that any power which Kodak possessed in the derivative 
aftermarkets was simply an "inherent power" over its own brand of equipment which 
was not sufficient to bring into play the antitrust "sledgehammer".12o This type of 
power is " ... possessed by every manufacturer of durable goods with distincti\'e 
parts". This particular approach was roundly condemned by the majority as a "radical 
departure" from the Supreme Courts previous antitrust laws. Its effects, the majority 
asserted, would be to grant per se immunity from antitrust laws to those manufacturers 
competing in the service market. 121 In the view of the majority the minority had no 
authority to implement such a policy change. 
Mr Justice Scalia then proceeded to analyse, in depth, the issue of market power. He 
stated that one of the Respondents original allegations, which was later abandoned, 
was that parts and services were actually tied to the sale of equipment. He asserted 
that had this claim proceeded it would have failed as it was accepted that Kodak did 
not possess market power in the interbrand equipment market. In the view of the 
minority it was simply anomalous that a manufacturer functioning in a competitive 
equipment market should be exempt from the per se rule when it bundles equipment 
with parts and service but not when it bundles parts and service. In the view of the 
minority, such reasoning made every market of unique parts a holder of market power 
for its own products irrespective of how unimportant its product might be in the 
market. With regard to the issue of market imperfection the minority rejected the 
arguments that information costs and switching costs could give rise to market power, 
In their view, gaps in the availability and quality of consumer information pervades 
119 Ibid at 486. 
120 I bid at 489, 
121 Ibid at 479 n ~ l ) )
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real world markets. Market imperfections, therefore, cannot create "... 'market 
power' of concern to antitrust where otherwise there is none".122 Furthermore, the fact 
that consumers tolerate some levels of service price increase, as a result of their initial 
capital investment, occurs in all types of markets and is of no concern to the antitrust 
laws. 123 Mr Justice Scalia then asserted that the Court should follow Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence in Jefferson Parish and assess the legality of all tying 
arrangements under the rule of reason. 
The approach adopted by the Court in Kodak and Jefferson Parish to the issue of 
market imperfections seem irreconcilable. In Jefferson Parish the Court held that 
market imperfections gave rise to an abstract form of market power, one that did not 
justify the condemnation of tying. In contrast and without explanation the Supreme 
Court in Kodak changed its position. This has provoked almost as much attention as 
the Dead Sea Scrolls. For some it is a return to traditional multi-dimensional 
values. 124 The Court simply concluded that tie-ins are facially anticompetitive and the 
very harm which antitrust laws are designed to prevent. F or others Kodak does not 
amount to a rejection of economic theory in antitrust jurisprudence. 125 The Court 
simply embraced a theory of economics that readily explained the facts before it. 
Absent the circumstances which made the ISOs theory hold true foremarkets and 
aftermarkets should still be presumed responsive. In any event, they assert, Kodak did 
not address the degree of market power required to invoke the per se rules and 
122 Ibid at 496. 
123 Ibid at 496-497. 
12-1 G.B. Spivak & c.T. Ellis, "Kodak: Enlightened Antitrust Analysis And Traditional Tying Law", 
(1993) 62 Antitrust U 203. See also E.M. Fox, "Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Scnln's Illc -
Infomlation Failure As Soul Or Hook?", (1994) 62 Antitrust U 759. 
125 See, for example, M.L. Popofsky and M.S. Popofsky, "Vertical Restraints In The 1990s: Is Thl'll' A 
'Thermidorian Reaction' To the Svlvania Orthodoxv?", (1994) 62 Antitrust U 729: T.E. K£luper, 
"A.ntitrust In 1992", (1993) 61 AliI/trust U 347; G . A ~ ~ !lay, "Is The Glass Half Empty Or !lalf Full'?" 
Reflections On the Kodak Case", (1993) 62 Antitrust LJ 177; O.J. Gifford, "The Damaging Impact or 
Thl' Eastman Kodak Precedent Upon Competition: Antitrust In Need Of Correction", (1994) 72 
IJ'dshingtoll {'nil'L'rsity [,1\1' Quarter/v 1507. 
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substantial power is still required to satisfy the market power filter. Whatever position 
one adopts, however, the facts remain that Kodak represents the current position in the 
US and has taken a tough line with regard to the determination of market power. 
E. Microsoft And The Browser Wars 
The Microsoft Corporation, founded in 1975 and based in Redmond Washington, is 
the world's largest producer of computer software. In 1993, for example, its net 
profits amounted to 1 billion US dollars of which one-third was generated in the EU. 
Over the last decade, however, Microsoft has been ensconced in antitrust 
investigations and litigation. In particular, Microsoft's bundling practice has been the 
subject of intense antitrust scrutiny. Mircosoft requires original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) to purchase its internet browser (IE) if they wish to obtain a 
license to pre-load its Windows operating system. Initially, this practice was of a 
purely contractual nature which eventually took on a technological dimension through 
the interlocking of the Internet Explorer code (lEA.O) with its Windows 98 operating 
system. Deletion of the code performing the browser function precipitated system 
degradation through the loss of stability and security. This technological welding was 
also reinforced by contractually proscribing manufacturers from deleting the code 
. h" d 126 pnor to sIppIng to en users. 
Microsoft's practices have resulted in complaints from a number of undertakings 
including Netscape, manufacturer of the competing ~ ~ N a v i g a t o r " " browser. In the US 
I ~ ( ' ' Scc A.J. Meese, "Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Man: Products Does !'.1lcrosoft Sell')", 
(1999) ,1·1 Antitrust B ()); P. Ruttley, "EC Competition La\v In Cyberspace: An Overview ()f Reel'Ilt 
!)c\L'lnpl11ents", (1998) 19 ECU? 186. 
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the Department of Justice attempted to have Microsoft held in contempt for \'iolating 
Section IV (E) (I) of a 1995 consent decree, which prohibited Microsoft from tying the 
sale of its operating systems to the sale of its software products, concluded following 
tripartite negotiations between Microsoft, DOJ and the European Commission. In In 
December 1997, the District Court refused to hold Microsoft in contempt but issued a 
preliminary injunction against the bundling practice and referred the matter to a 
Special Master for fact-finding. Microsoft appealed arguing that its operating system 
and IE formed part of an integrated system. The US Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia reversed the injunction holding that Microsoft's IE programme was 
"integrated" into its Windows 95 operating system and not in violation of antitrust law 
provided "plausible" benefits stemmed from the arrangements. 128 
In May 1998 the DOJ, nineteen states and the District of Columbia filed suit against 
Microsoft, charging it was engaging in a pattern of anticompetitive behaviour contrary 
to s.l and s.2 Sherman Act. Once again, it was alleged that Microsoft had engaged in 
illegal tying, forcing its customers to take IE as a condition of obtaining Windows. In 
contrast, Microsoft argued that its business tactics were common to the industry, 
beneficial to consumers and did not involve tying as it simply provided an "'integrated" 
system. 
Judge Jackson held in favour of the plaintiffs. 129 In his view the Court of Appeals did 
not intend to state a controlling rule of law for the purposes of the present case. It was 
primarily concerned with the construction of a single provision of a consent decree and 
127 US \' Microsoft Corp., 1995 'XL 505998, Civ No 9-l-156-l (DOC Aug 21, 1995): Commission Press 
Release I P , t ) - l / 6 5 ~ ~ of July 17, 1994. 
128 US v MlL'rosoft Corp .. 56 F. ~ d . . 1 cl-l8 (D.C 1995). 
12') 1)().1 I Antitrust: Microsoft Conclusions of Law and Final Order, 
htl p: //\\'\\" usdoj .gov/atr/cases/l-l-lOO -l-l()l) htm 
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contractual intent. The Court of Appeals' observations were strictly obiter dicta and 
not formally binding. 13o In any event the "plausible b e n e f i t s ' ~ ~ test enunciated by the 
Court of Appeals was undemanding and inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
In this respect he reviewed the Jefferson Parish and Kodak cases and concluded the 
"character of demand" for the constituent components and not their functional 
relationship determined whether two products were actually involved. Commercial 
realities faced by consumers and not "abstract or metaphysical" assumptions about 
product configurations had to be taken into account. 131 
On this basis, Judge Jackson, concluded that commercial reality indicated that 
consumers perceived operating systems and browsers as separate products. The 
bundling was not derived from technical necessity or business efficiency. It was 
simply a " ... deliberate and purposeful choice to quell incipient competition.,,132 In 
condeming the tying, Judge Jackson had no difficulty in concluding that Microsoft had 
appreciable economic power in the tying product market and that not an insubstantial 
amount of commerce was involved. 
Two final points. Firstly, on 7 June 2000 Judge Jackson, in the biggest antitrust break-
up since AT&T in 1982, ordered Microsoft to be split in two and imposed immediate 
curbs on its business activities. He condemned Microsoft's entire pattern of 
anti competitive behaviour and referred to the corporation as "untrustworthy". The 
break-up in his view, will revive competition. Undoubtedly, Microsoft will appeal. 133 
Secondly, the European Commission in 1999 approved Microsoft's licensing 
110 Ibid at 25. 
\.11 Ibid at 27-28. 
112 Ibid at 32. 
1\, R. Wolffc, T. Formeski and C. Grimes, "Microsoft Ordered To Split In Two", Findlll·ia/ Times, 8 
June 2000. 
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agreements with Internet Service Providers by means of comfort letter. 13.f Approval 
was only forthcoming after Microsoft redrafted its agreements to ensure they did not 
foreclose the market for Internet browser software from Microsoft· s competitors. 
However, following the ruling in the US the Commission has indicated its intention to 
investigate Microsoft's 2000 operating systems. 
III. TYING AGREEMENTS AND EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LA W 
A. The Development Of EU Tie-In Case Law 
Tie-ins can fall foul of Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82 (ex 86) EC. In comparison with the 
US there have been remarkably few decisions relating to tying in the EU. This is 
perhaps a reflection that tying need not necessarily involve exclusivity. Where tying 
has been condemned under Article 81 (ex 85) the authorities analysis has been 
relatively terse. In the case of Vassen/Moris135 a Dutch manufacturer of synthetic 
casings used in the production of sausages, complained to the Commission alleging 
that the commercial practices of Alex Moris and his company, ALMO, infringed 
Article 81 (ex 85) by impeding its access to the Belgium market. Moris had obtained 
a patent relating to a process and device for use in the making of sausages, particularly 
saucissions de Boulogne. A square shaped sausage made exclusively in Belgium out 
of a mixture of horsemeat, beef and pork. Moris granted ALMO a license to work his 
patents and the company, in turn, granted a number of sublicenses to other 
manufacturers including Imperial NY. Yassen, convinced that the patent was \'oid, 
informed Belgian sausage manufacturers to this effect. As a result, Imperial placed an 
order \\ith Yassen for 3000 sausage casings. Moris and ALMO responded hy issuint! 
1;1 COlllmission Press Release Ipt)-l/317 ofMllY 10, 1999, 
D ~ ~ COlllm Dec 79 '86 OJ 1979 L 19/30, l1979] 1 CMLR 511. 
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legal proceedings against Imperial. The latter agreed in November 1973. in order to 
settle the dispute, to recognise the validity of the patents and to purchase its future 
requirements from ALMO. The Commission concluded that this agreement infringed 
Article 81 (ex 85). Imperial was deprived of its freedom, which was open to everyone 
else to seek revocation of the patent. Furthermore, the tie-in that required the 
sublicensee to obtain its supplies of casings from ALMO whenever it used the 
patented process, deprived it of its freedom to obtain supplies elsewhere perhaps on 
more favourable terms and was not required by the industrial property right. In fact. 
the casings supplied by ALMO to Imperial were not covered by the patent. The tie-in 
simply resulted in the unlawful extension by contractual means of the monopoly given 
by the patent. In the Commission's view the agreement was simply not eligible for 
exemption because it did not contribute to improving the production or distribution of 
the goods in question. 
In February 1986 the Court of Justice examined the commercial practices of 
Windsurfing International Inc, an American undertaking, engaged in the manufacture 
of sailboards. The latter is composed of a board made of synthetic material and a rig 
consisting essentially of a mast, a joint for the mast and a sail. In the 1970s the 
American undertaking decided to extend its operations to Europe where it submitted 
patent claims in the UK and Federal Republic of Germany. Between 1973 and 1980 
the American undertaking granted licences for the production and sale of its sailboards 
to a number of European companies. Windsurfing placed an obligation on its 
licensees to sell the patented rigs only in conjunction with approved sailboards. Trade 
competitors conlplained to the Commission that this practice, amongst others. violated 
the rules on competition. As a result of comments recei\ cd from the ('ommissinn. 
\\'indsurfing concluded a number of new licensing agreements. The Commission. 
nevertheless, instituted proceedings and concluded that the licensing agreement 
infringed Article 81 (ex 85) EC in a number of respects and imposed a fine of 50,000 
ECUs. 136 
In the view of the Commission the tie-in restricted the licensees in their freedom to 
decide whether they wanted to act on the market as manufacturers of sailboards or 
suppliers of rigs. As regards the economic interests of the licensees the Commission 
observed that many of them did not manufacture rigs themselves (the production of 
boards and rigs involved distinct technological processes) preferring to acquire them 
from specialist contractors. To prevent this separate supply, which may have been of 
economic benefit to the licensees, amounted to an appreciable restriction of 
competition. The Commission also stressed that the German patent protection which 
extended to the rigs only, offered no protection from Article 81 (ex 85). With regard 
to Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)) the Commission concluded, quite succinctly, that the tie-in 
constituted a restriction in the distribution of the goods. 
In September 1983 Windsurfing in the case of Windsurfing International \' 
Commission 137 appealed to the Court of Justice for annulment of the Commission's 
decision. The Court, however, rejected the American undertakings arguments that 
there was only one market for the purchase of complete sailboards and that its German 
patent extended to the complete system. It accepted the Commission's view that two 
distinct markets existed and that the arrangement involved two products. The Court 
held that evidence from sales catalogues, advertising and information from 
manufacturers substantiated this. The Court also agreed with the Commission that the 
patent granted to the applicant covered only the rig for a sailboard and not the board 
116C0ll1m. Dec. ~ ( ) ) ·100 II'lIIdsllrjil1glnlerJ1(]lionaIOJ 1983 L229 /1,[1984 11 C\lLR 1 
In Case 19,/X3 [198611CR 611, [1986]3 CMLR 489. 
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itself. 138 In upholding the Commission's decision the Court stated that it could not", , , 
be accepted that the obligation arbitrarily placed on the licensee only to sell the 
patented product in conjunction with a product outside the scope of the patent is 
indispensable to the exploitation of the patent": 39 The Court also rejected 
Windsurfing's claims in relation to health, safety and the need to sell sailboards and 
rigs together. 
Article 82 (ex 85) relates to the abuse of a dominant position. Dominance has been 
held to exist where an undertaking has a market share of 50 per cent. 140 The 
imposition of tying arrangements is listed in Article 82 (d) (ex 86(d)) as a practice 
considered to be abusive. These arrangements may be imposed directly or indirectly. 
A dominant undertaking may indirectly tie others to itself by various means including 
the use of rebates and bonus schemes 141 or through refusals to supply except on 
conditions which amount to tying. 142 
In December 1980 the Commission commenced investigations into the direct tying 
practices of International Business Machines (IBM), the world's largest computer 
manufacturer. 143 The Commission alleged that IBM occupied a dominant position in 
the supply of its central processing units and operating systems for its System 370, It 
had abused this position, firstly, by failing to provide interface disclosure to enable 
competitors to ensure their products were architecturally compatible with IBM's 
138 Ibid 647-650, 
139 Ibid 657. 
I ~ O O See Case C -62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR 1-3359, [1993] 5 Cr-.1LR 215: Case 27/76 
United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207, [1978] I CMLR 429 [Market shares below 50 per cent 
gave rise to dominance]. See also D.G. Goyder, EC Competition Law (3 rd edn., OxtllrJ. 1998) ( , ' h ~ ~ IS. 
141 See in this context, Case 85176 Hoffman La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR .t61. [ , 1 9 7 9 ] ~ ~ -'.., l \ ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~
211; Case 322/81 ,\llchelin \' Commission [1983] ECR 3.t61. [1985] I CMLR 282; ~ a s l ' ' (-_,10, h ~ ~
British Indllstries Pic and British Gypsum Ltd v Commissiol1 [1995] ECR 1-865, [199)] .t C\ 1 LR 71 X, 
Comlll. Dec. 88/518 Xapia BrowlI - British Sugar OJ 1988 1.28411 I, [1990] 4 Ct\ lLR 196. 
142 Case 311/X.t ('(,lItrl' Belge-Telemarketmg \' CLT[1985] FCR 3261, [1986]2 C : \ l L ~ ~ 558. 
I·n IFl' Commissiun. FOlirtcl'llIh Report on Competition Policy /1),\'./ (Brussels, I lJ8)) pp 77-79 
systems. Secondly, IBM did not offer its System 370 without a compatibility of main 
memory included in the price, a practice known as memory bundling. Thirdly. I B ~ 1 1
also engaged in software bundling and finally, refused to supply certain installation 
services to users of non-IBM equipment. IBM denied these allegations and in its reply 
to the Commission's Statement of Objections indicated that it had already began 
unbundling its software and that it intended to make installation services available to 
all users of its software. The issues of memory bundling and interface disclosure, 
however, remained outstanding. The Commission instituted formal proceedings as 
well as undertaking informal discussions with IBM. In August 1984, the Commission 
agreed to accept IBM's undertaking to offer its System 370 without main memory or 
with a limited capacity in order to facilitate system testing. Furthermore, IBM also 
agreed to expedite interface disclosure. 
In 1988 the Commission also addressed the issue of tying in the case of London 
European-Sabena I44 . Here London European, a UK based undertaking operating a 
twice daily air service from Luton to Brussels and Amsterdam, complained to the 
Commission that Sabena, a Belgian owned company, had made access to its 
computerised ticket reservation system conditional upon accepting Sabena's ground 
handling services. In its very brief legal analysis the Commission had no difficulty in 
concluding that Sabena occupied a dominant market position.1 45 It had abused this 
dominance by tying two unconnected services contrary to the provisions of Article 
82( d) (ex 86( d)). A fine of ECU 100,000 was imposed. 
l.j.j Comm. Dec. 88/589 OJ 1988 L3 17/47, [1989] 4 CMLR 662. _. 1 4 ~ ~ rill' market share of the Saphir computerised reservation system fell between 40 Jl1d )0 per cent with 
owr 118 tra\cl ag,cIlts and all but two airlines operating from Brussels using the service. 
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B. Tie-Ins And Secondary Aftermarkets 
It is not uncommon for a manufacturer of a particular product to produce spare parts or 
consumables for use in its own primary equipment. In such circumstances the 
manufacturer operates on both the primary and secondary markets. A number of 
antitrust concerns may arise, in particular, whether the primary and secondary markets 
are to be viewed as responsive. Does intense competitive activity on the interbrand 
market discipline the secondary aftermarkets preventing the exploitation of 
consumers? 
In Hugin 146 the Commission found that a manufacturer's refusal to supply spare parts 
to Liptons, following its decision to set up its own UK based subsidiary, amounted to 
an abuse of a dominant position. Hugin's spare parts were not interchangeable and 
manufactured to its own design. While Hugin had only a 12 per cent market share in 
the primary equipment market the Commission concluded that it had a dominant 
position in the market for its own spare parts. On appeal the Court of Justice 
confirmed this position. However, it felt it unnecessary to adjudicate upon the issue of 
abuse as trade between Member States was not affected. As a result, it annulled the 
Commission's decision. 
Ten years later the Court of Justice confirmed this position in the cases of Voh'() \' 
Veng 147 and its companion case of Maxicar v Renault. 148 Here both car manufacturers 
refused to license independent repairers to manufacture spare parts for their respective 
products. Advocate General Mischo delivered the Opinion in both cases and stressed 
III> Case 2 ~ / 7 8 8 Hugill \' CommiSSIOn [1978] ECR 1869, [1979] 3 CMLR 345. 
lot7 else n ~ ; ; 8 7 7 [ 1998] ECR ( ) ~ ~ 1 I, [1989] 4 CMLR 1 ~ ~ . .
I.tX else 53 S7 [I98S] FeR 6039, [1990] 4 cr-.1LR 265, 
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that manufacturers may hold dominant positions in the secondary aftermarkets. The 
Court agreed. This would be the case if it possessed intellectual property rights which 
prevented other manufacturers from producing substituable parts. He also 
emphasised, however, that even in the absence of these rights a manufacturer may still 
hold a dominant position. Firstly, its distribution network is usually the first port of 
call for consumers looking for replacement parts. Secondly, the use of non-original 
body parts may vitiate the manufacturer's guarantee. Thirdly, independent repairers 
only enter the market after a new model has been launched in order to conduct the 
"reverse engineering"necessary to produce copies of the original parts. Finally, parts 
produced by independents do not enjoy the prestige associated with the original 
label. 149 
In March 1994, the Court of Justice in the case of Hilti v Commission 150 examined the 
marketing strategy of Hilti AG, a large Liechtenstein based undertaking and world 
leader in the manufacture and distribution of fastening systems used in the 
construction industry. Hilti manufactures nail guns and consumables used therein -
nails, cartridges and cartridge strips. Profix Distribution Ltd (formerly Eurofix) and 
Bauco (UK) Ltd manufacture nails for the use in such equipment. Both undertakings 
complained to the Commission alleging that Hilti was pursuing a commercial strategy 
designed to exclude them from the market in nails compatible with Hilti guns. In 
particular Hilti refused to supply its dealers with patented cartridge strips unless they 
also purchased a corresponding quantity of nails. Following these complaints the 
Commission conducted further enquiries and eventually initiated infringement 
proceedings. 
II" Case 238/87, note 1 ~ 7 7 abO\c, 6225; Case 53/87, note 148 abo\L', 6063. 
I ~ O O Case ('-5] 'l)2P [ 1 l ) l ) ~ ] ] H'R 1-()()7, [1994] 4 CMLR 614 
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In December 1987 the Commission concluded that Hilti infringed Article 82 (ex 
86).151 In arriving at its decision the Commission adopted narrow product market 
definitions concluding, significantly, that nail guns, cartridge strips and nails formed 
three distinct product markets. The Commission rejected Hilti' s view that these 
products formed an integral system of powder actuated fastening (PAFs) which 
formed a constituent part of the wider market made up of fastening systems in general. 
The Commission arrived at this conclusion on the basis of supply and demand 
considerations. On the supply side, it noted that nails and cartridge strips were 
produced by different technological processes and often by different undertakings not 
engaged in the manufacture of nail guns. On the demand side, the acquisition of a nail 
gun is usually from capital expenditure and is a depreciating asset. In contrast, nails 
and cartridge strips are purchased from current expenditure according to requirements. 
The Commission also rejected the notion that Hilti's equipment formed part of a wider 
relevant market for fastening systems in general. The system lacked functional 
interchangeability. Indeed, if Hilti' s P AF System formed part of a wider product 
market increases or decreases in the price of nail guns, nails or cartridge strips would 
have resulted in shifts of demand to or from other fastening systems. The Commission 
found no evidence of this. It concluded, therefore, that Hilti competed directly on the 
bl d ·· d 152 markets for consuma es use In Its own pro ucts. 
With regard to Hilti's market position the Commission concluded that it held a 
dominant position in both the primary and secondary aftermarkets with an estimated 
market share of 55 per cent in the market for nail guns and a similar share in the 
markets for nails and cartridge strips. Other factors also contributed to this dominance 
including inter alia, novel and technically advanced features on its nail guns protected 
I ~ I I Comlll. Dl'C. 8K/D8 Euro/ix - Ballco v Hi/II OJ 1988 L651\9. [1989]4 Ci\lLR 677. 
1'i2 Ibid} I-n. 
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by patents and a strong research and development ethos supported by a well organised 
distribution system. IS3 
The Commission also concluded that Hilti had abused its market position on eight 
separate counts. The first abuse related to the issue of tying. Hilti had tied its non-
patented nails to its patented cartridge strips. This amounted to abuse for three main 
reasons. Firstly, it foreclosed access to the market for Hilti compatible nails. By 
limiting the availability of its cartridge strips independent producers of Hilti 
compatible nails were severely restricted in their ability to penetrate the market. 
Consumers were left open to possible exploitation because they had no choice over the 
source from which they purchased nails. In the view of the complainents they were 
forced to maintain artificially low production runs which increased their costs and 
damaged the market for nails, generally Secondly, Hilti's policy prevented the 
possibility of arbitrage. As independent nail producers could only acquire Hilti 
compatible cartridge strips with Hilti compatible nails the threat of using these strips 
with lower priced nails manufactured by others was reduced. ls4 Finally, the 
Commission embraced the notion of leverage. It stated that Hilti's ability to carry out 
" ... its illegal policies (stemmed) from its power on the markets for Hilti-compatible 
cartridge strips and nail guns (where its market position is strongest and the barriers to 
entry are highest) and aims at reinforcing its dominance on the Hilti compatible nail 
market (where it is potentially more vulnerable to new competition)".l55 The 
Commission also rejected Hilti's claim that the tie-in was necessary on the grounds of 
safety. Hilti had not taken any action to give expression to its concerns for product 
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safety or reliability. Article 82 (ex 86) was, therefore, infringed and a fine of 6 million 
ECU imposed. 
In March 1988 Hilti appealed to the Court of First Instance seeking annulment of the 
C .., d .. 156 Th ommlsslon s eClslOn. e Court, however, agreed with the Commission that nail 
guns, cartridge strips and nails constituted distinct markets. From 1960, for example. 
there had been a number of independent nail producers making nails for guns. Some 
of these producers made nails for use in Hilti' s tools. This was sufficient evidence to 
indicate that there was a separate market for Hilti compatible nails. To have held 
otherwise would have been tantamount to permitting producers of nail guns to exclude 
the use of consumables other than their own branded products in their tools". With 
regard to the issue of dominance the Court also upheld the position of the 
Commission. It stated that the figures provided by Hilti indicated that it occupied a 
position of dominance which was strengthened by its ownership of intellectual 
property rights. Hilti' s commercial practices amounted to abuse contrary to Article 82 
(ex 86) and the Court dismissed its appeal. 
In February 1992 Hilti appealed to the Court of Justice l57 confining its action to the 
issue of dominance. It proffered seven pleas in support of its appeal. It argued, firstly 
that the Court below had wrongly concluded that separate markets existed for cartridge 
strips and nails. It was insufficient to rely on the fact that independent nail producers 
existed since 1960 producing nails for nail guns. The Court below simply ignored the 
question of demand substitutability between the various fastening system. The Court 
of Justice rejected this contention. The Court below had examined demand and supply 
1'(, Case T-30/89 fli/li \. Commission [1991] FeR 11-1439, [1992] 4 CMLR 16. 
157 C;\"e C-:;;"l).2 P fli/I; \' Commission [ 1994] ECR 66'(, i 1994] 4 C \ 1l R 614 
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side substitutability.ls8 Secondly, the finding of the Court of First Instance that some 
users found it practically impossible to use fastening systems other than P AF sYstems 
- , 
precluded it from finding that these systems were substitutable with others. The Court 
rejected this as this amounted to an issue of fact which could not be challenged before 
the present Court. 1S9 Hilti's third and fourth pleas related to the issues of technical 
specifications and the co-existence of other fastening systems. The fact that technical 
differences existed between various fastening systems and the fact other systems 
existed did not mean, in Hilti' s view, that its system was not substitutable. The Court 
of Justice rejected this, stressing that the Court below had relied on other factors in 
arriving at its conclusion. 160 Hilti's remaining pleas relating to the issues of burden of 
proof, inappropriate appraisal of reports submitted in evidence and failure to consider 
all evidential matters were simply rejected. 161 The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. 
The Hi/Ii judgment is significant because it indicates that the market for consumables, 
like the market for spare parts, forms a distinct market for the purpose of Article 82 
(ex 86) upon which a manufacturer can occupy a dominant position and act abusively 
through the imposition of tying arrangements. In 1995 the case of PelikaniKyocera l62 
came before the Commission. Pelikan, a German undertaking, manufactures a range 
of products including the toner cartridges for use in photocopiers and computer 
printers made by the Japanese undertaking Kyocera. The German undertaking 
complained to the Commission alleging that Kyocera was attempting to drive it out of 
the market to supply users of Kyocera's equipment through various restricti\'e 
practices. 
15K Ibid 700-702 
1'9 Ibid 702-70]. 
160 Ibid 703-705. 
161 Ibid 705-709. 
16.2 Ie Commission. ]6rh Report 011 COIl1/'L'litiol1 Policy.' 1996 (Brussels. 1997) p87: [1996J ECLR R-
)7. 
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In December 1995, the Commission concluded that these allegations were unfounded. 
Kyocera had neither infringed Article 81 (ex 85) nor Article 82 (ex 86). Of particular 
interest is the Commission's position with regard to the application of Article 82. The 
Commission found that Kyocera did not occupy a dominant position in any relevant 
market nor was there evidence of abusive conduct. Kyocera was found to have a small 
market share in the primary market for laser and inkjet printers. In contrast. the 
Commission found that Kyocera had a large market in the secondary market for 
consumables used in its printers but this did not give rise to a position of dominance. 
The Commission reasoned that Kyocera was subject to intense competition in the 
primary market and this restrained its behaviour in the secondary market for its 
consumables. The Commission took the view that consumers were well informed 
about the price of consumables prior to the purchase and the cost of switching to 
another brand of printer was considered to be low. This decision, of course, stands in 
contrast to previous rulings. Here, the Commission accepted the argument that 
primary and secondary markets are responsive. If similar analysis had been applied in 
Hugin for example, presumably Lipton's complaint would have been rejected on the 
basis that Hugin, with a 12 per cent share of the primary market, faced intensive 
interbrand competition. 
In October 1997 the Commission announced in Digital163 that it had accepted an 
undertaking from the Digital Equipment Corporation in relation to the supply and 
pricing of its post sale services. Digital manufactures computer systems and provides 
a number of post sale services including hardware (HWS) and software (SWS) support 
services designed to provide users with operational and technical support, fault 
16J Commission Press Release IP'97/868 of 10 October 19t)i See also P. :\ndre\\s, "/\ftermarket 
Power In The Computer Services r-..tarket: The Digital Undertaking" (1998) 19 £CLR 1-:'(1. \1 Dolmans 
and \' Pickering., "The 1997 Digital Undertaking", (1998) 19 £CLR 109. 
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lagnosis and remedial repairs. In 1995 the Commission received complaints from 
vo third-party maintenance companies (TPMs). The complaints alleged that Digital 
ad prevented them from competing in the secondary aftermarkets for the pro\'ision of 
~ r v i c e s . . The Commission opened investigations and conducted "dawn raids" on 
ligital's premises in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Digital responded by 
~ v i s i n g g its post sale service agreements and in January 1997 it offered th(' 
~ o m m i s s i o n n a draft undertaking in this regard. In May 1997 the Commission issued a 
tatement of Objections criticising Digital's business practices and its revised service 
greements. In particular, the Commission alleged that Digital had abused its 
ominant position in the markets for hardware and software services for Digital's 
y'stems. Digital made it known that it would vigorously contest these allegations. 
1 the absence of a fully reasoned decision one cannot be totally sure of the 
~ o m m i s s i o n ' s s approach. With regard to Article 82 (ex 86) and the issue of market 
efinition, the Commission undoubtedly regarded the primary market for computer 
y'stems as distinct from the aftermarkets because services were offered separately 
'om the purchase of the system itself. The aftermarkets were defined as the markets 
)r software and hardware support services. The lack of substitutability meant that 
lese markets were separate from each other. In fact, Digital's software and hardware 
~ r V l c e s s were not interchangeable with similar services provided by other branded 
)nlpetitors. With regard to the issue of dominance the Commission may ha\'e 
)nsidered transparency in terms of costs and whether consumers were '"locked in" or 
rhether they could switch to other brands in the event Digital raised the cost of its 
;rvlce provIsIOn. 
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In contesting these allegations Digital, on the basis of PelikanJKyocera. may haye 
contended that the primary market was competitive and this would discipline the 
secondary aftermarkets. Attempts to exploit consumers in these markets would simply 
lead to a loss in interbrand sales. Additionally, Digital may have pointed to the fact 
that the secondary aftermarkets were competitive. Software updates were readily 
available at reasonable prices and consumers could, therefore, utilise other service 
providers. 
The Commission contended that Digital had abused its position of dominance by 
engaging in exclusionary and predatory pricing and illegal tie-ins. With regard to 
tying, it alleged that Digital had engaged in both contractual and financial tie-ins 
designed to prevent competition in the market for hardware support. The contractual 
tying involved the tying of hardware support to software support services. The 
financial tying involved the tying of hardware and software support services by 
charging a package price for combined services (DSS) below the total price of the 
component pieces. This was designed, in the Commission's view, to prevent Digital 
users from switching to other suppliers of hardware services. Digital's package 
pricing made it uneconomical for users to purchase hardware support services from 
TPMs because the latter could not provide software support services. It was cheaper 
to buy both services from Digital. The latter denied this, contending that it was able to 
offer such package pricing as a result of cost savings and other countervailing benefits 
resulting from the provision of the combined services. 
In any event the Comn1ission eventually accepted Digital's undertaking. Article 1 of 
the undertaking addresses the issue of "Service Offerings for Digital Systems". 
Article 1.1 deals with the issue of contractual tying by incorporating the principle 01 
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separate availability. Digital agreed to provide all its standard services as separately 
available and separately priced products. Article 1.3 deals with the issue of package 
pricing. Digital agreed that its DSS service provision would not include additional 
work not provided in its other services if bought on an individual basis. Digital also 
agreed that its package price would be set at no less than 90 per cent of the sum of the 
published list prices of the component parts of the package. The published list prices 
for each Member State were to be made available to the public at a reasonable fee. 
Finally, quotes for the DSS service provision will also contain separate quotations for 
the components of the package if bought on a separate basis. 
With regard to the issue of market power the Commission in Digital, seems to accept 
that undertakings subject to competitive pressures in the primary market may still 
occupy and abuse dominant positions in the secondary aftermarkets for the servicing 
of its own products. This is in marked contrast to the position adopted in 
PelikaniKyocera. The Commission's acceptance of the Digital undertaking, although 
understandable in that it avoided lengthy and costly proceedings, has resulted in a lack 
of clarity. Perhaps, the overall expense of purchasing a Digital system with service 
provision and the high costs of switching made the difference. 164 
C. Tetra Pak II, Close Associative Links And Tying 
In the 1990s the Community authorities examined the commercial practices and 
standard form sale and leasing arrangements of Tetra Pak, a Swiss registered 
undertaking and one of the worlds leading packagers of liquid and semi-liquid foods in 
cartons operating in both aseptic and non-aseptic sectors. I n the aseptic sector, Tetra 
1(>\ See P. Andre\\ s, notl' 16] abo\c, 178-179. 
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Pak utilises the so called "Tetra Brik" system, designed for packaging liquid foods 
particularly UHT milk in a sterilised fashion. Tetra Brik cartons are delivered to users 
in the form of rolls which are inserted into a filling machine, manufactured by Tetra 
Pak, and soaked in a sterilising bath of hydrogen peroxide. The liquid food flows to 
the carton in an aseptic environment. This process, designed to extend the life 0 f the 
packaged food and enable it to be kept in a non-refrigerated environment. was first 
launched on the German market in 1968. 
In the non-aseptic sector Tetra Pak manufacturers its "Tetra Rex" cartons designed for 
the packaging of fresh foods particularly pasteurised milk, intended to be stored in a 
refrigerated environment and consumed within a short period. This process does not 
require the same degree of sterility and calls for the use of less sophisticated 
equipment which Tetra Pak also manufactures. 
Tetra Pak's agreements for the sale and leasing of its aseptic and non-aseptic filling 
machines required the purchaser or lessee to use only Tetra Pak's cartons which it 
must purchase exclusively from Tetra Pak. In September 1983, Elopak Italia 
complained to the Commission that Tetra Pak Italiana and its group of companies had 
engaged in trading practices, including predatory pricing and the imposition of unfair 
contract terms, amounting to an abuse of its dominant position. The Commission 
instituted proceedings in December 1988 which were concluded in July 1991. It found 
that Tetra Pak had engaged in a variety of anticompetitive practices including the 
imposition of tying arrangements. The Commission imposed an unprecedented fine (11 
75 million ECU. 165 
1 ( ' ~ ~ COIllIll. Ike <):2'163 Tt'lra ?uk II OJ 1992 L7211, [1992] 4 C\lLR ""I. 
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In November 1991 Tetra Pak appealed to the Court of First Instance seeking 
I t f th C .., d .. 166 annu men 0 e ommlsslOn s eClSlon. It argued inter alia that it did not occupy 
a position of dominance and the conduct complained of did not amount to abuse. 
Tetra Pak proffered three reasons in support of its lack of dominance. Firstly, it 
rejected the Commission's product market definitions. The latter had identified four 
product markets: the markets for aseptic machinery and aseptic cartons and the 
markets for non-aseptic machinery and non-aseptic cartons. In the view of the 
applicant the product market should have been defined more widely to include all 
liquid food packaging systems. Alternatively, it should have been defined on the basis 
of an integrated system consisting of filling machinery and cartons. 167 In rejecting 
these submissions the Court considered demand and supply side substitutability 
concluding that neither the machinery nor the cartons were interchangeable. These 
distinct markets were also "insulated" from the general market in systems for 
packaging liquid food. The Court also held that commercial usage did not support the 
applicant's view that machinery for the filling of cartons was indivisible from the 
carton itself. There existed independent manufacturers specialising in the production 
of non-aseptic cartons. In fact, the Court also rejected Tetra Pak's arguments that 
public health issues required that the filling machinery and its consumable product be 
treated as an integrated system. The protection of public health could be dealt with by 
the provision of technical specification or by means of legislation. 168 
Secondly, Tetra Pak contended that the relevant geographic market comprised the 
separate markets of the various Member States. The Court rejected this and upheld the 
('ommission's geographic market definition. The entire Community c o m p r i s ~ d d the 
166 Case 1'-83 q I T('{ra Pak \' Commission [19941 ECR 11-7'5'5, [1997]4 Ci\lLR 726. 
11>7 Ibid 788-792. 
168 Ibid 792-801 
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relevant market. Demand was stable and not insignificant throughout the Community. 
customers could obtain supplies in Membe St t th h h . rs a es 0 er t an t elr own and 
transportation costs were low. 169 
Thirdly, Tetra Pak argued that even if it was in a dominant position in the aseptic 
markets, Article 82 (ex 86) did not apply to practices carried out in the non-aseptic 
market. The Commission found that in the aseptic markets Tetra Pak held a quasi-
monopolistic position. It had a market share of 90 to 96 per cent, PKL was its only 
real competitor and industrial property rights and technological barriers to market 
entry existed. It was, therefore, in a dominant position. In contrast, the Commission 
found the non-aseptic markets more open but still oligopolistic. Tetra Pak had a 
market share of 52 per cent in the market for non-aseptic machines and a 48 per cent 
share in the market for non-aseptic cartons. Elopak and PKL were its two main 
competitors. Oddly, the Commission did not find that Tetra Pak occupied a position 
of dominance. Tetra Pak contended that an undertaking, not in a dominant position in 
a given market, cannot commit an abuse on that market. Furthermore, the 
Commission had failed to demonstrate any causal link between the abuses allegedly 
committed on the non-aseptic sector and Tetra Pak's dominant position in the aseptic 
markets. l7O The Court rejected these arguments. It stated that a dominant undertaking 
has a "special responsibility" not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition. However, the scope of this responsibility depends upon the specific 
circumstances of each case. The Court observed that Article 82 (ex 86) applies where 
an undertaking dominant in a particular market reserves to itself, without objecti\'e 
necessity, an ancillary or dependant activity on a neighbouring but separate market 
whl'rL' it is not in a dominant position, with the p o s s i b i l i t ~ ~ of c 1 i m i n ~ l l i n g . .
WI Ibid 803-S08, 
170 Ibid SOX-SII, 
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competItIon. Associative links existed between the aseptic and non-aseptic sectors. 
The filling machines and cartons in both sectors were used for packaging liquid food 
products. About 35 per cent of Tetra Pak's customers had purchased both aseptic and 
non-aseptic systems. Both Tetra Pak and PKL operated in both sectors. For producers 
of fresh and long life products Tetra Pak was an almost inevitable supplier of aseptic 
systems and a favoured supplier of the non-aseptic systems. It \\'as unnecessary, 
therefore, to establish the existence of a dominant position on the non-aseptic markets 
because the existence of a dominant position in the aseptic sector, together \\"ith its 
prominent position as the non-aseptic sector combined with these close associati\e 
links imposed a "special responsibility" on Tetra Pak to maintain genuine 
.. 172 
competItIOn. 
It will be recalled that Tetra Pak also argued that its conduct did not amount to an 
abuse. With regard to the issue of tying Tetra Pak contended that no connected sales 
took place. Commercial usage indicated that its systems were complete and 
indivisible. The Court rejected this. Tying could not be accepted in a market were 
competition was already restricted. It constituted an abuse because it deprived the 
customer of its ability to choose its source of supply and denied other producers access 
173 to the market. As for Tetra Pak's justifications for the use of tying the Court 
emphasised that it had already rejected them in relation to its consideration or the 
product market. Technical justifications and those relating to product liability. 
protection of public health and business reputation must be assessed in the light or 
Hi/Ii. Here the Court concluded that it was not the task of a dominant undertaking to 
1'1 Ibid 813. 
m Ibid 816-817. 
1"1 Ibid 
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take steps to eliminate products which it regards as dangerous or at least inferior. in 
quality to its own. Tetra Pak's tie-in clauses were clearly abusive. 
In November 1994 Tetra Pak appealed to the Court of Justice. 174 It based its appeal on 
five grounds. It argued, firstly, that the product market definition made by the 
Commission and accepted by the Court of First Instance was erroneous. The Court of 
Justice simply rejected this.175 Secondly, Tetra Pak asserted that the notion of close 
associative links could not be used to render Article 82 (ex 86) applicable. In rejecting 
this the Court stressed that the relevance of these links could not be denied. Tetra 
Pak's position on the aseptic markets enabled it to act independently of other operators 
on the non-aseptic markets. 176 Thirdly, Tetra Pak stressed, once again, that natural 
links existed between the two products and the tied sale was in accordance with 
commercial usage. The Court rejected this. Other independent manufacturers 
specialised in the production of non-aseptic cartons. This factor alone ruled out the 
existence of the natural link claimed by Tetra Pak.l77 The applicant's fourth and fifth 
pleas related to issues of predatory pricing and mitigating factors in relation to the fine 
imposed. These were also rejected and the Court dismissed the appeal. 
Undoubtedly, the Court's judgment in Tetra Pak II amounts to an extension of the 
jurisdictional reach of Article 82 (ex 86). It suggests that tying practised by a 
dominant undertaking, on a market on which it is not dominant, may still be captured 
by Article 82 (ex 86). Advocate General Ruiz-Jarobo Colomer suggests that the 
acceptance of the notion of close associative links amounts to the "furthest extent'" to 
which it is possible to relax the rule that the dominant market and market affected by 
174 Case c--, -' -' 9..t P Tet,.u Pak \' Commission [1996] ECR 1-595 I, [1997] ..t C i\ 1 LR 662. 
175 Ibid 6002-6006. 
17(, Ibid 6009. 
177 Ibid 60 I 0-60 I I. 
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the abuse must be the same. l78 The future scope of Tetra Pak II may. ho\vevcr, be 
confined by its own peculiar facts. The close association between neighbouring 
markets may occur only rarely and were markets are unrelated will not apply.179 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Tying is condemned on both sides of the Atlantic. Condemnation, however. is only 
appropriate in certain circumstances. It is important to establish, firstly, that two 
products are involved. In the US the Supreme Court has concluded that this will be 
the case provided separate markets can be shown to exist for each item. The approach 
in the EU is not dissimilar. The Community Courts look to the number of 
manufacturers involved, the nature of the technological processes employed and the 
type of expenditure incurred - capital or revenue. These issues can be crucial as 
evidenced in the Microsoft litigation. 
In the US tie-ins are treated as illegal per se if the seller has sufficient economic power 
over the tying product market to restrain interstate commerce in the tied product 
market. The degree of restraint in the latter market is merely a de minimis 
requirement. The notion of sufficient economic power, however, has fluctuated over 
the years. The Warren Courts were quite prepared to infer the existence of market 
power. Thereby, sweeping within the ambit of the per se rules most tying 
arrangements. In contrast, the Burger Courts required an evidentiary showing of 
sufficient economic power linking the concept to market power and anticompetitive 
forcing. Thus, heightening the tie-in thresholds and reflecting an increased judicial 
liS Ibid 5977. 
I") Scc N. lcv\" "Tetra Pak II: S t r e t c h i n ~ ~ The Limits Of Article 86'7", (1995) 16 ECLR 104, V.K()rah, 
., tetra Pak II -' Lack Of Reasoning In C O ~ l r t ' s s JUdgment". (1997) 18 E( 'LR 98 - criticising the Court h)1 
Lliling to cl)llsider Tetra Pak's reasons for imposing the tie-in 
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acceptance of the possible efficiency enhancing aspects of tying. Market share was 
taken as a proxy for market power. In the 1990s, however, the Supreme Court, in 
examining tying arrangements in the secondary aftermarkets, concluded that market 
imperfections could give rise to market power. 
In the EU tying seems to have engendered less concern. Undoubtedly, case law is 
rather sparse. However, concern does arise where the tie-ins are imposed by dominant 
undertakings. Market shares of 50 per cent give rise to the presumption of dominance. 
In Tetra Pak /l180 the Court held that a dominant undertaking operating on a market in 
which it is not dominant may still fall foul of Article 82 (ex 86) provided close 
associative links exist between the dominated and non-dominated markets and the 
undertaking occupies a prominent position on the latter. With regard to the issue of 
aftermarket power PelikaniKyocera l81 stands in contrast with the position adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Kodak. 182 The Commission found that competition in the 
primary equipment market disciplines the secondary aftermarkets preventing the 
exploitation of consumers. This approach ignores market power gained through 
market imperfections. In Digital18) the Commission seems to have reversed its 
position falling in line with the position adopted in the US. That is, undertakings can 
enjoy dominance in the servicing of its own equipment and the imposition of tying 
arrangements can amount to an abuse. In accepting Digital's undertaking, however, 
the Commission lost the opportunity to provide a reasoned decision and clarify its 
position on the issue of aftermarket power. 
180 Case C-333/94P Tetra Pak v Commission [1996] ECR 1-5951, [1997] 4 CMLR 662. 
181 EC Commission, 26'h Report On Competition Policy: 1996 (Brussels, 1997) p.87, (1996) 17 ECLR 
R-57. 
182 Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
183 Commission Press Release IP/97/868 of 10 October, 1997. 
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THE REFORMATION OF THE 
EU DISTRIBUTION RULES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the principal concerns of EU competition policy over the latter half of the 
1990s has been the appropriate treatment of vertical restraints. The block exemptions 
enacted in the 1980s have recently expired, the increased use of information 
technology including lIT delivery, the reduced role of traditional wholesalers in the 
chain of distribution and shifts in power configurations away from manufacturers to 
large purchasers with huge buying potential precipitated changes in the nature of 
distribution. In fact, with the single market legislation largely in place the 
Commission has come under increasing pressure to focus on issues of economic 
efficiency. In 1997, therefore, it published its Green Paper on Vertical Restraints 
which outlined some of the main problems relating to distribution and set out reform 
proposals. I With the recent adoption of Regulation 2790/19992 the reform process is 
I 1:(' Cornm ission, Green Paper on I 'ertical Restraints in EC Compelition Policy, COr--.1 (96) 7:" I f i n ~ l I I . 
. ' OJ 1999 I :n() 121, [20001 4 ('t\ 1 LR 398. 
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drawing to a close. The following, very briefly, charts the period of reformation and 
considers some of the ramifications of the new regime. 3 
II. THE NEW SYSTEM 
In its Green Paper review the Commission defined vertical relations as "(a)greements 
between producers and distributors".4 On the basis of this narrow definition the 
Commission proposed a number of reforms in relation to the treatment of exclusive 
distribution, exclusive purchasing, franchising and selective distribution. The first 
proposal (Option I) simply involved maintaining the status quo by extending the 
validity of the current block exemptions and preserving the legal principles currently 
governing selective distribution. 5 After all, the current system has promoted market 
unification, protected competition, promoted consumer interests and allowed the 
development of new and innovative forms of distribution. Indeed, in the view of the 
Commission, the system also provided speedy and efficient enforcement together with 
legal certainty, consistency and the benefits of one-stop shopping. 
The second proposal (Option II) promoted the retention of the current block 
exemptions but with amendments to increase their flexibility and scope.6 Amendment 
3 A considerable amount has been written on the process of reformation. See, for example, H.H.P. 
Lugard, "Vertical Restraints Under EC Competition Law: A Horizontal Approach?", (1996) 17 ECLR 
166; F.M. Carlin, "Vertical Restraints: Time for Change", (1996) 17 ECLR 283; F. Murray and J. 
Maclennan, "The Future for Selective Distribution Systems: The CFI Judgments on Luxury Perfume 
and the Commission's Green Paper on Vertical Restraints", (1997) 18 ECLR 230; D. Schroeder, 'The 
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints: Beware of Market Share Thresholds", (1997) 18 ECLR ·no; P. 
Kellaway, "Vertical Restraints: Which Option?", (1997) 18 ECLR 387; Z. Biro and A. Fletcher, ".The 
EC Green Paper on Vertical Restraints: An Economic Comment", (1998) 19 ECLR 129. A.l R I I ~ y , ,
"Vertical Restraints: A Revolution", (1998) 19 ECLR 483; J. Nazerali and D.C. Cowan, "Reforll1l11t. EU 
Distribution Rules - Has the Commission Found Vertical Realitv'1", (1999) 20 ECLR 1 :'9; 1\1 (Jriffiths, 
"A Glorification of De Minimis - The Regulation on Vertical Agreements", (2000) 21 £CLR 241. _ 
~ ~ EC Commission, GrCL'1I Paper on ~ ~ 'L'rtical Restraints in EC ('ompelitiol1 PO/ICV, CO\ 1 (96) 721 t ma\, 
Fxec. Summary para 2. 
5 Ibid para 281. 
(, Ib'd )1.') I para _0_. 
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proposals included inter alia coverage of multi-party agreements and those relating to 
the provision of services and to permit distributors to add value by transforming or 
processing the contract goods. This option also contained proposals for either the 
introduction of a selective distribution block exemption or a Commission' s Notice. 
Under Option III the Commission proposed the introduction of more focused block 
exemptions so as to apply only where the party's market shares are less than ..+0 per 
cent. 
7 The final proposal (Option IV) related to the introduction of a negative 
clearance presumption for parties with no significant market power. That is, with 
market shares of less than 20 per cent. 8 For those agreements where the presumption 
is rebutted or where market shares exceed 20 per cent Option II or III could be 
applied. During the consultation process other options emerged including a 
presumption that all vertical restraints should be treated as compatible with Article 81 
(ex 85), suggestions that national authorities should be empowered to grant 
exemptions under Article 81 (3) (ex 85(3)) and the enactment of a single block 
exemption to cover all distribution arrangements.9 
In 1998 the Commission published its follow-up to its 1997 Green Paper. tO In this 
Communication the Commission set out the results of the consultative process and 
announced its policy proposals. The current block exemptions are to be replaced with 
a single, broad umbrella block exemption incorporating a market share threshold. 
Other "flanking measures", designed to reduce legal insecurity were to be introduced 
7 Ibid para 286. 
8 Ibid, para 293. . . . .. . . 
9 K.P. Rohardt, "The Green Paper On Vertical Restraints In EC CompetItIon PoliCY - Is I he DISCUSSIOIl 
Open?", (1997) 8 EFLR 179. • 
10 • .. C' .. F h (' .. [I, Ippll"ation 0' thl' (O/1"ll/llI/[\, LC CommIssIon, 0l11l11Zlt11catIOn rom I e Ol11mlSSIOn on It ,'1 c 'J 
Compelilioll Rules 10 /'l'l'!tCU/ Reslrainls (Follow-Up to Ihe Green ParJl'r on raticu/ RL's[r(lll1[s) CO\1 
(98) 544, OJ 1998 C -,(lS/3, [1999] -l Cl\ 1LR 281. 
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including amending Article 4(2) of Regulation 17/62 to penn it the granting of 
exemptions on a retroactive basis, the issuance of guidelines detailing the 
Commission's policy with regard to granting exemptions above the market share 
threshold and withdrawal below and an increased role for national authorities in the 
administration of the competition rules. In September 1999 the Commission published 
its draft block exemption II and draft guidelines. 12 Regulation 279011999 entered into 
force in June 2000, after guidelines were fonnally adopted. This Regulation 
encompasses all forms of distribution covered by previous rules including that of 
selective distribution. Its scope includes not only goods for resale but also the 
provision of services and intennediate goods. The goods or services may be resold by 
the buyer or consumed as input goods in the production of other goods or the 
provision of services. Multi-party agreements now fall within the ambit of the new 
R 1 · 13 egu atlOn. 
Article 2(1) of Regulation 279011999 exempts agreements to the extent they contain 
restrictions capable of falling within Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)). The exemption appl ies 
to vertical agreements concluded between undertakings operating at different levels of 
the production or distribution chain. In common with the current rules, however, the 
new Regulation does not cover agreements between competitors except where the 
agreement is non-reciprocal and the buyer has an annual turnover not exceeding ECU 
100 million (Article 4(a). Because of the dangers of market foreclosure the n ~ \ \ ' '
Regulation does not apply to any direct or indirect non-compete obligations which 
II EC Commission, RegulatIOn Oil the Application of Article 81 (3) 0/ the £(. Trc(/ty To Catcgol[cs oJ 
J 'ertical ,I Rrcements and Concerted Practices, OJ 1999 C27017, [1999) 5 (\ 1 LR 1 16." 
11, C Con;mission, Guidelincs on J'l.,.tical Restraints, OJ 1999 (270'12, [1999)5 Ct\1LR 1176. 
11 t'd 1 1 
. 1)1 para _,to 
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exceed five years or are concluded for an indefinite period (Article 5( 1)). An 
exception exists, however, where the contract goods or services are sold from premises 
or land owned or leased by the supplier and provided to the buyer. In this case the 
non-compete obligation may be exempted provided it lasts no longer than the period 
of the tenancy. Similarly, post term non-compete obligations are not subject to 
exemption under the new block exemption unless the obligation is necessary to protect 
know-how transferred by the supplier to the buyer and the post term obligation is 
limited to a period of one year (Article 5(b)). 
Regulation 279011999 also contains a list of hardcore or blacklisted clauses which if 
contained in an agreement renders the block exemption inapplicable and individual 
exemption unlikely. The first of these restrictions relates to the buyers ability to 
determine its own sale prices. Although maximum or recommended prices may be 
stipulated they will only be countenanced if they are not directly or indirectly enforced 
as minimum or fixed prices (Article 4(a). Secondly, any restriction of the territory 
into which or the customers to whom the buyer may sell is not eligible for exemption. 
By way of derogation it is possible to restrict active sales into a dealers exclusive 
territory, to prevent members of a selective distribution network from selling to 
unauthorised dealers, and in certain circumstances, to restrict active sales to customer 
groups reserved to the supplier or to another buyer (Article 4(b». Finally, agreements 
between OEMs and manufacturers of spare parts for use in the original equipment. 
designed to prevent the latter from selling the spare parts to independent repairers or 
service providers renders the block exemption inapplicable (Article 4( e». 
Provided a(Jreements do not contain the aforementioned hardcore restrictions the hlock Q 
~ x c m p t i o n n creates a presumption of legality for agreements c o n c l u d ~ d d bd\\ccn 
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undertakings with market shares less than 30 per cent. Where this requirement is not 
satisfied agreements are not presumed illegal but need to be vetted on an indiyidual 
basis. 14 In which case the Commission has the burden of proving the agreement 
violates Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1 )). In this analysis the Commission now intends to 
consider inter alia the market positions of supplier and competitor, entry barriers. 
buying power, maturity of the market, level of trade and the nature of goods or service. 
If the agreement falls within Article 81 (1) the Commission will then consider the 
possibility of exemption. 15 In order to calculate market share the relevant market must 
be ascertained. The Commission's Notice on market definition sets out criteria and 
evidence to be relied upon in this assessment. 16 The data to be used for calculating 
market share must be based on figures from the undertakings preceeding financial 
years and must be calculated on the basis of sales value or sales volume. In order to 
cater for fluctuation in market share Article 9 provides that vertical agreements remain 
covered by the block exemption for a period of two years provided the market share 
threshold is not exceeded by 5 per cent. In the event this cap is exceeded by 5 per cent 
a grace period of one year applies. 
Underpinning the Commission's decision to adopt a more economic based approach, 
is its acceptance that vertical agreements may prove to be procompetitive or 
anti competitive depending upon the market structure in which they operate. Where 
markets are concentrated and interbrand competition is weak the more likely it is that 
vertical restraints have negative effects. Economists usually define market power as 
the ability to raise prices above competitive levels and obtain supra-national profits. 
14 Ibid para 22 and 52. 
I) Ibid para 114 and 127. 
16 EC Commission, Notice Oil the Definition Of Relel'ollt\f(lrket For Thl' fllrr'IISL'S Of Commlltllty 
('omrditioll LuwOJ 1997 C3T2'), [1998] -+ C(\lLR 177. 
318 
In antitrust analysis, however, market share is usually taken as a proxy for market 
power. By introducing a market share cap of 30 per cent the Commission is simply 
linking the new block exemption to the concept of market power. 
Article 6 and 7 permit the Commission and the competent authorities in each Member 
State to withdraw the benefit of the block exemption. Article 6 permits withdrawal by 
the Commission in respect of agreements which restrict competition on a relevant 
market which is wider than the territory of a single Member State. Where, however, 
the relevant market falls within the territory of a single Member State both the 
Commission and competent national authority have withdrawal competence (Article 
7). The Commission is also empowered by virtue of Article 8 to disapply, by way of 
regulation, the block exemption where parallel networks of similar vertical restraints 
cover 50 per cent of the relevant market. The disapplication is not addressed to 
individual undertakings but concerns all undertakings whose agreements come within 
its scope of application. 
III. The New System - Advantages and Disadvantages 
A number of criticisms have already been voiced with regard to the new regIme. 
Concerns have been raised that the 5 year limit attached to non-compete obligations 
may hinder the conclusion of long term industrial contracts; the list of hardcore 
restrictions are too long and too prohibitive, in particular Article 4(e) may result in 
vertical integration or the acquisition of sub-contractors by manufacturers and the 
power of withdrawal granted to national competition authorities may lead to political 
controversies between Member States. 
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Perhaps more significantly industry has consistently opposed the introduction of 
market share tests. 17 Fears exist that the introduction of the 30 per cent market cap 
may increase the complexity of the system, as assistance from economists and legal 
advisers may be required to advise on whether agreements fall within the market share 
threshold or require individual notification. Indeed, highly innovative undertakings 
with high market shares may feel themselves disadvantaged. Furthermore. the 
calculation of market shares is not an exact science nor indeed is it necessarily a 
reflection of market power. Fashions change and market shares can fluctuate rapidly 
in response, resulting in threshold cross-over. Crucial to the use of such thresholds is 
the ability to define the product and geographic markets. Past experience in the 
application of Article 82 (ex 86) has indicated how complex this process can be. 
Indeed, once these definitional issues have been dealt with, problems of calculation 
may still exist if the total volume of the market cannot be ascertained. While 
associations of industry or market research may be of help, reliable figures may simply 
not be available. Agreements of this nature will still need to be notified. Indeed, 
precautionary notifications may still be made amongst parties who market shares are 
close to threshold levels. 
In defence of the Commission, however, it must be acknowledged that it has taken 
steps to cater for some of these problems. Article 9 of the new block exemption is 
designed to cater for fluctuations in market shares and the Commission's Notice on 
market definition together with the block exemption guidelines are designed to assist 
in this area. The modification of Article 4(2) of Regulation 17/6218, which permits 
17 UNlel', ,\ fodcrnising EU ComjlL'lition Policy (1995), ,'l' - " • 
18 Council Reoulation (EC) 121511999 adopted on 10 June 1999, Amendll1g RegulatIOn No I) 6) ILl 
On the Appl i C ~ l t i o n n of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty To Certain Categories Of :\grl'cments And Concerted 
Practices. OJ 1999 LI--lX/l. 
3 ~ O O
exemption on a retroactive basis, is designed to assist undertakings which incorrectly 
assess their market share and erroneously believe their arrangements to be covered by 
the block exemption. Finally, the complexity of market share issues coupled with the 
speed of commercial change may force undertakings to regularly audit their 
arrangements to ensure compliance with attendant costs of compliance. 
Whilst undoubtedly a departure from previous policy the Commission considers that 
the new regime will allay criticisms of current policy, namely that it is form based, too 
legalistic with strait-jacket effects and with the real possibility of exempting 
agreements which distort competition. The new "black clause" approach defines, 
therefore, what is not exempt as opposed to defining what is exempted. The object of 
the new system is to treat different forms of vertical restraints which have similar 
effects in a similar way. Thus enabling undertakings to choose distributive methods 
on the basis of commercial merit and not according to exemptability. Commercial 
freedom is enhanced as undertakings may more readily tailor-make their agreements 
to satisfy their specific needs. As Regulation 279011999 has been extended in scope to 
cover services, intermediate products and multi-party agreements, a greater number of 
agreements will fall within its ambit. The Commission believes this will eliminate 
between 80 - 90 per cent of all notifications which in practice will be one of the most 
visible changes from the current system. Finally, the new changes seem to envisage 
greater participation by national competition authorities which will enable the 
Commission to focus on more pressing problems. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, the decision to introduce a single broad umbrella block exemption with 
a market share cap has proved controversial. In so doing, however, the Commission is 
adopting a more economic based approach designed to protect competition which 
protects consumer welfare and enhances efficiency. Vertical restraints, therefore, are 
to be examined in their market context. Despite this economic based approach market 
integration still remains a dynamic and enduring policy consideration. The importance 
of which becomes readily apparent when one considers the possibility of further 
Community enlargement. Not unsurprisingly, therefore, the Commission's 
willingness to move to this new approach remains subject to the insistence of the role 
of market integration as evidenced by the inclusion of hardcore restrictions in Article -+ 
of Regulation 279011999. 
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CONCLUSION 
In recent years the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints has generated interest, debate and 
controversy. Although economic issues surrounding these restraints are generally the same, 
policy direction in the US and EU has differed. This has had ramifications for the 
development of the law in both systems. 
Antitrust enforcement, in the decentralized complaints based system of the US, is judicially 
focused. Antitrust actions are undertaken by the private litigant or public enforcement 
agenCIes. The lure of treble damages and the payment of legal fees on a contingency basis 
makes the private litigant proactive. Judgments of the District Court may be appealed to 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court. 
The European Commission lies at the heart of the antitrust regime in Europe. While private 
antitrust action may be taken in the Courts of the Member States, complaint to the 
Commission is less costly and has traditionally been the preferred route. The goal of market 
unification, which requires consistency and uniformity of Treaty interpretation, has resulted 
in the centralization of power in the hands of the Commission. This position has been 
reinforced by the notification process and the Commission's sole right to grant exemptions 
under Article 81(3) (ex 85(3)). In fact, not only does the Commission adjudicatt: upon 
restrictions of competition or market abuse, it also perfonns an investigative and l e g i s l a t i \ \ ~ ~
.. ., .. 
-'--' 
lction. In all of this, however, it is important to stress that the Community Courts h a n ~ ~
yed vitally important roles. 
th regard to the US there may be, at anyone time, a variety of competing ideological 
)roaches or schools of antitrust. Indeed, the birth and demise of these schools seems to 
~ u r r with cyclical regularity. Two of the most influential schools have been the previously 
,instream Traditionalists and the currently mainstream Chicago School. Currently, US 
:itrust policy embraces the notion of consumer welfare, defined in terms of economic 
iciency, as the sole goal of antitrust policy. Concerns not related to the generic benefits 
competition do not impact upon antitrust analysis. Markets are considered to have 
lerent self-correcting properties in which the hidden hand of competition punishes the 
:fficient. This minimalist or abstentionist approach is founded on the notion that market 
ervention is misguided or less effective than market dynamics. Adherents to this view 
lsider that all vertical restraints should be legal per se. In contrast Traditionalists have 
vays advocated a more interventionist approach in order to secure inter alia market 
~ o n c e n t r a t i o n , , diffusion of economic power and the preservation of small business. 
cording to this view, intervention is justified in the area of vertical restraints because they 
1 be utilised for anti competitive purposes. 
J competition policy, rather than simply focusing on efficiency maxImlzmg antitnIst, 
lbraces a variety of concerns. Similarities exist, in this regard, with the multi-dimensional 
)roach of the Traditionalists. This, of course, is not to deny the importance of efficiency. 
tcr all, European business needs to be able to compete on a global stage. Some or the 
Kerns embraced by EU policy has been the need to ensure equity and fairness in the 
market place, particularly with regard to State subsidies and the need to protect the interests 
of workers, users and consumers. Competition policy has also been used as a mechanism to 
assist in economic recovery and to combat structural unemployment by redirecting 
resources towards growing sectors and away from those with less promising futures. It has 
also been used to display a positive bias towards small business. The latter provide a 
valuable source of employment, are important to the economic performance of the various 
Member States and cross border cooperation between these undertakings is seen as assisting 
the process of integration. Above all, competition policy in Europe has assisted, in 
conjunction with other measures, in the process of market unification. This unique role has 
impacted upon institutional and substantive norms and provides the major distinction 
between US and EU policy. 
The birth of the current legal approach to vertical restraints in the US is to be found in the 
seminal case of Continental TV Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc. t This case shifted the perception of 
the Sherman Act away from a multi-dimensional political statute to one based in 
economIcs. Three main points emerged. Firstly, interbrand competition became the 
primary concern of US antitrust. It acts to check the exploitation of intrabrand competition. 
Secondly, antitrust scrutiny is only necessary if market power is substantial. Finally, 
economic analysis is vital to the assessment of antitrust infringement. 
Sylvania's legacy, however, has been two-fold. Firstly, it resulted in the bifurcation of the 
world of vertical restraints into price and non-price categories. The fonner are condemned 
I .:l'3 U.S. 36 (1977). 
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as per se violations of the Sherman Act. Although, of course, maximwn price-fixing is now 
analysed under the rule of reason. Similarly, non-price vertical restraints are also analysed 
under the rule of reason. These include territorial allocation, exclusive dealing, customer 
restrictions, location clauses, areas of primary responsibility and profit passover clauses. 
The axis between price and non-price restraints has impacted upon analysis. Definitional 
issues have assumed importance in attempts to evade the standard of per se illegality. The 
American judiciary has been prepared to characterise restraints as non-price even though 
they impact upon price. Indeed, in Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corporation2 the 
Supreme Court concluded that price fixing could not be inferred from price complaints from 
other distributors and the subsequent termination of the dealer. A conscious commitment to 
a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective had to exist. In fact, in 
Business Electronics Corp v Sharp Electronics Corporation3 the Supreme Court held that 
an agreement to terminate a dealer had to be scrutinised under the rule of reason, absent the 
imposition of price restraints. 
The second legacy of Sylvania surrounds its failure to provide operational guidelines for the 
application of the rule of reason standard. Sylvania provided a standard without bounds. 
Subsequently, the judiciary has attempted to put flesh on the bones of this standard to 
provide business with legal certainty. The use of market power filters have been used 
widely. Underpinning this approach is the notion that suppliers lacking market power 
cannot raise prices above competitive levels without losing business to competitors. Market 
power analysis is also used in connection with tie-ins. In the US market power is generally 
2465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
; 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
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defined in terms of market share. In addition to market share, however, the Courts have 
also taken into account barriers to market entry, the ability to increase rivals costs and 
charge supra-competitive prices, product differentiation and buyer power. A key related 
enquiry is the degree of market foreclosure caused by the restraint. Only where market 
power concerns cannot be eliminated is it necessary to weigh the procompetitive and 
anti competitive aspects of the restraint. The increased use of economic analysis in the US 
has had three main effects. Firstly, the category of restraints subject to per se condemnation 
has been reduced. Secondly, there has been a reduction in the number of restraints being 
condemned under the rule of reason. Finally, the axis between price and non-price verticals 
has been subject to continual attack as lacking inherent economic justification. 
In Europe while the European Commission may consider issues of market powel under 
Article 82 (ex 86), it rarely does so under Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)). This is the case, firstly, 
because the Commission has traditionally defined a restriction of competition as a 
restriction on the economic freedom of market participants. Exclusive agreements, 
therefore, invariably fall within the parameters of Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)). Any economic 
analysis is reserved for examination under Article 81 (3) (ex 85(3)). Exemption is granted 
only if the arrangements satisfies all the requisite conditions. Secondly, the goal of market 
unification occasionally entails the rejection of a particular outcome mandated by economic 
analysis. The goal of market integration has traditionally taken precedence over economic 
analysis. 
I he Community Courts, however, have taken a more nuanced approach to Article 81 ( I ) (C\ 
85( 1)) requiring a 1110re economic based approach. The judgment of Dclil7lilis " HCl1l1in,l!.<.T 
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illustrates this point most graphically. Here the Court of Justice concluded that 
exclusive purchasing does not necessarily fall within Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) unless market 
foreclosure results and the agreement, in question, makes a substantial contri bution to that 
foreclosure. 
Unlike the US more importance is attached to intrabrand competition. Internal competition 
within the same product, particularly cross border trade, is seen as a vehicle for pron10ting 
market integration. This was first confirmed in the seminal case of Cons ten and Grundig v 
Commission. 5 Attempts to undermine the goal of unification, either directly or indirectly, 
have been treated with short shrift. RPM, for example, may result in price discrimination 
across Member States and reinforce market compartmentalization. Territorial allocation 
must be relative and not absolute. Parallel traders must remain unfettered to engage in 
parallel trade. Dealers must remain free to respond to passive sales opportunities. These 
concerns are reflected in the current block exemptions governing exclusive distribution and 
franchising. Exclusive purchasing and tying arrangements, if concluded on a national basis, 
can result in compartmentalization through market foreclosure. The exclusive purchasing 
block exemption attempts to curtail the impact of these concerns. In selective distribution 
networks quantitative restrictions are rarely permitted. Schemes which indirectly 
undermine market unification have also been condemned. These include inter alia dual 
pricing schemes, the use of guarantees schemes to prohibit parallel trade, the granting of 
rebates and bonuses to dealers to ensure they sell within home markets. 
4 eliSe C-234/89 [1991] ECR I - 935, [1992] 5 CMLR 210. 
'Cases 56 and 58/6-l [1996] ITR 299, [1966] CMLR -l18. 
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The Commission's lack of economic analysis has given rise to much criticism. Calls have 
been made, therefore, for it to adopt a more economic based approach similar to that of the 
US. Over the latter half of the 1990s the Commission has been engaged in a process of 
review. This process is now reaching its conclusion and the Commission has stated that the 
"primary objective" of policy is now the protection of competition. This will enhance 
consumer welfare and create efficient resource allocation.6 The Commission has also 
adopted the notion that vertical restraints only pose a problem for competition where 
interbrand competition is weak and market power exists at the level of supplier or buyer or 
both. The use of a 30 per cent threshold in the new block exemption (Regulation 
279011999) is designed to link it to the issue of market power. Undertakings whose market 
share exceed 30 per cent must notify their agreements in the quest for legal certainty. There 
is, however, no presumption of illegality. The Commission simply intends to conduct a 
"full competition analysis" in order to detennine whether Article 81 (1 ) (ex 85(1)) applies. 
In this regard it intends to consider those factors which enhance or reduce market power. 
Factors include the market position of the supplier, entry barriers, buying power, maturity of 
the market and level of trade. 7 
This more economic based approach has not resulted in the abandonment of the market 
integrative focus. The list of hard core restrictions, which if included in an agreement render 
the block exemption inapplicable, relate to the issue of market integration. The latter sti II 
remains of importance. Firstly, European business in the search for private profit may still 
attempt to fragment the market through the recreation of private barriers to cross horder 
6 Fe Commission, Draft Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ 1999 C-27011 2, [1999] 5 Ct"v1LR 1176. 
7 1bid para 114 
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trade. Secondly, the market integrative focus is reinvigorated by the prospect of an enlarged 
Community. Integrating the formerly centrally planned economies of the East may still 
present problems similar to those which faced the EEC in its formative years. Ultimately, it 
is this policy focus which renders symmetry of approach with the US unfeasible. 
ANNEX I 
Commission Regulation 1983/83 On Exclusive Distribution Agreements OJ 1983 
L173/1 
Applicability 
Article 1 of the Regulation provides that Article 81(1) (ex 85(1)) does not applY to 
agreements to which two undertakings are party and whereby one party a g r e e ~ ~ to 
supply goods to the other for resale within the whole or a defined area of the Common 
Market. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
This Regulation does not exclude the operation of Article 82 (ex 86) and applies to 
concerted practices. 
The agreement must be bilateral although the Community law definition of 
undertaking applies. 
The Regulation relates only to the resale of goods as the provision of services are 
excluded. 
Territorial allocation can amount to the whole of the Common Market or a defined 
area. 
Agreements between competitors are excluded unless it is non-reciprocal and the 
parties turnover does not exceed ECU 100 million. 
Territorial Exclusivity 
The benefit of the block exemption is lost if the agreement confers absolute territorial 
protection (Articles 3(c) and (d)). Parallel importation must remain possible or 
consumers must be able to obtain the contract goods outside the contract territory. To 
ensure that relative or qualified territorial allocation is conferred, only those 
restrictions in Article 1 and Article 2( 1) can be imposed on the supplier. The 
exclusive distributor must remain free to respond to passive sales in accordance with 
Article 2(2)( c). 
Exclusive Purchasing Obligations 
An exclusive distributor can agree to acquire the contract goods only from its 
exclusive supplier. This obligation must not extend beyond the contract duration 
(Article 2(2)(b )). 
Non-Compete Obligations 
The Regulation permits the exclusive distributor to agree not to manufacture or 
distribute competing goods, including spare parts and accessories. The obligation 
must not extend beyond the duration of the contract. (2(2)(a)). 
Sales Obligations 
The distributor must remain free to determine its 0\\11 prices, although supplicr price 
rL'cnn1mendation is possible (Recital 8). Article 2(3 )(a) - (c) enables the imposition nf 
obligations designed to increase sales including promotional ad\'ertising. thc provision 
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of customer services, sales in accordance with supplier specifications, network 
maintenance and the employment of suitably qualified staff. 
Customer Restrictions 
Agreements which limit the exclusive distributor's choice of customer can not be 
exempted. 
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ANNEX II 
Commission Regulation 1984/83 On Exclusive Purchasing Agreements OJ 1983 
L173/5 
Applicability 
Regulation 1983/84 applies to bilateral agreements and goods for resale defined in 
exactly the same manner as Regulation 1983/83. This particular Regulation is divided 
into 4 titles dealing with exclusive purchasing generally (Title I) and the specific 
peculiarities of the brewing and petroleum industries (Title II and III). The fourth title 
deals with miscellaneous provisions (Title IV). In its preamble to the Regulation the 
Commission recognises that exclusive purchasing can assist in forward planning, 
encourage optimal investment to strengthen dealer networks, stimulate interbrand 
competition, encourage market penetration and benefit consumers generally. 
The Regulation also recognises, however, that market foreclosure is the main antitrust 
concern. The Regulation attempts to prevent this in three ways. Firstly, Article 3 (c) 
prohibits tie-ins unless the goods are connected by virtue of their nature or commercial 
usage. Secondly, the Regulation limits contract duration. Contracts concluded for an 
indefinite period or for more than 5 years are not covered by the block exemption. 
There are, however, special rules for beer and petrol agreements. Thirdly, the 
Commission can withdraw the benefit of the exemption. 
Territorial Exclusivity 
Exclusive purchasing agreements only benefit from the block exemption provided the 
agreement does not place any territorial restraints upon dealers. The supplier can, 
however, agree not to distribute the contract goods in the reseller's principal sales area 
(Article 2(1)). 
Exclusive Purchasing Obligations 
The dealer may be obliged to purchase all of its contract goods from the exclusive 
supplier. Although, the agreement may permit the dealer to obtain the goods 
elsewhere if the supplier cannot comply with its supply obligations. (Guideline 35). It 
is also permissible for the agreement to include an "English Clause" enabling the 
dealer to purchase the goods elsewhere if more favourable terms e x i ~ t . . The c o ~ t r . a c t t
goods must also be specified by brand or denomination to prevent u ~ t l a t ~ r a l l v a n a t ~ o n n
of contract terms and ensure precision with regard to bans on dealIng m competmg 
goods. 
Non-Compete Obligations 
The dealer may be obliged not to manufacture or distribute goods w ~ i c h h compete with 
the contract goods. This obligation cannot extend beyond the duratIOn of the contract 
(Article 2(2)). 
Sales Obligations 
While a supplier may recommend prices, dealers must remain free to determine their 
own prices. Dealers, however, may be obliged to advertise the contract goods. 
maintain certain levels of stock, provide customer guarantees and employ suitable 
qualified staff (Article 2(3)). 
ANNEX III 
Commission Regulation 4087/88 On Franchise Agreements OJ 1988 L369/46 
Applicability 
This ~ e g u l a t i o n n applies only to bilateral retail and service franchise agreements. 
Industnal and wholesale franchise agreements are excluded. The Commission 
r e c o g n ~ s e s , , that franchising performs valuable economic functions (Recital 7). 
FranchIsor s, for example, are enabled to set up uniform distribution networks with 
limited financial investment and risk. This stimulates interbrand competition which is 
of benefit to the consumer. Certain restrictions of competition listed in Article 2 are. 
therefore, exempted by the Regulation. The Regulation also contains "white listed" 
clauses which if contained in the agreement do not violate Article 81 (1) (ex 85(1)). 
Provided their imposition is necessary to protect the franchisor's industrial or 
intellectual property rights or to maintain the common identity or reputation of the 
network (Article 3(1)). Unconditional "white listed" clauses do not prevent the 
application of the block exemption (Article 3(2)). Agreements which contain "black 
listed" clauses render the block exemption inapplicable (Article 5). An opposition 
procedure exists to cater for those agreements which may contain clauses which do not 
automatically fall within the block exemption. 
Territorial Exclusivity 
The franchise block exemption permits territorial allocation. The franchisor may be 
obliged, therefore, not to grant to third parties the right to exploit all or part of the 
franchise in the allotted territory. The franchisor may also be obliged not to exploit 
the franchise or sell the franchised product or service within the franchisee's territory 
(Article 2(a)). The Regulation also exempts the use of location clauses and acti\'c 
sales restraints (Article 2(c) and (d)). The franchisee must remain free to respond to 
passive sales requests and to source the contract goods from other franchisees or other 
authorised distributors (Article 4(a)). Guarantees cannot be used as instruments of 
market compartmentalisation (Article 4(b)). The Regulation also "black lists" any 
clause which prevents the franchisee from supplying end-users because of their place 
of residence (Article 5(c)). Finally, Article 8(c) empowers the Commission to 
withdraw the benefit of the block exemption if either party uses differences in product 
specification between Member States in order to fragment the market. 
Exclusive Purchasing Obligations 
An exclusive purchasing obligation cannot be imposed upon a franchisee. The block 
exemption only applies if the franchisee remains free to purchase the contract goods 
from other franchisees or authorised dealers (Article 4(a)). 
Non-Compete Obligations 
The Regulation permits the imposition of two types of non-compete obligations. 
Firstly. the franchisor may oblige the franchisee not to manufacturc. or s ~ l 1 1 gond" 
\'vhich cOlnpete with the contract goods (Article 2(e)). Secondly. the franchIsee may 
l1L' obliged to refrain from engaging in any competing business pro\ided it is n e c e S S ~ l r ) )
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to protect the franchisor's know-how or maintain the common identity of the network 
(Article 3(1)(c)). 
Sales Obligations 
The franchisee must remain free to set its own prices, although price recommendation 
is possible (Article 5 (e)). Obligations may be imposed, however, on the franchisee to 
use its best endeavours to sell the contract goods, to achieve minimum turnover and to 
provide customer and warranty services (Article 3(1 )(f)). 
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